- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Putta Venkarrayudu v. The State .
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Bhimasankaram, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 1954, disposed of by this Court on 10 January 1955. The appellant was the first accused (A-1) in Sessions Case No. 50 of 1954, Court of Session, Visakhapatnam Division. In the Sessions Court the appellant was tried together with two other accused. There were two distinct charges:
- A conspiracy charge (first count) alleged against all three accused — agreement to murder Putta Appalaraju (framed as S.120-B read with S.302 IPC).
- A second charge alleged against A-1 and A-3 jointly for murder of Putta Appalaraju (S.302 read with S.34 IPC).
The Sessions Judge found insufficient evidence to hold A-2 and A-3 guilty under the first charge, and gave A-3 the benefit of doubt under the second charge. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant (A-1) under S.114 read with S.302 IPC and sentenced him to transportation for life; this conviction and sentence were confirmed by the Court in the appeal.
After the appeal was disposed, the appellant's counsel (Mr. G.K.V. Devar) filed an unnumbered petition seeking a rehearing of the appeal on two principal grounds (discussed below).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an acquittal (allegedly of the appellant) under S.302 read with S.34 IPC bars conviction of the same accused upon the same facts under a different section by operation of Section 403(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- Whether a purported misapprehension by the Sessions Judge about the precise charge (specifically, the contention that the learned Judge thought the first accused was charged under S.114 read with S.302) requires rehearing of the appeal.
- Whether Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the High Court to rehear or treat its previous signed judgment as non est in circumstances where Section 369 of the CrPC appears to bar altering or reviewing a signed judgment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the petition)
- There is an acquittal of the appellant under S.302 read with S.34 IPC, and that acquittal prevents conviction on the same facts under a different section by virtue of Section 403(1) CrPC.
- The Sessions Judge laboured under a misapprehension that the first accused was actually charged under S.114 read with S.302 IPC, and this error requires rehearing to avoid miscarriage of justice.
- Although these points were not raised in the earlier hearing, it is in the interests of justice that the appeal be reheard and any clear error of law be rectified; counsel relied in particular on Section 561-A CrPC to justify re-hearing or reconsideration.
The opinion does not set out detailed opposing submissions from the State or other parties; the material before the Court focuses on the appellant's petition and the Court's analysis of legal power to re‑hear.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Madras High Court Rulings, p. xxix, Criminal Proceedings, 7 Nov. 1873 | Where an appeal was rejected without hearing the appellant's pleader and an adequate excuse for non-appearance is shown, appellate Court may rehear the appeal. | The Court cited this as an early instance where a rehearing was permitted because the original hearing had been deprived of the appellant's advocate, illustrating the narrow jurisdictional exception. |
| Kunhammad Haji, In re — ILR 46 Mad 382; AIR 1923 Mad 426 | When an appeal has once been disposed of, the Court is functus officio and cannot hear the appeal again. | Relied upon to support the general proposition that a High Court, once its judgment is signed, is normally unable to reopen or retry the appeal. |
| Gibbons — ILR 14 Cal 42 (FB) | Authority supporting the view that a Court is functus officio after signing judgment. | Referenced as one of the authorities underpinning the rule that prevents reopening a signed judgment except in limited circumstances. |
| Queen Empress v. C.P. Fox — ILR 10 Bom 176 (FB) | Support for the principle that a Court cannot rehear an appeal once disposed and signed. | Used as part of the body of authority showing finality of signed judgments subject to narrow exceptions. |
| Soma Naidu, In re — ILR 47 Mad 428; AIR 1924 Mad 640 | The High Court's judgment in a criminal matter is final once signed; also an order passed against an accused without opportunity to be heard is null and void ab initio. | Applied to explain the distinction: finality of signed judgments vs. the exception where a judgment or order is void for want of jurisdiction due to lack of hearing. |
| In re Ranga Rao — 23 Mad LJ 371 | Where a judgment was passed without proper opportunity to the accused, the proper course is to proceed afresh after giving proper notice. | Reinforced the Court's position that only judgments void for lack of jurisdiction can be reopened and then must be heard afresh with proper notice. |
| A.T. Sankaralinga Mudaliar v. Narayana Mudaliar — ILR 45 Mad 913; AIR 1922 Mad 502 (FB) | Section 561-A does not confer new powers on the High Court to circumvent limitations in Section 369 of the CrPC. | Cited to support the view that Section 561-A cannot be used to overcome the prohibition on altering signed judgments found in Section 369. |
| P. Veerappa Naidu v. Avudayammal — ILR 48 Mad 262; AIR 1925 Mad 438 (FB) | Same principle: S.561-A does not enlarge powers to revise signed judgments contrary to S.369. | Used as additional precedent demonstrating continuity of this principle in Madras decisions. |
| Marudayya Thevar v. Shanmughasundara Thevar — 49 Mad LJ 593; AIR 1926 Mad 139 (CD) | Affirmation that S.561-A confers no new powers to override S.369 constraints. | Again relied upon to show the consistent approach of Madras High Court on the limits of rehearing or revision after judgment is signed. |
| Mohan Singh v. King-Emperor — ILR 23 Pat 28; AIR 1944 Pat 209 | Illustration that other High Courts have accepted the restrictive view of Section 561-A vis-à-vis Section 369. | Cited as one of several non-Madras decisions that share the approach that Section 561-A does not allow surmounting Section 369. |
| Bashiruddin Ahmed v. Emperor — ILR (1937) Nag 236; AIR 1937 Nag 181 | Authority from another High Court in line with the restrictive view on rehearing/revision powers. | Used to show consensus among various High Courts regarding the limited scope to reopen a signed judgment. |
| Nandlal Chunilal v. Emperor — ILR (1946) Bom 207; AIR 1946 Bom 276 (FB) | Bombay High Court authority supporting that Section 561-A does not enlarge powers to override Section 369. | Applied as further support for the proposition that the High Court cannot revisit a signed judgment except in narrowly defined jurisdictional circumstances. |
| Banwarilal v. Emperor — AIR 1935 All 466 | Another High Court decision supporting the restrictive approach toward rehearing signed judgments. | Relied on to show broad judicial agreement across High Courts. |
| Chandrika v. Rex — AIR 1949 All 176 | Where a criminal appeal was heard and disposed of before the date fixed for hearing (depriving advocate of opportunity), the hearing was without jurisdiction and the matter was reopened and re-heard. | Cited to demonstrate the narrow exception where a judgment pronounced without hearing is treated as without jurisdiction and may be re-opened; used to distinguish the present case from instances that allow rehearing. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise analysis, confined to the material and authorities referenced in the opinion:
- Threshold procedural point: The Court observed that no statutory provision or binding authority was shown that allows the Court to revisit or rehear a matter once its judgment has been signed, except as provided by the Code or Letters Patent — the Court quoted Section 369 of the CrPC, which forbids altering or reviewing a signed judgment except to correct clerical error.
- The appellant's counsel urged that the Court could treat its earlier judgment as non est and rehear relying on Section 561-A CrPC. The Court rejected this contention, holding that Section 561-A cannot be read so as to negate the explicit prohibition contained in Section 369.
- The Court recognized the established narrow exception: where a judgment has been pronounced without notice to the accused or without giving the accused an opportunity to be heard, that judgment may be treated as one without jurisdiction and can be re-heard (i.e., such a subsequent hearing is in substance a first hearing in accordance with law). The Court reviewed a line of authorities illustrating this exception (earlier Madras decisions and Chandrika v. Rex).
- Applying the law to the facts: the Court found that the appellant's first contention (that there was an acquittal of A-1 under S.302 read with S.34 IPC) rested on an erroneous reading of the Sessions Judge's judgment. The Sessions Judge's "finding" entry stated that A-2 and A-3 were not guilty under the second charge, but the second charge in the record was actually framed against A-1 and A-3. The Court found no passage in the Sessions Judge's judgment supporting the idea that A-2 was a clerical mistake for A-1; accordingly there was no established acquittal of A-1 under S.302 read with S.34 to trigger Section 403(1) CrPC.
- On the contention about the absence of a separate charge-head under S.114 read with S.302 IPC, the Court referred to Sections 236 and 237 CrPC. Section 236 permits charging with several offences or in the alternative where it is doubtful which offence the proved facts will constitute; Section 237 permits conviction for an offence shown by evidence even if the accused was charged with a different offence under the circumstances contemplated by Section 236. The Court relied on these provisions to conclude that the trial procedure was lawful and not vitiated by irregularity in the charging.
- Conclusion from analysis: because there was no jurisdictional defect of the kind that would render the judgment void ab initio, and because the procedural provisions (Sections 236 and 237) permitted the mode of charging and conviction employed, the Court found no basis to re-open or rehear the disposed appeal under the arguments advanced.
Holding and Implications
Holding: PETITION REJECTED.
Direct effect: The unnumbered petition seeking a rehearing of Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 1954 was dismissed. The Court held that neither Section 561-A CrPC nor the circumstances relied upon by the appellant justified re-opening a signed judgment in the absence of a jurisdictional defect (such as a hearing conducted without notice or opportunity to the accused).
Broader implications: The opinion emphasizes the settled position — reflected in the authorities cited — that a High Court's signed criminal judgment is final and cannot be altered or reviewed except within narrow, established exceptions (for example, where the judgment was void for want of jurisdiction because the accused was not afforded an opportunity to be heard). The Court did not purport to create any new precedent; rather, it applied existing principles to the facts and rejected the application to re-hear.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Petition rejected." (Final paragraph of the judgment.)
Bhimasankaram, J.:— By a judgment dated 10th January, 1955, we disposed of Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 1954. The appellant therein was the first accused in Sessions Case No. 50 of 1954 in the Court of Session, Visakhapatnam Division. He was convicted by the learned Sessions Judge under S. 114 read with S. 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to transportation for life. The conviction and sentence were confirmed by our judgment in the appeal. It may be noted that he was tried along with two other accused in the Sessions Court and there were two different charges framed, one against him and the other two accused (first charge) and another against him and the third accused (second charge). The charges are as follows:
“(1) That you three on or about 28th day of March, 1954, before 11 p.m at Koruprolu, agreed to cause to be done an illegal act to wit murdering Putta Appalaraju and that the same act to wit murder of Putta Appalaraju was done in pursuance of the agreement and you three thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 120-B read with S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
2. That you (1) Putta Venkatrayudu (A-1) and (2), Putta Chinnayya (A-3) on the night of 28th day of March, 1954, at about 11 p.m at Koruprolu in furtherance of the said conspiracy and in furtherance of common intention of you both, did jointly commit murder by intentionally causing the death of Putta Appalaraju of Koruprolu, by inflicting injuries on his head and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 302 read with S. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.”
2. The learned Sessions Judge found that there was not sufficient evidence to hold A-2 and A-3 guilty under the first charge. He also gave the benefit of doubt to A-3 under the second charge. The learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 1954 under S. 114 read with S. 302, Indian Penal Code, as already stated above.
3. Mr. G.K.V Devar, the learned counsel for the appellant, now seeks through this unnumbered petition a rehearing of the appeal mainly on two points. His first contention is that there is an acquittal of the appellant under S. 302, read with S. 34, Indian Penal Code and that the acquittal bars the Court from convicting him upon the same facts under a different section, so long as the acquittal is in force, by virtue of Section 403(1) of the Cr PC. Secondly, he states that the learned Sessions Judge was under a misapprehension that the first accused was actually charged under S. 1, 14 read with S. 302, Indian Penal Code. He admits that these points were not raised at the time of the hearing of the appeal, but he urges that it is necessary in the interests of Justice that the appeal should be reheard on the ground that an act of Court should not prejudice any party and that, if there is a clear error of law resulting in miscarriage of justice, this Court is not without power to rectify it.
4. Before proceeding to deal with the merits, Ave must observe that no statutory provision or binding authority has been brought to our notice which enables us to exercise the power invoked by the appellant's advocate. Section 369 of the Cr PC runs thus:
“Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force or, in the case of a High Court by the Letters Patent or other instrument constituting such High Court, no Court, when it has signed its Judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error.”
5. This, indeed, the learned counsel says that he does not dispute but he urges that we can treat our previous judgment as non est and consider the appeal afresh. In support of his contention, he relies on Section 561-A of the Cr PC. We are unable to agree that Section 561-A of the Cr PC, enables the High Court to do what Section 369 of the Cr PC, has expressly prohibited. It is true that, where a judgment has been pronounced without notice to the accused or without giving him an opportunity to appear and plead his case, such a judgment has been treated as one without jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the hearing of the appeal once again would not be a re-hearing, but would really be the first hearing in accordance with law. In an early case reported in 7 Madras High Court Rulings p. xxix, Criminal Proceedings, 7th November, 1873(A), the Madras High Court decided that when a Criminal Appeal had been rejected without hearing the appellant's pleader and it was afterwards proved to the satisfaction of the appellate Court that an adequate excuse had been made for the pleader's non-appearance, it was open to the appellate Court to rehear the appeal, on its merits. In Kunhammad Haji, In re, ILR 46 Mad 382 : (AIR 1923 Mad 426) (B), Devadass J., observed that, when an appeal has once been disposed of, the Court is functus officio and cannot hear the appeal again. In support of this view, the learned Judge placed reliance on the decisions in the matter of Gibbons. ILR 14 Cal 42 (FB) (C) and Queen Empress v. C.P Fox, ILR 10 Bom 176 (FB) (D). This view, it is to be noticed, was expressed when Section 369 of the Cr PC, was couched in a different language. Then it ran thus:
“No Court other than a High Court, when it has signed its judgment shall alter or review the same, except as provided in Ss. 395 and 484 or to correct a clerical error.”
6. He pointed out that the exception contained in S. 369 is with reference to the power of review in regard to cases decided by a Judge of the High Court presiding over the sessions when points are reserved for consideration by the Full Bench or on the certificate of the Advocate-General. In Soma Naidu, In re, ILR 47 Mad 428 : (AIR 1924 Mad 640) (E), Wallace J., accepted that view. The head-note of the case runs thus:
“The Judgment of the High Court in a Criminal matter is final as soon as it is signed and thereafter the Court is functus officio and has no power to revise or alter its decision. ILR 14 Cal 42 (FB) (C) : ILR 10 Bom 176 (FB) (D) : ILR 46 Mad 382 : (AIR 1923 Mad 426) (B), followed”.
7. That case further decided that an order passed against an accused who had not been given an opportunity of being heard, as for instance where by mistake of Court a case was posted on a day anterior to that fixed in the notice to the accused and the sentence was enhanced in his absence, is null and void ab initio, as being one passed without jurisdiction. The learned Judges who decided ILR 47 Mad 428 : (AIR 1924 Mad 640) (E), referred to an earlier decision of the Madras High Court reported in In re Ranga Rao, 23 Mad LJ 371 (F), in support of that position, wherein it was observed that the proper course in such a case was to proceed with the matter afresh after proper notice to the accused.
8. It has also been pointed out in A.T. Sankaralinga Mudaliar v. Narayana Mudaliar, ILR 45 Mad 913 : (AIR 1922 Mad 502) (FB) (G); P. Veerappa Naidu v. Avudayammal, ILR 48 Mad 262 : (AIR 1925 Mad 438) (FB) (H) and Marudayya Thevar v. Shanmughasundara Thevar, 49 Mad LJ 593 : (AIR 1926 Mad 139) CD, that S. 561-A confers no new powers on the High Court and that the Court cannot in purported exercise of inherent power surmount the limitations imposed by Section 369 of the Cr PC. This view has been shared by other High Courts (vide) Mohan Singh v. King-Emperor*, ILR 23 Pat 28 : (AIR 1944 Pat 209) (J); Bashiruddin Ahmed v. Emperor, ILR (1937) Nag 236 : (AIR 1937 Nag 181) (K); Nandlal Chunilal v. Emperor, ILR (1946) Bom 207 : (AIR 1946 Bom 276) (FB) (L) and Banwarilal v. Emperor, AIR 1935 All 466 (M).
9. But Mr. Devar referred us to the decision in Chandrika v. Rex, AIR 1949 All 176 (N); that was also a case where there was no hearing in accordance with law, for a criminal appeal was taken up for hearing and disposed of before the date fixed for hearing thus depriving the advocate for the appellant of an opportunity to argue his client's case. The Court in accordance with the generally accepted view that such a hearing was without jurisdiction, reopened the matter and re-heard the appeal. But that does not support Mr. Devar's contention that we can re-hear the present appeal for the reasons stated by him. We may add that we feel little regret that we are unable to re-hear the appeal, for we are persuaded that the submissions of Mr. Devar on the merits are devoid of substance.
10. His first point is based on the assumption that there is an acquittal of the first accused under S. 302 read with S. 34, Indian Penal Code; there is no finding to that effect so far as we can see in the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge. It is true that under the heading “finding of the Judge” at the top of the judgment, it-is stated that A-2 and A-3 are not guilty under the second charge. This entry ignores the fact that A-1 and A-3 alone have been charged under the second count. There is no passage in the judgment which supports or authorises the contention that A-2 is a mistake for A-1 nor do we see any scope for the application of Section 403(1) of the Cr PC, to a case like the present one.
11. We also do not see any force in the contention that there is no separate charge head under S. 114 read with S. 302, Indian Penal Code. Section 236 of the Cr PC, enables the Court in a case like this to charge the accused with having committed all or any of several offences which will be constituted by an act or a series of acts when it is J doubtful which of them the facts which can be proved will constitute; or to charge him in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences. Section 237 of the Cr PC, is as follows:
12. If, in the case mentioned in S. 236, the accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of that section, he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it.”
13. In our view, therefore, the trial was not vitiated by any irregularity or illegality in procedure, we cannot hold that a trial conducted in accordance with the terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure has or could have prejudiced the appellant. We therefore reject his unnumbered petition.
D.H.Z
14. Petition rejected.
Alert