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The Public Prosecutor v. M. Rangareddy And Others (Accused)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from the acquittal of accused 1, 2, and 4 in case C.C No. 1854/52 before the Stationary Sub Magistrate, Allagadda. The prosecution alleged that accused 1 to 3 were transporting 15 this of arrack in a car belonging to the 4th accused. The vehicle was stopped at around 2:45 a.m. on 12-9-52 by the prohibition Sub-Inspector (P.W 1). Charges were framed under Sections 4(1)(a) and 12 of the Madras Prohibition Act. The Sub Magistrate did not accept the prosecution evidence and acquitted the accused. Subsequently, the Public Prosecutor filed this appeal challenging the acquittal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution evidence, including oral testimony and the statements recorded (Ex. P-1), was sufficient to convict the accused under the Madras Prohibition Act.
- Whether the statements recorded by the prohibition officer are admissible evidence under the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- What evidentiary value should be attached to the confessions made by accused 1 to 3, particularly in relation to the 4th accused.
Arguments of the Parties
Prosecution's Arguments
- The prosecution relied on oral evidence of witnesses P.Ws 1 to 4 and the statement Ex. P-1 containing confessions of accused 1 to 3.
- It was asserted that the car carrying the arrack belonged to the 4th accused and that accused 1 to 3 were transporting the illicit liquor.
- Great reliance was placed on the admissibility and evidentiary value of Ex. P-1.
Defense's Arguments
- The defense challenged the credibility of prosecution witnesses, highlighting inconsistencies and interest in their testimony.
- The defense argued that the statements recorded by the prohibition officer were inadmissible, as the officer was considered a police officer under the Evidence Act and CrPC.
- The 4th accused’s counsel contended there was no direct evidence linking his client to the offences apart from the statements in Ex. P-1, which were weak and insufficient for conviction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Srinivasa Narasimha Bayanker v. State, 1954 Mad WN 659 | Prohibition officer is not a police officer within the meaning of Section 162 CrPC or Section 25 Evidence Act; statements to such officer are admissible. | The court held the lower court erred in ruling the statements inadmissible on the ground that the prohibition officer was a police officer. |
| Kashmira Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159 | Confession of an accused is not evidence against co-accused in the ordinary sense; such confession is weak evidence and cannot solely support conviction. | The court relied on this principle to discount the confession of accused 1 to 3 as insufficient to convict the 4th accused. |
| Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, 76 Ind App 147 : AIR 1949 PC 257 | Confession of co-accused is weak evidence and not subject to cross-examination; it cannot be the sole basis for conviction. | Referenced to emphasize the weak evidentiary value of co-accused confessions. |
| Nathu v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 56 | Confession of co-accused cannot alone support conviction but may fortify other evidence. | The court reiterated that without corroborative evidence, confessions cannot sustain conviction. |
| Reg v. Ambigara Hulagu, ILR 1 Mad 163 | Conviction solely on co-prisoner’s confession is bad in law; confession admissible under Section 30 Evidence Act but is weak evidence. | Used to support the conclusion that the confession was insufficient to convict the 4th accused. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully examined the prosecution's oral evidence and found significant inconsistencies and reasons to doubt the credibility of key witnesses, including P.W 1, 3, and 4. The court noted that P.W 3’s testimony was unhelpful and that P.W 1 and P.W 4 were considered interested witnesses, a conclusion the appellate court did not dispute. The only other witness, P.W 2, was found unreliable due to contradictory statements and failure to obtain independent signatures on the panchanama.
The court also considered the evidence of the defense witness, D.W 1, who testified that the arrack was already on the road when he arrived, raising the possibility that the illicit liquor might have come from vehicles other than the accused’s car. This created reasonable doubt about the prosecution's claim that the arrack was found in the 4th accused’s car.
Regarding the admissibility of the statements recorded by the prohibition officer (Ex. P-1), the court held the lower court erred in considering the prohibition officer a police officer under Sections 162 CrPC and 25 Evidence Act. The court relied on the precedent of Srinivasa Narasimha Bayanker to conclude that such statements are admissible.
However, even assuming the statements were voluntary and admissible, the court found them insufficient to convict because the confessions of co-accused do not constitute strong evidence against others without corroboration. The court relied on Supreme Court and Privy Council decisions to highlight the weak evidentiary value of co-accused confessions.
Finally, the court acknowledged the absence of any direct evidence linking the 4th accused to the offences apart from the confessions, which were inadequate for conviction.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The court upheld the acquittal of the accused, finding that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The statements recorded by the prohibition officer were held admissible but of insufficient evidentiary value to support conviction without corroborative evidence. This decision confirms the principle that confessions of co-accused cannot alone sustain conviction and underscores the necessity of credible and direct evidence to establish guilt. No new precedent was set; the ruling adheres to established legal principles regarding the admissibility and weight of confessions and the credibility of prosecution witnesses.
1. This is an appeal filed by the State against the order of acquittal of accused 1, 2 and 4 in C.C No. 1854/52 on the file of the Stationary Sub Magistrate, Allagadda. The case of the Prosecution is that accused 1 to 3 were carrying 15 this of arrack in a car M.D.U 184 belonging to the 4th accused. At about 2.45 a.m on 12-9-52, the car was stopped by the prohibition Sub-Inspector, Sirvel, examined as P.W 1. Charges framed against the accused were under Sections 4(1)(a) and 12 of the Madras Prohibition Act. The Stationary Sub Magistrate did not accept the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and acquitted the accused. The Public Prosecutor of Andhra has consequently preferred the appeal.
2. The case of the prosecution rests upon the oral evidence of P.Ws 1 to 4 and Ex. B-1, a statement recording the confessions of accused 1 to 3 P.W 3 who signed Ex. P-1 stated that by the time he went to the place where the car was stopped, he found that the this were all on the road. His evidence is that he did not see the this being seized in the car. He also stated that he did not know the contents of Ex. P-1 and that he signed it after the panchanama was written. His evidence is therefore of no assistance to the prosecution. P.W 1 is the prohibition Sub Inspector and P.W 4 is the Police Sub-Inspector. Their evidence was not accepted by the Sub Magistrate as being interested. I see no reason to differ from his conclusion. So, the only question is, whether the evidence of P.W 2 is sufficient to convict the accused of the offences charged. It is elicited in the evidence of P.W 4 that P.Ws 2 and 3 are stock panchayatdars. P.W 2 also admits that the prohibition people generally call him and that he would sign Panchanamas. It is in evidence that there are a number of independent persons residing near the locality. Their signatures were not at all obtained. In the cross examination, P.W 2 stated that P.W 4 also signed Ex. P-1.
3. In the re-examination, he no doubt corrected himself and stated that the signature of P.W 4 was not obtained. Similarly, he stated in the cross-examination that the signatures of accused 1 to 3 were obtained in Ex. P-1. Having regard to the discrepancies in his evidence, the court below refused to accept his evidence. Having gone through his evidence, I am not prepared to place any reliance and reverse the judgment of the court below. The Magistrate accepted the evidence of the Khaji Sab, examined as D.W 1. He deposed that he was brought to the place at 4 a.m and that by the time he went there the this were already on the road.
4. It is brought out in the evidence that a lorry passed along the road and that the car of one Kondayya also passed along that road. It was suggested in the course of the cross-examination that the this might have been recovered from the lorry or Kondayya's car, and kept on road. In the absence of clinching evidence that the this were in the car of the 4th accused, I am unable to hold that the accused are guilty of the offences charged.
5. Great reliance was placed on Ex. P-1 containing the statements of accused 1 to 3. The Court below held that the document was inadmissible on the ground that the probihiton officer was a police officer and that the statements recorded by him were inadmissible. The view of the magistrate is no doubt wrong, having regard to the decision of Mr. Justice Somasundaram in Srinivasa Narasimha Bayanker v. State, 1954 Mad WN 659 (A). The learned Judge held that a prohibition officer is not a police officer either within the meaning of Section 162 of the Cr PC or within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and that a statement by the accused to the prohibition officer is not hit at by those sections. At page 660 are the relevant observations and they are as follows:
“The Madras Prohibition Act is a self contained Act prescribing its own procedure; and only by virtue of certain provisions, some of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are made applicable. There is no provision in the Madras Prohibition Act which makes “Chapter XIV of the Cr PC applicable to investigations under the Madras Prohibition Act. Section 162 of the Cr PC cannot, therefore, be invoked as a bar to the statement made by the accused to a prohibition officer.
I have already pointed out how by Section 53(a) of the M.P Act, Prohibition Officer will be a police officer only within the meaning of Section 125 of the Evidence Act, and not within the meaning of Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act. In these circumstances, I must hold that the prohibition officer is not a police officer either within the meaning of Section 162 of the Cr PC or within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.”
6. Following these observations, I hold that the Court below was wrong in holding that the statement was inadmissible.
7. The next question is, what is the value to be attached to the statement having regard to the evidence on record. It is admitted that both the prohibition Sub-Inspector and the Police Sub-Inspector stopped the car, asked accused 1 to 3 to get down from the car and took the statement Ex. P-1. Even assuming that the accused were not arrested by the Police Sub Inspector and were not in the custody of the Sub Inspector, I am prepared to hold that the confession was a voluntary one. I am therefore not prepared to place any reliance on the statements contained therein. As I am not impressed with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and not prepared to place any reliance upon Ex. P-1, I confirm the judgment of the court below. Sri K. Subrahmanya Beddi the learned advocate for the 4th accused contended that there is absolutely no evidence to connect his client with the offences. It was fairly conceded by the learned Public Prosecutor that, apart from Ex. P-1, there is no direct evidence connecting the 4th accused with the offences. Accused 1 to 5 stated in Ex. P-1 that the car belonged to the 4th accused and that the 4th accused asked them to get the arrack in his car. In Kashmira Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159 (B), Bose, J. held that the confession of an accused person is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term as against a co-accused. Reference was made to the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, 76 Ind App 147 : (AIR 1949 PC 257) (C). Reliance was placed on the observations in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (C) at page 155 (of Ind App): (page 260 of AIR) which are in the following terms:
“It does not indeed come within the definition of ‘evidence’ contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by the cross-examination…………it is obviously evidence of a very weak type………… It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of ah” approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities.”
8. This decision was recently followed by the Supreme Court in Nathu v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh , AIR 1956 SC 56 at p. 58 (D). Venkatarama Ayyar, J. observed as follows:
“The question how far the confession of co-accused could be treated as evidence against an accused was considered elaborately in Kashmira Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (B) and it was held there that such statements, were not evidence as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act, that no conviction could be founded “thereon, but that if there was other evidence on which a conviction could be based, they could be referred to as lending assurance to that conclusion and for fortifying it.”
9. The decision of the Madras High Court in Reg v. Ambigara Hulagu, ILR 1 Mad 163 (E) is also to the same effect. It was held dial a conviction based solely on the evidence of a co-prisoner is bad in law. No doubt the confession is admissible under Section 30 of the Evidence Act; but, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (B) the evidence is of a very weak type. As already pointed out, the confession does not appear to have been voluntarily made and it cannot be the basis for convicting the 4th accused. I see no ground for interference and in the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed.
K.S.B
10. Appeal dismissed.
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