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Badduri Chandra Reddy And Another v. Pammi Rami Reddy And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was brought by defendants 2 and 3 in O.S. No. 43 of 1949 against the Decree and Judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Narasaraopet. The factual background as stated in the opinion is as follows:
- Ramamma, the wife of defendant 1, died in October 1948.
- Defendant 1 filed a complaint (marked Ex. B.2) stating that two persons (Badduri Chandra Reddi and Badduri Ramana Reddi — the appellants in this appeal) informed him that five persons (the present plaintiffs) were seen coming out of the backyard about the time of the death.
- The Police investigated, charged those five persons under Section 302 of the Penal Code and committed them to Sessions Court at Guntur.
- The accused (the plaintiffs in the civil suit) pleaded death was accidental (a fall on a Cuddappah slab causing skull fracture). The Sessions Judge accepted that plea and acquitted them, remarking that the prosecution had taken advantage of the death of an old woman to make a false report.
- Following acquittal, the five persons (the plaintiffs in the civil suit) filed a suit for damages for malicious prosecution against: (i) the complainant (defendant 1) and (ii) the two informants (defendants 2 and 3).
- The trial court dismissed the suit against defendant 1, but awarded a decree against defendants 2 and 3: Rs. 3,250 (Rs. 750 towards litigation expenses and Rs. 2,500 for mental suffering at Rs. 500 per plaintiff).
- Defendants 2 and 3 appealed from that judgment and decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether persons who merely give information to another (or to the police) can be held liable in a civil suit for malicious prosecution where they did not themselves formally institute or actively conduct the prosecution.
- Whether, on the facts of this case, defendants 2 and 3 were "prosecutors" or otherwise so active in the institution or conduct of the prosecution as to render them liable for malicious prosecution.
- Whether the amount of damages awarded by the trial court (particularly the Rs. 2,500 awarded for mental suffering at Rs. 500 per plaintiff) was supported by the evidence and was excessive.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (Defendants 2 and 3)
- Appellants contended they could not be made liable for malicious prosecution because they were not "prosecutors" in the sense required for that civil action; they merely gave information to defendant 1 or the police and did not institute or conduct the prosecution.
- Counsel for the appellants relied notably on Narasinga Row v. Muthayya Pillay (26 Mad 362) and Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh (35 Ind App 189 (PC)) to support the proposition that a mere informant to the police is not necessarily a prosecutor amenable to an action for malicious prosecution.
Respondent's Arguments (Plaintiffs / Respondent)
- The respondent relied on authorities such as Venkatappa v. Ramakrishnamma (AIR 1932 Mad 53) to argue that persons who concoct documents, create false evidence, or actively help others give false evidence can be liable in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution.
- Implicit in the respondent's position is that the information supplied by defendants 2 and 3 — that the plaintiffs were seen leaving defendant 1's house — was false and instrumental in setting the prosecution in motion, justifying civil liability.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narasinga Row v. Muthayya Pillay, 26 Mad 362 (A) | Principle that only the person who actually prosecutes (not a mere informant) can be sued for malicious prosecution. | The appellants relied on this authority; the court discussed it and noted the judgment's rule is "sound enough if properly understood" but not of universal application. It was used as a starting point in the discussion of informer liability. |
| Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh, 35 Ind App 189 (PC) (B) | Approving aspects of 26 Mad 362; principle that mere giving of information to police does not automatically render informer liable; active participation can make one the real prosecutor. | The court treated this as confirming that an informant who only supplies information he believes true is generally not liable; liability depends on the complainant's conduct and active role in the prosecution. |
| Dudhanath Kandu v. Mathura Prasad, 24 All 317 (C) | Cited in the context of earlier rulings (used by the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh) to contend a formal complainant could not be sued. | Referred to in recounting the conflicting judicial approaches in the authorities discussed in the opinion. |
| Periya Goundan v. Kuppa Goundan, AIR 1919 Mad 229 (D) | Held that any person who gives information known to be false which leads to prosecution is liable for malicious prosecution (a view differing from Narasinga Rao). | The court described this decision as striking a different note from Narasinga Rao. It was noted that some benches preferred this view, but the court did not need to choose between the conflicting lines of authority for deciding the present appeal. |
| Shumnugha Udayar v. Kandaswamy Asary, AIR 1920 Mad 789 (E) | Preferred the Periya Goundan approach over Narasinga Rao. | Referred to as part of the body of Madras decisions that took the Periya Goundan line; used in the court's survey of the authorities. |
| Balbhadar Singh v. Badri Sah, AIR 1926 PC 46 (F) | Privy Council acceptance that an informant who only gives information he believes true is not liable; active participation in prosecution can render one liable. | The court relied on this to state it is well established that mere informing (if honestly believed) does not sustain an action for malicious prosecution; active conduct is the distinguishing factor for civil liability. |
| Venkatappa v. Ramakrishnamma, AIR 1932 Mad 53 (G) | Held that persons who concoct documents creating false evidence and help others give false evidence may be liable in malicious prosecution suits. | Cited by respondent's counsel. The court expressly disagreed with that view as inconsistent with Privy Council and other High Court decisions. |
| Baboo Gunnesh v. Mugneeram, II Beng LR 321 (PC) (H) | Rule that witnesses cannot be sued for damages for evidence given in judicial proceedings; perjury prosecution is the remedy for false evidence. | Invoked by the court to support the proposition that giving evidence (even false) in judicial proceedings is not normally the basis for civil damages; the proper remedy is criminal prosecution for perjury. |
| Templeton v. Lawrie, 25 Bom 230 (I) | Expressed the view that giving false evidence does not furnish a basis for a civil suit for damages; perjury is the remedy. | Used by the court as an example of the consistent approach of several High Courts that false testimony is not the basis for civil damages. |
| Manickka Mudaliar v. Munuswamy Naidu, AIR 1916 Mad 666 (J) | Madras High Court view aligning with the principle that false evidence is not a basis for civil damages; relied on English authorities. | Cited to show established Madras authority for the proposition that civil damages are not the remedy for false evidence, referencing English precedents. |
| Revis v. Smith, 1856-18 CB 126 (K) | English authority relied on in Manickka Mudaliar in support of limits on civil liability for witnesses' testimony. | Noted as one of the English decisions upon which Indian High Court decisions relied; mentioned by the court as part of supporting authorities. |
| Henderson v. Broomhead, (1859) 4 H & N 569 (L) | Another English authority cited in Manickka Mudaliar on the limited civil consequences of testimony. | Referenced as part of the body of English decisions cited in support of the rule limiting civil liability for giving evidence. |
| Taharat Karimj v. Malik Abdul Khaliq, AIR 1938 Pat 529 (M) | Illustrates that the question of who is the real prosecutor depends on substance and circumstances; a formal complainant can be only a name-lender while another is the real prosecutor. | The court noted this case but said it did not carry the respondent very far because its findings were that the formal complainant was a name-lender and the other person was the real instigator. |
| Issardas Krishfnchand v. Assudamal Ramandas, AIR 1940 Sind 90 (N) | Held that a person who instigated a false and malicious prosecution and is responsible for it is liable for damages. | Cited by the respondent; the court observed the case is inapplicable here because it was not proved that defendants 2 and 3 instigated defendant 1 to file the complaint. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a focused legal analysis addressing two central strands: (1) liability of an informant or non‑formal prosecutor in malicious prosecution suits, and (2) the sufficiency and quantum of damages awarded by the trial court.
Analysis of Liability for Malicious Prosecution
- The court reviewed competing lines of authorities. One line (represented by Narasinga Rao v. Muthayya Pillai) holds that only the actual prosecutor can be sued; another line (represented by Periya Goundan v. Kuppa Goundan) treats an informant who gives false information leading to prosecution as liable. The Privy Council authorities and subsequent decisions such as Gaya Prasad and Balbhadar Singh were examined to reconcile these approaches.
- The court accepted the underlying principle that liability depends on the whole circumstances: if a complainant merely gives information which he believes true and the police proceed without further active involvement by him, it is improper to hold him liable for the prosecution's failure. Conversely, if the complainant knowingly gives false information, suborns witnesses, or actively influences the authorities, he may be treated as the real prosecutor and be liable.
- Applying the principles to the facts, the court concluded that the defendants in this case (defendants 2 and 3) were not the persons who "set the law in motion" in the sense required to make them directly or primarily responsible for the prosecution. The court stated that it was "difficult to say that one who gives some information to another who lodges a report before the Police can be brought within the scope of such a principle" of primary responsibility.
- The court rejected the respondent's reliance on authorities that would extend civil liability to persons who merely assisted in creating documents or false evidence, citing higher authority (Privy Council and several High Court decisions) to the contrary; it specifically relied on precedents that limit civil liability for false evidence and point to perjury as the proper remedy.
- Consequently, the court held that the trial court's factual finding that defendants 2 and 3 had not actually seen the plaintiffs leaving the house and yet told defendant 1 so did not, on the whole of the evidence and law as surveyed, render them civilly liable as the real prosecutors in this instance.
Analysis of Quantum of Damages
- The court examined the plaintiffs' pleaded claim (Rs. 5,250 in the plaint without apportioned heads) and the oral testimony: P.W.1 claimed Rs. 3,000 spent on the criminal case and overall loss over Rs. 5,000; P.W.2 claimed Rs. 2,000 loss from inability to cultivate; P.W.3 claimed Rs. 5,000 (Rs.3,000 expenses + Rs.2,000 loss). None of the witnesses quantified mental suffering as a monetary amount.
- The trial court had awarded Rs. 2,500 for mental suffering (Rs. 500 each). The appellate court found no adequate evidential basis for that figure and described Rs. 500 per plaintiff as "very excessive" given the lack of valuation evidence; it suggested that if any award were proper for mental suffering, Rs. 200 per plaintiff would be a more defensible maximum — but on the primary finding on liability the question of quantum became moot.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Appeal allowed; the decree of the trial court is set aside and the suit is dismissed. The court directed that each party shall bear its own costs throughout.
Implications:
- The direct effect of the decision is that the plaintiffs' suit for malicious prosecution against defendants 2 and 3 fails, and no damages are recoverable from those defendants under that suit.
- The court's reasoning follows established authorities that limit civil liability for persons who merely give information believed to be true, and confirms that civil liability for malicious prosecution requires a showing that the person sought to be made liable was directly or primarily responsible for instituting or actively conducting the prosecution.
- The opinion does not purport to announce a new legal principle; it places the present facts within existing lines of authority and applies them to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim. (The opinion contains a survey of relevant precedents but does not record the creation of a novel precedent.)
Disposition
As recorded in the opinion: the appeal is allowed; the decree of the trial court is set aside and the suit is dismissed. Each party to bear its own costs.
Note: The above summary is strictly confined to the statements and materials contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal points beyond that text.
1. The appeal is brought by defendants 2 and 3 in O.S No. 43 of 1949 against the Decree and Judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Narasaraopet. In order to appreciate the points arising for determination in this case, it is necessary to trace briefly the background of this litigation. One Ramamma, the wife of defendant 1 died in October 1948. In connection with her death, a complaint was filed by defendant 1 and the same is marked as “Ex. B. 2” in this case.
2. It was stated therein that Ramamma died as a result of homocidal violence, that two persons by name Badduri Chandra Reddi and Badduri Ramana Reddi (Appellants in this case) informed him that five persons (the present plaintiffs) were seen coming out of the backyard of the house of defendant 1 at about the time of the death of Ramamma. On receipt of this complaint, the Police investigated into the case, filed a charge sheet against these five persons under S. 302 of the Penal Code and they were committed to Sessions at Guntur to take their trial for the offences with which they were charged. The case for the accused in that case (the plaintiffs herein) was that it was not as a result of violence that Ramamma died, but she sustained a fracture of the skull by falling on a Cuddappah slab while she was carrying some grain to the granary.
3. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the plea of the accused and acquitted them. It was also remarked by the Judge that the prosecution took advantage of the dead of an old woman to make a false report against the accused therein. Consequent upon the acquittal of the accused therein, they have filed a suit for damages for malicious prosecution against the complainant, and the two persons who gave information to the complainant impleading them as defendants 1 to 3 respectively.
4. The case for the plaintiffs as disclosed in the plaint is that on account of enmity that existed between the plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendants on the other, they concocted a case of murder against them taking advantage of the death of Ramamma, that Ramamma who was suffering from biliousness had a fall in the afternoon on 9-10-1948, while attending to her domestic work and her head struck against a Cuddappah slab resulting in the fracture of her head.
5. It is recited in the plaint that the defendants actuated by malice and without any reasonable or probable cause set the law in motion against the plaintiffs. A sum of Rs. 5,250/- was claimed as damages.
6. The suit was contested by all the defendants denying that there was any conspiracy to give a false complaint against the plaintiffs. While defendant 1 stated that by reason of information which he received from defendants 2 and 3, he was led to believe that his wife died as a result of foul play by the plaintiffs and he merely mentioned his suspicion in the complaint, the case of defendants 2 and 3 was that they were not in any way responsible for the launching of the case, that information given by them to defendant 1 was not without reasonable and probable cause, nor was there any malice.
7. A plea was also taken that the plaintiffs did not suffer any damage and, at any rate, the damages claimed were excessive.
8. The trial court dismissed the suit against defendant 1, but gave decree against defendants 2 and 3 for Rs. 3,250/-. Rs. 750/- towards expenses of the litigation, and Rs. 2,500/- towards mental suffering of all the plaintiffs i.e, at the rate of Rs. 500/-.for each. The learned Judge thought that the evidence on record did not justify the plea of the plaintiffs that Ramamma died as a result of an accidental fall and that her death was due to injuries inflicted on her head with a heavy object like a big stone or a big pounder.
9. He also found against conspiracy amongst the defendants, to give a false report to the authorities concerned. In the opinion of the learned Judge no case was made out against defendant 1 because he merely communicated his suspicion in Ex. B. 2 based upon the information given by the 2nd and 3rd defendants and that he was not over anxious to make out a case against the plaintiffs as seen from the contents of Ex. B. 2.
10. So far as defendants 2 and 3 are concerned, his view was that defendants 2 and 3 did not actually see the plaintiffs going out of the house and yet told the 1st defendant that they saw the plaintiffs going out of the house which showed malice on their part and absence of reasonable and probable cause for them. In that view he found defendants 2 and 3 are liable for damages for malicious prosecution of the plaintiffs. These two defendants have preferred this appeal against that Judgment and decree.
11. In support of this appeal, it is first argued by Mr. Ramachandra Rao that on the findings of the learned Judge, the appellants cannot be mulcted with damages as they could not be regarded as prosecutors in any sense of the term. According to the learned Counsel, the view of the learned Judge that the appellants were responsible for the prosecution of the plaintiffs is erroneous. To substantiate this, the first case cited by the counsel for the appellants is — ‘Narasinga Row v. Muthayya Pillay’, 26 Mad 362 (A).
12. It is laid down there by Boddam and Bhashyam Iyengar JJ. that the only person who can be sued in an action for malicious prosecution is the one that actually prosecutes and any person who merely gives information to the Police cannot be said to have prosecuted the plaintiffs. A decision in — ‘Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh’, 35 Ind App 189 (PC) (B), is cited as approving 26 Mad 362 (A).
13. Referring to 26 Mad 362 (A), the Privy Council in the latter case observed thus:
“The principle here laid down is sound enough if properly understood and its application to the particular case was no doubt justified; but in the opinion of their Lordships, it is not of universal application. In India the Police have special powers in regard to the investigation of criminal charge, and it depends very much in the result of their investigation whether or not further proceedings are taken against the present accused.
14. If, therefore, a complaint does not go beyond giving what he believes to be correct information to the police, and the police without further interference on his part (excepting giving such honest assistance as they may require) think fit to prosecute, it would be improper to make him responsible in damages for the failure of the prosecution.
15. But, if the charge, is false to the knowledge of the complainant; if he misleads the police by bringing suborned witnesses to support it; if he influences the police to assist him in sending an innocent man for trial before the Magistrate, it would be equally improper to allow him to escape liability because the prosecution has not, technically, been conducted by him.
16. The question in all cases of this kind must be — who was the prosecutor? — and the answer must depend upon the whole circumstances of the case. The mere setting of the law in motion is not the criterion, the conduct of the complainant before and after making the charge, must also be taken into consideration. Nor is it enough to say, the prosecution was instituted and conducted by the police.”
17. In that case, a person by name Imam-ud-din Shah made a report to the police that several persons had cut and carried away crops of certain lands and stolen other crops and property belonging to some tenant. Another person by name Bhagat Singh was directed by the police to inquire and report and he submitted a report stating that Gaya Prasad who subsequently filed the suit for malicious prosecution was one of those that participated in the rioting. Imam-ud-din and Bhagat Singh conducted the prosecution before police. They procured evidence that a not was committed and that Gaya Prasad actually had taken part in it, and took an active part in the conduct of the prosecution at later stages.
18. When a suit was filed by Gaya Prasad after his acquittal in the criminal proceedings for damages for malicious prosecution, one of the pleas taken was that they did not institute any criminal proceedings, that they were merely witnesses for the prosecution and so no suit could be brought against them. The trial court gave a decree against the defendants as it found the defendants to be the chief cause of the plaintiffs having been accused of rioting and of having concocted and fabricated false evidence against the plaintiffs, although their names did not appear on the face of criminal proceedings.
19. This decision was reversed by the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh on the authority of — “Narasinga Rao v. Muthayya Pillai (A)’, and — ‘Dudhanath Kandu v. Mathura Prasad’, 24 All 317 (C), and it was held that a person who has made a formal complaint could not be sued for damages for malicious prosecution. On appeal the Privy Council set aside the Judgment of the Judicial Commissioner on the view referred to already.
20. It is seen that both the defendants were held responsible for the prosecution of the plaintiff, one directly for the charge against the plaintiff and the other having made the original report of uni lawful assembly upon which the prosecution for rioting was ultimately based and that bod of them acted together throughout the subsequent proceedings. The test propounded in that case is that mere filing of a complaint does not amount to malicious prosecution and something more must be done to indicate that the defendants were the real prosecutors.
21. I have referred to this pronouncement at some length because this has formed the basis of several rulings of various High Courts and of the Privy Council.
22. In — ‘Periya Goundan…(Plaintiff) v. Kuppa Goundan…(Defendant) .*’, AIR 1919 Mad 229(2) (D), a Bench of the Madras High Court struck a note different from that in ‘Narasinga Rao v. Muthayya Pillay (A)’. The opinion expressed in that is that any person who gives information to the authorities, which, to his knowledge, is false and has led to the prosecution of the person who is ultimately acquitted, renders himself liable for damages for malicious prosecution. They dissented from ‘Narasinga Rao v. Muthayya Pillai (A)’.
23. In the opinion of the learned Judges, ‘Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh (B)’ should not be regarded as having approved the principles underlying ‘Narasinga Rao v. Muthayya Pillai (A)’. In — ‘Shumnugha Udayar v. Kandaswamy Asary’, AIR 1920 Mad 789 (E), another Bench of the Madras High Court expressed its preference to AIR 1919 Mad 229(2) (D), as against ‘Narasinga Rao v. Muthayya Pillai (A)’.
24. The principle laid down in ‘Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh (B)’, was accepted by the Privy Council in another case — ‘Balbhadar Singh v. Badri Sah’, AIR 1926 PC 46 (F). It may be taken that it is now well established, that, if a person does nothing beyond giving information to the police which he considers to be true, an action for damages for malicious prosecution is not maintainable against him. If on the other hand, besides netting the law in motion he takes an active part in the conduct of the prosecution he made be regarded as the real prosecutor, although the actual prosecution is by the police and renders himself liable for damages.
25. In this case I am relieved of the necessity of choosing between — ‘Narasinga Rao v. Muthayya (A)’ and — ‘Periya Goundan…(Plaintiff) v. Kuppa Goundan…(Defendant) .* (D)’, and the rulings that followed it, as the defendants, in my opinion, are not the persons, that set the law in motion. The reason, why a person who gives information, to the Police notwithstanding that he is not the actual prosecutor is said to be responsible for the malicious prose-, cution is that his information to the authorities, which naturally leads to prosecution is just the I same as the prosecution.
26. The complainant is regarded as the person who has set the law in motion.
27. Even in ‘Periya Goundan…(Plaintiff) v. Kuppa Goundan…(Defendant) .* (D)’, the position is summed up thus:
“The fact that some Officer, whether Policeman or Magistrate, has to form an opinion on the apparent truth of the informant's information before the prosecution proceeds is no more reason in the one case than in the other for, exonerating the in, formant from liability for what follows. It is in each case his false information, out of which the prosecution arises, and it makes no difference whether the person led astray in the first instance is the Police Officer or the Magistrate.”
28. It is thus seen that the basis of liability is the information to the police in the one case and the complaint to the Magistrate in the other. Responsibility is fastened upon the complainant, because it is his complaint that is responsible for the stating of prosecution against the plaintiff and the starting point of the proceedings against him. This rule is stated in almost all the cases.
29. To hold that any person who gives information to the complainant will be guilty of malicious proceedings is opposed to the principles enunciated in ‘Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh (B)’ ‘Balbhadar Singh v. Badri Sah (F)’ and even ‘Periya Goundan…(Plaintiff) v. Kuppa Goundan…(Defendant) .* (D)’. It is too much to extend the principle embodied in ‘Periya Goundan…(Plaintiff) v. Kuppa Goundan…(Defendant) .*)’, to a person who had furnished some information, to the complainant because he cannot be regarded as having set the law in motion.
30. Mr. Kotayya, the learned Counsel for the respondent relied on a Bench decision of the Madras High Court in — “Venkatappa v. Ramakrishnamma”, AIR 1932 Mad 53 (G). In that case Venkatasubba Rao and Pakenham Walsh JJ. thought that persons who concocted documents which created false evidence and helped others in giving false evidence on a charge were also liable in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution.
31. I must express my respectful disagreement with this view as this is in the teeth of the several pronouncements of the Privy Council and of the Madras and other High Courts.
32. In ‘Baboo Gunnesh v. Mugneeram’, II Beng LR 321 (PC) (H) the Privy Council ruled that witnesses could not be sued for damages in respect of evidence given by them in a judicial proceeding, and the only way of punishing them if the evidence is found to be false was by charge-sheeting them for perjury. This has been followed in a number of decided cases. In — ‘Templeton v. Lawrie’, 25 Bom 230 (I), a Bench of the Bombay High Court expressed the opinion that giving of false evidence, however malicious and mala fide it might be, does not furnish any basis for filing a suit for damages in a civil court, the only remedy being a prosecution of perjury.
33. The same view is expressed by the Madras High Court in — ‘Manickka Mudaliar v. Munuswamy Naidu’, AIR 1916 Mad 666 (J). In this last mentioned case, reliance is placed on a number of English decisions, namely, — ‘Revis v. Smith’, 1856-18 CB 126 (K) and — ‘Henderson v. Broomhead’, (1859) 4 H & N 569 (L). It may also be stated here that in ‘Venkatapa v. Ramakristnamma (G)’, no reasons are given for holding that persons creating documents to be used as false evidence should be held liable, nor is any decision referred to.
34. Mr. Kotayya next called an aid the Judgment of the Patna High Court in — ‘Taharat Karimj v. Malik Abdul Khaliq’, AIR 1938 Pat 529 (M). There the first defendant wanted to escape liability by pleading that the complaint was not lodged by him, but by the other defendant on his own initiative and so he could not be made to pay any damages.
35. On the finding that defendant 1 had a great deal to do with the case brought by defendant 2 that he wanted to file a complaint and that he did not do so because defendant 2 filed one and that lie was prevented from doing so by his legal advisers, the learned Judges held that he was the real prosecutor, defendant 2 was only a formal complainant. The learned Judges stated that the responsibility for prosecution in such a case is a question of substance, as pointed by Sir Andrew Scoble in ‘Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh (B)’, depending upon the circumstances of the case and that the mere setting of the law in motion is not the criterion.
36. It is not necessary for me to consider whether the principle in ‘Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh (B)’, was correctly applied in the case cited, because of the finding that the second defendant in that case was only a name-lender and that the person behind the prosecution was defendant 1, who, in fact, went to than to give the complaint but was prevented from doing so by his legal adviser. In my opinion, this case does not carry the respondents very far.
37. Mr. Kotayya also cited the decision of the Sind Court in — ‘Issardas Krishfnchand v. Assudamal Ramandas’, AIR 1940 Sind 90 (N). The opinion expressed by a Bench of that Court was that a person, who instigated false and malicious prosecution and is thus responsible for it, is liable for damages. This ruling is again inapplicable to this case, because it is not proved that the defendants 2 and 3 instigated defendant I to file a complaint. It may be that their information was in a way responsible for the malicious prosecution.
38. Further the principle that should guide the determination of the liability for damages for malicious prosecution, as already stated by me, is that the person sought to be made liable for damages should be directly or primarily responsible for the prosecution. It is difficult to say that one who gives some information to another who lodges a report before the Police can be brought within the scope of such a principle.
39. Finally, Mr. Kotayya called in aid passages from Halsbury's Laws of England Volume 22 (2nd edition by Hailsham) at p. 3:
“A prosecution exists where a criminal charge is made before a Judicial Officer or Tribunal and any person who makes or is actively instrumental in the making or prosecuting of such a charge is deemed to prosecute it, and is called the Prosecutor. Thus a person who lays before a Magistrate an information stating that lie suspects and has good reason to suspect another, or who prefers a bill of indictment, is engaged in a prosecution and he may be responsible for the prosecution even, though the charge made before the Magistrate is an oral one.”
40. In para 3 at p. 4, it is stated:
“A person who prosecutes another in the sense explained above may be liable as prosecutor, and so may one who represents himself as prosecutor, though he did not in fact initiate the prosecution and is present only as witness.”
41. These passages do not in any way substantiate the proposition of Mr. Kotayya. All that they mean is that not only the actual Prosecutor but one who causes or procures the prosecution as in the case of a person who moves the police by his complaint who starts a prosecution against the defendant is liable. It follows from the above discussion that the defendants cannot be made liable for damages for malicious prosecution.
42. The above finding is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. However, as the question of quantum of damages also was argued before me, I proceed to give my finding on that aspect also. In the plaint, a sum of Rs. 5,250/- was claimed, without apportioning, it under different heads. It is merely stated that the defendants are liable to pay to the plaintiffs damages which the plaintiffs estimated at the moderate figure of Rs. 5,250/-.
43. But, in the witness-box, P.W 1 stated that a sum of Rs. 3,000/- was expended in connection with the criminal case and that the total loss of the plaintiffs was more than Rs. 5,000/-. He also deposed that the health of the plaintiffs was affected because of the life in jail. P.W 2, the 1st plaintiff, did not say anything about expenses in connection with the criminal case, but testified to a loss of Rs. 2,000/- on account of their inability to carry on the cultivation, having been confined in jail. P.W 3 claims Rs. 5,000/-, Rs. 3,000/- as having been spent in connection with the case and Rs. 2,000/- towards the loss of income due to the non-cultivation of the lands.
44. It is thus seen that none of the witnesses has claimed anything towards mental suffering. It is true that plaintiff 5 as P.W 3 stated that he suffered bodily and mentally on account of the jail life, but he did not try to evaluate the mental suffering in terms of money.
45. In the circumstances, it looks to me that it is difficult to support the Judgment of the trial court in so far as it awards Rs. 2,500/- as damages for mental suffering of the plaintiffs. Even in the plaint, all that is stated is that they had suffered a great deal in mind, body, finance and reputation.
46. Even if any damages could be awarded under that head notwithstanding the circumstances pointed out above, it looks to me that a sum of Rs. 500/- awarded to each of the plaintiffs is very excessive. There is no basis for the learned Judge having awarded Rs. 500/- to each of the plaintiffs. There is no discussion on this question. Assuming they are entitled to damages on account of mental suffering anything more than Rs. 200/- for each of the plaintiffs seems to be excessive.
47. In the result, the appeal is allowed; the decree of the trial court is set aside and the suit-dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct each party to bear its own costs throughout.
D.H.Z
48. Appeal dismissed.
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