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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. G.M. Chennabasappa
Case Summary — Reference under Section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act
Factual and Procedural Background
This reference arises from an assessment dispute involving the assessee, a Hindu undivided family engaged in large-scale manufacture and dealing in groundnut kernel and oil. In the books for the Deepavali year ended 12-11-1947 (previous year for assessment year 1948–1949) the assessee's ledgers showed certain cash credits in four ledger accounts (annexures A to D) totalling Rs. 41,255/-. The Income-tax Officer (ITO) required the assessee to prove the genuineness of these transactions and, being unsatisfied with the explanations, added the sums to income in the assessment.
On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner reduced the addition by considering only peak credits, which amounted to Rs. 19,968/-. The assessee appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal rearranged the four accounts and, on that rearrangement, took peak credits to aggregate Rs. 10,300/-. The Tribunal further opined that even this amount need not be added because intangible additions of over Rs. 30,000/- in the assessments for 1946–47 and 1947–48 could reasonably be considered to cover this peak introduction; accordingly the Tribunal deleted the entire addition of Rs. 19,968/- and directed the ITO to amend the assessment.
The Revenue sought a reference to the High Court; this attempt failed at the Tribunal stage. The petitioner (Revenue) approached the High Court under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act asking for questions of law to be referred. The High Court directed the Tribunal to state a case and submitted two questions to the High Court for decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in making out a new case for the assessee in respect of the peak credit ascertained by it on a rearrangement of the impugned credits.
- Whether the sum of Rs. 10,300/- ascertained by the Tribunal as a peak credit is based on an obvious mistake.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Position (Revenue)
- The Revenue sought referral of questions of law to the High Court challenging the Tribunal's deletion of the addition and its procedure of rearranging credits to form a new case for the assessee.
- The petitioner advanced two questions (initially framed) focusing on whether there was material to support the Tribunal's conclusion that the cash credits were explained by intangible additions and whether the assessee discharged the onus of establishing genuineness of the cash credits aggregating to Rs. 19,968/-.
Respondent's Position (Assessee / Counsel)
- Counsel for the respondent sought to re-open the question whether the cash credits were properly explained or not, although the ITO and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had found the explanations unsatisfactory and the assessee had admitted several entries were fictitious.
- Counsel for the respondent also argued that the issue whether the amounts formed part of intangible additions of prior years had not been specifically raised in the questions directed to be submitted by the Tribunal, and therefore the High Court should not address that aspect at this stage.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| D.C. Auddy and Bros. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, 1955-28 ITR 713 (AIR 1956 Cal 295) | Establishes that, once explanations offered by an assessee are rejected, the Revenue may treat unexplained cash credits as income of the year in which entries were made; burden lies on the assessee to show such receipts belonged to earlier years (i.e., formed part of intangible additions). | The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the Tribunal had no basis for conjecturing that the disputed sums were part of intangible additions for prior years when the assessee had not advanced such a case; deletion of the entire addition was therefore unwarranted. |
| Ganga Ram Balmokand v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, 1937-5 ITR 464 (AIR 1937 Lah 721) | Affirms that the High Court is not confined to the formulation of questions by the Commissioner or the court issuing mandamus and has full power to decide questions of law as they actually arise from the statement of the case. | Used to support the proposition that the High Court has the power and duty to reframe/recast questions to bring out the real dispute between the parties under Section 66 of the Act. |
| Shiva Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P., AIR 1929 All. 819 | Holds that the High Court is entitled to re-settle issues and decide them (i.e., restate or reframe questions) when deciding references under the statutory provision. | Cited to reinforce the High Court's authority to reframe questions of law arising from the statement of the case. |
| Rameshwara Rao v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad, 1957 Andh L.T 891 (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 53) | States that if a question is ambiguous the Court is entitled to reframe or amend it; the power to reframe or amend is implied in sub-section (5) of Section 66. | Relied upon to justify the High Court's ability to recast questions in order to bring out the real controversy between the parties. |
| Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, 1954-26 ITR 765 (AIR 1955 SC 176) | Supreme Court authority indicating that the High Court may raise or reframe a question which arises as a corollary to the answer to another question; the High Court need not be strictly confined to the precise questions submitted. | Invoked to support the High Court's discretion to reframe or add questions where necessary to decide the real issue before it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds in distinct stages corresponding to the central issues identified in the stated case.
1. On whether the Tribunal was justified in rearranging the ledgers to compute peak credits:
- The Court confined the inquiry to whether there was any basis for the Tribunal to rearrange the cash credits; it did not revisit the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's (AAC) decision because no appeal was taken by the Department against the AAC and that decision had become final.
- The Tribunal's order gave no reasons for the procedure of rearrangement. The assessee never contended that the four ledger accounts (annexures A–D), each standing in different names, constituted a single account that ought to be arranged chronologically as one account. Accordingly, there was no factual foundation for treating them as one account.
- One ground advanced before the AAC was that certain annexures (B, C and D) should be reduced to peak credits (annexure A had a single entry only). However, that point was not pursued before the Tribunal in a manner that justified the Tribunal's combining and rearranging the separate accounts. The Court found the Tribunal effectively "making out a new case" for the assessee without any supporting basis.
- On this basis the Court concluded the Tribunal had no justification for regarding the disparate ledger accounts as one account and for arranging them chronologically so as to derive a smaller peak-credit figure.
2. On whether the cash credits were genuine or could be attributed to prior-year intangible additions:
- The Court noted that the ITO was not satisfied with the assessee's explanations, and that the AAC and Tribunal had acquiesced in that unsatisfactory view. The assessee had, in any event, admitted that several entries were fictitious.
- Once the explanations were found unsatisfactory, the Department was entitled to treat the entries as income accounts in the year in which the entries were made. The contention that they were genuine cash credits therefore failed.
- The Tribunal's further view that the disputed sums might have been included among intangible additions in earlier assessments was unsustainable in the absence of any case advanced by the assessee to that effect. The Court relied on the principle (citing D.C. Auddy and Bros.) that it is the assessee's burden to show that receipts in a particular accounting year were in fact income of earlier years and formed part of intangible additions.
- The Tribunal, having no evidence or case put forward by the assessee on that point, had indulged in conjecture; deletion of the entire addition of Rs. 19,968/- was therefore unwarranted.
3. On the High Court's power to recast questions:
- The Court examined Section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act and concluded that, although the subsection does not expressly spell out a power to recast questions, such power is implied. The High Court's duty includes reframing questions to bring out the real dispute between the parties.
- The Court cited multiple authorities (including Ganga Ram Balmokand, Shiva Prasad, Rameshwara Rao and the Supreme Court in Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills) in support of the proposition that the High Court may reframe or restate questions to decide the real controversy presented by the stated case.
- Applying that principle, the Court treated the question of whether the disputed sums formed part of intangible additions in prior years as encompassed by the first question it was asked to decide; hence it was competent to decide that issue as well.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The questions referred were answered in favour of the Department.
Implications and direct consequences derived from the opinion as expressed in the text:
- The Tribunal was not justified in rearranging separate ledger accounts standing in different names so as to create a new case for the assessee and to reduce the addition by reference to an artificially derived peak credit. The Tribunal's deletion of the entire addition of Rs. 19,968/- was unwarranted.
- The Tribunal's speculative conclusion that part of the disputed sums might have been included in intangible additions for prior years lacked any case or material from the assessee and could not sustain deletion; the burden to prove such a connection lay on the assessee.
- The respondent (the assessee) was ordered to pay the costs of the petitioner in the sum fixed by the Court, Rs. 150/-, as recorded in the opinion.
The opinion does not state that a novel legal principle was established; rather, existing authorities and principles concerning the burden of proof on an assessee and the High Court's power to reframe questions under Section 66(5) were applied to dispose of the reference.
P. Chandra Reddy, C.J:— This is a reference under Section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, which arises in the following circumstances.
2. The assessee, a Hindu undivided family, is a manufacturer and dealer in groundnut kerne and oil on a large scale. In its books for the Deepavali year ended 12-11-1947, and for the assessment year 1948–1949, there were certain cash credits in favour of several persons totalling a sum of Rs. 41,255/-. The Income-tax Officer, called upon the assessee to prove the genuineness of these transactions in the four ledger accounts annexed as annexures A to D. As the assessee was unable to prove them to his satisfaction, the Income-tax Officer added these sums to the assessment to cover the unsatisfactory features of the case. On appeal by the assessee, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner took the view that peak credits alone should be added which amounted to Rs. 19,968/-. There was a further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by the assessee. The Tribunal thought that all the four accounts should be rearranged and the peak credits as rearranged should be taken into account in assessing the unexplained cash credits. In that position, the peak credits would aggregate only to Rs. 10,300/-.
3. In its opinion, even this amount should not be added since for the assessment years 1946–1947, and 1947–1948 intangible additions of over Rs. 30,000/- appear to have been made and “it is not unreasonable to conclude that a part of them at least should be available to the assessee to cover the above peak introduction of Rs. 10,300/- during the Dewali year ended 12-11-1947, the previous year for assessment year 1948–1949, in full”. In the result, the entire addition of Rs. 19,968/- was deleted and the Income-tax Officer was directed to amend the assessment accordingly. The attempt of the Revenue to have a case referred to this Court by the Tribunal proved futile. Thereupon, the petitioner approached this Court for reference under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act.
4. The petitioner wanted the following questions of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal to be referred to the High Court.
(1) Whether there was any material available to the Appellate Tribunal on which it could hold that the cash credits in question are explained by the intangible additions made in the previous year's assessments.
(2) Whether oil the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee has discharged onus: of establishing the genuineness of cash credits aggregating to Rs. 19,968/-.
5. This Court, complying with the request of the petitioner, directed the Tribunal to state a case and submit to this Court the following two questions:
(1) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in making out a new case for the assessee in respect of the peak credit ascertained by it on a rearrangement of the impugned credits.
(2) Whether the sum of Rs. 10,300/- ascertained by the Tribunal as a peak credit is based on an obvious mistake.
6. Accordingly, the Tribunal has stated the case.
7. The first question to be considered is, whether there was any justification for the Tribunal to have the peak credits determined on a re-arrangement of the unexplained cash credits. Here, we are not concerned with the correctness of the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner whether the cash credits as found in all the four ledgers should have been added to the return or whether it is the peak credits that should be taken into account, as no appeal was filed by the Department against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and that has become final.
8. The only point is whether there was any basis for the Tribunal to rearrange, the cash credits in dispute. A reading of the order of the Tribunal would not disclose any reasons for the procedure adopted by it. Further, it was not the case of the assessee at any time that the transactions in the four ledger accounts set out in annexures A to D aforesaid and standing in the names of different individuals have, in fact, constituted a single account and that they should be arranged chronologically as one account.
9. On the other hand, one of the grounds urged in support of his appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was that cash credit, should be reduced to peak credits in the annexures B.C and D. Obviously, annexure A was omitted, because there was only one entry of 9,800/- and, therefore, there was no question of peak credits being taken into consideration. It is significant that even before the Tribunal such a point does not seem to have been presented.
10. That apart; we fail to see how the accounts standing in the names of three different individuals could be regarded as one account for the purpose of arriving at the peak credits. Thus, it is clear that there was absolutely no foundation for treating them as the same account and we find that there was no justification for the Tribunal to regard the whole thing as one account and to arrange, it chronologically so as to make it a single account. It should not have attempted to make out a new case for the assessee.
11. The learned counsel for the respondent sought to re-open the question whether the cash credits were properly explained or not, but we do not think he can succeed in doing so. The Income-tax Officer was not convinced with the explanation offered by the assessee. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the Tribunal acquiesced in the view of the Income-tax Office? that the explanation offered by the assessee was unacceptable. Apart from all that, the assessee himself ultimately had to admit that several of these entries were fictitious ones.
12. Once the explanation furnished by the assessee was found to be unsatisfactory, the Department is entitled to treat them as income accounts. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that they were genuine cash credits fails and is rejected.
13. The next point for determination is whether the opinion of the Tribunal that these sums might have been included in the intangible additions for the previous years is sustainable. The Tribunal, as already stated, thought that it was not unreasonable to conclude that a part of them at least should have gone into the undisclosed profits which were added to the assessments in the previous years.
14. When once the explanation given by the assessee that certain cash credits standing in the names of third parties were genuine is rejected as being unconvincing, the Revenue is at liberty to treat them not only as income accounts but also as receipts derived in the year in which these entries were made and it is for the assessee to show that this was the income which he got in the previous years of account and which formed part of the intangible additions made in the previous years. See D.C Auddy and Bros. v. Commr. of Income-tax, West Bengal, 1955-28 ITR 713 : (AIR 1956 Cal 295). No such case was put forward by the assessee at any time, either before the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or even before the Tribunal. In such a situation, there was no justification for the Tribunal to have indulged in guesses and conjectures. The burden is upon the assessee to prove that certain amounts of cash received in an accounting year are not of an income nature and it is not for the Income-tax Officer to prove that they are. It follows that the deletion of the entire addition of Rs. 19,968/- is unwarranted and could not be sustained.
15. It was maintained by the counsel for the respondent that since the issue whether this formed part of the intangible additions made for the previous accounting years was not specifically, raised in the questions directed to be submitted by the Tribunal, it is not competent for this Court at this stage to answer that. We do not think we can accede to this argument. It is true that there is no specific mention of this aspect of the matter in either of the two questions. But it looks to us that this is involved in question I.
16. Otherwise, it would be unmeaning to answer the question regarding the re-arrangement of peak credits and no purpose will be served if really these amounts should be treated as part of the intangible additions for the prior years. We feel that the first question is comprehensive enough to take in the point regarding the intangible additions. However, that is not very material as, in our opinion, this Court has power to recast the questions.
17. Section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act which confers jurisdiction on the High Court in this behalf reads thus:
“The High Court upon the hearing of any such case shall decide the questions of law raised thereby and shall deliver its judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded and shall send a copy of such judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal which shall pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case conformably to such judgment.”
18. In our opinion, the power to recast or reframe questions is implied in this sub-section, although it does not specifically invest the Court with such a power. The only condition is that questions of law should be raised by the reference. The High Court has not only the power but it is its duty to reframe the questions in such a way as to bring out the real dispute between the parties. The court is not confined to the questions which the Tribunal was directed to submit.
19. There is abundant authority for this proposition. In Ganga Ram Balmokand v. Commr. of Income-tax Punjab 1937-5 ITR 464 : (AIR 1937 Lah 721), the Punjab High Court has ruled that the High Court is not confined to the decision of the question of law as formulated by the Commissioner or the Court, issuing the mandamus. On the other hand, that Section (S. 66) confers upon the High Court full powers to decide the question of law in the form it actually arises from the statement of the case made by the Commissioner.
20. This decision follows the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Shiva Prasad v. Commr. of Income-Tax, U.P, AIR 1929 All. 819 which has laid down that the High Court is entitled to re-settle issues as it were and to decide them. A Bench of this Court in Rameshwara Rao v. Commr. of Income-tax, Hyderabad, 1957 Andh L.T 891 : (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 53) had observed that if the question was in an ambiguous form, the Court was certainly entitled to reframe it or amend it in such a way as to bring out the real dispute between the parties, and that the power to reframe or amend a question was implied in sub-section (5) of Section 66 of the Act.
21. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. Commissioner Of Excess Profits Tax, 1954-26 I.T.R 765 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 176) is to the same effect. Their Lordships, in the course of the judgment, remarked that the High Court should have raised a question which arose as a corollary to the answer given by them to another question. Since that was not done by the High Court, the Supreme Court reframed a question by restoring the question suggested for by the assessee.
22. There are also other decisions which express the same view, but it is unnecessary to multiply citations. Suffice it to say that the High Court has ample power to recast or amend the questions so as to bring out the real controversy between the parties, if they are warranted by the statement of the case.
23. In the result, the questions referred to us are answered in favour of the Department. The respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner, which we fix at Rs. 150/-.
V.B.B
24. Answer accordingly.
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