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Saraswathula Kameswaramma And Another v. M/S. Radhakrishna And Co. And Others
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This summary is drawn only from the text of the provided opinion.
On 4-11-1971 plaintiffs instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam, valuing the suit at Rs. 12,000. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 226 of 1971, the plaintiffs appealed to the District Court, Visakhapatnam; the appeal was valued at Rs. 12,795. After the suit was instituted, the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Act 19 of 1972) was enacted and came into force on 1-11-1972. The Subordinate Judge disposed of the suit on 30-6-1973, i.e., after the Act came into force.
The office objected that the District Court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The plaintiffs-appellants contended that because the suit was disposed of after the new Act came into force, the appeal to the District Court was maintainable under Section 17(1) of the 1972 Act (which provided appeals to the District Court when the value did not exceed Rs. 15,000). Prior to the 1972 Act, under Section 13 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873, appeals above Rs. 10,000 lay to the High Court. Because of conflicting decisions of this High Court and an earlier decision to the contrary, the District Judge made a reference to the High Court under Section 113 of the Civil Procedure Code asking whether the provisions of the 1972 Act are prospective or retrospective in operation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Act 19 of 1972) operate retrospectively or only prospectively.
- Given the temporal question above, whether the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs to the District Court (valued below Rs. 15,000) is maintainable—i.e., whether the change in appellate forum effected by the 1972 Act applies to suits instituted before the Act came into force.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Arguments
- Because the suit was disposed of after the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 came into force (the decree being passed on 30-6-1973, after 1-11-1972), the appellate provision of Section 17(1) of the 1972 Act applied and therefore the appeal to the District Court was maintainable.
Office / Respondent Objection (as represented to the Court)
- The District Court did not have the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because on the date of institution of the suit the right of appeal lay to the High Court under Section 13 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873 (i.e., the appeal value was above the earlier threshold), and therefore the change in forum effected by the 1972 Act should not apply to pending proceedings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369 | Statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention is manifested; depriving a suitor in a pending action of an appeal or transferring it is interference with an existing right. | The court accepted and relied on this principle to support the presumption against retrospective application of the 1972 Act to pending litigation. |
| Garikapati Veerayya v. Subbaiah Choudury, AIR 1957 SC 540 | Articulated five propositions: (i) proceedings (suit, appeal, etc.) are part of one legal process; (ii) right of appeal is substantive; (iii) institution of suit preserves existing rights of appeal; (iv) right of appeal is vested from date of institution and governed by law at that date; (v) such vested rights can be taken away only by clear statutory provision. | The court adopted these propositions as authoritative and used them as a framework to determine whether the 1972 Act affected vested rights in pending suits; they supported the conclusion that the right of appeal is preserved unless the statute clearly says otherwise. |
| Mukund Deo v. Mahadu, AIR 1965 SC 703 | Reaffirmed that alterations in procedure are generally retrospective, but a right of appeal to a particular forum is substantive and is not lost by alteration in the law unless expressly provided or necessarily implied. | Used to reinforce the distinction between procedural changes (which may be retrospective) and substantive appellate rights (which are preserved unless clearly taken away); supported holding that 1972 Act did not divest vested appellate rights without express provision. |
| I. Venkata Reddy v. J. Ayodhyamma, (1973) 2 APLJ 250 | High Court decision cited in the text as supporting the view that the 1972 Act operates prospectively. | The court treated this High Court decision as consistent with its conclusion and noted that it had been applied again in a subsequent (unreported) decision. |
| V. Venkayamma v. P. Ramalakshmi, (1973) 1 APLJ (Short Notes) 97 (and unreported S.R. No.31046/1973 dated 15-6-1973) | Another High Court decision (short note / unreported order) applied in a manner consistent with the view that the 1972 Act was prospective. | The court cited these decisions as supporting authority for the non-retrospective operation of the 1972 Act. |
| Kotina Papayya v. Samminga Appala Naidu, (1960) 1 An WR 100 | Held that the Madras Civil Courts (Andhra Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act I of 1956) was retrospective and applied to suits instituted before it came into force; relied on postponement clause and statements of objects and reasons. | Cited as a contrasting authority. The court distinguished that case on its facts and surrounding circumstances (noting the stronger indicia of retrospective intent present there) and declined to follow it here because such strong circumstances were absent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by applying established principles concerning retrospective operation of statutes as set out in the authorities cited in the opinion. The analytical steps, as stated in the opinion, are:
- The court began from the entrenched presumption against retrospective application of statutes where vested rights are affected—i.e., statutes are not to be construed as retrospective unless a clear intention appears (drawing on Colonial Sugar and subsequent Supreme Court authority).
- The court reiterated and applied the five propositions distilled in Garikapati Veerayya v. Subbaiah Choudury: that appeals form part of the single legal proceeding begun by institution of suit; the right of appeal is substantive and vested as of the date of institution; and such vested rights are preserved unless a later enactment clearly or by necessary implication takes them away.
- The court noted Mukund Deo v. Mahadu to emphasize that procedural changes may be retrospective but substantive rights of appeal are preserved absent express statutory provision or necessary implication to the contrary.
- With those principles, the court examined the language of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972. It noted: (a) Section 17(1) increased the pecuniary jurisdiction of District Courts (appeal to District Court where value not more than Rs. 15,000); (b) Section 34(1) repealed prior relevant Acts; and (c) crucially, Section 34(2) made provisions of Sections 8 and 18 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891 applicable.
- The court applied Section 8 of the General Clauses Act (as made applicable by the 1972 Act) to conclude that a right of appeal to the High Court which accrued and existed on the date of institution of the suit (under Section 13 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873) was preserved to the litigant. The court interpreted this textual provision as an express legislative intention to protect vested appellate rights.
- The court contrasted the present statute with the earlier (1960) decision (Kotina Papayya) that held a prior amendment retrospective. It observed that in Kotina Papayya there were strong surrounding circumstances (a postponement clause plus a statement of objects and reasons explicitly aiming to reduce High Court arrears) that supported a finding of retrospective intent. By contrast, in the present Act the preamble merely recited consolidation and amendment; there were no comparable strong circumstances indicating an intention to affect pending rights.
- On this basis—textual protection via Section 34(2) and the General Clauses Act and absence of circumstances indicating a contrary legislative intent—the court concluded that the 1972 Act was prospective only and did not divest the parties of their vested right of appeal under the law prevailing at the date of institution of the suit.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 is only prospective in its operation and not retrospective. Consequently, the appeal preferred before the District Court was not maintainable.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The change in appellate forum effected by the 1972 Act does not apply to this suit instituted on 4-11-1971; therefore the right of appeal existing when the suit was instituted (i.e., under Section 13 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873) is preserved and the plaintiffs' appeal to the District Court is not maintainable.
- On precedent/new law: The opinion applies and follows established principles laid down in earlier cases (as catalogued above). The court did not purport to create a new rule of law beyond applying those principles to the statutory language and facts; it distinguished earlier conflicting authority (Kotina Papayya) on the specific factual indicia of legislative intent. The opinion therefore resolves the reference by applying existing authorities rather than announcing a novel legal doctrine.
Result: Reference answered accordingly.
Chennakesav Reddy, J.:— In this reference made by the District Judge, Visakapatnam under Section 113 of the CPC the issue that requires resolution is whether the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Act 19 of 1972) are only prospective or retrospective in operation.
2. The facts giving rise to the reference are these: Aggrieved against the judgment and decree in O.S No. 226 of 1971 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the District Court Visakapatnam. The appeal was valued at Rs. 12,795/-. The suit itself was instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. Visakhapatnam on 4-11-1971. The value of the suit was Rs. 12,000/-. After the institution of the suit, the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act’) was passed and the said Act came into force on 1-11-1972. The suit was disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge after the Act came into force on 30th June, 1973. Under Section 17(1) of the Act an appeal lies only to the District Court against the decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge when the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit or proceedings is not more than Rs. 15,000/-. Since the value of the suit was below Rs. 15,000/- the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the District Court. The office took an objection that the District Court had no petuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants it was argued that as the suit was disposed of after the new Act came into force, the appeal was maintainable. In view of the conflicting decisions of this High Court in I. Venkata Reddy v. J. Ayodhyamma, 1973-2 APLJ 250, and in V. Venkayamma v. P. Ramalakshmi, (1973) 1 APLJ (Short Notes) 97 on the one hand, and in Kotina Papayya v. Samminga Appala Naidu, (1960) I An WR 100 on the other on the question whether the operation of the Act is retrospective or prospective and as an appeal lay to the High Court prior to the present Act under Section 13 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873 (Central Act III of 1873) if the value of the appeal was above Rs. 10,000/- the learned District Judge made this reference under Section 113 of the CPC.
3. The law regarding such type of questions as the present one whether the benefit conferred under a statutory provision was prospective or retrospective is plenty. Courts have invariably leaned very strongly against applying a new Act to a pending action when the express language of the Act itself does not compel to do so. In the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369 Lord Macnaghten in delivering the Judgment of the Judicial Committee, observed as follows:—
“to deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested.”
4. The rule in the above case was accepted and applied by the Supreme Court in Garikapati Veerayya v. Subbaiah Choudury, AIR 1957 SC 540. After an exhaustive review of the earlier authorities. S.R Das C.J deduced the following five propositions:—
“(i) The legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceedings;
(ii) the right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right:
(iii) the institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit;
(iv) the right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of filing of appeal;
(v) this vested right of appeal can be taken away only by subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.”
5. In Mukund Deo v. Mahadu, AIR 1965 SC 703 Shah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Supreme Court observed as follows:—
“It is true that as a general rule, alterations in the law of procedure are retrospective, but a right of appeal to a particular forum is a substantive right and is not lost by alteration in the law, unless provision is made expressly in that behalf, or a necessary implication arises.”
6. The above decisions are authorities for the proposition that any change in the law relating to appeals after the institution of original proceedings which adversely touches the vested right in a suitor, is presumed not to be retrospective in the absence of anything in the enactment that would compel courts to hold otherwise. We have, therefore, to examine the language of the enactment to determine whether the intendment of the Legislature was clearly and positively to bring within reach of the enactment even pending proceedings. The suit in this case was instituted on 4-11-1971. The value of the suit was Rs. 12,000/-. On the data of the institution of the suit the rights of the parties to an appeal were governed by the Madras Civil Courts Acts 1873 (Central Act III of 1873). Under Section 13 of the said Act, the parties had a right of appeal to the High Court if the value of the appeal was above Rs. 10,000/-. By Section 17(1) of the new Act, which came into force on 1-11-1972 an appeal was provided to the District Court if the value of the appeal was below Rs. 15,000/- that is, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain appeals against the decrees of the subordinate Courts was enhanced by the new Act. By Section 34(1) of the Act, the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Civil Courts Act, 1873, the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Civil Courts Act, 1954 and Section 17 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Small Causes Courts Act, 1330 fasli are repealed. By sub-section (2) of Section 34, the provisions of sections 8 and 18 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891 are made applicable upon such appeal. Therefore by the application of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act a right of appeal to the High Court which accrued to the litigant and existed as on the date of the institution of the suit under Section 13 of the Madras Civil Courts, Act, 1873, is preserved to the litigant. The dominant intention of the Legislature is thus clearly and distinctly expressed that the Act would not prejudicially affect vested rights by the express provision of clause 2 of Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the Act is only prospective and not retrospective.
7. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in (1973) 2 APLJ 250, which has again been applied in an unreported decision of this court in S.R No. 31046 of 1973 dated 15-6-1973 (Venkayamma v. Rama Lakshmi, (1973) 1 APLJ (Short Notes) 97.
8. In (1960) 1 An WR 100 the learned Judges held that the Madras Civil Courts (Andhra Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act I of 1956) was retrospective in its application and would apply even to suits which had been instituted before the Act came into force. In that case an amendment to the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873, (Central Act III of 1873) was brought about by the Amendment Act, of 1955. By the said Amendment Act an appeal was provided to the District Court against a decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge if the value of the appeal does not exceed Rs. 10,000/- whereas, prior to the amendment, an appeal lay to the High Court if the valuation was above Rupees 5,000/-. The learned Judges in coming to the conclusion that the Legislature intended the Act to have retrospective operation relied firstly on the postponement clause in the Act itself that the Act would come into operation on the date to be notified by the State Government and Secondly, on the statement of objects and reasons which revealed an anxiety on the part of the Legislature to reduce the heavy file of first appeals in the High Court by the enhancement of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judges upto Rs. 10,000. It is true that in the present Act also there is a postponement clause, Sec. 1(3) enacts that the Act shall come into force in such area and on such date as the Government may, by notification appoint; and they may appoint different dates for different areas and/or different provisions of this Act. But postponement clause by itself is not decisive of the matter whether a statute is prospective or retrospective in operation. Retrospective operation cannot be taken to be intended unless that intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication. In this context the following principle of construction contained in Craies Statute Law, 5th Edition, at page 363, may profitably be read:
“A postponement clause in an Act has been sometimes said to be an indication against the presumption that a retrospective intent is not to be inferred.” In (1960) 1 An WR 100 it seems to us the learned Judges leaned very heavily on the statement of objects and reasons in coming to the conclusion that the Act was intended to be retrospective in operation. In that case the statement of objects and reasons was in the following terms:
“The High Court Arrears Committee constituted by the Government of India under the Chairmanship of Sri Justice S.R Das to suggest ways and means to reduce the accumulation of arrears in High Courts suggested, among, others, the enhancement of the appellate jurisdiction of District fudges upto Rs. 10,000/-. This will have the effect of reducing the heavy file of first appeals in the High Court to a large extent. The Government of India have accepted this recommendation and suggested that this may be implemented by the State Government by amending the Civil Courts Act suitably so as to enhance the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judges upto Rs. 10,000/-, with a provision to fix the same at such lower limit as the State Government may, by notification, determine in consultation with the High Court. Further, this will give an opportunity to the District Judges to assess the judicial work of the Subordinate Judges, which has become impracticable after the commencement of the Madras Civil and Village Courts (Amendment) Act, 1951 (XVI of 1951). The bill seeks to give effect to the above suggestion.”
9. It is thus abundantly clear that the learned Judges were impelled by the strong surrounding circumstances to draw the inference that the intendment was to have retrospective operation.
10. But in this case there are no such strong circumstances that would compel us to draw the presumption that the intendment of the present Act was to have a retrospective operation. The preamble of the Act merely recites that the Act is to consolidate and amend the law relating to the civil Courts subordinate to the High Court in the State of Andhra Pradesh. We, therefore, hold that the Act is not retrospective in operation and the appeal, therefore, preferred before the District Court is not maintainable.
11. The reference is answered accordingly.
12. Reference answered accordingly.
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