- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Gedda Durga Malleswa... v. Ranga Panaiah And Br...
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed H.R.C. No. 95/1972 before the House Rent Controller, Vijayawada, seeking eviction of the respondent from a non-residential building. The Rent Controller passed an ex parte order on 19-7-1972 and possession was taken by evicting the respondent on 9-9-1972. The respondent filed I.A. No. 4519/1972 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 15-9-1972, seeking condonation of delay in filing an application to set aside the ex parte order of eviction. In an affidavit supporting the I.A., the respondent alleged he had no notice of the eviction petition or the ex parte order, that he was unaware of the order until he was forcibly evicted (the affidavit refers to a date of 19-9-1972 for forcible eviction), and that the landlord had collected rent on 7-9-1972 without disclosing the ex parte order. The landlord opposed the petition, alleging the respondent refused court notices, was absent when called on 19-7-1972, and that no valid reasons were shown for condoning delay.
The Rent Controller condoned the delay and allowed the petition, subject to the respondent paying Rs. 10/- to the petitioner as costs. The petitioner appealed to the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada; the appellate court confirmed the Rent Controller's order and dismissed the appeal. The petitioner then filed the present revision petition challenging those orders. The central legal question raised in the revision was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings before a Rent Controller exercising powers under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (the Rent Control Act).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings before the Rent Controller exercising powers under the Rent Control Act.
- Whether the Rent Controller is a "court" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act (and related provisions), such that the Limitation Act applies.
- Whether Rule 8(3) of the rules framed under the Rent Control Act (providing a 30-day period to apply to set aside an ex parte order) excludes the operation of Section 5 (i.e., whether condonation of delay under Section 5 is available), and if the 30-day period must be computed from pronouncement in open court or from the date the affected party acquires knowledge of the order.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments
- The Rent Controller is not a "court" and therefore Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to proceedings under the Rent Control Act.
- Under rule 8(3) of the rules framed under the Rent Control Act, an application to set aside an ex parte order must be filed within 30 days from the date of pronouncement in open court, and there is no provision under those rules for condoning delay; consequently the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
- Relied upon Firm of S. Mohd. Ali & Sons v. V. Madhavarao (AIR 1964 A.P. p.132) where it was held that the Rent Controller is not a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 24 CPC; and relied upon Nityanand v. Life Insurance Corporation of India ((1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 S.C. p.209) in which the Supreme Court held a Labour Court was not a "court" within the Limitation Act — to support the contention that specialised tribunals may fall outside the Limitation Act's notion of "court".
Respondent's Arguments
- The Rent Controller exercising powers under the Rent Control Act is a "court" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, so Section 5 applies to proceedings before the Rent Controller.
- By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, even if the Rent Controller were not a civil court, the provisions of the Limitation Act (Sections 4 to 24) apply to the extent not expressly excluded by the special/local law (i.e., the Rent Control Act and its rules), thereby making Section 5 applicable.
- With respect to rule 8(3), the respondent argued that because he had no notice of the eviction proceedings and thus no knowledge of the ex parte order until he was dispossessed, the 30-day period should be computed from the date he acquired knowledge of the order; he relied on Satyanarayana v. Venkatasubbaiah to support computation from knowledge in such circumstances.
- Supported his submissions by invoking several rulings of this Court and the Supreme Court that treat Rent Controllers or similar authorities as "courts" for specific purposes.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K. Chalapathi Rao v. B.N. Reddy, (1968) 2 An. W.R. p. 587 (Division Bench) | Held that the Rent Controller is a "court" subordinate to the High Court within the terms of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act; applied tests (including Cooper v. Wilson) to conclude the Rent Controller possesses attributes of a "court". | The Court treated this ruling as a clear authority supporting the conclusion that the Rent Controller is a "court" and therefore Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings before the Rent Controller. |
| Cooper v. Wilson, L.R. (1937) 2 K.B. 309 at 340 | Provided tests (four tests) to determine whether a body possesses the attributes of a "court". | Referenced in K. Chalapathi Rao and relied on for the analytical framework to determine that the Rent Controller has the attributes of a "court". |
| Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank, AIR 1967 S.C. 1494 | Held that an Assistant Registrar under the Bihar & Orissa Co-operative Societies Act is a "court" subordinate to the High Court for purposes of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. | Used as supporting authority showing that statutory/quasi-judicial officers can be "courts" for particular statutory purposes. |
| Vidya Davi v. Film Madanlal, AIR 1971 Punjab 150 (Full Bench) | Held that the Rent Controller and appellate authority under the Punjab Rent Restriction Act are courts or civil courts for purposes of certain CrPC provisions (Sections 155(1)(b), 476 and 479-A CrPC). | Accepted as additional precedent establishing that Rent Controllers may be recognized as "courts" for statutory purposes. |
| Firm of S. Mohd. Ali & Sons v. V. Madhavarao, AIR 1964 A.P. p.132 | Held by Gopairao Ekbote, J. that the Rent Controller was not a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 24 CPC. | The Court noted this decision but explained it was distinguished in K. Chalapathi Rao and does not support the petitioner's contention that the Rent Controller is not a "court" for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. |
| Nityanand v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 S.C. p.209 | Held that the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act is not a "court" within the meaning of the Limitation Act; therefore the Limitation Act did not apply to it. | The Court observed this precedent but held it was not applicable to the present case because the Court had concluded, on other authorities, that the Rent Controller is a "court". Thus Nityanand did not assist the petitioner. |
| Yousufuddin Khan v. Mrs. Sita Krishna Swamy, 1962 (2) An. W.R. 98 | Chandra Sekhara Sastry, J. held that even if the Rent Controller is not a civil court, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies, and therefore certain provisions of the Limitation Act (e.g., Section 15) would apply to proceedings before the Rent Controller. | Adopted as supporting authority for the alternative argument that Section 29(2) can render Limitation Act provisions applicable to Rent Controller proceedings; the Court noted this point but considered it unnecessary to decide because it had already held the Rent Controller is a "court". |
| Satyanarayana v. Venkatasubbaiah, 1961 (2) An. W.R. 65 | Discussed computation of limitation period from date of knowledge where a party had no notice of earlier proceedings. | The Court acknowledged that this decision supports the respondent's submission that the 30-day period under the rules could be computed from the date the affected party became aware of the order; the Court found force in this argument but proceeded on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reviewed the rival contentions and relevant authorities. It focused on whether the Rent Controller is a "court" such that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies. The Court relied principally on K. Chalapathi Rao v. B.N. Reddy, wherein a Division Bench applied tests (including those in Cooper v. Wilson) and concluded that the Rent Controller possesses the attributes of a "court" subordinate to the High Court. The Court also cited Jugal Kishore, Vidya Davi and other authorities to reinforce that tribunals exercising statutory adjudicatory functions may be treated as "courts" for statutory purposes.
The Court considered the petitioner's reliance on Firm of S. Mohd. Ali & Sons v. V. Madhavarao and Nityanand v. LIC but found those decisions distinguishable or inapplicable to deny the applicability of Section 5 in this case. In particular, the Firm of S. Mohd. Ali judgment was distinguished in K. Chalapathi Rao and therefore did not support the petitioner's contention. The Nityanand decision was noted to concern a Labour Court, and the Court held that it did not assist the petitioner because the Court had reached the opposite conclusion on the status of the Rent Controller.
The Court also considered the argument under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act — that even if the Rent Controller were not technically a civil court, Section 29(2) could render the Limitation Act's provisions applicable to proceedings under a special/local law. The Court observed that this line of reasoning is supported by prior authority (Yousufuddin Khan), but since it had already concluded that the Rent Controller is a "court" for purposes of Section 5, it found it unnecessary to decide the applicability of Section 29(2) in the alternative.
Regarding rule 8(3) and the computation of the 30-day period, the Court acknowledged the respondent's contention (supported by Satyanarayana v. Venkatasubbaiah) that, where a party had no notice of the proceedings, the limitation period should be computed from the date of knowledge rather than the date of pronouncement. The Court found "considerable force" in that submission. However, because the Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to proceedings before the Rent Controller, the respondent's petition filed under Section 5 was adjudged maintainable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court concluded that the Rent Controller acting under the Rent Control Act is a "court" for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are therefore applicable to proceedings before the Rent Controller.
DISPOSITION: The Court dismissed the revision petition. The Court held that I.A. No. 4519/1972 (the petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act) was maintainable and therefore the earlier orders condoning delay and setting aside the ex parte order were upheld; the revision petition failed and was dismissed with costs.
Implications: The direct consequence is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be invoked in proceedings before the Rent Controller (subject to the facts and circumstances of each case). The opinion did not purport to set a new broad precedent beyond applying prior authorities to the facts; it relied on existing rulings to reach its conclusion. No separate or novel legal rule beyond the Court's application of cited authorities was articulated.
1. The question that arises in this revision petition filed under Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (Act IV of 1960), is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act (hereinafter called the Act), are applicable to proceedings before the Rent Controller exercising powers under the Rent Control Act. The question arises on the following facts.
2. The petitioner herein filed the application H.R.C No. 95/1972 on the file of the House Rent Controller, Vijayawada, for eviction of the respondent from a non-residential building. The application was ordered ex-parte on 19-7-1972 and possession was taken over by evicting the respondent on 9-9-1972. The respondent filed the petition I.A No. 4519/1972 under section 5 of the Act, on 15-9-1972 for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the exparte order of eviction. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it was alleged by the respondent that he had no notice of the eviction petition, that no such notice was served on him, that until 19-9-1972, on which date he was forcibly evicted, he was not aware of the order of eviction passed against him and that the land lord had in fact come to his shop on 7-9-1972 and received rent but he did not disclose that he had obtained an order of eviction on 19-7-1972 and therefore the exparte order should be set aside after condoning the delay in filing the petition. This petition was opposed by the landlord alleging that the respondent refused every notice issued from court, that he was called on 19-7-1972 but he was absent and therefore he was set exparte, that the respondent did not raise any objection to the said proceedings taken on 9-9-1972 and that there were no valid reasons made out for condoning the delay and setting aside the exparte order.
3. The Rent Controller condoned the delay and allowed the petition subject to the respondent paying a sum of Rs. 10/- to the petitioner as costs.
4. The petitioner carried the matter in appeal to the learned Subordinate judge, Vijayawada and the order of the Rent Controller was confirmed and the appeal dismissed. Hence the revision petition.
5. Sri N. Rajeswara Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Rent Controller is not a “court” and therefore section 5 of the Act, is not applicable to the case. The submission of the learned counsel is that under rule 8(3) of the rules framed under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, an exparte order can be set aside on the affected party's filing of an application within 30 days from the date of pronouncement of the order in open court, that there is no provision made under the rules for condoning the delay in filing such an application, and that the provisions of section 5 of the Act are not made applicable to the proceedings under the Kent Control Act and hence the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain an application filed under Section 5 of the Act.
6. On the other hand, it is contended by Sri J.V Suryanarayana Rao, the learned counsel for the respondent that the Rent Controller exercising powers under the Rent Control Act, is “Court” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act and by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Act, the provisions of Section 5 are applicable to proceedings under the Rent Control Act, and in support of this submission, the learned counsel invited my attention, to the several rulings of this court and of the Supreme Court.
7. On a consideration of all the rival contentious, I think the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the Rent Controller is a “Court” and that the provisions of Section 5 of the Act are applicable 10 proceedings under the Rent Control Act, has to be accepted.
8. In K. Chalapathi Rao v. B.N Reddy(1) 1968 (2) An. W.R p. 587 a division Bench of this court consisting of Narasimham J., as he then was) and Vaidya, J. held that “Rent Controller” is a “court” subordinate to High court within the terms of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The learned Judges referred to the several provisions of the Rent Control Act and the Rules made thereunder and the several rulings of the Supreme Court, and the four tests laid down in Cooper v. Wilson(2) L.R (1937) 2 K.B 309 at 340 and came to the conclusion that the Rent Controller, having regard to the several provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder, possesses all the attributes of a “Court”. This ruling is therefore a clear authority in support of the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the “Rent Controller” is a “Court”.
9. In Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank(3) AIR 1967 S.C 1494. It was held that the Assistant Registrar functioning under Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, is a “Court” subordinate to high Court for purposes of Section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act.
10. In Vidya Davi v. Film Madanlal(4) AIR 1971 Punjab, 150 a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, held that Kent Controller and the Appellate authority under Punjab Rent restriction Act, are courts or civil courts for purposes of Sections 155(1)(b), 476 and 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
11. In view of the aforesaid rulings, there cannot be any doubt that the Rent Controller acting under the Rent Control Act, is a “Court”, and the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, are applicable to the proceeding before the Rent Con teller under the said Act.
12. Sri N. Rajeswara Rao, relies upon a decision of Gopairao Ekbote, J. (as he then was) in Firm of S. Mohd. Ali & Sens v. V. Madhavarao(5) AIR 1964 A.P p. 132. There it was held by the learned judge that the Rent Controller not a court subordinate to the High Court, within the meaning of Section 24 C.P.C This case was distinguished in K. Chalpathi Rao v. B.N Reddy (1) on the ground that neither the Rent Control Act nor the rules made thereunder apply to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and that the power to transfer cases from one Controller to another Controller vests in the Appellate authority and that there being a special provision under the rules, section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been manifestly kept out. Therefore this ruling does not support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that “Rent Controller” is not a at “court” for the purpose of Section 5 of the Act.
13. Sri N. Rajeswara Rao, then relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Nityanand v. Life Insurance Corporation of India(6) (1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 S.C p. 209, where their Lordships held as follows:
“In view of Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act, it would be Hear that the scheme of the Act is that it only deals with applications to courts and the labour court is not a court within the Limitation Act.”
14. Their Lordships held that the labour court exercising powers under the industrial Disputes Act, is not a “Court” within the meaning of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. This case also does not lend any support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner because in view of the conclusion reached by their Lordships that the Labour court is not a court within the meaning of Limitation Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act were held to be not applicable to proceedings before labour court. But the same is not the position with regard to Rent Controller exercising powers under the Rent Control Act. I have already held that the Rent Controller is a “court” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act. If so, it follows that the provisions of Section 5, are applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controller.
15. In Yousufuddin Khan v. Mrs. Sita Krishna Swamy (7) 1962 (2) An. W.R 98), Chandra Sekhara Satry, J. held that though the Rent Controller may not be a civil court, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 applies and therefore the provisions of Section 15 of the Indian Limitation Act would apply to the proceedings before the Rent Controller.
16. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, reads as follows:
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule and “for the purpose of determining any period of Limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
XXXXXXXXXX
17. Sri J.V Suryanarayana Rao, relying upon Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, submits that even assuming chat the Rent Controller is not a Civil Court, still the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, are applicable by virtue of the provisions of Section 29(2).
18. This argument is no doubt supported by the judgment of Chandresekhara Sastry, J., referred to above. But as I have come to the conclusion that the Rent Controller is a “Court” for the purpose of Section 5 of the Act, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on this question, whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, apply even if it is to be held that the rent controller is not a civil court. Sri J.V Suryanarayana Rao, further contended that under rule 8(3) of the rules framed under the Rent Control Act, the application for setting aside the exparte order has to be set aside within 30 days from the date of pronouncement of the order, that inasmuch as the respondent was not served with notice of the petition for eviction, he had no knowledge of the exparte order of eviction passed against him, and that for the first time he came to know about it on 9-9-1972 when he was forcibly dispossessed from the building, and that the petition filed on 15-9-1972 for setting aside the exparte order within 30 days from the date of knowledge of the order of eviction, would be within time. He submits that though rule 8(3) of the rules framed under the Rent Control Act provides that the application should be filed within 30 days from the date of pronouncement of the order in open court, still when the party against whom the order was passed, had no knowledge of the proceeding and was not served with notice, the period of 30 days should be computed from the date on which he became aware of the said order; and in support of this submission, he relies upon the decision of M.S Ramachandra Rao, J. in Satyanarayana v. Venkatasubbaiah(8) 1961 (2) An. W.R 65.
19. There is considerable force in this submission of the learned counsel. But as I have come to the conclusion that section 5 of the Act is applicable to proceedings under the Act, the petition I.A No. 4518/1972 filed under section 5 of the Act, is maintainable. In the result, the revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
Alert