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Hotha Sitarama Sastry v. State Of Andhra Pradesh
Factual and Procedural Background
These are two separate petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code and Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution of India. The petitions challenge final orders in W.A. Nos. 149 and 150 of 1957. The petitioners contended (1) that Regulation IV of 1951, made by the Governor of Madras purportedly under S. 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, was ultra vires and a colourable exercise of power; and (2) that a notification issued under Section 1(4) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, XXVI of 1948, fixing a date for taking over certain estates (Gangolu A and C estates) was invalid and should be quashed. The High Court rejected those contentions and upheld the orders passed in W.P. Nos. 28 and 29 of 1953. The petitioners sought certificates of fitness and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Articles 132 and 133(c).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Regulation IV of 1951 made by the Governor under S. 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution was ultra vires or colourable legislation, which raises a substantial question of law involving interpretation of the Constitution (Article 132).
- Whether the notification under Section 1(4) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, XXVI of 1948 fixing a date for taking over an estate partly situated in a scheduled area was invalid and whether that question was substantial enough to warrant certification under Article 133(c).
- Whether authoritative pronouncements of the former Federal Court on corresponding provisions of the Government of India Act (notably Section 92) affect the "substantiality" of the questions for purposes of leave to appeal under Articles 132 and 133.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Both principal contentions raise substantial questions of law that warrant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
- The first contention, concerning Regulation IV of 1951 and the interpretation of S. 5 of the Fifth Schedule, involves a substantial question of constitutional interpretation falling within Article 132 and therefore merits a certificate under Articles 132 and 133(c).
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' or other parties' specific legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Subba Rao v. Veerraju 1951-2 Mad L.J 222 at p. 227 : (AIR 1951 Mad 969 at p. 973) | The meaning of the term "substantial question of law": when a question is fairly arguable there is room for difference of opinion and it is substantial; but when a point is practically covered by the decision of the highest court it will not be a substantial question. | The Court relied on this formulation to assess whether the constitutional question remained substantial in view of prior authoritative decisions. |
| State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, AIR 1954 SC 245 | The Supreme Court is not bound by the decisions of either the Federal Court or the Privy Council. | The Court noted this principle while considering whether the absence of a Supreme Court pronouncement made the Federal Court's decisions irrelevant to the question of substantiality. |
| T.M. Arumugam v. State Of Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 115 | On the effect of Federal Court decisions after commencement of the Constitution: decisions of the Federal Court on points of law given prior to 26-1-1950 are binding on all courts within the territory of India after that date. | The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that Federal Court law continues to have force unless altered by the Supreme Court or a competent authority. |
| Chatturam v. Commr. of Income Tax Bihar, 1947-2 Mad L.J 432 : (AIR 1947 FC 32) | Authoritative pronouncement by the Federal Court on Section 92 of the Government of India Act (provision substantially similar to S. 5 of the Fifth Schedule). | The Court treated this decision as an authoritative interpretation relevant to the present question and used it to conclude the constitutional point could not be regarded as substantial for Article 132 purposes. |
| Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar, 1949-2 Mad LT 356 : (AIR 1949 FC 75) | Another authoritative Federal Court decision on the corresponding provision (Section 92 of the Government of India Act). | The Court relied on this precedent, together with Chatturam, to hold that the question of interpretation of S. 5 of the Fifth Schedule was no longer of sufficient substance to warrant grant of leave under Article 132. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in stages:
- It acknowledged that the first contention directly raised an interpretation question of S. 5 of the Fifth Schedule and that such a question, in the abstract, may be of substance.
- It then asked whether that question remained a "substantial question" for the purposes of Article 132 given authoritative prior decisions of the Federal Court on the corresponding provision (Section 92 of the Government of India Act).
- The Court referred to Subba Rao v. Veerraju for the test of "substantial question of law" — a point is not substantial if it is practically covered by decisions of the highest court.
- The Court examined the constitutional recognition of Federal Court decisions (citing Articles 372, 225 and 374(2)) and relied on T.M. Arumugam to note the continuing force of Federal Court law after 26-1-1950 until altered by the Supreme Court or competent authority.
- Given that S. 5 of the Fifth Schedule is substantially the same as Section 92 of the Government of India Act, and that the Federal Court had authoritatively interpreted Section 92 in Chatturam and Jatindra Nath Gupta, the Court concluded the constitutional question could not be regarded as substantial so as to justify leave under Article 132.
- On the Article 133(c) point (the notification affecting an estate partly in a scheduled area), the Court observed that the High Court must be satisfied of the substantiality or fitness of the case before certifying; the term "certify" is a strong term and should be used where there are complexities requiring authoritative interpretation by the Supreme Court. The Court found no such difficulty or doubt in the present case and held the notification valid.
- Accordingly, the Court found no justification for granting certificates or leave to appeal and rejected the petitions.
Holding and Implications
PETITIONS REJECTED.
Direct effect: The Court refused leave to appeal under Articles 132 and 133(c) and rejected both petitions. The High Court's orders upholding the validity of Regulation IV of 1951 and the notification under Section 1(4) of the Madras Estates Act (as challenged) stand. No order as to costs was made.
No broader or new precedent was articulated by the Court beyond its application of existing Federal Court authorities and constitutional provisions on the continuing force of those authorities.
Kumarayya, J.:— These are two separate petitions for leave to appeal to Supreme Court under Sections 109 and 110 of the CPC, and Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution of India. They are directed against the final orders passed in W A. Nos. 149 and 150 of 1957 whereby the contentions of the petitioners that Regulation IV of 1951 made by the Governor of Madras purporting to act under S. 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution was ultra vires the powers of the Governor and is a colourable legislation and that the notification issued by the Government of Madras thereafter under Section 1(4) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, XXVI of 1948 fixing a particular date for taking over the estates of Gangolu A and C estates is invalid and liable to be quashed, have been discountenanced and the order passed in W.P No. 28 and 29 of 1953 has been upheld.
2. The main plea advanced by the petitioners is that inasmuch as both the above contentions raise substantial questions of law and that the first contention in particular involves a substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution within the meaning of Article 132 of the Constitution of India, this is a fit and proper case for a certificate under both the Articles 132 and 133(c) of the Constitution of India.
3. It is no doubt true that the first contention turns upon the interpretation of S. 5 of the Firth Schedule of the Constitution of India, and that such a question not only directly arises in the case for determination but also is of some substance, but as discussed in the judgment, the corresponding provisions of the Government of India Act embodied in S. 92 have been authoritatively interpreted by the then highest Court of the land i.e, the Federal Court. The question, therefore, is whether the point of law involved can still be deemed to be a substantial question in view of the authoritative pronouncement of that Court. As to the meaning of the term “substantial question” our attention has been invited to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Subba Rao v. Veerraju 1951-2 Mad L.J 222 at p. 227 : (AIR 1951 Mad 969 at p. 973). The learned Judges therein while discussing the term “substantial question of law” observed as follows:
“When a question of law is fairly arguable, when there is room for difference of opinion on it, then such a question will be a substantial question of law……. But when a point of law is practically covered by the decision of the highest court say like the Privy Council or the Supreme Court, it will not be a substantial question.”
4. In the instant case, no doubt, the provisions of the Constitution of India and not the Government of India Act were for consideration. It is also clear that there is no direct authority of the Supreme Court on this point, and further that as observed in the State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, AIR 1954 SC 245, the Supreme Court is not bound by the decisions of either the Federal Court or the Privy Council.
5. The question, therefore, is whether, in the absence or any pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the pronouncement made by the Federal Court on any such points of law can affect the sub-stantiality of the point for purposes of leave to appeal under Articles 132, 133 and 134. This takes us to the question of the force and authority of the Federal Court's decisions as recognised by the Constitution of India. On a perusal of the various provisions of the Constitution, it would appear that the law settled by the Federal Court will continue to be applicable even after the advent of the Constitution till it is altered by the Supreme Court or by a competent authority. That is what is contemplated by Articles 372 and 225 and also Article 374(2) which provides inter alia that the judgments and orders of the Federal Court delivered or made before the commencement of this Constitution shall have the same force and effect as if they had been delivered or made by the Supreme Court. It is on this basis that the Madras High Court in T.M. Arumugam v. State Of Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 115, observed that the decisions of the Federal Court on points of law given prior to 26-1-1950 are binding on all the Courts within the territory of India after that date.
6. Having regard to the fact that the provisions of S. 5 of the Fifth Schedule are substantially the same as of Section 92 of the Government of India Act on which there is authoritative pronouncement of the Federal Court in Chatturam v. Commr. of Income Tax Bihar, 1947-2 Mad L.J 432 : (AIR 1947 FC 32) and Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar, 1949-2 Mad LT 356 : (AIR 1949 FC 75), we are of the opinion that the question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution involved in the case can no longer be regarded as substantial as to warrant the grant of leave under Article 132.
7. It is next contended that inasmuch as the notification related to an estate partly and not wholly situated in the scheduled area it raises a point of law as to its validity substantial enough to warrant grant of leave under Article 133(c). We are not convinced that the point raised is of substance having regard to the language of the enactment. It must be remembered that the term ‘certify’ use in the Article is a strong term.
8. The High Court must be convinced of the sub-stantiality of the point or of the fitness of the case before it can certify under Article 133. It is only when there are some complexities of law involved in the case requiring an authoritative interpretation by the Supreme Court that a certificate of fitness should be ordinarily granted. The point of law involved should be one of difficulty or of great importance. Having regard to the circumstances of the case this Court felt no such difficulty nor was there a doubt entertained on the point. The notification in question under the circumstances was held to be valid. In such circumstances we do not feel justified in granting a certificate on the mere, ground that there is a question of law involved even though for the reasons shown above it is not substantial.
9. We, therefore, reject both the petitions. No order as to costs.
V.S.B
10. Petitions rejected.
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