- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Bhadramma And Another v. Kotam Raj .
Factual and Procedural Background
This proceeding is Revision Petition No. 637/6/1954 against the judgment of the Munsiff Court, Miryalguda dated 8-3-1954. The petition was initially heard by a Single Bench and was referred to the Division Bench under Section 8 of the Hyderabad High Court Act. The Court heard arguments of the parties.
The factual allegations recorded in the opinion are: Kottam Raj (the applicant/complainant) complained of a breach of the peace to police on 1-12-1952. The police took possession of the house in dispute on 11-12-1952, locked it and deposited the key in the court (Nazarath) on 24-12-1952. A police report was filed in court on 12-12-1952. The Circle Inspector's deposition was recorded only on 14-2-1953, and the preliminary order under Section 145 CrPC was passed on 14-2-1953. It was contended before the learned Magistrate that, by the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145 CrPC, because dispossession occurred more than two months before the preliminary order, the complainant could only be referred to a civil court and could not obtain relief in the criminal court. The learned Magistrate disagreed and, on evidence, found that the applicant had been in possession and should be restored to possession. The Single Bench referred the matter to a Division Bench owing to conflicting authorities on the point.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), a Magistrate is precluded from passing an order under Section 145 where the dispossession occurred more than two months before the date of the preliminary order.
- Whether, and in what circumstances, the court may apply the doctrines of casus omissus and/or actus curiae neminem gravabit (and the related remedy of entering orders nunc pro tunc) so that delay attributable to the court's proceedings does not prejudice a party's entitlement under Section 145.
Arguments of the Parties
Argument recorded before the Magistrate
- It was argued that, in view of the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145 CrPC, if the dispossession took place more than two months prior to the preliminary order (as in this case), the complainant could not be given relief by the criminal court and could only be referred to a civil court.
The opinion does not provide a detailed, party-by-party catalogue of further distinct legal arguments; it records the contention just above and then proceeds to analyze relevant authorities and interpretive principles.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Krishnam Raju v. Chintalaswami Naidu, AIR 1927 Mad 816 | Held that an order under S.145 may be passed even if preliminary order is recorded more than two months after dispossession; courts may avoid prejudice from delay (application of actus curiae / nunc pro tunc). | The Court identified this case as part of a line of authorities supporting a remedial, retrospective approach; it considered it persuasive for applying nunc pro tunc where delay is attributable to the court. |
| R. Srinivasa Reddy v. M. Dasaratha Rama Reddy, AIR 1929 Mad 198 | Same principle as above: delay in passing preliminary order should not defeat relief when the delay is the court's act. | The Court treated this decision as one of the authorities favouring a liberal approach to avoid prejudice from court delay. |
| Chunchu Narayana v. Kesappa, AIR 1951 Mad 500 | Followed the view that an S.145 order can be made despite the preliminary order being recorded after two months, to avoid prejudice caused by delay. | Counted among the cases endorsing the application of nunc pro tunc / actus curiae to permit relief despite elapsed time. |
| Subarna v. Kartika, AIR 1954 Orissa 183 | Supported the view that delay attributable to the court should not bar relief under S.145; endorse remedial retrospective ordering. | The Bench noted and treated it as a supporting authority for applying the remedial doctrine where delay is not the fault of parties. |
| Vemuri Ammanna Sastri v. Molli Sitaramayya, 49 Mad LW 473 | Part of the same line of cases allowing S.145 orders despite delay to prevent prejudice from court action. | Regarded as persuasive authority in favour of a remedial approach in appropriate cases. |
| Arunachala Goundan v. Chinnadurai, AIR 1945 Mad 216 | Held that where the statutory words are clear the court must give them literal effect; if interval between dispossession and preliminary order exceeds two months, no order under S.145 can be passed (literal construction). | The Court acknowledged this line as carrying the weight of authority and endorsed the underlying principle of literal construction, but went on to analyse whether casus omissus applies in the present facts and carved out an exception where delay is due to the court. |
| Lakshami Narain Singh v. Jugeshwar Jha, AIR 1954 Pat 169 | Followed the literal interpretation that the proviso to S.145(4) operates to bar relief when dispossession preceded the order by more than two months. | Noted as part of the cluster of authorities adopting the literal-rule approach; the Court acknowledged their weight while creating a limited exception in the present circumstances. |
| Tolan Kalita v. Bhubban Chandra, AIR 1951 Assam 161 | Another authority endorsing the literal application of the proviso to S.145(4). | Recognised by the Bench as supporting the literal-rule position which the Court nevertheless distinguished for the facts at hand. |
| Emperor v. Parashram, AIR 1931 Nag 38 | Recognised as authority for literal application of statutory words in the context of S.145 proviso. | Included in the list of cases adopting the literal approach; the Court considered but limited their application by reference to casus omissus in the present case. |
| Meharban Singh v. Bhola Singh, AIR 1935 All 35 | Another case applying the plain words of the proviso to S.145(4) literally. | Noted as following the literal construction line; the Court accepted the principle but applied a narrower exception given the facts before it. |
| Janama Bhoi v. Draupadi Bhoiahi, AIR 1952 Orissa 26 | Applied the literal meaning of the proviso to S.145(4). | Recorded as part of the authorities following the literal-rule approach which the Court weighed against the remedial line. |
| Mohomed Beg v. Ehsan Beg, AIR 1941 Oudh 515 | Held in support of literal application of the proviso to S.145(4). | Noted among precedents favouring literal construction; the Court nevertheless formulated an exception for court-caused delay. |
| Mohd. Ali v. Shamsul Haq, AIR 1940 Sind 33 | Another precedent cited for literal reading of the proviso. | Included in the group of authorities supporting literal interpretation; the Court accepted the principle's force but held it did not preclude relief where delay arose from the court's workings. |
| Bhairon Singh v. Nain Singh, 1952 Raj LW 441 | Cited as following the literal interpretation of the proviso to S.145(4). | Noted by the Bench as part of the predominant line of authority favouring literal construction. |
| 34 Deccan LR 263 | Recorded as a decision of this Court aligning with the literal-rule approach (following AIR 1945 Mad 216). | The Court observed that this decision supported the literal interpretation; it was considered in the overall weighing of authorities. |
| Fatima Sultana Begum v. Rang Rao, AIR 1954 Hyd 215 | Decision of this Court which took the same view as AIR 1945 Mad 216 (literal application of the proviso). | Noted as a local precedent endorsing literal construction; the Bench acknowledged it while distinguishing present facts by reference to casus omissus and court-caused delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook the following analysis, in the sequence found in the opinion:
- Identification of conflict in authority: The Court reviewed two conflicting lines of authority. One line (Madras precedents and those following it) permitted remedial retrospective ordering (applying actus curiae / nunc pro tunc) so that delay in making the preliminary order would not prejudice a party. The opposing line (starting with AIR 1945 Mad 216 and followed by many High Courts and this Court's own decisions) insisted on literal application of the proviso to S.145(4): where the interval between dispossession and the preliminary order exceeds two months, no order under S.145 may be passed.
- Endorsement of the principle of literal construction: The Court acknowledged that the weight of authority supported the proposition that clear statutory words ought to be given literal effect. The Bench expressly endorsed the rule that when the words of a statute are clear there is generally no room for interpretation.
- Identification of casus omissus (omitted case): The Court then considered whether the present situation falls within a casus omissus — a contingency not covered by the statutory words. The Court observed that the proviso speaks of dispossession within two months of the date of the preliminary order but does not expressly provide for cases where the date of the preliminary order exceeds two months. Thus there is a textual gap for contingencies where delay is not attributable to the parties but to circumstances incidental to the court's working.
- Purpose of Section 145: The Court examined the object of Section 145 — to prevent breaches of the peace — and held that denying the remedial machinery of S.145 in cases where delay is due to the court would be contrary to parliamentary intent and the protective purpose of the provision.
- Application of remedial doctrine where delay is court-caused: Considering the facts (police possession from 11-12-1952, key deposited in court, police report filed on 12-12-1952, but the Circle Inspector's deposition and the magistrate's preliminary order only on 14-2-1953), the Court found the delay was due to adjournments caused by inability of the Circle Inspector to attend. The Court concluded that where delay is not due to fault of the parties but to the court's operation, it is appropriate to apply the doctrine (nunc pro tunc / actus curiae neminem gravabit) so as not to prejudice a party.
- Reconciliation of authority: Although the Court recognised the prevailing weight of literal construction authorities (including AIR 1945 Mad 216 and this Court's prior decisions), it held that the doctrine of casus omissus and the remedial principle permit an S.145 order where the delay is attributable to the court. Thus the Court adopted a qualified approach: it endorsed literal construction generally but carved out an exception in cases where the proviso's silence leaves a casus omissus and adherence to the literal rule would frustrate the statute's purpose.
- Conclusion on present facts: Applying that reasoning to the facts before it, the Court found no merit in the revision petition and dismissed it, thereby upholding the Magistrate's order restoring possession under Section 145.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Revision petition dismissed.
Implications (direct effects and interpretive outcome):
- The immediate effect is that the Magistrate's order under Section 145 (which found that the applicant had been in possession and awarded possession) stands; the revision petition seeking to interfere with that order was dismissed.
- The Court clarified its interpretive approach: while the literal wording of the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145 CrPC is ordinarily to be given effect (a view supported by a number of High Court decisions and this Court's prior decisions), there is room to apply the doctrines of casus omissus and actus curiae neminem gravabit — i.e., to permit remedial retrospective ordering (nunc pro tunc) — where the delay between dispossession and the preliminary order is attributable to the workings of the court and not to any fault of the parties, because exclusion of relief in such situations would defeat the protective object of Section 145.
- If the opinion discusses no further broad legal consequences beyond this interpretive qualification, the practical consequence is a limited rule: magistrates and appellate courts may uphold S.145 orders made after two months where the elapsed time resulted from court procedure or unavoidable adjournments, so that parties are not prejudiced by delays that are the court's act.
Siadat Ali Khan, J.:— This is revision petition No. 637/6/1954 against the judgment of the Munsiff Court, Miryalguda, dated 8-3-1954. The revision petition was first heard by a Single Bench of this Court and by judgment dated 17-11-1954 it has referred the case to this Bench under Section 8 of the Hyderabad High Court Act. We have heard the arguments of the learned advocates of the parties.
2. The facts alleged are that the applicant, Kottam Raj complained of breach of peace to the Police authorities on 1-12-1952. The Police took possession of the house in dispute on 11-12-1952. It deposited the key of the house which was locked by it in the Nazarath. A report was also filed and the learned Magistrate decided that he would record the deposition of the Circle Inspector. The deposition was recorded on 14-2-1953 and the preliminary order was passed on that date. It was argued before the learned Magistrate that having regard to the provisions of proviso to sub-s. (4) of Section 145 of the Cr PC as the dispossession has taken place more than two months before the date of the preliminary order, the applicant could only be referred to a civil court and could be given no remedy by the criminal court. The learned Magistrate did not agree with this view, and recorded the finding, that, on evidence, the possession of the applicant was established and he should, therefore, be given possession of the house in dispute. The learned Judge of the Single Bench has referred to the various authorities of the Indian High Courts and has expressed an opinion that as there is some conflict on this point, the matter may better be decided by a Division Bench.
3. The state of authorities appears to be as follows. In — ‘Krishnam Raju v. Chintalaswami Naidu’, AIR 1927 Mad 816 (A) and — ‘R. Srinivasa Reddy v. M. Dasaratha Rama Reddy’, AIR 1929 Mad 198 (B), the court took the view that even though the preliminary order may have been passed more than two months after the date of dispossession, an order under S. 145 could be passed as no party should suffer from the delay on the part of the Court. This view has been followed by—‘Chunchu Narayana v. Kesappa’, AIR 1951 Mad 500 (C) and — ‘Subarna v. Kartika’, AIR 1954 Orissa 183 (D) and — ‘Vemuri Ammanna Sastri v. Molli Sitaramayya’, 49 Mad LW 473 (E). In — ‘Arunachala Goundan v. Chinnadurai’, AIR 1945 Mad 216 (P), however, another view was taken and it was held that when the words of a statute are clear, they should be literally applied; that the words of the proviso to sub-s. (4) of S. 145 are clear and, therefore, if the interval between the dispossession and the date of the preliminary order is longer than two months, no order can be passed under S. 145 and the only course open to the Magistrate is to maintain the possession of the non-applicant. This view has been followed by almost all the Indian High Courts, for instance, — ‘Lakshami Narain Singh v. Jugeshwar Jha’, AIR 1954 Pat 169 (G), — ‘Tolan Kalita v. Bhubban Chandra’, AIR 1951 Assam 161 (H), — ‘Emperor v. Parashram’, AIR 1931 Nag 38 (I), — ‘Meharban Singh v. Bhola Singh’, AIR 1935 All 35 (J), — ‘Janama Bhoi v. Draupadi Bhoiahi’, AIR 1952 Orissa 26 (K), — ‘Mohomed Beg v. Ehsan Beg’, AIR 1941 Oudh 515 (L), — ‘Mohd. Ali v. Shamsul Haq’, AIR 1940 Sind 33 (M), and — ‘Bhairon Singh v. Nain Singh’, 1952 Raj LW 441 (N). This Court in — 34 Deccan LR 263 (O) and — ‘Fatima Sultana Begum… v. Rang Rao….’, AIR 1954 Hyd 215 (P) also took the same view as that of the Madras High Court in AIR 1945 Mad 216 (F). A brief resume of the ‘ratio decidendi’ of these various judgments may be given here. The line which the case following AIR 1945 Mad 216 (F) took is this:
“Undoubtedly it is unfortunate that a party should be prejudiced by delay in making of a preliminary order under sub-section (1), especially if that delay is in any particular case attributable to the ineptitude on account of the multiplicity of business in the courts but we cannot concede that any interpretation at variance with the plain words of the section is justified.”
4. On the other hand the reasoning of the line of cases following ‘AIR 1927 Mad 816 (1) (A)’, appears, to be as follows:
“A perusal of Section 145(4) of the Cr PC and its proviso makes it clear that no time should elapse between the complaint and the issue of the preliminary order. The order should follow the petition that the Magistrate should be satisfied on the complaint or the report of the Police and should not enter into any enquiry at that stage whether the complaint or the report of the Police is correct or not. So, the Magistrate is not justified in delaying the passing of a preliminary order if the Police report or other information is sufficient to satisfy him a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace existed. If the Magistrate is not justified in taking time to pass a preliminary order, then even if the time mentioned in the order is of a subsequent date, it should be deemed to have been passed immediately after the receipt of the Police report or the other information. It is in such circumstances that the well known maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’, an act of the Court shall prejudice no man has to be applied. Broom's Legal ‘Maxims, 10th Edn., page 73 explains this maxim by the illustration that where a case stands over for argument on account of the multiplicity of business in the court or for judgment from the intricacy of the question, the party ought not to be prejudiced by that delay but should be allowed to enter up his judgment retrospectively to meet the justice of the case and judgment may be entered ‘nunc pro tunc’ (now for then) for the delay is the act of the Court for which neither party should suffer.”
5. We carefully considered all the above authorities. It is evident that the weight of authority is on the side of AIR 1945 Mad 216 (F). We are quite clear that as far as the principle enunciated in it is concerned, there is no room for difference. We fully endorse the view that when the words of the statute are clear, there is no room left for interpretation and the clear words of the statute should be given effect to. Still, when a given state of affairs does not come within the obvious meaning of the words of the statute, i.e, when certain contingencies are not provided for; or, when the words of a provision though crystal clear, do not embrace a particular question in hand and, it seems obvious that it was not contemplated by the legislature, there appears to be, what is well known in canons of interpretation, the case of casus omissus. It is trite knowledge that in every statute there are several casus omissi. According to the celebrated writer, Prof. Allen,
“to leave no contingency unprovided for requires perfect foresight and perfect command of the language. Perfect foresight and perfect command of the language, is not within the competence of ordinary mortals and, therefore, of the draftsmen who draft the statutory provisions and hence very often Judges find provisions which do not cover the particular case which arises for decision before them. They I have, therefore, to look to the intention of the legislature as gathered from the entire provisions of the statute.”
6. In the particular case now before us the words of the proviso to sub-s. (4) of S. 145 appear to come within the doctrine of casus omissus. The provision only speaks of dispossession within two months of the date of the preliminary order. The words are very clear but they do not contain any provision in respect of cases in which the date of the preliminary order exceeds two months. In this case, there were several adjournments owing to the inability of the Circle Inspector to come and depose in support of his report. In the result, the dispossession which had taken place on 1-12-1952 was deposed to by the Circle Inspector on 14-2-1953 and the preliminary order was passed on 14-2-1953, i.e, more than two months after the date of dispossession.
7. It is quite evident, therefore, that the proviso has not provided for the contingency where the date of dispossession exceeds two months. Hence as already stated above, we have to look to the entire provisions of S. 145 and the evil which they are intended to meet. Section 145 is intended to stop breaches of peace and if the remedy provided by it is denied, it will not be acting in accordance with the intent of the legislature as expressed in the provisions of S. 145. This we do not think, is what the legislature intended and what the canons of interpretation enjoin. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that an order should be passed under S. 145 when the delay is not due to any fault of the parties but due to circumstances incidental to the working of the court. A consideration of the ‘ratio decidendi’ of the line of cases following AIR 1927 Mad. 816 (1) (A) given in paragraph 4 of this judgment will show that the application of the doctrine of ‘nunc pro tunc’ is, in other words, the application of the doctrine of casus omissus as detailed by us in this paragraph. In our opinion, therefore, this revision petition does not merit acceptance and is, therefore, dismissed.
Palnitkar, J.:— I agree. Any other interpretation will lead to difficulty and absurdity. The facts of this case amply illustrate that position. On 1-12-1952, Kotam Raj, the complainant, applied to the Police Authorities under Section 145 of the Cr PC, the Police made the investigation and finding an imminence of breach of peace, took possession of the house in dispute on 11-12-1952; it locked the house and on 24-12-1952 deposited the key in the court. A report was filed in court on 12-12-1952. But the deposition of the Circle Inspector could not be recorded till 14-2-1953. The preliminary order was passed on that date. The Magistrate after holding the necessary enquiry came to the conclusion that Kotam Raj, the complainant, was in possession of the house till 30-11-1952 and that he was dispossessed before 1-12-1952 when he returned from some village where he had gone on 30-11-1952. The Magistrate came to the conclusion that this was dispossession within two months having regard to the provisions of S. 145, sub-s. (4) read with its proviso.
8. It was argued that the said proviso could only be availed of if the dispossession of the applicant had taken place within two months from the date of the preliminary order i.e, in this case, if that, had happened on or before 14-12-1952, the preliminary order being on 14-2-1953. It this argument is accepted, then none of the contestants would get an order in their favour under the section as none of them was in actual possession of the house in dispute on 14-12-1952. As already stated, it was the Police who took possession of the house on 11-12-1952 and the possession was from that date either with the Police or with the Court. This is not a case of inability on the part of the Magistrate to determine possession upon the evidence adduced by the parties nor is it a case of possession of the third party not contesting the case. Naturally, the Magistrate cannot declare that the possession was of the Police as the Police had no claim to the property but attached the same to prevent breach of peace so that the court may restore it to the party entitled. It is in such cases that the principle ‘nunc pro tunc’ (now for then) is to be applied, for the delay in making the preliminary order is the act of the court for which none of the parties should suffer, as an act of the court shall prejudice no one. I respectfully agree with the opinion of Panigrahi, C.J, reported in AIR 1954 Orissa 183 (D). There has been, some conflict of opinion as to whether the expression “two months next before the date of such order” should be literally construed or whether a more liberal interpretation should be adopted. In view of the wording of the section, I am of the opinion, that a literal interpretation is necessary as the section provides that possession “at the date of the order” should be looked, into.
9. In determining the object of the enactment or the meaning of it language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles, should in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be a true one (Maxwell 191).
10. The ‘ratio legis’ in enacting the proviso to S. 145, Cl. (4) appears to be to give relief to persons dispossessed within two months from the date of the complaint. We have therefore to deduce the abovesaid intent in spite of the authority of the printed word giving preference to the dictates of legal reasonableness in the context of the enactment. One of the canons of interpretation according to Allen is
“if the printed word irresistibly leads to an anomaly, then the Judges must regretfully allow it to do so the responsibility is not theirs. But if reason and convenience can do it, this result will always be avoided. It is always to reason and convenience that the court leans……”(P. 293, Allen Law in the Making).
11. For the above reasons, I dismiss this revision petition.
K.S.B
12. Revision dismissed.
Alert