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R. Narasimha Reddy v. Bhoomaji And Others
Judgment Summary — Seshachalapati, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
These are two connected appeals under S. 116(a) of the Representation of the People Act (as amended) against the decision of the Election Tribunal (District and Sessions Judge), Secunderabad, in election petition No. 37457 declaring the elections to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly for the Gajwel double-member constituency void.
In the January 1957 election for the double-member Gajwel constituency several candidates contested, and polling took place on 4-3-1957. The declared winners were J.B. Mutyalrao (reserved seat) and R. Narasimha Reddy (general seat). The petitioner, Shri Bhoomaji, filed an election petition under Sections 80 and 81 of the Representation of the People Act seeking to declare the elections of the two returned candidates void, alleging (among other matters) non-acceptance of his retirement, exploitation of voters' superstition (use of bulls), intimidation and violence, conveyance of voters by vehicle, distribution of a bogus pamphlet in the name of Smt. Kamala Devi, and that R. Narasimha Reddy was disqualified under S. 7(d) for having a subsisting Public Works Department (P.W.D.) contract.
The Tribunal settled eight issues on these pleadings, recorded findings on each, and declared both returned candidates' elections void. The appellants (R. Narasimha Reddy and J.B. Mutyalrao) appealed. The High Court considered the evidence, legal standards (including the quasi-criminal nature of corrupt practice allegations and the requisite standard of proof), and the correctness of the Tribunal's findings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the non-acceptance of the petitioner's purported retirement (notification of withdrawal) materially affected the result of the election.
- Whether the exhibition of bulls (and related acts) to play upon voters' superstitions amounted to a corrupt practice under S. 123(2)(a)(ii) and materially affected the election.
- Whether conveyance of voters (by jeep or lorry No. HYT 162 / HYT 160 as alleged) constituted a corrupt practice under S. 123(5) and materially affected the election under S. 100(D)(ii).
- Whether the disturbance of an election meeting and acts of goondaism (including alleged beating of agents) were established and vitiated the election.
- Whether distribution of a pamphlet (Ex. P-1) falsely purporting to be issued by Smt. Kamala Devi was a corrupt practice under S. 123(4) and whether the appellants or their agents issued or consented to it.
- Whether R. Narasimha Reddy was disqualified under S. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act by reason of having a subsisting P.W.D. contract on the relevant date.
- Whether, in a double-member constituency, invalidation of one returned candidate's election necessarily vitiates the entire election.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The Tribunal's findings (particularly on corrupt practices) were not based on the evidence and were opposed to the probabilities of the case; the required standard of proof had not been met.
- In relation to the petitioner's alleged retirement, the petitioner in fact canvassed and took interest in the election, and the retention of his polling box did not cause confusion or affect the result.
- The evidence did not establish that the lorry was used at the instance of the returned candidates or their election agents; the appellants argued lack of proof of consent or agency linking the lorry/transport to the returned candidates.
- Regarding disqualification under S. 7(d), it was argued that removal of Narasimha Reddy's name from the contractors' list showed he was not a contractor on the relevant date.
Respondent's Arguments
- The allegations of corrupt practices (Sections 123 & 124) are quasi-criminal in nature and must be viewed against the standard of proof applicable to criminal cases; the Tribunal's findings were justified by evidence.
- The respondents asked the court to draw an adverse inference from the appellants' failure to examine the lorry owner (Mala Gowd) and Raja Reddy (alleged arranger of transportation), arguing that such non-examination supported the petitioner's case.
- The respondent relied on Bhagwan Datt v. Ram Ratan Gupda to support the proposition that conveyance of voters may be attributable to a candidate in certain circumstances (to show connivance or consent).
- In respect of the double-member constituency issue, the respondent urged that where one election is set aside the entire election should be held void, relying on Surendra Nath Khosla v. Dalip Singh.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhagwan Datt v. Ram Ratan Gupda, XI E.L.R. 448 | Used by respondent to show circumstances where conveyance of voters was held attributable to a candidate (connivance or involvement by the candidate). | The Court held this decision had no application to the present facts and distinguished it because those factual circumstances (proved use of vehicle and connection to candidate) were absent here. |
| Chatturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram | Principle that a contract continues in being until discharged by both sides. | Applied by the Court to hold that Narasimha Reddy's P.W.D. contract was subsisting (not terminated) and thus he was disqualified under S. 7(d). |
| Howe v. Smith, 27 Ch. D. p. 89 | Cited in submissions to support the proposition that when a contract is rescinded deposits/earnest may be forfeited, with implications as to termination of contractual rights. | The Court considered this and related authorities of little assistance; distinguished them because there had been no recession/repudiation of the P.W.D. contract in the present case. |
| Barrel v. Panell, 10 Ch. App. p. 512 | Similar to Howe v. Smith — cited in relation to forfeiture on repudiation/rescission of contract. | Distinguished by the Court for reasons stated: no recession/repudiation and the contract continued in the appellant's name. |
| Sprague v. Booth, 1989 A.C. p. 576 | Authority cited on consequences of contract rescission (forfeiture, etc.). | Distinguished and held of little assistance to the facts of the present case. |
| Natesa Aiyar v. Appavu Padayachi, 38 Mad. p. 178 | Cited in submissions about forfeiture and consequences of repudiation of contract. | Considered not to govern the present facts; the Court did not apply it to reach a contrary outcome on disqualification. |
| Abdul Gani & Co. v. Trustees Bombay Port, A.I.R. 1952 Bom. p. 310 | Cited in support of the general proposition concerning forfeiture on rescission of contract. | The Court did not find these authorities decisive and distinguished them for lack of a true rescission here. |
| Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Rai Bahadur Har Swarup, 1926 P.C. p. 1 | Cited on contractual forfeiture/repudiation principles. | Distinguished; not applied to change the Court's conclusion that the P.W.D. contract subsisted. |
| Surendra Nath Khosla v. Dalip Singh | Authority on effect of improper rejection of nomination and whether such an error renders the whole election void. | The Court held this precedent had no bearing on the present facts (no improper rejection here) and therefore did not support invalidation of the other returned candidate's election. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reviewed each of the Tribunal's findings issue by issue and applied legal principles stated in the Representation of the People Act, together with evidentiary standards applicable to allegations of corrupt practice (noting their quasi-criminal character). The Court emphasized the onus on the petitioner to establish corrupt practices beyond reasonable doubt.
On the question of the petitioner's (Shri Bhoomaji's) attempted retirement, the Tribunal had found the failure to accept the retirement did not materially affect the election result; the High Court noted that this finding was not disputed and did not require further consideration.
Regarding the allegation of employing bulls to exploit superstition (Majidapalli), the Court scrutinized the oral testimony (P.W.1, P.W.19, P.W.20 and respondent witnesses) and documentary circumstances. It observed that key evidence was weak or inconsistent (for example, petitioner visiting the site only after the polling day and omission to mention bulls in a contemporaneous communication, Ex. 9 dated 6-3-1957). The Court found the bulls story to be an afterthought and held the Tribunal's finding on this point to be incorrect. The Court therefore did not need to decide whether such conduct would amount to corrupt practice under S. 123(2)(a)(ii).
On disturbance at a meeting (Ramayanpet) and alleged physical assaults on agents, the Court found the evidence unconvincing. Although the Tribunal had preferred the petitioner's witnesses over certain resident respondents, the High Court found it improbable that a disturbance would occur near the police station without any police report being made and gave weight to the negative evidence of resident witnesses. The Court concluded the allegations of meeting disturbance and beating of agents were not established.
On conveyance of voters: the Court accepted that the Tribunal found the lorry (No. HYT 160/162) had been used to convey voters from Laxmapur to Akkannapet. However, the Court held that the petitioner failed to discharge the heavy onus of proving that the returned candidates or their election agents had committed or consented to the corrupt practice. The Court emphasized two requirements: proof of (i) the vehicle's use for conveyance and (ii) the returned candidate's or his agent's consent/connivance. The Court found the evidence insufficient to show Raja Reddy (who allegedly arranged the transport) was an election agent or that the returned candidates or their agents consented. The Court rejected the request to draw an adverse inference from the non-examination of the lorry owner and Raja Reddy, reiterating that the petitioner bears the onus and the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature.
On the distribution of the pamphlet Ex. P-1 purportedly in the name of Smt. Kamala Devi, the Court examined printing records, witnesses (P.W.2, P.W.3), and admissions. The Court found the press owner's account and the story of a stranger commissioning the pamphlets to be improbable and discredited parts of the evidence. Although the pamphlet was proved to be a spurious document not issued by Smt. Kamala Devi, the Court held there was no satisfactory evidence that the respondents (the appellants) or their election agents issued, caused, or consented to its publication or distribution. The Tribunal's finding attributing responsibility to the respondents was held to be erroneous.
On the question of disqualification under S. 7(d) for R. Narasimha Reddy arising from a P.W.D. contract (issue 6), the Court engaged in a detailed review of documentary evidence (powers of attorney, correspondence between Executive and Superintending Engineers, bills, and the state of works). The Court concluded that removal of Narasimha Reddy's name from the contractors' list did not amount to termination of the contract. The Superintending Engineer had not approved a retrospective transfer to the power-of-attorney holder (Jagpat Rao), the work had commenced, bills were being prepared in Narasimha Reddy's name and final payment was outstanding. Applying the principle (cited from Chatturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram) that a contract continues until discharged, the Court held the contract was subsisting on the relevant date and that Narasimha Reddy was therefore disqualified under S. 7(d).
On whether invalidation of one returned candidate's election in a double-member constituency voids the entire election, the Court explained that the cited authority (Surendra Nath Khosla v. Dalip Singh) concerned improper rejection of nomination and was not applicable. Here, there was no improper rejection; instead, one returned candidate (Narasimha Reddy) was disqualified under S. 7(d). The Court held that in such a case the Tribunal can only declare the election of the disqualified returned candidate void and that the other returned candidate's election stands unless independently vitiated.
Holding and Implications
The Court made the following dispositive rulings:
- Special Appeal No. 3 of 1958 (R. Narasimha Reddy): DISMISSED. The Court upheld the Tribunal's finding that Narasimha Reddy was disqualified under S. 7(d) because he had a subsisting P.W.D. contract on the relevant date. Because most other allegations against him were found unreasonable or unproven, the Court made no order as to costs for this appeal.
- Special Appeal No. 4 of 1958 (J.B. Muthyalrao): ALLOWED. The Court held that the Tribunal's findings against the other returned candidate on issues of corrupt practice (bulls, disturbances, conveyance, pamphlet, assaults) were incorrect or not proved; therefore Muthyalrao's election was not vitiated. The appeal was allowed with costs (advocate's fee Rs. 100).
Consequences:
- R. Narasimha Reddy is disqualified and his election is declared void.
- J.B. Muthyalrao remains duly elected; the Tribunal's declaration setting aside his election was reversed.
- The Court emphasized the heavy evidentiary onus on petitioners in election petitions alleging corrupt practices and required proof of consent/connivance where others' acts are alleged to have been done with the returned candidates' approval.
- The Court distinguished prior authorities relied upon by the parties where factual matrices differed; it did not purport to lay down any new precedent beyond applying settled principles (for example, contract continuation until discharge and the evidentiary burden in quasi-criminal election allegations).
Orders recorded in the opinion: Spl. Appeal No. 3 dismissed (no order as to costs); Spl. Appeal No. 4 allowed with costs (Advocate's fee Rs. 100).
Seshachalapati, J.:— These are two connected appeals filed under S. 116(a) of the Representation of the People Act, as amended by Act XXVII of 1956, hereafter called the Act against the decision of the Election Tribunal (District and Sessions Judge) Secunderabad in election petition No. 37457 on its file declaring the election of the legislative assembly of Andhra Pradesh void.
2. The appellant, Shri R. Narasimha Reddy and Shri J.B Muthyalrao, appellants in Special Appeals Nos. 3 & 4 of 1958 respectively, the 1st respondent Shri Boomaji and five others stood as candidates for election to the legislative Assembly, Andhra Pradesh from Gajwel double member constituency in or about January 1957. The nominations were duly filed by all these candidates before the last date filed by all these candidates before the last date fixed, i.e 29-1-′57 and they were duly scrutinized on 1-2-′57. The date for the polling was fixed to 4-3-57 and the election took place on that day. The result of the poll was as follows:—
CANDIDATE Votes polled 1. Artula Ramachandra Reddy … … 10,183 G. 2. J.B Mutyalrao … … 24,450 R. 3. Narsiah … … 6,494 R. 4. Banam Veeraswamy … … 5,684 R. 5. Bhoomaji … … 5,048 G. 6. Balakrishna Reddy … … 5,208 G. 7. Mallesham … … 12,998 R. 8. Reddygari Narasimha Reddy … … 22,168 G.
3. This being a double member constituency, Shri J.B Mutyalrao, who polled 24,450 votes, was declared elected for the reserved seat, and Shri R. Narasimha Reddy, who polled 22,168 votes, was declared duly elected to the general seat.
4. Thereupon, Shri Bhoomaji, the 1st respondent in both the appeals, filed an election petition under Secs. 80 and 81 of the Representation of the People Act challenging the validity of the election and praying for a declaration that the election of the two returned candidates be declared void.
5. The main allegations in the petition are:
(1) That the petitioner Shri Bhoomaji had on 21st February 1957 notified to the Returning Officer his intention to retire from the contest in accordance with S. 55(a) of the Act, and that the retirement was not duly accepted on the ground that the communication was not delivered to the Returning Officer.
(2) That by reason of the non-acceptance of the retirement, the appellants exploited the situation by spreading the rumour that the petitioner took a bribe from Artula Ramachandra Reddy, and that as the bargain was not completed he was continuing to stand inspite of his attempt to withdraw from the contest.
(3) That on the polling day, i.e on 4-3-1957, the two appellants through their agents, political and otherwise intimidated the voters by tying pairs of bulls at the four entrances of the polling booth at Majidpalli polling booth and making the voters put ‘kum kum’ on the foreheads of the bulls and take oath to cast their votes for the Congress candidates and thus playing upon the religious superstition of the voters.
(4) That the appellants through their agents and workers arranged for the conveyance of the voters by jeeps at Gajwel and also employed a transport lorry No. HYT 162 for conveying the voters from Laxmapur village to the polling booth at Akkannapet.
(5) That on 23-2-1957, an election meeting presided over by the petitioner Shri Boomaji was violently disturbed resulting in abandonment of such a meeting.
(6) That at Nemtoor, Itkyal and Jagdeopur, polling booths goondaism was perpetrated by the respondents and their agents and the polling agents of A. Ramachandra Reddy were beaten and driven away.
(7) That the appellants got a bogus pamphlet purporting to be issued by Smt. Kamala Devi the wife of A. Ramachandra Reddi circulated. The pamphlet states that Smt. Kamala Devi had renounced her connections with the Communist Party and calls upon the voters to abstain from voting in favour of her husband A. Ramachandra Reddy, so as to teach him a lesson. It is stated that the publication of this spurious pamphlet purporting to be issued by the wife of one of the contesting candidates had a very great affect on the result of the polling.
(8) That the appellant in Special Appeal No. 3/58 R. Narasimha Reddy, had a subsisting P.W.D contract with the State. Government and as such he was disqualified under S. 7 Cl. (d) of the Representation of the People Act. Shri Narsimha Reddy and Shri Mutyalrao who were impleaded as respondents, filed their written statements denying the allegations in the petition and the petitioner filed a rejoinder thereto.
6. On the pleadings, the tribunal settled eight issues and recorded its findings on each one of them.
7. The tribunal found that even though the retirement of the candidature of Shri Bhoomaji should have been accepted in time and the reasons for not doing so are not tenable, still it could not be said that the result of the election was materially affected by the non-acceptance of the retirement and so found the issue against the petitioner. It is not necessary for us to deal with this question, as the learned Counsel for the respondents in these appeals has not questioned the finding.
8. The tribunal held that the allegation as to the exploitation of the superstition of the voters by the exhibition of the bulls and inducing the voters to take oath by smearing vermilion on the fore-heads of the bulls has been made out. The tribunal further held that even though the charge of conveying the voters by jeep had not been pressed, the conveyance of the voters by the lorry from Laxmapur to Akkannapeta had been sufficiently established, but it has also been held that it does not amount to a corrupt practise within the meaning of S. 100(D)2 of the Act. The tribunal held that the pamphlet Ex. P-I is a spurious document, that it was never issued by Smt. Kamala Devi, that it had been brought into existence by the respondents, that is, the appellants or their agents, and that by design and effect it had a very adverse effect on the polling and that it would amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of S. 123(4) of the Act. As regards the disturbance of the meeting at Ramayanpet and the goondaism practised by the election agents of A. Ramachandra Reddy, the tribunal found in favour of the petitioner. In regard to the allegation that R. Narasimha Reddy had a subsisting contract with P.W.D of the State Government, the tribunal came to the conclusion that the allegation is true and that R. Narasimha Reddy is, therefore, disqualified from standing as a candidate. In the result, the tribunal gave a declaration that the election of the two returned candidates was void. The learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously contended before us that the findings of the tribunal are not based upon the evidence and are opposed to the probabilities of the case. The allegations as to corrupt practices as those referred to in Sections 123 & 124 of the Act are of quasi criminal character and the standard of proof required to establish them is the same as pertains to proof in criminal cases. It is from that basic point of view that the evidence tendered in this case has to be scanned and its value assessed.
9. In regard to the first objection, it is in evidence the petitioner notified his intention to withdraw on 21-2-1957. It was not, however, accepted as it was not delivered in person to the Returning Officer. The result of it was that the ballot box of the petitioner was kept in all the polling booths and he polled as many as 5048 votes.
10. It is contended for the appellants that, as a matter of fact, the petitioner personally canvassed for his election prior to the date of the polling and actually took interest in his election on the polling day. It is further contended that no confusion ensued on account of the retention of the petitioner's polling box. It is not necessary for us to dwell further on this aspect of the case, as the tribunal's finding that the failure to accept the retirement of the petitioner did not affect the result of election has not been disputed before us.
11. The allegation as to the employment of the bulls for purposes of playing upon the superstitious sentiments of the voters has been sought to be proved by the evidence of P.Ws 1, 19 & 20. P.W 1, the petitioner has in his evidence stated that he went to Majidapalli where the bulls were exhibited only on the next day of the polling. Therefore, he could not have seen the bulls being employed in the manner suggested on the polling day at Majidapalli. P.W 19 states in the chief examination that, the bulls were tied at a distance of about 70 yards and that he had seen three or four people putting ‘kum kum’ on the foreheads of the bulls. He states further that they all felt that if they did not, vote for the bulls they would be committing a sin. He does not say that anybody forced him to take on oath or that he saw any persons being forced or induced to vote for the congress after smearing vermilion on the foreheads of the bulls. For the respondents, R.W 2 states that he did not find any bulls tied to any place near the polling booth. Similarly R.W 18 states that there was no Pooja or decoration of the bulls in the village on the day of election.
12. In our view, the oral evidence is of little value. That the story of the bulls is an afterthought is clearly established by Ex. 9 dt. 6-3-1957. Two days after the election, the petitioner. Shri Bhoomaji wrote to the Returning officer of Dommat constituency drawing his attention to the irregularities in the election held for the Gadwal constituency on 4-3-1957. While he has mentioned several irregularities there was no reference at all to the bulls and, in our view, the omission of any reference thereto is a clinching circumstance militating against the truth of the story put forward by the petitioner. We are of opinion that the finding of the tribunal on this part of the case is incorrect. In the view we take of the facts, it is unnecessary to consider whether the alleged exhibition of the bulls with intent to play upon the superstituous sentiments of the voters would amount to a corrupt, practice within the meaning of S. 123(2)(a)(ii) of the Act.
13. We think it convenient to deal together with the alleged disturbance at Ramayanpet meeting and the personal violence to which the agents of A. Ramachandra Reddy were subjected. These allegations are spoken to by P.Ws 14, 15 & 18. P.W 14 has stated that there was a meeting at Ramayanpet prior to the election and that it was presided over by Shri Boomaji. During the course of the meeting, it is stated, the Congress volunteers who were drunk came there armed with bands, created disturbance by abusing Shri Boomaji and asking the speakers not to speak. In the cross examination it was elicited that the meeting took place about 100 paces from the Police Station and that there was a Sub-Inspector of Police with a posse of constables. Yet it would appear that no report was made to the Police Inspector. P.W 15 also speaks to the disturbances at the meeting, which according to him consisted of 2,000 persons. He also admits that the meeting was very near the Police Station. In cross examination he states that the meeting lasted for three hours, and that he was present at the meeting from beginning to the end. P.W 18 also speaks of the disturbance, but also admits that it was very near to the Police Station. We are not impressed with this evidence.
14. On behalf of the respondents, R.Ws 9, 10 & 11 have been examined. They are the residents of Ramayanpet. They say that they have attended the meeting and, that there was no disturbance. The tribunal has observed that the negative evidence of the three witnesses for the respondents does not seem to be convincing. We are unable to agree. The meeting was held about to or 12 days prior to the date of the election. Admittedly it was held very near to the Police Station. It is highly improbable that any body would dare create such disturbance in the immediate neighbourhood of the Police Station. However, if the meeting was really broken, no report of the disturbance would appear to have been lodged with the police. In these circumstances, we are unable to say that the allegation as to the disturbance of the Public meeting at Ramayanpet has been made out.
15. Nor are we able to agree with the tribunal as to the beating of the agents of A. Ramachandra Reddy. P.Ws 7, 8, 9 & 17 speak about the incident of violence. P.Ws 7 states that he went to Jagdeopur and wanted to appoint one Chandra Reddy as polling agent, but that some 10 or 15 Congress people showed him Ex. P-1, threatened him, and asked him to go away and that he did so. P.W 7 Chandra Reddy supports P.W 6, P.W 8 states that he saw some 10 or 15 people asking P.W 6 to go away. P.W 9 was the polling agent of Ramachandra Reddy at Itkyal. He states that some Congress men came and showed him the pamphlet of Smt. Kamala Devi, that he was detained there till 12 O'clock and beaten by them at 11 O'clock. He further added that at 12 O'clock, Kamala Devi and others came there in a car and he went, weeping and reported the matter to them. In the cross examination he expressly admitted that he did not inform any of the constables about the beating, though there were several constables (about 5 or 6) near the booth. P.W 10 speaks that at 11-O'clock, P.W 9 was made to hold His cars and stand and sit. That, however, was not the story given by P.W 9 himself. P.W 18 is Smt. Kamala Devi, the wife of Sri A. Ramachandra Reddy. She states that Durga Reddy (P.W 9) who was appointed as an agent at Itykal was beaten. Obviously, she had not seen the incident and she does not seem to have taken any steps to make a police report. Further Sri Boomaji had not made any reference to the beating on the 4th March 1957 to the Returning officer for the Dommat constituency in his communication (Ex. R. 9). In these circumstances, we are of opinion that the allegation as to the beating of the election agents of Sri Ramachandra Reddy has not been made out. We are unable to agree with the tribunal in its finding on this issue.
16. We next come to the case of the conveyance, which is covered by issue 4. It may at once be stated that the petitioners did not press at the enquiry before the tribunal, the case as regards the conveying of the voters by jeep, even though in the original petition it had been alleged that the respondents and their agents arranged for the conveyance of the voters through their own jeeps at Gadwel proper. The only allegation pressed under this charge is that a lorry bearing No. HYT 160 was employed by the respondents and their agents for purposes of conveying the voters from Laxmapur polling booth to Akkannapet.
17. There is no question that in S. 123 sub-section 5 of the Act, “the hiring or pro curing, whether on payment, or otherwise of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent or by any other person, for the conveyance of any elector (other than the candidate himself, the members of his family or his agents) to or from any polling station provided under S. 25 of a place fixed under sub-S. (1) of S. 29 for the poll” would be a corrupt practice. It remains to be seen whether, as a matter of fact, the lorry was used for the purposes of conveying the voters form Laxmapur to Akkannapet polling station. The evidence on which this charge is sought to be sustained is of P.Ws 11, 12 and 13. P.W 11 is a resident of Laxmapur. He states that he went in a lorry from Laxmapur to Akkannapet, that Raja Reddy had arranged for the transportation. He further added that he was a worker in the Medak Taluq Congress Committee. He also gave the names of four other people, who are stated to have travelled in the lorry. P.W 12 states that Raja Reddy is the President of the Taluq Congress Committee and said that he would arrange for a lorry. He stated further that there was only one trip and as he could not go by the first trip he went to the polling booth on foot. P.W 13 also states that Raja Reddy brought a lorry for transporting the voters, and he gives the names of 5 or 6 people who travelled by the lorry. On the other hand R.Ws 12 and 13 who are also residents of Ramayanpet, have deposed that there was no lorry and that all the villagers went on foot to the polling booth.
18. In this state of oral evidence we have to bear in mind that the onus of establishing a corrupt practice rests heavily upon the petitioner and we are of the opinion that onus has not been duly discharged. Further the tribunal itself while holding that the transport of voters had been established held that it has not been proved that the result of the election had been materially affected by this corrupt practice within the meaning of S. 100(D)(ii) of the Representation of the People Act. Mr. B.V Subrahmanyam, the learned Counsel for the respondents has urged before us that the respondents had summoned Mala Gowd, stated to be the owner of the lorry, and Raja Reddy who is stated to have arranged for the transportation with the lorry and that for reasons best known to them, the respondents have not examined them both. He wants us to draw an adverse inference from such non-examination. As stated supra, the onus of proof is on the petitioner. As has been held, the proceedings before the election tribunal alleging corrupt practice is in the nature of quasi criminal trial, and it is for the petitioner to establish it beyond reasonable doubt. We are of opinion that the evidence in this, cast is not enough 10 establish that the lorry was actually used at the instance of Raja Reddy. Assuming for the sake of argument that Raja Reddy did provide for the transportation of the lorry, a further step has yet to be established, namely, that the corrupt practice has been committed by the returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of either. There is no evidence that the returned candidates or their agents have committed the corrupt practice. Raja Reddy was admittedly not an election agent in the returned candidates. The definition of an agent formerly in S. 79(1) has now been put in S. 123 Sub-Section 7 Explanation 1. Raja Reddy does not certainly fall within this definition of an agent and consent of the returned candidates or their agents for the use of the lorry has not been proved by any other evidence. It cannot be a matter of conjecture or surmise. In these circumstances, we are unable to agree with the contentions of the learned Counsel fir the respondent that a cast of corrupt practice within the meaning of S. 123(3) has been established.
19. Mr. Subrahmanyain relied on certain observations in the decision of the Supreme Court, in Bhagwan Datt v. Ram Ratan Gupda . XI E.L.R 448.. In that case it was actually proved that the car belonging to the Socialist candidate for the State Assembly for the some constituency was used for conveying voters to the polling station for the House of the People, that the respondent had contributed funds tot the Socialist Party and had no agents of his own. In those circumstances it was held that the finding of the Tribunal that the conveying of the voters was with the connivance of the candidate was correct. We are of opinion that the decision cited has no application, as in the instant case there are no such circumstances. Further under the amended language of S. 100(b) ‘consent’ of the reurned candidate or his election agent is necessary for acts done by others. No such proof is forthcoming in this case. The next ground upon which the learned Counsel for the respondent has laid strong reliance is the distribution of the pamphlet. Ex. P-1. The tribunal considered this question under issue 5 and found the issue in favour of the petitioner. Ex. P-1 is a pamphlet in Telugu purported to be issued by Smt. Arutula Kamala Devi, the wife of A. Ramachandra Reddy. It states that she was originally a member of the Communist Party, that she successfully stood for the Alier Constituency last time that she was again standing for Alier, that the Communists have been responsible for several cruel acts, that she had not so far divulged all of them, that wherever she goes people are reluctant to help her, that the Congress candidate Poona Reddy had rendered great public services, and that she believed that he would win. Further it is stated in the pamphlet that she had given up her contact with the Communist Party and that she desired that her husband should be defeated in the election and taught a lesson. The pamphlet ends with the slogan: “Down with crudities of the Communists and our vote is for the Congress”.
20. The Contention is that this pamphlet was got up falsely in the name of Smt. Kamala Devi and distributed at some of the polling booths with the intention of damaging the electoral chances of Arutula Ramachandra Reddy, the P.D.F candidate. The petitioner will have therefore, to establish that this pamphlet, firstly was a false one, and secondly, that it was issued or caused to be issued by the respondents or their agents or any other person with the consent of the respondent or their election agents.
21. Smt. Kamala Devi was examined as P.W 17. She denies having issued Ex. P-1 and we see no reason to discredit her disclaimer. That the pamphlet was distributed at Jagdeopur. Peerlapalli, Dharmaram and Itkyal is spoken to by P.W 4. P.W 2 is the owner of the press by name “Kisan Press” at Afzal Gunz, Hyderabad. He states that one Seshagirirao gave him an order for printing of the pamphlets and he has produced the vouchers dt. 2-3-1957 signed by Seshagiri Rao and marked as Ex. P-7. He states that he was asked by Smt. Kamala Devi about the printing of the pamphlets and he told her that the order was given by one Seshagiri Rao. Seshagiri Rao was examined as P.W 3. He gives a curious story and says that on the 2nd of March 1957 he had come to Hyderabad from Alier and near Osman Gunj some person accosted him and told him that he had some matter to be printed and gave his name as Chinna Kishta Reddy and requested the witness to help him in that behalf. So. P.W 3 obligingly got the pamphlets printed. In the cross examination he says that he does not belong to any party though he was a four anna member of the Congress from Bhongir taluq. He states further that one congress volunteer came to him and took the pamphlets. He states that he was surprised at the contents of the pamphlet, but made no enquiries and delivered it at the Congress Office. We are unable to attach any value to this evidence. It is extremely improbable that P.W 3 who is an educated man would have taken the responsibility to get such a pamhlet printed at the instance of a person whom he did not know before and who accosted him casually near Osman Gunj.
22. R.W 4 is a person who is stated to have distributed these pamphlets. He states that he was a four anna member of the Congress and that he worked for the Congress. He wrote Ex. R-2 to Narasimha. Reddy stating that Artula Ramachandra Reddy had summoned him to give evidence about the distribution of the hand bills of Smt. Kamala Devi's resignation, and that Narasimha Reddy was responsible for the money due to Mutyal Rao for loaning the cycle to him. In the cross examination he states that he found the pamphlets in the office of the Congress at Jagdeopur and that somebody dropped them in the room. We are not at all impressed with this evidence. The suggestion is that P.W 3 who is a Congress-man got them printed and P.W 4 also a Congress-man distributed them obviously with a view to discredit the P.D.F candidate and thereby serve the interests of the respondents. Assuming that P.W 3 & P.W 4 are both Congress-men, there is absolutely no evidence that the respondents or their election agents had any knowledge of the publication or distribution of the pamphlet or they gave any consent thereto. We are of opinion that the finding of the Tribunal on this part of the case is erroneous and that it has not been proved that the respondents are responsible for or consented to the printing and the distribution of the pamphlets, There remains one question which is referable only to Narasimha Reddy and that is the disqualification under S. 7(D) of the Act by reason of the P.W.D contract. This is covered by issue 6. That Narsimha Reddy is a P.W.D contractor, that he entered into a contract with the Hyderabad State Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) for restoring the Shalipet tank in Medak District as per the estimates and specifications can admit of no doubt. However, on deciding to stand for the election to the legislative assembly the petitioner wrote Ex. R-1 to the Executive Engineer, Irrigation Branch, Medak asking for the cancellation of his certificate as a ‘D’ Class contractor and for a reply in writing. On 29-12-1956, the Executive Engineer replied in R-5 that his name was removed from the list of contractors in his division as desired. It is, therefore, contended for the appellants that on the relevant date the appellant was not a contractor and as such there was no disqualification within the meaning of S. 7(D) of the Act.
23. This argument proceeds upon misapprehension. It may be that he was removed from the list of contractors of the ‘D’ Class, but the question is whether the contract he entered into with the Government was subsisting or not.
24. The respondent, Narsimha Reddy, had executed a power of attorney Ex. P-14(a) in favour of one Jagpatrao on 5-11-1956 and addressed a letter Ex. P-15 dt. 13-11-1956 to the Executive Engineer requesting that he had appointed Jagpatrao as his agent for doing the construction work taken in his name. The Executive Engineer addressed a letter Ex. P-5 to the Superintending Engineer on 14-3-1957 suggesting that by reason of the removal of Narsimha Reddy's name from the list of ‘D’ Class contractors, the power of attorney also had to be cancelled, and if it were so, fresh tenders would have to be called for which would take considerable time. Hence he sought the advice of the Superintending Engineer whether the work could not be done through the power of attorney agent. The Superintending Engineer replied in Ex. P-4, that the work of the 1st contractor may be closed and the balance work let out to the other man in his name, and on 17-7-1957 the Superintending Engineer wrote his final reply (Ex. P-13). In that reply the Superintending Engineer had stated that a retrospective transference of the contract in the name of Jagpat Rao could not be granted and that the contract should be considered as being continued in the original man's name.
25. It is true that by the letter dated 29-12-1956, the Executive Engineer informed R. Narsimha Reddy that his name has been removed from the list of contractors in his division, but that cannot mean that the contract entered into by R. Narsimha Reddy with the P.W.D under Ex. P-10 had become completed and all the rights and liabilities there under were settled and adjusted. In fact, the Superintending Engineer did not agree to the transference of the contract to Jagpat Rao. It is also clear from Ex. R-6 that the contractor had already started the work and that he received the mark out and that the work of the removal of obstruction at the Weir site was in progress. It is, therefore, obvious (hat prior to 29-12-1956 some work was done in respect of the contract either by the principal contractor Narsimha Reddy or his power of attorney agent, Jagpat Rao. Under Cl. 14 of the contract for work done 7%, shall be held in deposit in addition to the 2% that was deposited by the Contractor on the full estimated value of the work and the value of the work had to be determined later on and due payments made. It would also appear from Ex. P-16 that a bill was drawn in the name of Jagpat Rao, the power of attorney holder and it was cancelled and issued in the name of Narsimha Reddy (Ex. P-16 & P-16A.). P.W 21, the Executive Engineer in his evidence has stated that the bills were made in the name of Narsimha Reddy and that the final bill has been prepared on 25-6-1957 (Ex. P-17), but that the payment has not been made. P.W 16 also speaks to the same effect.
26. It seems to us, therefore, clear that on the relevant date the contract under Ex. P-10 was subsisting. The Superintending Engineer who alone under CI. 24(E) of the contract (Ex. P-10) has right to terminate the contract had not so terminated it. The transfer of the work in the name of Jagpat Rao had not been recognised. The bills were being issued in the name of the principal contractor. In view of these circumstances, we are of opinion that the contract was not terminated and the interest of Narsimha Reddy continued in the contract. In Chatturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram, Bose, J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed that a contract continues in being till it is discharged by both the sides. So long as in the case the final bills have not been settled, R. Narasimha Reddy must be deemed to have a subsisting interest in the contract. It has been contended that after the removal of the contractor's name from the list of contractors, the contract must be deemed to be at an end; that no work was practically done under the contract in respect of which payment could be demanded by the contractor, that the original deposit must be deemed to have been forfeited, so much so that there was nothing to be done under the contract after the removal of the name of the contractor. We have taken the view that under Cl: 24(E) it is only the Superintending Engineer who can terminate the contract. Such a termination had not been made. The removal of his name from the list of contractors did not amount in fact and cannot amount in law to the termination of the contract.
27. The learned Advocate General pressed on our attention that when there is a recession of contract any deposit made would be forfeited, and so Narsimha Reddy could not claim it back. In support of that contention he relied upon: Howe v. Smith . 27 Chancery Div. p. 89., Barrel v. Panell . 10 Chancery Appeals p. 512., Sprague v. Booth . 1989 A.C p. 576., Natesa Aiyar v. Appavu Padayachi . 38 Mad. p. 178., Abdul Gani & Company v. Trustees Bombay Port . A.I.R 1952 Bom. p. 310., Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Rai Bahadur Har Swarup . 1926 P.C p. 1.. These cases are, in our view, of little assistance to the point in question. Where in respect of contract for sale some earnest money is paid and if eventually the purchaser does not perform his pan of the contract, it has been held in those, cases that the earnest money paid as an advance would be forfeited even though there may be no express covenant in that behalf. The forfeiture in such cases is dependent upon a repudiation or a recession of the contract. In this case there has been no such recession. On the contrary, Narasimha Reddy has desired that the work should be performed by his power of attorney agent and the contract continues in his name. It seems to us that there can be no question of automatic forfeiture of the deposit so as to constitute a complete termination of all possible rights and obligations under the contract. The case of the appellant is not that there was any recession or repudiation. Further as seen from R. 6 some work was done by the appellant or his agent and the final is still pending. In these circumstances, we are clearly of opinion that Narsimha Reddy was under a disqualification within the meaning of S. 7(D) of the Representation of the People Act and the finding of the tribunal under issue 6 is correct.
28. It, therefore, follows that, on this ground alone the Special Appeal No. 3 of 1958 should be dismissed. But since most of the grounds alleged are found to be unreasonable we make no order as to costs.
Special Appeal No. 4 of 1958.
29. The appellant in this case is Shri J.B Muthyal Rao. There is no allegation that he had any contract with the Government or that he was interested in such contract within the meaning of S. 7(d). The only grounds of objection against his election are general grounds common to both the appellants and covered by issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 & 8. We have taken the view that the finding of the tribunal in so far as they are against the elected candidates on these issues are incorrect. It, therefore, follows that appellants' election is not in any way vitiated.
30. Mr. B.V Subramanyam, the learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that election to a double member constituency is an integral whole and that where one election is set aside, the entire election should be held to be void. In support of his contention he drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Surendra Nath Khosla v. Dalip Singh. In that case the question was whether there was an improper rejection of the nomination within the meaning of S. 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the rejection was improper and that it, therefore, rendered the entire election void. That decision has no bearing on this case. In this case there is no improper rejection of any nomination and the presumptions that may arise in that behalf will arise. All that can be said is that Narsimha Reddy on the date of his election was disqualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly by reason of S. 7(d) of the Act. In such a case the tribunal can only declare the election of the returned candidate void. The entire election cannot be deemed to be void. Therefore, the disability of Narasimha Reddy and the declaration that his election is void will not affect the other candidate Sri Muthyal Rao.
31. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that Sri Muthyalrao's election is not open to any objection and the declaration given by the Tribunal setting aside his election is incorrect. We, therefore allow the appeal with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100.—
Ch. R.
32. Spl. appeal No. 3 dismissed.
33. Spl. appeal No. 4 allowed.
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