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Yeditha Satyanarayanamurty And Others v. Tadi Subrahmanyam And Others
Judgment Summary — Chandra Reddy, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs (three brothers) and defendants 2 and 3 were sons of the first defendant and originally members of a joint Hindu family. Defendants 1 to 3, the first plaintiff, and plaintiff 2 (minor represented by his father and guardian, the first defendant) executed a simple mortgage for Rs. 4,500 in favour of Yeditha Lachanna. On the same day, the same group executed another simple mortgage for a similar sum in favour of Yeditha Sathiraju. On 2 November 1934 agreements of sale were executed in favour of the mortgagees by defendants 1 to 3 and plaintiffs 2 and 3 (the latter two being minors represented by the first defendant).
The plaintiffs instituted suits for partition of the A-schedule properties into six equal shares, for possession of such shares and incidental reliefs, declaring that the agreements dated 2 November 1934 would not bind them or alternatively for recovery of unpaid purchase money with interest.
The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suits on the view that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act prevented the plaintiffs from asserting title. On appeal, the District Judge decreed the suits as regards the share of the first plaintiff but confirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as plaintiffs 2 and 3 were concerned. The aggrieved defendants filed these second appeals challenging the District Judge's conclusion in favour of the first plaintiff. The appeals were referred to this Bench because they raised an important question of law regarding the interpretation of Section 53-A.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act can operate to bar a member of a joint Hindu family (who is not the contracting party) from asserting title to property when the contract of transfer was executed by the family manager or the father on behalf of the family.
- Whether the term "person" in Section 53-A includes a joint Hindu family such that a contract signed by the Manager (or father) can operate, under that section, to debar other family members who did not sign the contract.
- Whether a coparcener (here, the first plaintiff) claims his share "under" the Manager or father of the family such that Section 53-A could be invoked against him.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Section 53-A is a bar to even the first plaintiff suing for recovery because he is a member of the joint family on whose behalf the first defendant entered into agreements of sale.
- The word "person" in Section 53-A includes a joint Hindu family, and the Manager of such a family can make binding contracts on behalf of the family even if he does not expressly describe himself as Manager.
- Authority was cited to show that transactions entered into by a Manager on behalf of the family bind the joint family, and a signature may be implied to be on behalf of the family from the document and surrounding circumstances.
- It was further argued that the first plaintiff is debarred because he claims his share in the family under the Manager (i.e., through the Manager's acts).
Plaintiffs' Position (as reflected in the record)
- The plaintiffs sought partition and possession of equal shares, and asserted that the agreements dated 2 November 1934 would not bind them.
- Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought recovery of the value of unpaid purchase money with interest.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rattayya v. Chandrayya, 1948-1 Mad LJ 392; AIR 1948 Mad 526 | Held that Section 53-A requires the actual signature of the contracting party or of someone who signed expressly on his behalf; the statute does not allow treating a signature as "deemed" to be on behalf of others for the section's purposes. | The Bench expressed respectful agreement with this dictum and applied it to conclude that S.53-A cannot be invoked against persons who have not themselves contracted by a writing "signed by him or on his behalf." |
| V. Chinnayya v. V. Ramamurthi, AIR 1955 NUC (Mad) 3167 (S.A. No. 2695 of 1949) | Supports the same view about the requirement of an actual signature by the contracting party or by someone expressly authorised to sign on his behalf for S.53-A to apply. | The court relied on this authority as also supporting the proposition that S.53-A cannot be applied against family members who were not the contracting parties. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by setting out the language of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and then analyzed the scope of the equitable doctrine of part performance embodied therein. The analysis proceeded along the following lines:
- Textual reading of S.53-A: The section applies where "any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf" and where the transferee has taken or continued possession in part performance and has done acts in furtherance thereof, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part.
- Scope of remedy: The court observed that S.53-A is based on the rule of estoppel and operates as a disability on the contracting party (the transferor) — it prevents the transferor from recovering property after the transferee has partly performed. It is available as a defensive shield to protect a defendant's possession; it does not create a legal title in the transferee and cannot be used as a sword to assert an independent title.
- Requirement of signature: The court held that to attract S.53-A, the contract must be "signed by him or on his behalf." The section requires the signature of the contracting party (the "him") or of someone who was specifically authorised to sign on his behalf. The court rejected the notion that signatures could be treated as "deemed" to be on behalf of others for the purposes of S.53-A; the statutory language does not permit importing such a deeming fiction.
- Interaction with Hindu law principles: Although under Hindu law a Manager (or father) can bind the joint family in appropriate cases, the court concluded that those Hindu law principles are irrelevant when construing S.53-A. The statutory test is formal: whether the contract was signed by the transferor or by someone expressly signing on his behalf. The fact that a Manager may bind a family in Hindu law does not alter the statutory requirement for the operation of S.53-A.
- Application of authorities: The court referred with approval to Rattayya v. Chandrayya and V. Chinnayya v. V. Ramamurthi, both supporting the view that S.53-A requires an actual signature by the contracting party or an expressly authorised signatory and cannot be extended to persons who merely can be said to be represented or affected indirectly.
- On the coparcener point: The court analyzed the contention that the first plaintiff claimed through the Manager and rejected it. It held that a coparcener's interest arises by birth and is not acquired "under" any other coparcener; thus the first plaintiff did not claim "through" the Manager and could not be debarred on that basis under S.53-A.
On these bases the court found that S.53-A could not be applied against members of the joint family who had not themselves contracted (i.e., had not signed the contract or had no one expressly sign on their behalf), and it rejected the appellants' submissions to the contrary.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeals are dismissed.
Implications (direct effects on the parties):
- The District Judge's conclusion upholding the first plaintiff's right to his share (as distinct from plaintiffs 2 and 3) is sustained by this Bench.
- The appellants' contention that Section 53-A bars the first plaintiff from claiming his share because the Manager contracted on behalf of the joint family was rejected.
- The parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.
Broader legal implication as reflected in the opinion: the court applied existing authorities to hold that Section 53-A operates only against the contracting party (or someone who has expressly signed on his behalf); it functions as an equitable shield based on estoppel, and does not apply to non-contracting family members merely because a Manager purported to bind the family under Hindu law.
V.B.B
Final disposal: Appeals dismissed.
Chandra Reddy, C.J:— These second appeals have been referred to a Bench by Umamaheswaram J., as an important question of law relating to the interpretation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is involved in them.
2. The facts are not in dispute and may be briefly set out in so far as they are relevant for this enquiry. The plaintiffs, three in number, and defendants 2 and 3 are the sons of the first defendant and originally they formed members of a joint Hindu family. Defendants 1 to 3, the first plaintiff and plaintiff 2 minor by his father and guardian, the first defendant, Executed a simple mortgage for Rs. 4,500/- in favour of the Yeditha Lachanna. On the same day, the same persons executed another simple mortgage for a similar sum in favour of one Yeditha Sathiraju. Sometime later, i.e, on 2nd November, 1934, agreements of sale were executed in favour of the mortgagees by defendants 1 to 3 and plaintiffs 2 and 3, the later two being minors by their father and guardian, the first defendant. It is unnecessary for us in this context to refer to the proceedings for scaling down the debts instituted by one or the other members of the family.
3. The suits giving rise to these appeals were instituted by the three plaintiffs, plaintiffs 2 and 3 being the younger brother of the first plaintiff, for partition of the A schedule properties into six equal shares, for possession of such shares and for other incidental reliefs, after declaring that the agreements dated 2nd November, 1934 in favour of the defendants would not bind the plaintiffs etc., or in the alternative, for recovery of the value of the unpaid purchase money with interest thereon.
4. The suits were dismissed by the Subordinate Judge in the view that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act prevented the plaintiffs from asserting any title to the properties in dispute. On appeal, the District Judge decreed the suits as regards the share of the first plaintiff, while confirming the judgment of the trial court in regard to plaintiffs 2 and 3 being of the opinion that S. 53-A was no impediment in the way of the first plaintiff filing a suit for partition and for recovery of his share of the property. This conclusion of the District Judge is assailed in these second appeals filed by the aggrieved defendants.
5. It is urged in support of these appeals that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is a bar to even to first plaintiff suing for the recovery of the property since he is a member of the joint family on whose behalf the first defendant entered into agreements of sale. The argument on behalf of the appellants is put thus. The word ‘person’ occurring in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act includes ‘a joint Hindu Family’ and the Manager of such a family can make binding contracts on behalf of the family and in so doing it is not essential that he should describe himself as the Manager.
6. Several rulings were cited to us as substantiating this proposition. It is not necessary to refer to them in detail as they only establish that the transactions entered into by a Manager on behalf of the family would bind the joint family and this result would follow even if he does not describe himself as such, provided that he was the Manager at the material time and it could be implied from the contents of the document and the surrounding circumstances that he acted in that capacity.
7. In such event he will be deemed to have signed the document on behalf of the family, notwithstanding that he does not purport to do so. The authority of the father to represent the family is unquestionable. We also agree that the word “person” is comprehensive enough to include a joint family.
8. That point, however, does not arise for determination in this enquiry as the question in this case has to be answered with reference to the terms of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. There is no scope for importing the principles of Hindu Law as to the binding nature of transactions entered into by the Manager of the family. It is convenient to read here Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. It reads:
“Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any pair: thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract,
and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract,
then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferrer or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.”
9. It is seen that the equitable doctrine of part performance embodied in S. 53-A is applicable only where a person having contracted to transfer property by writing signed by him or on his behalf and put the vendee in possession thereof, wants to recover the property taking advantage of want of formality in the evidence. In other words, this section precludes a transferor from asserting his title in respect of property transferred by him when the conditions contemplated by the section are fulfilled.
10. It is based on the rule of estoppel, and hence the disability attached to a contracting party and not to any other person. This is available only to a defendant to protect his possession and it does not create any legal title in him. To put it differently, it can be used only as a shield and not as a weapon of attack. That being so, it could not be applied against a member of a joint Hindu family who has not agreed to transfer the property by writing signed by him or on his behalf.
11. It is true that an agreement of sale made by the Manager of the family would bind all the persons provided it is for the benefit of the family and would affect the interests of each of them, as, under Hindu Law, the Manager is vested with authority to represent the family and to do all acts on its behalf, so long as they are not detrimental to its interests. But those considerations are irrelevant in construing S. 53-A which bars a person who has contracted to sell property by writing “signed by him or on his behalf.”
12. Thus, in order to attract S. 53-A, it is essential that the contract must be signed by him or expressly on his behalf. That section cannot come into play where the writing is deemed to have been signed on his behalf. That covers only two cases, namely, where the plaintiff has actually signed or where someone who has been specifically authorised has signed on his behalf. If the language was “signed by him or on his behalf or deemed to have been signed by him” it would have been permissible to import such notions into the section. As it is, the signature must be by the contracting party or by some-one on his behalf.
13. There is authority for this view of ours. In Rattayya v. Chandrayya, 1948-1 Mad LJ 392 : (AIR 1948 Mad 526), it was ruled by Satyanarayana Rao J., that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act requires that there should be the actual signature of somebody who is the plaintiff or of some one on his behalf. In the absence of it, S. 53-A could not be availed of by the defendant. The learned Judge in repelling the contention similar to the one put forward in this case, observed as follows:—
“The language of S. 53-A is not that the contract should be signed “by him or must be deemed to have been signed on his behalf”. The language is “signed by him or on his behalf”. The statute therefore requires the actual signature of somebody who is the plaintiff or by some one on his behalf. If it is merely a question of inferring that the signature was on behalf of others also the section, in my opinion, would have no application and the language should have been “signed by him or on his behalf or deemed to have been signed on his behalf”. To accept the contention of the learned advocate for the respondent would be introducing into the language of the section, ignoring the express words, terms which are not there.”
14. We are in respectful agreement with the dicta laid down by the learned Judge in that passage. The judgment of Krishnaswami Nayudu J., in V. Chinnayya v. V. Ramamurthi, AIR 1955 NUC (Mad) 3167: (S.A No. 2695 of 1949) is to a like effect. For these reasons, we cannot give effect to the submission made on behalf of the appellants that S. 53-A affords protection against every member of the joint Hindu family, notwithstanding that he is not the contracting party.
15. It was next urged by Sri Subrahmanyam for the appellants that the first plaintiff is debarred from claiming the property, since he claims his share in the family under the Manager of the joint family. We do not think we can subscribe to this proposition.
16. A coparcener does not claim interest in the co-parcenary under any other coparcener. He acquires interest in the joint family property by birth and does not claim it under his father or the Manager of the family. Nor could it be predicated that he claims the interest through the joint family.
17. The joint family is a collection of the members thereof and the property of all the coparceners constitutes the joint family property. There is, therefore no question of any individual member claiming it through the family. This argument is devoid of substance and is therefore negatived.
18. In the result, these appeals are dismissed. In our opinion these are fit cases in which the parties should be directed to bear their own costs throughout.
V.B.B
19. Appeals dismissed.
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