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Narkulla Venkayya And Another v. Noona Satyanaravana And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
This litigation arises from a suit brought in the Zilla Court, Warangal by minor plaintiffs who are grandsons of one Nuna Ramayya. Ramayya left a widow, Nagamma, and a son (Venkayya), the father of the plaintiffs. After Ramayya's marriage to Nagamma he lived separately from his son and they cultivated separately; defendants contend this separation resulted from a partition, a fact the plaintiffs deny (although a previous plaint contained an admission suggesting partition). Nagamma, having no issue of her own, brought up her sister's daughter, Rangamma (defendant No. 2), who was married to defendant No. 1; both defendants lived with Nagamma during Ramayya's lifetime.
After Ramayya's death (two years before the death of the plaintiffs' father), Nagamma was found in possession of the property; she died in 1351 F. Plaintiffs allege they came into possession after Nagamma's death but were later dispossessed by the defendants. Defendants assert that Ramayya gifted property (including a moiety of ancestral property) to Nagamma by a registered gift deed in 1343 F, Nagamma remained in possession, and she later executed a will in favour of the defendants, who thus acquired indefeasible rights and continued in possession. Plaintiffs deny the gift and the testamentary disposition and claim title as surviving coparceners or as nearest heirs of Nagamma.
At trial eleven issues were settled. The trial court found the gift to Nagamma proved but not her will, and decreed for plaintiffs. The First Appellate Court modified the decree with respect to mesne profits and disallowed plaintiffs' claims to movables it found unestablished. Both parties appealed (S.A. No. 558/50 by defendants; S.A. No. 64/51 by plaintiffs) and the defendants filed a revision petition (No. 284/4/51-52) challenging a post-judgment correction. The plaintiffs had made clerical errors in Schedule A (wrong survey number and acreage), which the trial court corrected; the defendants sought revision. This opinion covers the appeals and the revision petition and addresses other related appeals/applications.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the will executed by Nagamma in favour of the defendants was validly executed and proved (issue No. 6) — i.e., was the execution and genuineness of the will established by the defendants?
- Whether the earlier registered gift deed from Ramayya to Nagamma (1343 F) was proved and its legal consequences.
- Whether the 1st defendant can claim as an illatom son-in-law and thereby acquire rights to the property of Nagamma or Ramayya.
- Whether the plaintiffs' claim to movables left by the deceased (issue No. 7) was established and what relief should be granted.
- Determination of mesne profits for the period of unlawful possession and whether the courts below applied Section 238 of the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code correctly (issue No. 10 and related appeals).
- Whether clerical mistakes in the plaint schedule (wrong survey number and acreage) can be corrected under Section 152 of the CPC and by which court such correction may be effected.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- Ramayya gifted his property, including a moiety of ancestral property, to Nagamma by a registered gift deed in 1343 F; Nagamma was in possession thereafter.
- Nagamma executed a will in favour of defendants; as legatees (and the 1st defendant additionally as illatom son-in-law), the defendants acquired indefeasible rights and continued in possession.
- The schedules of movable property filed by the plaintiffs are incorrect.
- The familial relationship and long cohabitation (Nagamma having brought up her sister's daughter and arranging her marriage) make it probable the defendants were natural objects of Nagamma's bounty and thus the will should be regarded as genuine.
- The defendants raised an appeal against the trial court's mesne profits order and against the correction of certain items in the decree.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- Plaintiffs deny the factum of the alleged gift and deny the testamentary disposition by Nagamma, including her competence to make such a will.
- They claim the suit property as surviving coparceners or, alternatively, as the nearest heirs of Nagamma.
- Plaintiffs assert they came into possession of the immovable property after Nagamma's death and were subsequently dispossessed by the defendants.
- Plaintiffs pointed out clerical errors in their Schedule A (wrong survey number and acreage), which they sought to correct; they obtained a trial court order to that effect and applied to this Court to correct the appellate decree accordingly.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Brahmadat Tewari v. Chaudan Bibi, AIR 1916 Cal 374 | The case indicates that where a will is regular on its face and there is reliable evidence of due execution and attestation, strict proof of formal compliance need not be insisted upon; but it does not support dispensing with proof of execution merely because terms are reasonable. | The Court held this authority did not assist defendants' contention that reasonableness of terms displaces necessity of proof of execution; the judgment indicates reliable evidence of execution was present in that case and thus does not help the defendants here. |
| Dulhin Genja Kunwar v. Harnandan Prasad Singh, 33 Ind Cas 790 : AIR 1916 PC 157 | Relates to appreciation of evidence in will disputes (how evidence should be weighed). | Cited as another authority on appreciation of evidence; used to support principle that reliable evidence is required and that appellate courts must respect trial court's findings on credibility unless special grounds exist. |
| Kaur v. Doulat Ram, AIR 1952 Punj. 147 (and Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshwari Pratab, AIR 1951 S.C. 120 cited there) | When credibility of witnesses is determinative, appellate court should not overturn trial judge's finding unless special features or strong balance of improbabilities justify interference. | Applied to emphasize that appellate courts should not lightly disregard trial court's acceptance of witnesses; nonetheless, in the present case the appellate conclusions regarding non-proving of the will were supported by material discrepancies. |
| Madhavayya v. Achamma, AIR 1949 P.C. 325 | Deals with appreciation of evidence in relation to execution of documents. | Referred to for the proposition that the execution of a will must be duly proved; used to support the court's insistence on proper proof of execution. |
| Narasayya v. Ramachandrayya, AIR 1956 Andhra 209 | Sets out essentials of illatom adoption: adoptee must marry the adoptor's daughter and there must be an agreement to give him a share; living with and helping the family alone does not suffice; custom must be proved. | Applied against the defendants' claim of illatom son-in-law status for the 1st defendant; the Court rejected the illatom claim on the basis of the principles in this authority. |
| Venkateswarlu v. Ragliavuiu, 1955 Andh. W.R. 39 : AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 604 | Discusses proof and incidents of illatom adoption. | Cited in support of the position that mere cohabitation and assistance do not establish illatom adoption; used to reject the 1st defendant's illatom claim. |
| Nagi Reddi v. Najundappa, AIR 1940 Mad 761 | Also discusses proof and incidents of illatom adoption and related customs. | Referred to as additional authority reinforcing that the illatom status and its incidents require proof of custom and agreement, supporting rejection of the defendants' claim. |
| Balaramireddi v. Ramamma, 18 Ind Cas 698 (Mad) | Authority relied on by defendants' counsel to argue that a person taken into an adoptor's house and described as son-in-law acquires rights of illatom son-in-law. | The Court observed this authority conflicts with decisions of the present Court and did not accept it as supporting the defendants' position. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by reviewing the evidence and applying established legal principles governing testamentary disputes, proof and credibility, adoption by illatom custom, procedural provisions of the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code, and the scope of appellate correction of clerical mistakes.
- Burden and standard of proof for wills: The Court emphasized that the defendants, who propound the will to their own benefit and to the exclusion of plaintiffs, bear the onus to prove both (a) the execution of the will by a free and capable testator and (b) that it was her last will. The Court reiterated that reasonable terms alone do not dispense with the requirement of proving execution; execution must be proved as any other fact.
- Standard of persuasion: The Court articulated a non-criminal standard — that a prudent man, on available evidence and surrounding circumstances, can reasonably act in the belief that the document was executed by the testator. The veracity of witnesses must be tested against surrounding circumstances and admitted/proved facts.
- Appellate deference: The Court acknowledged that appellate courts should not lightly disturb trial court findings on witness credibility unless special features or a sufficient balance of improbability displace the trial judge's conclusions. Nevertheless, where both lower courts concur that the will was not proved and material discrepancies exist, the appellate court may uphold that conclusion.
- Application to facts: On reviewing the record (including testimony of defence witnesses D.Ws 2–9, 16, 18 and plaintiffs' rebuttal P.Ws 3, 4, 7, 9), the Court found insufficient affirmative proof of execution and "sufficient material" to discredit the defendants' account. The Court rejected the argument that discrepancies were minor or due to lapse of memory, finding them material and indicative of falsity.
- Probabilities and relationship: The Court considered but rejected the contention that familial affection and cohabitation made the will inherently probable. It held that even if terms appear reasonable, without proof of execution and the deceased's approval the document cannot be treated as a valid will.
- Precedents on proof and evidence: The Court reviewed authorities (e.g., Brahmadat Tewari; Dulhin Genja Kunwar; Kaur v. Doulat Ram; Madhavayya v. Achamma) to underline that while reasonableness and face-regularity of a will are relevant, they do not relieve a proponent of the obligation to produce reliable proof of execution; reliable, trustworthy evidence is required.
- Illatom adoption claim: The Court analyzed authority on illatom adoption (notably Narasayya v. Ramachandrayya) and concluded the 1st defendant had not proved the required elements (marriage to adoptor's daughter and agreement to give a share) nor established a community custom. Mere living with Nagamma and assisting in household/farm matters did not confer illatom status.
- Inconsistency/alternative pleadings: The Court observed plaintiffs had earlier admitted partition in a previous suit but noted that in the present plaint plaintiffs had pleaded alternative grounds (surviving coparceners and nearest heirs of Nagamma) and that relief could be granted on an alternative pleaded basis. The courts below had granted relief on the nearest-heir ground.
- Movables and mesne profits: On movables (issue No. 7) the Court identified specific items that could be held to have been left by the deceased and found these came into defendants' possession; a decree could be given against 1st defendant for those items, with valuation to be determined by the executing court at rates prevailing on the suit date. Regarding mesne profits, the Court held that once unlawful possession is established the defendants are liable and that the directions of the court below complied with Section 238 of the Hyderabad CPC (specifically clause (c) of section 238(1)).
- Clerical mistakes and correction: The Court found that obvious clerical mistakes (wrong survey number and incorrect acreage) in the plaint schedule, which carried into the decree, were accidental slips correctible under Section 152 of the CPC. It observed that the power to correct such errors lies with the court in the suit whose decree is appealed and, in the exercise of its appellate powers, this Court directed corrections in the plaint schedule and decree.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core rulings):
- S.A. No. 558 of 1950 (defendants' appeal): Dismissed without costs.
- S.A. No. 64 of 1951 (plaintiffs' appeal): Allowed in part without costs (movables claim allowed in part as specified; no relief as to ornaments).
- C.M.A. No. 107/3 of 1951 (appeal re: mesne profits): Dismissed without costs.
- C.R.P. No. 264/4 of 1951–52 (revision): No orders necessary as it has become infructuous in view of an order in C.M.P. No. 798 of 1958.
- C.M.P. No. 798 of 1958 (petition by plaintiffs to correct clerical mistakes): Allowed; corrections directed in the plaint schedule and in the decree relating to acreage of Survey No. 526 and Survey No. 529.
Implications and consequences:
- The will propounded by the defendants was not proved to the Court's satisfaction and therefore cannot be relied on to defeat the plaintiffs' claims; both lower courts' findings rejecting the will were upheld.
- The defendants' claim of illatom son-in-law status for the 1st defendant was rejected for lack of proof of essential elements and community custom; hence the 1st defendant cannot claim as an heir on that basis.
- The plaintiffs obtain a decree on the grounds sustained by the courts (nearest heir to Nagamma) and are granted relief as to certain movables (specific lists of animals and agricultural items), with valuation to be fixed by the executing court at rates prevailing on the date of the suit; no relief was granted for ornaments.
- The defendants are liable for mesne profits in accordance with Section 238 of the Hyderabad CPC; the courts below applied clause (c) of section 238(1) properly and the appellate challenge failed.
- The Court exercised appellate power to correct clerical mistakes in the plaint schedule and decree under Section 152 of the CPC; the correction was allowed and the petition for correction granted.
- This decision applied established principles concerning proof of wills, appreciation of evidence and customary illatom adoption; it does not announce a novel legal principle or purport to set a new precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.
K.S.B
Orders accordingly.
Kumarayya, J.:— All the three appeals and the revision petition which are before us arise out of a suit brought by the minor plaintiffs against Narukula Venkayya and his wife Rangamma in the Zilla Court, Warangal. These plaintiffs are the grandsons of one Nuna Ramayya who died leaving surviving him widow Nagamma and a son by the first wife, Venkayya, the father of the plaintiffs. It is common ground that after his marriage with Nagamma, Ramayya became separate from his son both in residence and food and that they used to cultivate their lands separately. According to the defendants, this was in consequence of partition between the father and the son.
2. This position is not accepted by the plaintiffs who attribute it to mere administrative convenience, but their previous plaint filed in the Madhira Court through their maternal grand-father contains clear admission to that effect. As Nagamma had no issue she brought up her sister's daughter, Rangamma, defendant No. 2, and got her married to 1st defendant. Both the defendants were living with her during the life-time of Ramayya. After the death of Ramayya which took place two years prior to the death of plaintiff's father, Nagamma was found in possession of the property left by Ramayya. She however died in 1351 F. Plaintiffs claim that they got into possession of the immovable property thereafter but were subsequently dispossessed by defendants 1 and 2. This the defendants do not admit. Their contention is that Ramayya during his lifetime gifted away his property, which included a moiety of what was once the ancestral property, to Nagamma under a registered gift deed in the year 1343 F. From that time onwards Nagamma was in possession of the gift property. She executed a will of the same in favour of defendants 1 and 2 as a result of which defendants as legatees and defendant No. 1 also as the illatom son-in-law of Ramayya acquired an indefeasible right and continued in possession of the property.
3. Their further contention is that the schedules of moveable property filed by the plaintiffs are not correct. Plaintiffs categorically deny the factum of gift made by Ramayya and the testamentary disposition of. Nagamma and her competence to make the same. They claim the suit property as the surviving coparceners or heirs of Ramayya and also in the alternative as the nearest heirs of Nagamma herself. On these pleadings, eleven issues were settled. The trial Court found that the gift in favour of Nagamma was fully proved but not her will and as no title could pass to any of the defendants on that account the learned Judge decreed the claim of the plaintiffs.
4. The First Appellate Court however modified the decree in relation to mesne profits and disallowed the claim to moveables which according to it was not established. Aggrieved by this decree both the parties have come in appeal, the defendants' appeal being S.A No. 558/50 and that of the plaintiffs' being S.A No. 64/51. The contest between the parties does not end at this. The plaintiffs in schedule A committed two mistakes. One is a mistake as to the area and the other as to the survey number. An area of Ac. 33½ instead of 33½ guntas was entered in relation to S. No. 526/3 and Survey No. 524/4 instead of survey No. 529/4 was wrongly entered in the schedule A and these mistakes were obvious from the gift deed relied on by the defendants themselves.
5. These being accidental slips the trial Court, on the application of the plaintiffs ordered correction and the necessary amendment in the decree. As a result the defendants have come in revision which is No. 284/4/51-52. There is another appeal preferred by the defendants and this is directed against the order passed in relation to mesne profits and this appeal is 107/8/51. This judgment will govern all these proceedings.
6. Appeals S.A Nos. 558/50 and 64/51 involve only questions of fact on which both the Courts below are concurrent to a great extent. Such appeals would have been incompetent had it not been for the provisions of Section 602 of the Hyderabad CPC which governs them. That Section permits Second Appeals even on questions of fact. We have therefore to examine how far on a review of evidence the findings of the Courts below can be sustained.
7. Though several points were raised in the memorandum of appeals the learned counsel confined their arguments only to issues other than issues Nos. 1 and 3 to 5. Out of these the issue No. 6 is the vital issue on which the fate of the defendants' appeal mainly rests. It relates to will and the dispute primarily centres round the question of its execution. The defendants examined D.Ws 2 to 9, 16 and 18 in support of the will and the plaintiffs in rebuttal have relied on the sworn testimony of P.Ws 3, 4, 7 and 9. It is no doubt true that this will is not produced for the first time in this suit.
8. It was referred to in the written statement filed in a previous suit relating to the same property brought by the plaintiffs in the Madira Court and was actually filed there on 31-7-1351 F. within a short period after Nagamma's death. But that circumstance alone does not absolve the defendants from the necessity of proving that the said will is true and was executed by a free and capable testator. It is manifest that the will is propounded by defendants who get full benefit thereunder to the exclusion of the plaintiffs who in the natural course of events ought to be entitled to the entire estate.
9. The plaintiffs have categorically denied the will. In the circumstances the Courts will indeed demand strict and clear proof of the genuineness of the will and disposing state of mind of the testator. The question of genuineness of course would depend not only on the assertions of the witnesses but also upon the surrounding circumstances and facts admitted or proved. As a matter of fact the veracity of witnesses will be tested by reference to such facts. The onus probandi however lies on the defendants to show that the will is natural and in full accord with the feelings, sentiments and tenor of the life of the testator and that it is her last will. Both the elements are essential to be established before the party can hope to get a decision in its favour.
10. That a will is reasonable or proper in terms or even that it expresses natural inclinations or desires of the alleged testator, is by itself no answer or defence for the contention that its execution is not proved. In the absence of satisfactory proof of its execution, be authorship of a will cannot be presumed in law by mere terms of the will. The law is that in order to be effective it should be the last will of a free and capable testator.
11. The reasonableness of the terms may be a favourable circumstance but only to show that there can be no suspicion inherent in the transaction and that the disposition is such as is likely to be made by the testator. But this does not displace the proof of execution. That has to be proved as any other fact. The standard of proof required in the criminal case may not be applicable. Certainly the standard is not an absolute or conclusive one. It is only that of a prudent man.
12. The Court should be of opinion that under the circumstance, a man of ordinary prudence can act in the belief that the document is executed by the testator. As already observed the veracity of the statements of the ??? should be tested in view of the surrounding circumstances. A further duty is cast on a court of appeal not to lightly disregard the view of the credence taken by the trial Court where the simple question is which set of witnesses is to be believed with these principles in view, we proceed to consider the evidence on record. (After discussion of the evidence, the judgment proceeds as follows:)
13. Thus the defendants have not only failed to establish affirmatively the execution of the will deed by Nagamma but also there is sufficient material on record to discredit such a story. Both the Courts below have expressed the same opinion. We see no strong grounds to differ from that view. There is no force in the argument that the discrepancies are minor and that they are merely the outcome of lapse of memory or inattention to details. We are firmly of the view that they are material and expose the falsity of the defendant's story. Great stress has been laid on the balance of probabilities.
14. It is argued that since 1st defendant was her own sister's daughter to whom the deceased was greatly attached and even got her marriage celebrated and both the defendants were living with her till the ??? to breath of her life, it is highly probable that they became the proper object of her bounty and the will should therefore be regarded as genuine. It is argued on that basis that notwithstanding the material discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses, the will must be given effect to. We find no force in this argument either. Apart from the fact that the probabilities are not at all conclusively in favour of the defendants, we are not prepared to agree with the proposition that the alleged will can operate as valid will even though its contents were unknown to the deceased and she had not approved of the same. Merely because its terms apnea to be reasonable a document purporting to be a will deed cannot without due proof of its execution operate as a valid will.
15. Learned counsel on behalf of the defendant-appellants has cited various authorities for a contrary proposition but these authorities do not help his case. Brahmadat Tewari v. Chaudan Bibi, AIR 1916 Cal 374 is not an authority as is argued by the learned counsel for the proposition that the reasonableness of the terms would displace the necessity of proof of execution of the document. All that it says is where a will is regular on the face of it and there is ??? reliable evidence on record to show that it was duly executed and attested, strict proof of compliance with the statutory requirements need not be insisted upon and even though the evidence of an attesting witness may be vague or even conflicting on some material point on consideration of the circumstances or other evidence, the Court may pronounce in favour of the will Obviously these observations do not help the proposition that the proof of execution is unnecessary.
16. It would appear from the judgment in that case that there was ample reliable evidence on record to show that the will was duly executed and attested and there was only some doubt as to the full compliance with the requirements of the statute as regards due attestation. Of course there was a further question involved relating to appreciation of evidence but the decision is clear that there should be some reliable and trustworthy evidence in proof of the execution of the will. In Dulhin Genja Kunwar v. Harnandan Prasad Singh 33 Ind Cas 790 : (AIR 1916 PC 157) there was again the question of appreciation of evidence.
17. The trial Judge has held the will proved but the High Court differed from that view on the ground that it was not executed by publicity and the witnesses who proved it were men of low social position. It was held that since the persons who are available at the time of the execution had signed the will, it was improper to reject their evidence merely on the ground of their inferior status. In ??? Kaur v. Doulat Ram, AIR 1952 Punj. 147 to point as to appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Court had no doubt arisen for consideration. Following the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshwari Pratab, AIR 1951 S.C 120 it was held that:
“When there is a conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges on the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact.”
18. Madhavayya v. Achamma, AIR 1949 P.C 325 is also a case involving question of appreciation of evidence in relation to execution of document. It is however abundantly clear that without due proof of execution of the will the party cannot successfully rely oil the terms of the will. It would appear that even according to 1st defendant and his father (as D.W 16) the relations between the deceased and the minor's father were not strained so that it may be ruled out that Nagamma could not be moved by any consideration favourable to the minor plaintiffs at the time of disposition of her property. It therefore follows that the probabilities are not conclusive in favour of the defendants. At any rate, inasmuch as the execution of the document is not proved the defendants can set up no claim on the basis of the disputed will.
19. It is then argued that since the 1st defendant is the illatom son-in-law, he is entitled to the property as such. It should be remembered that 110 issue was raised on that ground with the result that the parties could not adduce any clear evidence in that behalf. It would appear from pleadings that hough the plea of illatom adoption in somewhat vague terms was set up by the defendants it was categorically denied that the defendant could ever in law be deemed to be an illatom son-in-law.
20. It does appear from the evidence that defendant No. 2 being the sister's daughter, Nagamma had brought her up as she had no issue and later on got her married to first defendant and both of them were living with her til her death. 1st defendant of course was assisting Nagamma's husband and after his death was working at the farms and looking after her household affairs, but the question is, whether that gives him a status of illatom son-in-law so that he may set up a claim for the property of Nagamma or her husband. Relying on the dictum in Balaramireddi v. Ramamma, 18 Ind Cas 698 Mad, the learned counsel has argued that inasmuch is 1st defendant was taken into Nagamma's house for the purpose of marrying her foster daughter and was described as her son-in-law, he acquired all the rights of an illatom son-in-law. But this authority is in conflict with the decisions of this Court
21. In Narasayya v. Ramachandrayya, AIR 1956 Andhra 209, the essentials of illatom adoption and the incidents thereof have been discussed at great length. It was observed that it is necessary that the adoptee must marry the daughter of the adoptor and that there must be an agreement to give him a share. Merely living in the house of the father-in-law and helping in the management of the property would not make him an illatom-son-in-law. Both the ingredients must needs be established to confer the status of illatom son-in-law on the person claiming.
22. It was also held that the institution of illatom adoption which, in other words is affiliating a son-in-law in the family of the adoptor and giving him a share is purely a creature of custom which has received judicial recognition. Unless such custom is proved in that community it cannot be accepted at all. It was further observed that there is no custom that a person by marrying the near relation of the adoptor i.e, foster daughter, is treated as an illatom son-in-law. This authority is clearly against the defendant. The questions of proof and incidents of illatom have been also discussed in single Bench case Venkateswarlu v. Ragliavuiu, 1955 Andh. W.R 39 : (AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 604) and also in Nagi Reddi v. Najundappa, AIR 1940 Mad 761. In this view of the law on the subject, it is impossible to hold that defendant is the son-in-law or that he can as heir set up a claim to the property left by Nagamma. At any rate, inasmuch as no special custom is set up as being prevalent in the community to which the parties belong, following the dictum laid down in AIR 1956 Andhra 209 we reject the claim of the defendants.
23. The last agrument advanced by the learned counsel is that the claim of the plaintiffs has not been consistent throughout. While in a previous suit admitting the partition between their father and grandfather they set up their claim to the property by reason of the death of Nagamma they claim now as the surviving coparceners and the evidence too has been adduced on these lines. The courts below did not countenance their claim as surviving coparceners but nevertheless granted relief on the basis of their being nearest heirs to Nagamma.
24. The contention of the learned counsel is that the courts could not grant relief making out a new case for the plaintiffs which is inconsistent with the one set up by them in their plaint. While we agree that the basis of the claim as set up in the previous suit is different from the one in this case, yet it would appear from paragraph 8 of the plaint that the plaintiffs have set up their right on two alternative grounds and that in our opinion would warrant the grant of relief that they may be entitled to on any of those two grounds. As a matter of fact, the Courts below have decreed their claim on that ground. The contention of the defendants therefore fails. In the result, their appeal S.A No. 558 of 1950 is dismissed without costs.
25. Now we turn to the appeal S.A No. 64 of 1951 filed by the plaintiffs. It relates to two items. It would appear that while the trial Court had granted relief in relation to the movable property, the appellate Court rejected such a claim. Further, the claim for mesne profits was not allowed in its entirety by both the Court's below. The trial Court had granted only Rs. 100/- towards mesne profits ever, though the amount claimed was Rs. 500/- The plaintiffs therefore have come in appeal against the order in relation to both these reliefs. Issue No. 7 relates to the first part of their claim and issue No. 10 relates to the latter part so far as issue No. 10 is concerned, we do not see any reason to differ from the conclusion arrived at by both the Courts. In the absence of clear proof as to the quantum, the figure arrived at cannot be said to be wholly unreasonable and the directions given under Section 238 of the Hyderabad CPC are in accordance with law.
26. Now the only point that remains for consideration is whether issue No. 7 has been fully established. (After discussion of evidence the judgment proceeds:) In this way, 8 bullocks 12 she-buffaloes, 2 bandies, 6 candies of paddy, one candy of jawar, 2 cart loads of kadivi & 7 or 8 cart loads of grass can be held to have been left by the deceased which came into possession of the defendants and a decree can be given to that extent against 1st defendant. The question as to value of course shall have to be determined and this may be left to the Court executing the decree. The price, of course, will be determined according to the rates prevailing on the date of the suit. The appeal of the plaintiffs to this extent must be allowed and we accordingly allow the same without any costs. We may make it clear no relief can be granted as to ornaments claimed.
27. Then we come to appeal No. 107/3/1951. It is in relation to the determination of the mesne profits for the period pending litigation. We do not see any merit's in this appeal for when it is established that the defendants were in unlawful possession of the property they will necessarily be liable to pay the mesne profits and in a suit brought for possession of the immovable property together with mesne profits the decree in relation to mesne profits will have to be drawn in terms of the provisions of section 238 of the Hyderabad CPC. The direction given by the Court below is in full compliance with clause (c) of section 238(1). The appeal against such order is therefore without merits. We therefore dismiss the same.
28. Now, we turn to the revision petition. As already stated, a mistake was committed by the plaintiffs in entering the correct acreage of S. No. 526 and also in relation to S. No. 529 which was incorrectly entered as S. No. 524. That it was due to sheer inadvertence is evident from the description given in the gift deed relied on by the defendants themselves. Admittedly the deceased was not in possession of S. No. 524 nor was the acreage of S. No. 526 more than 33½ guntas.
29. The suit related to the property once in possession of Nagamma and S. No. 529 was the survey number that was in her possession. As a mistake in this behalf crept into the plaint schedule the some mistake necessarily entered into the judgment and decree. It is indeed an accidental slip and a clerical mistake. This can be rectified under Section 152 of the CPC. There is nothing which limits the power of the Court under Section 152 to correct such errors and mistakes which arise in the suit.
30. In appropriate cases like this where mistakes have arisen by reason of inadvertence in entering the number in the plaint, the Court has ample powers under Section 152 to correct such mistakes. The Court below has discussed this point at length. We do not feel called upon to enter into a detailed discussion on the subject with reference to the authorities on the point. But we feel however, that this power could have been exercised only by the Court that passed the decree in appeal.
31. The trial Court could not rectify such mistakes in the judgment or decree which has been superseded by the appellate Court's decree or has merged into the same. The counsel for the petitioner realised this mistake and has filed a petition to this Court for correcting the error, as the appeal is pending before us.
32. We have given opportunity to the other party to file counter and heard his counsel in that behalf. The respondents no doubt oppose the petition but there can be no doubt that the mistake that has crept into the plaint by sheer inadvertence is responsible for the mistake or error in the decree.
33. In exercising of our powers of appeal in relation to the decree under appeal, it is perfectly open to us to correct the necessary mistakes. We therefore direct corrections be made in the plaint schedule and also in the decree in relation to the acreage of Survey No. 526 and S. No. 529. The petition filed by the plaintiff is therefore allowed. No orders are necessary in the revision petition.
34. In the result, S.A No. 558 of 1950 is dismissed without costs; S.A No. 64 of 1951 is allowed in part without costs; C.M.A No. 107/3 of 1951 is dismissed without costs and no orders are necessary in C.R.P No. 264/4 of 1951-1952 as has become in fructuous on account of an order in C.M.P No. 798 of 1958. The petition filed by the plaintiffs i.e, C.M.P No. 798 of 1958 is allowed. No; order as to costs in Revision Petition. It may be recorded.
K.S.B
35. Orders accordingly.
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