Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Kamya (Accused) v. State .

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Apr 22, 1959
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion by Jaganmohan Reddy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Sessions Judge, Adilabad, convicted the accused of murder under Section 302 IPC and awarded life imprisonment; he was also convicted under Section 379 IPC and given 3 years' rigorous imprisonment. The accused and the father of the deceased were related (the appellant being the brother of the father of the deceased). On 8-8-1958 the accused went to the father of the deceased, asked after him and, being told he was in the fields, is said to have asked the deceased child to take him to the field. The deceased was a seven-year-old boy named Digamber.

Several witnesses reported seeing the accused with the child and that the child did not return home. The accused was found in a cinema house and, after being questioned by relatives and a clerk (Khande Rao), is reported to have broken down and confessed that he had killed the boy in a nearby toddy grove to steal the child's ear-rings. He was taken to the police station where he is said to have confessed; two ear-rings were allegedly handed over to the Sub-Inspector (P.W.16). The accused then led police to the dead body and a rumal (handkerchief) attributed to him was recovered.

The prosecution also produced evidence that the accused had a previous conviction for theft of ear-rings from a child (two months' imprisonment; judgment Ex. P-8). Two shopkeepers (P.W.6 and P.W.7) gave evidence that the accused had tried to sell ear-rings to them and they had told him the ear-rings were brass and they would not buy them.

On appeal, the High Court (bench presided over by Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) reviewed the trial record, the confessional and other statements, the evidence concerning the rumal and ear-rings, and the handling of previous conviction evidence at trial, and allowed the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the confession recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was voluntary and admissible.
  2. Whether evidence of the accused's previous conviction for theft could be admitted and relied upon by the prosecution at trial.
  3. Whether the prosecution's evidence (including testimony of child and other witnesses, recovery of ear-rings and the rumal) was sufficient to prove the accused's guilt for murder beyond reasonable doubt.
  4. Whether the Sessions Judge's examination of the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. was adequate.
  5. Whether the Sessions Judge's view that circumstantial evidence should lead to a lesser sentence (life imprisonment as a lesser sentence for circumstantial cases) was legally correct.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in a series of focused assessments of the key evidentiary and procedural features of the trial:

  1. Confession under Section 164 Cr.P.C.:
    • The confession recorded on 16-8-1958 was rejected by the Sessions Judge for cogent reasons, which the High Court endorsed: despite remand to judicial custody, police access to the accused appeared likely; the accused told the magistrate he had been maltreated and beaten and was asked to make a confession. The court held a confession obtained in such circumstances loses its voluntary character and cannot be given the weight of a confession made free of police interference.
    • The court emphasized that the judicial lock-up was guarded by police constables and the investigating officer could have had easy access, further undermining voluntariness.
  2. Admissibility and prejudicial effect of evidence of previous conviction:
    • The prosecution led evidence of a prior conviction for theft of ear-rings (two months' imprisonment; Ex. P-8) and witnesses were made to refer to prior similar acts. The court explained that previous convictions are generally not relevant unless the accused's character is put in issue under Section 54 of the Evidence Act or when Section 75 IPC (enhancement for repeat offenders) is specifically invoked.
    • The court observed that Sections 75 IPC and 310 Cr.P.C. regulate bringing previous convictions before the court and that those provisions were inapplicable here: (a) the prior sentence (two months) fell short of the minimum threshold required for enhanced punishment under Section 75 IPC (three years), and (b) the prosecution did not ask for enhanced sentence under Section 75 IPC. Therefore the evidence of the previous conviction was inadmissible and likely prejudicial to the accused.
    • The court concluded that leading such evidence was calculated to prejudice the accused and vitiate the trial.
  3. Reliability and sufficiency of other prosecution evidence:
    • Child witness (P.W.14): Although courts can rely on child witness testimony, the court cautioned about tutoring and noted P.W.14 (an eight-year-old girl) only saw the accused take the deceased and had no knowledge of what the accused did thereafter; her testimony was limited.
    • Witnesses P.W.10 (Nagaiah) and P.W.2: Their account was found unreliable because they stated the accused initially denied involvement when questioned and then later, after further questioning by Khande Rao, the accused purportedly "broke down" and confessed. The court viewed this sequence as unconvincing and insufficiently corroborated.
    • Implausibility of the motive/evidence chain: Several witnesses testified in effect that the ear-rings were brass and of negligible value (known in the locality). The court found it inconceivable that the accused would kill a child for ear-rings worth two annas while leaving valuable silver armlets and anklets on the child and then retain the brass ear-rings in his pocket or produce them at the police station. These inconsistencies weakened the prosecution's theory that the killing was for theft of ear-rings.
    • Shopkeeper evidence (P.W.6 and P.W.7): They testified they told the accused the ear-rings were brass and would not buy them; this cast doubt on the accused's motive and the alleged conduct of retaining the ear-rings.
  4. Recovery of the rumal and related circumstantial evidence:
    • The rumal recovered at the scene was identified as belonging to the accused by a witness (P.W.5), but the accused in his Section 342 statement asserted that although the rumal belonged to him it was not found at the scene and that it had been taken from him in jail in the presence of another prisoner. The court treated the accused's statement under Section 342 as an important piece of evidence to be considered with the rest of the record and found the accused's version plausible.
    • The court considered the recovery of the rumal to be possibly artificial and thus unreliable as proof of guilt.
  5. Adequacy of the Sessions Judge's examination under Section 342 Cr.P.C.:
    • The court found the trial judge's examination under Section 342 to be inadequate and unsatisfactory

      Structured Summary of the Opinion by Jaganmohan Reddy, J.

      Factual and Procedural Background

      The Sessions Judge, Adilabad, convicted the accused of murder under Section 302 IPC and awarded life imprisonment; he was also convicted under Section 379 IPC and given 3 years' rigorous imprisonment. The accused and the father of the deceased were related (the appellant being the brother of the father of the deceased). On 8-8-1958 the accused went to the father of the deceased, asked after him and, being told he was in the fields, is said to have asked the deceased child to take him to the field. The deceased was a seven-year-old boy named Digamber.

      Several witnesses reported seeing the accused with the child and that the child did not return home. The accused was found in a cinema house and, after being questioned by relatives and a clerk (Khande Rao), is reported to have broken down and confessed that he had killed the boy in a nearby toddy grove to steal the child's ear-rings. He was taken to the police station where he is said to have confessed; two ear-rings were allegedly handed over to the Sub-Inspector (P.W.16). The accused then led police to the dead body and a rumal (handkerchief) attributed to him was recovered.

      The prosecution also produced evidence that the accused had a previous conviction for theft of ear-rings from a child (two months' imprisonment; judgment Ex. P-8). Two shopkeepers (P.W.6 and P.W.7) gave evidence that the accused had tried to sell ear-rings to them and they had told him the ear-rings were brass and they would not buy them.

      On appeal, the High Court (bench presided over by Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) reviewed the trial record, the confessional and other statements, the evidence concerning the rumal and ear-rings, and the handling of previous conviction evidence at trial, and allowed the appeal.

      Legal Issues Presented

      1. Whether the confession recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was voluntary and admissible.
      2. Whether evidence of the accused's previous conviction for theft could be admitted and relied upon by the prosecution at trial.
      3. Whether the prosecution's evidence (including testimony of child and other witnesses, recovery of ear-rings and the rumal) was sufficient to prove the accused's guilt for murder beyond reasonable doubt.
      4. Whether the Sessions Judge's examination of the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. was adequate.
      5. Whether the Sessions Judge's view that circumstantial evidence should lead to a lesser sentence (life imprisonment as a lesser sentence for circumstantial cases) was legally correct.

      Arguments of the Parties

      The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

      Table of Precedents Cited

      No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

      Court's Reasoning and Analysis

      The court's analysis proceeds in a series of focused assessments of the key evidentiary and procedural features of the trial:

      1. Confession under Section 164 Cr.P.C.:
        • The confession recorded on 16-8-1958 was rejected by the Sessions Judge for cogent reasons, which the High Court endorsed: despite remand to judicial custody, police access to the accused appeared likely; the accused told the magistrate he had been maltreated and beaten and was asked to make a confession. The court held a confession obtained in such circumstances loses its voluntary character and cannot be given the weight of a confession made free of police interference.
        • The court emphasized that the judicial lock-up was guarded by police constables and the investigating officer could have had easy access, further undermining voluntariness.
      2. Admissibility and prejudicial effect of evidence of previous conviction:
        • The prosecution led evidence of a prior conviction for theft of ear-rings (two months' imprisonment; Ex. P-8) and witnesses were made to refer to prior similar acts. The court explained that previous convictions are generally not relevant unless the accused's character is put in issue under Section 54 of the Evidence Act or when Section 75 IPC (enhancement for repeat offenders) is specifically invoked.
        • The court observed that Sections 75 IPC and 310 Cr.P.C. regulate bringing previous convictions before the court and that those provisions were inapplicable here: (a) the prior sentence (two months) fell short of the minimum threshold required for enhanced punishment under Section 75 IPC (three years), and (b) the prosecution did not ask for enhanced sentence under Section 75 IPC. Therefore the evidence of the previous conviction was inadmissible and likely prejudicial to the accused.
        • The court concluded that leading such evidence was calculated to prejudice the accused and vitiate the trial.
      3. Reliability and sufficiency of other prosecution evidence:
        • Child witness (P.W.14): Although courts can rely on child witness testimony, the court cautioned about tutoring and noted P.W.14 (an eight-year-old girl) only saw the accused take the deceased and had no knowledge of what the accused did thereafter; her testimony was limited.
        • Witnesses P.W.10 (Nagaiah) and P.W.2: Their account was found unreliable because they stated the accused initially denied involvement when questioned and then later, after further questioning by Khande Rao, the accused purportedly "broke down" and confessed. The court viewed this sequence as unconvincing and insufficiently corroborated.
        • Implausibility of the motive/evidence chain: Several witnesses testified in effect that the ear-rings were brass and of negligible value (known in the locality). The court found it inconceivable that the accused would kill a child for ear-rings worth two annas while leaving valuable silver armlets and anklets on the child and then retain the brass ear-rings in his pocket or produce them at the police station. These inconsistencies weakened the prosecution's theory that the killing was for theft of ear-rings.
        • Shopkeeper evidence (P.W.6 and P.W.7): They testified they told the accused the ear-rings were brass and would not buy them; this cast doubt on the accused's motive and the alleged conduct of retaining the ear-rings.
      4. Recovery of the rumal and related circumstantial evidence:
        • The rumal recovered at the scene was identified as belonging to the accused by a witness (P.W.5), but the accused in his Section 342 statement asserted that although the rumal belonged to him it was not found at the scene and that it had been taken from him in jail in the presence of another prisoner. The court treated the accused's statement under Section 342 as an important piece of evidence to be considered with the rest of the record and found the accused's version plausible.
        • The court considered the recovery of the rumal to be possibly artificial and thus unreliable as proof of guilt.
      5. Adequacy of the Sessions Judge's examination under Section 342 Cr.P.C.:
        • The court found the trial judge's examination under Section 342 to be inadequate and unsatisfactory. The Sessions Judge did not set out the salient facts disclosed by the evidence that he relied upon in convicting the accused.
        • The High Court emphasized that an accused must be given full liberty in such an examination to explain all incriminating circumstances which the judge is likely to use in support of a conviction, and failure to do so causes prejudice to the accused.
      6. Sentencing observation:
        • The Sessions Judge had expressed the view that because the evidence was circumstantial, the sentence to be awarded should be the lesser sentence of life imprisonment. The High Court described this proposition as startling and not warranted by any provision of law.
      7. Overall factual-conclusion synthesis:
        • Taking the foregoing together—the unreliable/confessed evidence rejected, the inadmissible prejudicial reference to previous conviction, limits of the child witness's evidence, improbabilities in the motive and sequence of events, and the questionable recovery of the rumal—the court concluded that the prosecution's case fell short of the legal standard required to prove murder beyond reasonable doubt.

      Holding and Implications

      Holding: The appeal is allowed; the conviction and sentence are set aside and the accused is acquitted and directed to be released.

      Implications:

      • The direct effect is the reversal of the Sessions Court's conviction and sentence and the release of the accused from custody.
      • The High Court found that certain procedural and evidentiary errors (inadmissible use of prior conviction evidence, a rejected confession, inadequate Section 342 examination, and insufficient circumstantial proof) required acquittal rather than any remediation short of reversal.
      • The opinion notes that no legal basis exists for the proposition that circumstantial evidence necessarily requires a lesser sentence (the Sessions Judge's sentencing approach in that regard was rejected), but the judgment does not purport to lay down a broader new precedent beyond the facts and legal points addressed in this case.

      K.J.R

      Appeal allowed.

Show all summary ...

Jaganmohan Reddy, J.:— The Sessions Judge, Adilabad, convicted the accused under Section 302 ??? awarded life imprisonment. He also convicted him under Section 379 for ??? giving him 3 years R.I The appellant and the brother of the father of the deceased Maria married sisters. It is said that on the day of the ???, namely, on 8-8-1958, the accused came to the house of the father of be deceased, Pochigadu and asked him where he was and when he was told that he was away in the field, he wanted the deceased to take him and show him the place where his father was working. Pochigadu had two children, is the deceased Digamber of 7 years and the other a girl Satti aged 8 years. It is further alleged that the sister of the deceased, P.W 14 saw the ??? taking her younger brother at about 2 p.m on the day of the occurred. The accused and the deceased were seen going towards Bhainsa by P.W Nagiah. When Digamber did not return home, the sister and the ??? began to weep and cry and P.W 10 who had come to their house inform them that he had seen the deceased and the accused going towards Bhai Immediately thereafter P.W 2, Lachadu, another brother of the father of deceased and P.W 10 went in search of the accused. They found him in Cinema house. They brought him out and asked him what he had done Digamber. The accused denied all knowledge of the deceased at which P.W 10 is alleged to have told him that he had seen him with Digamber. ??? these persons took the accused to the house of Deshmukh, Natharao, but was not there. His clerk Khande Rao was informed about the missing be and when Khande Rao questioned the accused, he denied all knowledge of boy. Later Khande Rao is said to have asked the accused to tell the ??? when he began to shake and shiver and thereafter confessed that he had kill the boy in the toddy tope near the village where the deceased and his fat lived in order to commit theft of the ear-rings. The accused was immediate marched off to the Police Station where he is said to have confessed and ??? of his pocket the two ear-rings which he handed over to the Sub-Inspect P.W 16. Thereafter he made a statement as a result of which he took to mediators to the place where the dead body was found. At that place ??? accused's shamla or Rumal was also discovered and was seized. The me atornamas pertaining to the dead body and the Rumal are Exs. P-7 and ??? respectively dated 9-3-1959. Apart from this evidence there is the evidence of two shop-keepers at Bhainsa, P.W 6 Amritlal and P.W 7 Madan, who testify to the fact that the accused came to them to sell the ear-rings, seeing the ear-rings both of them had, at different times, told the accused the they were brass ear rings and that they would not purchase them.

2. It may at this stage be mentioned that the prosecution led evidence of to previous conviction of the accused for an offence of theft of ear-rings from child for which he was awarded two months imprisonment. Copy of the judgment of the Sessions Court, Nanded dated 3-12-1952 proving this fact Ex. P-8. Apart, from the production of this documentary evidence, P.W 5 one of the witnesses who identified the rumal found at the scence of the offenc as that belonging to the accused was made to say even in his examination in chief that the accused committed dacoity on a previous occasion also who he cut off the earrings of a child from Mudhol and he was convicted in that case 5 or 6 years ago. The Sessions Judge in the examination of the accuse under Sec. 342, strange to say, put to the accused his previous conviction. I is an elementary principle of criminal jurisprudence that the previous ??? of an accused are not relevant and cannot be proved unless the good character of the accused is relevant under section 54 of the Evidence Act on ??? the prosecution, under Section 75 I.P.C prays for an enhancement of be sentence. When it is required that the accused should be dealt with ??? because of a previous conviction, there must be a specific charge under Section 75 I.P.C Section 310 Cr. P.C is meticulous enough to enjoin the Courts, whether it is a trial by a Jury or a Judge that the accused is ??? with an offence and further charged that he is by reason of a previous ??? liable to enhanced punishment or to punishment of a different kind ??? such subsequent offence, such further charge shall not be read out in Court and the accused shall not be asked to plead thereto, nor shall the same be ??? to by the prosecution, or any evidence adduced thereon unless and ??? he has been convicted of the subsequent offence or in the case of a trial by a jury, the jury have delivered their verdict on the charge of the subsequent offence, or in the case of a trial by the Judge himself, the Court may, in its ???, proceed or refrain from proceeding with the trial of the accused on he charge of the previous conviction. In this case, the prosecution, quite rightly, did not ask for enhanced sentence, because Section 75 I.P.C would ??? inapplicable. The sentence awarded to the accused under the previous conviction was only two months, while the minimum that is required for enhancement of punishment is 3 years under Section 75 I.P.C so that the previous conviction of the accused could not be proved against him or any evidence allowed to be adduced thereof, even where he was charged under Section 75, unless the Court came to the conclusion that the offence with which he is charged has been proved. In this case Section 75 I.P.C and Section 310 Cr. P.C have no application and the bar of section 54 of the Evidence Act comes into play. The evidence of a previous conviction led at the trial by the prosecution is calculated and is likely to prejudice the accused. It is equally clear that anything which prejudices the case of the accused, does vitiate the trial.

3. In this case, the accused was put before the Magistrate for a confession which was recorded under Section 164 on 16-8-1958. The Sessions Judge rejected this confession on cogent reasons, firstly, because though the accused was remanded to judicial custody, the police seemed to have had access. Secondly, the accused himself at the time of making the confession clearly told the Magistrate that he was maltreated and beaten and was asked to make a confession. A confession recorded in these circumstances loses its voluntary character. Further, he did not inform him that he will not be handed over to the police. Even if he had said so, it would have been a misnomer. The judicial lock-up situated as it is in the Magistrate's Court is guarded by the Police Constables to which the Investigating Officer, as is shown in this case, could have had easy access. A confession made in these circumstances cannot certainly be given weight that would be accorded to that made when the accused had been free from the interference of the police.

4. That apart, the evidence in this case does not satisfy us as to the guilt of the accused. P.W 14 is a girl of 8 years and though the evidence of a child witness can be relied upon Courts must be careful to examine the evidence to exclude the possibility of any tutoring. In this case, P.W 14 says that the accused took Digamber and killed him. She has no knowledge of what the accused did. All that she could have spoken is to the accused taking the deceased. Secondly, the evidence of P.W 10, Nagaiah is not dependable because, he and P.W 2 both say that when they questioned the accused, he denied the offence and when they took him to Khande Rao, he equally denied having taken the deceased. Subsequently without any further encouragement merely on Khande Rao asking him to tell the truth, he is said to have broken down with remorse and said that he killed the deceased for the theft of the ear-rings. P.W 14 says that the ear-rings were of brass and P.W 9, a neighbour of the deceased, says that the accused used to come now and then to the house of the deceased and that everyone in the locality knew that the ear-rings were made of brass and that all the relatives who visited them knew that they were of brass. It is, therefore, certain that the accused who was also a relative and was visiting then, must have known that the ear-rings were of brass. In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that the accused who avowedly took the child, to commit theft of the ear-rings, would have been so fool-hardy to murder the deceased for ear-rings worth two annas and yet left the body with silver armlets and silver anklets, which were of a great value, because when the body was discovered there were silver anklets and silver Kadiyalu. Further, it is equally incongruous that when P.Ws 6 and 7 to whom the accused is alleged to have taken the ear-rings informed him categorically that they were made of brass, that the accused would keep them in pocket. Again, the accused is supposed to have brought out the ear-rings from his pocket in the police station and handed them over to the Sub-Inspector, P.W 16, which circumstance is equally unbelievable, because when P.W 2, P.Ws 10 and 11, were informed by the accused that he had committed the murder for ear-rings, is it likely that they did not ask what he had done with them? The witnesses want us to believe that they did not ask such questions, which only shows how unreliable their testimony is. Apart from these circumstances, which in our view militate against the evidence of the prosecution, the recovery of the Rumal appears to us to be artificial. The accused in his statement under Section 342 asserts that though the Rumal was his it was not found at the place where the body was recovered and in fact it was taken away from him in the jail in the presence of another accused who his it was confined with him. Of course, that is a mere statement of the accused, but as observed by the Supreme Court, the statement of the accused under Section 342 is an important piece of evidence which is to be considered along with the other evidence and the circumstances brought out at the trial. We are inclined to accept the version of the accused, because as we have already stated, it is unlikely that the accused who has gone there with the intention of committing in under for the ear-rings, would leave valuable ornaments and also left the Rumal to serve as evidence incriminating him with a murder charge. The Police have put forth evidence of a murder which falls short of the legal proof required to bring home the charge of murder against the ???. It appears to us that the circumstances of the accused being previsonly convicted for a similar theft of ear-rings weighed with the Sessions Judge, our view, not only on the ground of prejudice, but also due to the defect the prosecution evidence, the conviction of the accused cannot be allowed to ???.

5. It is also necessary to remark that the examination of the accused under section 342 is most inadequate and unsatisfactory. The Sessions Judge has not ??? out the salient facts disclosed by the evidence upon which he relied in convicting the accused. It must be borne in mind that the accused, placed as be is, must be given full liberty to explain all the incriminating circumstances which appear against him and which the Judge is likely to use in support of a conviction. If he fails to do so that again would, in our view, cause prejudice ??? the trial.

6. Before we part with this case, we may observe that even if the conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the view of the Sessions Judge that because of the evidence being circumstantial, the sentence to be awarded is the lesser ??? of life-imprisonment, to say the least, is a startling proposition and is not warranted by any provision of law.

7. In the view we have taken, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence are set aside and the accused is acquitted and directed to be released.

K.J.R

8. Appeal allowed.