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Berar Oil Industries And Another v. The Deputy Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes, Anantapur

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Oct 7, 1958

Judgment

Subsequent
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (P. Chandra Reddy, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These connected revision proceedings concern sales-tax assessments made against dealers purchasing groundnuts and manufacturing groundnut oil and vanaspati. The principal party in several matters (T.R.C Nos. 47 & 48 and T.R.C Nos. 75–77 of 1956) is Messrs Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. They were assessed to purchase tax for certain transactions in the years 1950–51 and 1952–53. The court notes that the factual findings underlying the assessments are not open to challenge in these revision proceedings.

Central procedural elements: the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal had earlier held that some of the transactions fell within the Explanation to Article 286 of the Constitution (and thus were not taxable by the State where delivery took place) having regard to the Supreme Court decision in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar. Parliament subsequently enacted the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 to nullify the effect of that decision and to restore the legal position as stated in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd.

Another separate revision (Tax Revision Case No. 25 of 1956) concerned Messrs Berar Oil Industries. The assessment related to purchases of groundnuts made in Andhra Pradesh in 1951; the turnover was itemised and the court analysed whether deliveries were taken within Andhra Pradesh or outside it for purposes of Article 286.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the term "groundnut" includes "groundnut kernel" for the purpose of levying purchase tax.
Whether transactions in which the sale was completed in one State but delivery effected in another fall within the Explanation to Article 286 and thereby prevent the State where delivery occurred from levying tax.
Whether the Madras Sales Tax Act and the Turnover and Assessment Rules (specifically Rule 4(2)) empower the Revenue to levy tax at the point of purchase (purchase-point taxation) for goods specified (including groundnut).
Whether, where tax is leviable on purchase of certain goods, the department must wait until those purchased goods are ultimately sold by the purchaser before imposing tax (i.e., the single-point taxation / timing question relied on from Full Bench authorities).
Whether the Government's withdrawal of the rebate regarding refined oil was barred by the second proviso to section 3(5) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act (to avoid double taxation) or by Article 14 of the Constitution.
In Tax Revision Case No. 25 of 1956 (Berar Oil), whether deliveries that were physically taken in Andhra Pradesh but where transport to another State was effected by the purchaser's agent attract the Explanation to Article 286.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners (Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. and similarly situated dealers)

Contended that "groundnut" should not be read to include groundnut kernel (and thus purchase tax on kernel should not be leviable).
Argued that sales were completed in other States and that deliveries in Andhra State therefore could not be taxed by Andhra State under Article 286 — the Tribunal decision invoking The Bengal Immunity case was relied upon.
Advanced a contention that, because ownership passed in other States, the transactions were not to be regarded as inter-State (and so should not be taxed by Andhra State).
Asserted that the Sales Tax Act (and Rule 4(2)) do not invest the Revenue with power to levy tax at purchase point for groundnuts (i.e., the charging provision is section 3, not Rule 4(2)).
Alternatively, relied on Full Bench authority (Hajee Abdul Shukoor & Co.) to submit that even if purchase taxation is permitted, the department must wait to impose the tax until the goods purchased are ultimately sold by the company (single-point taxation principle).
Challenged the Government's withdrawal of rebate for refined oil on the basis that the second proviso to section 3(5) prevents double taxation and therefore the rebate could not be cancelled; also argued the withdrawal violated Article 14 (equal protection/equality before the law).

Respondent / Revenue

Maintained that the expression "groundnut" includes kernel (T.R.C No. 44 decision relied on by the court).
Relied on the effect of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 to assert that sales which fall within the Explanation to Article 286 are taxable in the States where deliveries are made (thus denying the Tribunal's earlier exemption view under Bengal Immunity).
Asserted that Rule 4(2), made under section 3(4) of the Madras Sales Tax Act, properly treats purchases of certain goods (including groundnut) as turnover for assessment and therefore purchase-point taxation is valid.
Contended that no provision imposes an obligation on the department to postpone assessment until the purchased goods are resold by the purchaser.
Defended the amendment excluding refined oil from rebate (sub-rule (5) added to rule 18) as a valid classification and not violative of Article 14 or the second proviso to section 3(5).
In the Berar Oil matter, reasoned that the factual materials showed delivery was taken in Andhra Pradesh (agent took possession), and therefore the Explanation to Article 286 did not apply.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar [1955] 6 S.T.C 446 S.C.	Held (as understood by the Tribunal) that certain transactions were saved by Article 286, limiting State power to tax deliveries made in another State.	The Tribunal relied on this decision to exempt the company from tax; the court records this reliance but notes Parliament enacted the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 to get over the effect of this decision.
The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. [1953] 4 S.T.C 133 S.C.	The earlier Supreme Court view as restored by Parliament (i.e., supporting the State's power to tax sales within the Explanation to Article 286 where deliveries are made in the State).	The court records that the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 restored the law as pronounced in this case, and applies that restored principle to hold that deliveries made in a State bring the sale within the taxing power of that State.
Sundararamier and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1958] 9 S.T.C 298	Interprets the Explanation to Article 286 to include transactions where sale completed in one State but delivery effected in another as an integral part of the sale.	The court cites this decision to reject the petitioners' argument that ownership passing in another State exempts the transaction; the Explanation covers such transactions.
Hajee Abdul Shukoor and Co. v. State of Madras (Full Bench)	Explains that Rule 4(2) does not fix the single point of taxation for hides and skins; rule 16 fixed the single point in that context.	The petitioners relied on this Full Bench passage to argue for postponement of purchase taxation until resale; the court held the Full Bench ruling is not helpful for groundnuts, which are governed by Rule 4(2) and subject to multiple taxation.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohammed Azam Abdul Bari & Co.	Followed Hajee Abdul Shukoor on related points concerning hides and skins and single-point fixation.	The court notes this decision but says it does not touch the specific question whether the department must await resale of the very goods bought by the dealer.
Pithapuram Tobacco Merchants' Union v. State of Andhra Pradesh	Interprets "such goods" narrowly — cigars, cheroots, bidi, snuff etc. made out of tobacco leaves were not "such goods" as tobacco for the second proviso to section 3(5).	The court relies on this reasoning to reject the argument that oils extracted from groundnuts (refined oil) are necessarily included in "such goods" for the purpose of rebate protection; the court treats "such goods" as not extending to products made out of the goods.
Mohammed Ishok v. State of Madras	Clarifies that the Explanation to Article 286 concerns delivery to the buyer, not transport across a border by the buyer's agent.	The court cites this authority in the Berar Oil matter to hold that transport by the buyer's agent across the border does not attract the Explanation; delivery to the buyer in the State suffices for the State to tax.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds as follows:

On the scope of the word "groundnut": the court refers to the disposition in T.R.C No. 44 of 1956 (disposed on 30th August 1958) which decided that the expression "groundnut" is comprehensive enough to include kernel; that contention is therefore negatived for the present matters.
On Article 286 and the applicability of the Explanation: although the Tribunal had previously accepted the Bengal Immunity line and held that certain transactions were saved by Article 286, Parliament enacted the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 to reverse the effect of Bengal Immunity and to restore the law as in State of Bombay v. United Motors. The legislative change means sales falling within the Explanation to Article 286 are taxable in the State where deliveries are made; this legislative-mandated restoration undermines the petitioners' reliance on Bengal Immunity.
On the argument that ownership passing in other States avoids inter-State taxation: the court rejects this. It reads the Explanation as covering transactions where the sale is completed in one State but the delivery is effected in another as an integral part of the sale (citing Sundararamier). Hence the fact that ownership might be said to pass elsewhere does not avoid the Explanation's operation when delivery occurs in the taxing State.
On Rule 4(2) / purchase-point taxation: the court recognises that the charging provision is section 3, but observes that section 3(4) expressly empowers the Government to prescribe rules to determine turnover. Rule 4(2) (in the Turnover and Assessment Rules, 1939) specifies categories of goods in respect of which purchase constitutes turnover, including groundnut. Therefore, for such enumerated goods power is vested in the department to levy tax at the point of purchase. The court notes that it is well-recognised that tax may be collected either at sale point or purchase point and rejects a challenge to the department's authority to levy at purchase point.
On reliance upon Hajee Abdul Shukoor (single-point taxation / waiting until resale): the court finds the Full Bench decision concerned hides and skins and the fixation of single point under rule 16. It holds that that reasoning does not assist the petitioners for groundnuts, which are specifically dealt with in Rule 4(2) and are subject to multiple taxation under the scheme; there is no provision that requires the department to wait until the purchaser ultimately resells the goods.
On withdrawal of rebate for refined oil and section 3(5) proviso (ii): the court analyses the language of "such goods" in the second proviso and refuses to extend its meaning to include oils produced from the enumerated goods. The court treats such an expansion as unduly enlarging the statutory phrase. It cites Pithapuram Tobacco Merchants' Union as authority for not equating products made out of the goods with the goods themselves. Consequently, cancellation of the rebate for refined oil is not inconsistent with section 3(5).
On Article 14 challenge to rebate withdrawal: the court considers the classification (crude oil v refined oil) and accepts that the Government may have legitimate policy reasons (encouraging export or conserving cake for the country; later deciding refined oil to be largely for domestic consumption). The court holds that a reasonable nexus exists between the classification and the object of the rule; therefore Article 14 is not breached.
In the Berar Oil revision (T.R.C No. 25 of 1956), the court scrutinised documents and probabilities and concluded that goods were delivered to the petitioner's agent in Andhra Pradesh, who then despatched them to the principal place of business. The Explanation to Article 286 addresses delivery to the buyer by the seller, not transport effected by the buyer's agent; thus Mohammed Ishok is cited and the court holds that the Explanation is not attracted. The revision is dismissed.

Holding and Implications

The court's principal rulings and their direct effects are:

On scope of "groundnut": the court treats the expression as including groundnut kernel (following T.R.C No. 44 of 1956), and thus purchase tax on kernel is sustainable.
On Article 286 / Explanation: because Parliament passed the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 restoring the law in State of Bombay v. United Motors, sales within the Explanation to Article 286 are taxable in the State where deliveries are made; reliance on Bengal Immunity does not avail the petitioners in light of the validation statute.
On purchase-point taxation: Rule 4(2), made under section 3(4) of the Madras Sales Tax Act, validly specifies goods (including groundnut) for which purchase constitutes turnover — therefore tax at the purchase point is permissible.
On rebate for refined oil: the Government validly excluded refined oil from rebate by amending the Turnover and Assessment Rules (adding sub-rule (5) to rule 18); the second proviso to section 3(5) does not compel retention of rebate for refined oil, and Article 14 is not contravened by this classification.

Case-specific final orders (as pronounced in the opinion):

T.R.C Nos. 47 and 48 of 1956: Allowed, except to the extent of weighment charges which were treated as permissible deductions. The respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate's fee fixed at Rs. 250 in each case.
T.R.C Nos. 75 to 77 of 1956: Dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee fixed at Rs. 200 in each case.
Tax Revision Case No. 25 of 1956 (Berar Oil Industries): Dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee fixed at Rs. 150.
C.M.P Nos. 7919 to 7922 of 1958: Not pressed and dismissed.

Implications: The decision applies the post‑Bengal Immunity statutory scheme (Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956) and reconfirms that where deliveries are made in a State transactions falling within the Explanation to Article 286 are taxable in that State. The opinion does not announce the setting of a novel precedent beyond applying existing and restored legal principles; its direct effects are the disposal of the named revisions and fixation of costs and advocate fees as stated above.

Limitations: This summary is confined strictly to the matters and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions not expressly stated in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

P. Chandra Reddy, C.J:— These revision cases raise common questions of law and can, therefore, be disposed of by one judgment.

2. The respondent in T.R.C Nos. 47 and 48 of 1956 and the petitioner in T.R.C Nos. 75 to 77 of 1956 is Messrs Thungabhadra Industries Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners). The petitioners purchase groundnuts and convert them into refined oil as also vanaspati. For the years 1950-51 and 1952-53, the company was assessed to purchase tax in regard to certain purchases made by them. It is unnecessary for us to go into the details of the transactions or of the taxes levied thereon, as the findings of fact cannot be canvassed in these revision cases. One of the points presented in these cases is whether tax can be levied on the purchase of groundnut kernel; in other words, whether the word “groundnut” includes groundnut kernel also. This was answered in T.R.C No. 44 of 1956*, which was disposed of on 30th August, 1958. It was decided that the expression “groundnut” is comprehensive enough to take in kernel also. This contention is therefore negatived. Another argument pressed upon us is that as the sales in question were completed in other States, the fact that deliveries were made in the Andhra State would not enable the Government to impose taxes. It may be mentioned here that before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the petitioner succeeded on this issue on the ground that these deals fell within the scope of Article 286 of the Constitution. The Tribunal thought that having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar [1955] 6 S.T.C 446 S.C. which departed from the view taken in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. [1953] 4 S.T.C 133 S.C., the company could not be assessed to tax as the transactions were saved by Article 286 of the Constitution. If matters had stood there, the Tax Revision Cases filed by the Government against the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal will have to be dismissed. But, subsequently, the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (Act No. 7 of 1956) was passed by the Parliament to get over the effect of the decision in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and to restore the law pronounced in The. State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. The result is that all sales which come within the range of the Explanation to Article 286 are taxable in the States in which the deliveries are made.

3. An attempt was made to get over the difficulty created by the passing of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act by arguing that since the ownership in the goods passed in other States, they could not be regarded as inter-State transactions. Apart from the circumstance that the petitioner-company took the stand before the Tribunal that these sales were covered by the Explanation to Article 286 and got an exemption on that score before the Tribunal, it is precisely this kind of transactions that are affected by the Explanation. A reading of the Explanation leaves no room for doubt that a transaction where the sale has been completed in one State but the delivery is effected in another State as an integral part of the sale, attracts the Explanation to Article 286 of the Constitution. (Vide the decision in Sundararamier and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1958] 9 S.T.C 298.). We therefore reject this argument also.

4. It was next urged that the Sales Tax Act has not invested the Revenue with power to levy tax on the purchase of groundnut and that Rule 4(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, has not the effect of conferring the power of taxation at the purchase point. We are not very much impressed with this argument. Undoubtedly, it is section 3 that is the charging section and the power of taxation is not derived from Rule 4(2) of the Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, in regard to groundnuts. That section enables the Sales Tax Authorities to tax the turnover of a dealer. But the legislature has left the power to Government to frame rules to determine the turnover, after defining the scope of the liability to tax and specifying the persons who are liable to pay tax etc.

5. It is pursuant to the power conferred by section 3(4) of the Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939, which says,

“For the purposes of this section and the other provisions of this Act, turnover shall be determined in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed”

that the Turnover and Assessment Rules, 1939, were framed. Rule 4(2) specifies certain categories of goods in regard to which the purchase thereof will constitute turnover. As we have already pointed out, it is the turnover of a dealer which is subject to the levy of sales tax and in regard to the goods enumerated in Rule 4(2) including groundnut, the purchase amount will be deemed to be the turnover. Consequently, power is vested in the department to levy tax on goods at the purchase point. It is well-recognised that tax could be collected either at sale point or purchase point and it is too late in the day to contest the authority of the department to levy tax at purchase point.

6. Finding the futility of the submission, counsel for the petitioner fell back upon the argument that although the tax is leviable on the purchase of commodities mentioned in rule 2, the department has to wait to impose the tax till the goods involved in the purchases were ultimately sold by the company. As substantiating this proposition, the learned counsel calls in aid a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Hajee Abdul Shukoor and Co. v. State of Madras. The passage that is relied on by the learned counsel occurs at page 364 of the report and it reads thus:

“The conclusion we have reached as a result of the above discussion is that (1) the charging provision section 3 is subject, in the case of transactions in hides and skins, to the terms of section 5(vi) under which a single point of taxation in a series of sales has to be fixed by the rules; (2) Rule 4(2) is not the fixation of a single point within section 5(vi) but is merely designed to determine whether it is the buyer or the seller that shall be liable to be taxed; (3) the single point is fixed and the liability to tax is established only under rule 16;. and (4) that under rule 16(2)(i) it is only the sale of untanned hides and skins by a licensed dealer to a licensed tanner who tans the same that gives rise to a tax liability and that purchases of untanned hides and skins by tanners from persons other than licensed dealers are not within the taxing provisions.”

7. We do not think that this judgment affords us any guidance. That decision merely pointed out that Rule 4(2) did not purport to fix the single point taxation in regard to hides and skins but it is rule 16 that achieved that object. So far as groundnuts are concerned, they are dealt with in Rule 4(2) and they are subject to multiple taxation. The ruling of the Full Bench of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohammed Azam Abdul Bari & Co., which followed the decision in Hajee Abdul Shukoor & Co. v. State of Madras, is also not relevant to the present enquiry, as that does not touch the question whether the department has to await the sale of the very goods purchased by the dealer. There is no provision of law either in the Act or in the Rules which impose such an obligation on the department. When once it is established that tax could be levied on purchase of certain goods, it cannot be postulated that the department has to wait till the commodities are disposed of by the purchaser. This submission lacks substance and has to be overruled.

8. We will now deal with the argument bearing on the action of the Government in withdrawing the rebate as regards the refined oil. The point sought to be made is, under section 3(5), proviso (ii), of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, where a dealer has been taxed in respect of the purchase of any goods in accordance with rules referred to in clause (i), he shall not be taxed again in respect of any sale of such goods effected by him and consequently it is not within the competence of the Government to cancel the rebate concerning the refined oil. It may be noticed that the Government granted rebate in regard to refined oil also upto 1951 when the Turnover and Assessment Rules were amended excluding the refined oil from the ambit of rule 18 by adding sub-rule (5). Sub-rule (5) enacted that sub-rules (1) to (4) which enable the dealers to claim rebate in regard to oils would not apply to refined oil. The argument pressed upon us by Sri Ranganadha Sastry is that the object of the second proviso to section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1939, being to avoid double taxation, refined oil also should be deemed to come within the purview of “such goods” mentioned in the second proviso. We are unable to give effect to this contention. It is true that the intendment of the section is not to tax a transaction twice, but that does not mean that the Government is under a duty to give rebate in regard to all products of groundnut. It would be straining the meaning of the words “such goods”, if we were to interpret them as including oils extracted out of the “goods”. That will be unduly enlarging the content of that expression. We have to give plain meaning to the words occurring in an enacted legislation, unless the circumstances compel us to deviate from such a course. If citation is needed for such a proposition, the decision in Pithapuram Tobacco Merchants' Union v. State of Andhra Pradesh may be referred to. In this decision, it was remarked by Subba Rao, C.J, (as he then was) and Jaganmohan Reddy, J., that cigars, cheroots, bidi, snuff etc., made out of tobacco leaves were not “such goods” as tobacco within the definition of the second proviso to section 3(5) of the General Sales Tax Act. Hence, the argument that the withdrawal of rebate as regards refined oil is inconsistent with the main provision of the enactment, falls and is negatived.

9. Alternatively; it is contended that this cancellation contravenes the wholesome principle underlying Article 14 of the Constitution. It is said that this withdrawal is in conflict with the doctrine of equality before law and equal protection of laws contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. We do not think we can accept this argument. Either the rule granting the rebate or the one withdrawing the rebate in regard to refined oil does not disclose the reasons therefor. Perhaps the object in granting the rebate is to encourage the conversion of seeds into oil and then export it instead of the groundnut being exported in the shape of kernel. This would result in the saving of cake for the country. Finding that it was no longer necessary to continue the rebate in regard to refined oil since refined oil is mostly consumed in the country, the Government might have taken the step it did in this behalf. That apart, it cannot be predicated that there is no reasonable basis for classifying the oil into crude oil and refined oil. Nor can it be said that the nexus that is essential between the reason for the division and the object of the rules is absent in a case like this. As we have already remarked, the idea of rebate might have emanated from a desire to encourage the export of oil to other countries. In these circumstances, we hold that this argument also is equally untenable and is overruled. No other points are argued in these revision cases.

10. It follows that T.R.C Nos. 47 and 48 of 1956 are allowed except to the extent of weighment charges which were treated as permissible deductions and the respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner herein. Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 250 in each of these cases. T.R.C Nos. 75 to 77 of 1956 are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee in each of them is fixed at Rs. 200.

Tax Revision Case No. 25 Of 1956

11. The petitioner herein is Messrs Berar Oil Industries carrying on the business of manufacture of groundnut oil at Akola in Madhya Pradesh. It has a branch at Adoni within the State of Andhra Pradesh. In regard to the purchases of groundnut made by the petitioner in the State of Andhra Pradesh in the year 1951, the Sales Tax Department levied taxes amounting to Rs. 9,359-13-0. The total turnover in this behalf was estimated at Rs. 6,00,858-13-3. For the purpose of this revision, the turnover may be divided into two categories. In regard to certain purchases amounting to Rs. 2,74,762-7-3, the petitioner figured both as the consignor and the consignee, while in respect of the turnover of Rs. 3,34,358-4-0 the consignor was the seller, the petitioner being the consignee.

12. With regard to the first category, the case was not seriously pressed either before the Tribunal or before us.

13. In scrutinising the transactions, it is important to note that the petitioner had a branch at Adoni. It was argued here that these purchases are not subject to any tax for the reason that delivery was made outside the State of Andhra Pradesh and consequently they fell within the ambit of the Explanation to Article 286 of the Constitution. It is only the State where delivery has been made that is entitled to collect the tax on these goods. We are not inclined to accept this argument. With regard to the first category, there could be no room for any argument that the delivery was outside the State of Andhra Pradesh. The various documents produced and the probabilities of the case establish beyond doubt that the representative of the petitioner took possession of the goods and later on despatched them to Akola. This is not a case where the seller himself, notwithstanding that the sale had been completed within one State, had transported the goods to another State where delivery was taken by the purchaser.

14. On the proved facts, the goods were delivered to the agent of the vendee, who in his turn despatched them to the principal place of business. The position does not seem to be very different even in respect of transactions where the consignor is the seller and the consignee is the purchaser. The invoices produced by the petitioner before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and which have been marked as Exhibits A-1 to A-10 make out that the goods were delivered to the petitioner in the Andhra Pradesh State itself. It is true that the seller is described as the consignor in the railway receipt, but the reason for this is set out by the Tribunal in its order. We are unable to disagree with the Tribunal in this regard. The probabilities also are that delivery must have been effected in the Andhra Pradesh State itself because the petitioner company has a branch at Adoni.

15. It was argued by the counsel for the petitioner that even so these transactions are governed by the Explanation to Article 286 of the Constitution for the reason that transport of goods is an integral part of the sale. We do not think we can give any weight to this argument. The Explanation is concerned only with the delivery to the buyer and not with the transport of the goods by his agent across the border and handing them over to his principal in another State. It is only in cases where the delivery is made by the seller himself to the buyer in another State that the Explanation is attracted and the right to levy tax thereon is vested in the State where delivery is effected. See Mohammed Ishok v. State of Madras. For these reasons, we hold that the petitioner cannot claim exemption in these cases also on the ground that they are saved by the Explanation. This revision case also fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 150.

C.M.P Nos. 7919 to 7922 of 1958

16. These petitions are not pressed and they are dismissed.

17. Ordered accordingly.