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Gayatri Salt Works v. Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Dec 2, 1974
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Alladi Kuppuswami, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are two firms engaged in salt production at Polekurru, Kakinada Taluk, East Godavari District. The first firm held a year-to-year licence to manufacture salt over Ac. 607-52 and the second firm over Ac. 572-41. Re-alignment plans were submitted and approved; the firms were directed to undertake realignment works. Because large sums were required for work and funds were short, the petitioners negotiated sales of parts of the licensed lands to raise money. They were informed that, under the Andhra Pradesh Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 (“the Act”), the lands could not be alienated because the petitioners’ holdings exceeded the statutory limits and documents of sale could not be registered.

The petitioners filed a writ petition seeking a declaration that the Act does not apply to their lands and that sale deeds could be registered. They argued the lands are used for salt manufacture and are neither agricultural land nor capable of being used for agriculture. They also challenged aspects of the Act as being repugnant to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The writ petition was amended to add paragraphs 6(a)–6(e) (order for amendment granted as unopposed).

The writ petition was ultimately dismissed with costs; advocate’s fee was assessed at Rs. 100/-. The Court found the question whether the lands are “capable of being used” for agriculture to be a factual issue not appropriate for determination in the writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned Act (Andhra Pradesh Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972) is within the powers of the State Legislature.
  2. If the expression "land" is interpreted so as to include lands used for the manufacture of salt, whether the Act is to that extent repugnant to the Central Excise and Salt Act and is therefore ultravires.
  3. Whether the lands belonging to the petitioners are lands to which the provisions of the impugned Act are applicable (i.e., whether they are "land" used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes within the Act's definition).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Act applies only to land "used or capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture, including horticulture"; the petitioners' lands are used for salt manufacture and are neither agricultural nor capable of agricultural use.
  • Some lands became salt lands because of tidal inundation in 1963; conversion into salt production was inescapable.
  • To the extent the Act treats salt-licensed lands as within its definition of "land," that definition is ultra vires the State Legislature because manufacture and regulation of salt are Union subjects under Entry 52, List I; the State cannot legislate so as to trench on a central law (the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944).
  • Condition 4 of the licence (prohibiting use of the land for purposes unconnected with manufacture and storage of salt) indicates the land cannot be used for agriculture, and returning land to agricultural use would require enormous expenditure.

Respondents' / Government's Arguments

  • The State relied on Entry 18, List II (transfer and alienation of agricultural land) and contended the impugned Act was a valid exercise of state power to prohibit alienation of agricultural land as defined in the Act.
  • Even though salt manufacture is regulated by central law, prohibition of alienation merely regulates transfer of land and does not trench on the central power to regulate manufacture of salt; any incidental effect on manufacture does not render the State Act ultravires.
  • The lands, though then used for salt manufacture, are capable of being used for agriculture (it is open to the licensee to desist from manufacturing salt) and thus fall within the Act’s definition; classification in revenue records as agricultural land was presented as supportive (though the Court did not treat revenue entry as determinative).
  • The practical ability to revert to agriculture (subject to licence cessation or surrender) meant lands were, in the State’s submission, "capable of being used" for agriculture.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarojini Devi v. Sri Krishna, A.I.R. 1944 Mad P. 401 The expression "agricultural lands" must receive the widest meaning and include lands used or capable of being used for raising valuable plants or trees or other purposes of husbandry. The Court relied on this decision to support a wide interpretation of "agricultural land" and to show the impugned Act's definition of "land" (used or capable of being used for agriculture) is in consonance with prior judicial meaning of the term.
Nil Govlnda Mlsra v. Rukmini Devi, A.I.R. 1944 Cal. p. 421 "Agricultural land" includes lands not actually used but lying waste and capable of being brought under tillage; capability to be used for agriculture is relevant. Used to reinforce that the statutory definition (land used or capable of being used for agriculture) aligns with earlier interpretations that include land lying fallow or unused but capable of agriculture.
Court of Wards Paigah v. Commr. W. Tax, A.I.R. 1969 A.P. 345 (Full Bench) The phrase "agricultural land" in wealth-tax context should be given the same wide meaning as in the Constitution; land left barren but capable of cultivation qualifies as agricultural land; actual user is an indicium. The Court quoted and applied the tests and indicia described in this decision (e.g., present or prospective capability of cultivation, effect of diversion to non-agricultural use) when assessing "capable of being used" under the impugned Act.
State Of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd, 1959 S.C.R. p. 379 A legislature cannot enlarge its power by giving extended definitions to bring matters outside its competence within its legislative entry (example: defining "sale" to include "works contract" was ultra vires). Referenced as a cautionary precedent: if the definition in the impugned Act were at variance with the constitutional entry it would be ultra vires. The Court concluded, however, that the impugned Act's definition is not at variance with Entry 18.
Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1961 (3) SCR 242 Example of a State Act beyond competence where the subject matter did not fall within the State entry relied upon by the legislature. Used to illustrate that where a definition or subject matter transcends the legislative entry it may be invalid; here the Court found the impugned Act did not suffer that defect.
Gulabbhai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. p. 1110 A definition wider than the corresponding constitutional term may be at variance and thus invalid (example: "land" wider than "estate" in Art. 31-A). Cited to show the principle that definitions cannot be used to alter the constitutional scope; applied by the Court to test whether the Act's definition of "land" conflicted with Entry 18 (the Court held it did not).
Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd. Khulna, 1947 FCR 28 (74 I.A. p. 23) Pith and substance doctrine: where the pith and substance of a law falls within the legislative entry, incidental encroachment on another entry does not affect validity. The Court relied on this principle to reject the contention that any incidental effect of the State Act on central regulation of salt would render it invalid; the pith and substance was prohibition of transfer of agricultural land under Entry 18.
K.D.H.P Co. v. State of Kerala, (1972) 2 SCC 218 (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. p. 2301) Confirmed that State competence under Entry 18 (and Entry 42, List III) cannot be denied merely because the State law has some effect on an industry controlled under Entry 52, List I; "effect" is not the same as "subject-matter". Applied to the facts: even if the State Act affected salt manufacture to some extent, such incidental effect did not make the State Act ultravires; the Court expressly relied on this decision to reject the repugnancy/ultra vires contention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages:

  1. The Court set out the relevant provisions of the impugned Act (Act 13/72), notably:
    • Section 5(1) and 5(2) prohibiting alienation by persons whose holdings exceed the specified limit;
    • Section 3(b) defining "holding" as the entire land held by a person as owner;
    • Section 3(c) defining "land" as land "which is used or is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture including horticulture"; and
    • Section 4 prescribing specified limits (text refers to 4 hectares for wet land and gives an extent for dry land in different places in the opinion).
    The Court observed it is admitted the petitioners' holdings exceed the specified limit.
  2. On the question of legislative competence, the Court identified Entry 18, List II (State List) as the source of power to legislate on "transfer and alienation of agricultural land." The Court reasoned that if the Act's definition of "land" corresponds to "agricultural land" as understood under Entry 18, the State has competence to enact the statute.
  3. The Court reviewed prior decisions (Sarojini Devi; Nil Govlnda Mlsra; Court of Wards Paigah) interpreting "agricultural land" broadly to include lands actually used or capable of being used for agriculture. The Court concluded the definition of "land" in the impugned Act is in consonance with those judicial interpretations and therefore not an impermissible enlargement of state power.
  4. Addressing the contention of repugnancy with the Central Excise and Salt Act, the Court examined the argument that prohibition of alienation of salt lands would interfere with central regulation of salt manufacture (and cited Central Excise Rules such as Rules 102, 112, 130). The Court concluded prohibition of alienation restricts the owner's ability to transfer land but does not impair the Central Government's regulatory power over manufacture of salt. Even assuming some interference, the Court applied the pith and substance doctrine: the State Act's pith and substance was prohibition of transfer of agricultural land (Entry 18); any incidental effect on the Central legislation does not render the State Act invalid. The Court cited Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and K.D.H.P. Co. to support this view.
  5. On whether the petitioners' lands were "land" used or "capable of being used" for agriculture, the Court found:
    • On the date the Act commenced (2 May 1972) the lands were not used for agriculture; they had been converted into salt pans and salt was being manufactured. Licences had been obtained, and the lands could not be said to be used for agriculture in the sense of the first part of Sec. 3(c).
    • The respondents contended the lands remained capable of being used for agriculture because the licensee could desist from manufacture and revert to agriculture; the petitioners contended the lands were not capable due to licence conditions and the large expense required to convert salt pans back to cultivable land.
    • The Court adopted and applied the formulation from Court of Wards Paigah: "capable of being used" means reasonably capable of being used for agriculture — i.e., capable of being used without incurring large expenditure out of proportion to the value of the land or without immense effort. If it would require enormous expenditure or effort, then in practical terms the land is not "capable of being put to agricultural use." The Court emphasized that this is a fact-specific inquiry.
    • The Court rejected arguments that the licence condition alone made the land incapable of agricultural use, since the condition subsists only during the licence's period and the licences were year-to-year as of the Act's commencement (permitting the petitioners' argument that permanent licences had not yet been granted but the Court expressly noted it was unnecessary to resolve some hypothetical aspects concerning permanent licences).
    • The Court also held the entry of land as agricultural in the revenue records is not determinative — it is only one relevant factor and not conclusive.
    • Because capacity to be used for agriculture is a question of fact dependent on detailed evidence, the Court held it cannot be properly determined in the writ petition and recommended that the petitioners' proper remedy is a civil suit for a declaratory determination.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Writ Petition is dismissed with costs; advocate's fee assessed at Rs. 100/-.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioners' prayer for a declaration that the Act does not apply to their lands and for directions to register sale deeds was refused; the prohibition in the Andhra Pradesh Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 remains applicable unless a civil court or appropriate forum determines otherwise.
  • The Court upheld the State Legislature's competence to enact the impugned Act under Entry 18, List II, and held that the Act's definition of "land" is in consonance with judicial interpretations of "agricultural land." The Court rejected the contention that incidental effects on the Central Excise and Salt Act render the State Act ultravires.
  • The Court did not decide the factual question whether the petitioners' lands are "capable of being used" for agriculture; it held that question is fact-specific and more appropriately determined in a civil suit. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond application of existing pith-and-substance and definitional principles; it applied established authorities to the facts and refused the writ on those grounds.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

Alladi Kuppuswami, J.:— The petitioners are two firms carrying on the business of salt production at Polekurru, Kakinada Taluk, East Godavari District. The first petitioner was granted a licence to manufacture salt in an extent of Ac. 607-52 and the second petitioner in an extent of Ac. 572-41. The licences were issued from year to year pending alignment of the salt pans as per the plan to be approved by the Salt Department. Accordingly, re-alignment plans were submitted and applications were made for the grant of permanent licences. Approval of the re-allgnment plan was communicated and the firms were directed to take up the work of realignment as per the approved plans.

2. As large sums of money were required for undertaking the various works in accordance with approved realignment plans and due to shortage of funds the petitioners decided to sell some of the lands covered by the licences in order to raise the required funds. The firms therefore, entered into negotiations with buyers and having entered into contracts with them were considering the execution of the sale deeds. In respect to those lands. They were however, informed that under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 (referred to in this judgment as ‘the Act’), the lands could not be alienated as the petitioners owned lands in excess of the limit specified in the Act, namely, 4 Hectares of wet land and 10 hectares of dry land and any documents of sale could not be registered. The petitioners, therefore, filed this writ petition praying that this court may declare that the Act does not apply to the petitioner's lands and that a direction may be given that the sale deeds in respect of those lands may be registered. The case of the petitioners is that the Act applies only to land which is used or is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture, including horticulture. The lands which the petitioners intend to sell are lands in which salt is being produced and are neither used for the purpose of agriculture nor are they capable of being used for that purpose. Hence they are free to alienate those lands and the sale deeds in respect of those lands have to be registered. Subsequently, a petition to amend the writ petition by adding paragraphs 6(a) to 6(e) was filed and was ordered as it was not opposed. In the amended writ petition, it was contended that as the lands were actually under use for manufacture of salt they cannot be treated as Agricultural lands or capable of being used for agricultural purpose, nor can they be so treated on the ground that sometime ago some of these lands were used for agriculture. Conversion of the petitioners lands into salt lands became inescapable due to the tidal wave in the year 1963 which completely submerged these lands with sea water. It was further contended that in case the petitioners salt lands are to be treated as agricultural lands, the definition of ‘land’ in the Act so as to bring within its fold ‘saltlands’ licenced as a salt factory under the Central Excise and Salt Act, which provides that such salt lands shall be held only for the purpose of manufacturing salt and for no other purpose, is ultra vires the State legislature as the subject of manufacture, regulation and control of manufacture of salt is a union subject falling under entry 52 of List I of the Constitution. The definition of ‘Land’ in such manner is repugnant to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The State Legislature has enacted the Act by virtue of entry 18, list II, but as the Central Excise and Salt Act is a law enacted by Parliament under entry 58, the State Act would be wholly repugnant to the Central Act if it should be applicable to salt lands. The definition of ‘land’ in the Act, in so far as it seeks to include ‘salt lands’ is wider and different from the expression ‘agricultural land’ which is the subject of entry 18, list II and it is not open to the State Legislature to legislate with respect to lands which are not agricultural lands by merely enlarging the definition of ‘agricultural land’.

3. In view of the allegations in the writ petition as subsequently amended, the following questions fall for consideration:

1) Whether the impugned Act is within the powers of the State Legislature?

2) If the expression ‘land’ is interpreted so as to include lands used for the manufacture of salt, whether the Act is to that extent repugnant to the Central Excise and Salt Act and is therefore ultravires?

3) Whether the lands belonging to the petitioners are lands to which the provisions of the impugned Act are applicable?

4. Before dealing with these contentions it is necessary to briefly set out the relevant provisions of the impugned Act. The impugned Act, namely, Act 13/72 was enacted with a view to prohibit alienation of agricultural lands by certain persons in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

5. Section 5(1) is as follows:

“No person whose holding as on the date of commencement of this Act or at any time thereafter exceeds the specified limit shall alienate such holding or any part thereof by way of sale, lease for a period exceeding six years, gift, exchange, usufructuary mortgage or otherwise or effect a partition or create a trust of such holding or any part thereof; and any alienation made or partition effected or trust created in contravention of this section shall be null and void.”

6. Section 5(2) is in similar terms and deals with alienation by a member of a family. ‘Holding, is defined in Sec. 3(b) as the entire land held by a person as owner. Section 3(c) defines ‘land’ as land which is used or is capable of being used for purposes of agriculture including horticulture. Section 3(e) defines ‘specified limit’ as the extent of land specified in Section 4 as the specified limit. Section 4 prescribes the specified limit for the purposes of sec. 5 as 4 hectares in the case of wet land and 18 hectares in the case of dry land. From a reading of these provisions together it is seen that no person whose holding exceeds 4 hectares in the case of wet land or 10 hectares in the case of dry land shall alienate such holding. The ‘land’ referred to is the land which is used or is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture including horticulture. It is only such type of land that cannot be alienated. Section 6 prohibits the registration of any document relating to alienation of land contrary to the provisions of the Act. It is admitted that the petitioners' holding exceeds the specified limit referred to in sec. 4. But it is contended that the land is not land which is used or is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture including horticulture within the meaning of sec. 3(c) and hence the provisions of sec. 5 do not apply to such land.

7. Dealing now with the first contention regarding the powers of the legislature to pass the impugned Act, it is seen that the Act is passed in exercise of the powers conferred under Art. 246(2) of the Constitution read with list II, Entry 18. Entry 18 of list II, which is in the State list, it as follows:

“Land, that is to say, rights in of over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.”

8. It is clear from this entry that the State Legislature is entitled to enact a legislation dealing with the transfer and alienation of agricultural land. The impugned Act is one prohibiting alienation of land which is defined under the Act as land used or is capable of being used for the our pose of agriculture including horticulture. If land which is defined under the Act is agricultural land within the meaning of entry 18 there can be no doubt that it is within the competence of the State Legislature to enact the legislation in question.

9. Though the expression ‘agricultural land’ is not defined in the Constitution or the Government of India Act’ the expression ‘agricultural land’ in entry 18, List II, Sch. VII of the Constitution and the corresponding entry in the Government of India Act, 1935 have been the subject-matter of interpretation in a number of decisions. In Sarojini Devi v. Sri Krishna (1) A.I.R 1944 Mad P. 401 it was held that the expression ‘agricultural lands’ in List II and III of Sch. 7 of the Government of India Act must receive the widest meaning and the expression ‘agricultural lands’ must be taken to include lands which are used or are capable of being used for raising any valuable plants or trees or for any other purpose of husbandry. In this connection it may be noticed that entry 18 of list II of the Constitution corresponds to eniry 21 of List II of the Government of India Act which was the subject-matter of consideration in Sarojini Devi v. Sri Krishra (1) Supra. In Nil Govlnda Mlsra v. Rukmini Devi (2) A.I.R 1944 Cal. p. 421 also it was held that the phrase ‘agricultural land’ in item 21 of list II of the Government of India Act would include not only lands actually used for raising, by culrivation, food grains and other crops, but would also include lands not being actually used and are lying waste A piece of fallow land in the middle of agricultural fields would have to be taken as agricultural land, for it is capable of being brought under tillage and would in all probability be brought under tillage. Land so used or land though lying unused, but capable of being used, having regard to its general nature and character, for raising food for men and beasts, foodgrains and vegetables and fodder etc. should be regarded as agricultural lands. In Court of Wards Paigah v. Commr. W Tax. (3) A.I.R 1969 A.P 345 (FB) a Full Bench of this Court had to consider the meaning of the word ‘agricultural land’ in the Wealth-tax Act. It held that it should be given the same meaning as the said expression bears in entry 86 of list II of the Constitution and given the widest meaning. Approving the decision in Sarojinl Devi v. Sri Krishna (1) Supra it was held that the land which is left barren but which is capable of being cultivated can also be ‘agricultural land’. It was observed that every land which is presently or prospectively capable of cultivation, can be said to be ‘agricultural land’.

10. It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that the expression ‘agricultural land’ as used in the Constitution and in the Government of India Act of 1935 has been interpreted as including land not only used for agriculture, but also land capable of being used for agriculture. The definition of ‘land’ in the impugned Act is in consonance with the interpretation given to ‘agricultural land’ by the above decisions.

11. It is true that when a legislature is empowered to enact Legislation with respect to a particular subject mentioned in the list it cannot enlarge its powers by giving its own definition. It was held in State Of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras) Ltd (4) 1959 S.C.R p. 379, that in entry 48, List II, Sch 7 of the Government of India Act, 1935 the State Legislature had power to legistate with respect to tax on sale of goods and the legislature cannot enlarge its power by defining ‘sale’ so as to include ‘a works contract’ which does not amount to a sale and hence the Madras General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947 defining a sale to Include ‘a works contract’ was ultra vires. Similarly, it was held in Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (5) 1961 (3) SCR 242 that the U.P Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956 which authorised the State Government to impose a cess on the entry of cane into the premises of a factory for use, was beyond the competence of the legislature as the premises of the factory was not a local area within the meaning of entry 52, list II, Schedule 7. Again, in Gulabbhai v. Union of India (6) A.I.R 1967 S.C p. 1110 it was held that the definition of ‘land’ in Sec. 2(g) of the Daman (Abolition of Proprietorship of villagesj Regulation (7 of 1962) was wider than definition of ‘estate’ in Art. 31-A and hence, being at variance with definition of ‘estate’ cannot stand with it. If, therefore the definition of ‘land’ in the impugned Act is at variance with the meaning of ‘agricultural land’ in Entry 18 of list II, Sch. VII it would no doubt follow that such a definition would be ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature. But in this case, it is seen that the definition of ‘iand’ in the Impugned Act is in consonance with the meaning given to the expression ‘agricultural land’ In entry 18 in the decisions of the various courts referred to above. We are therefore, of the view that the contention that the Act is ultra vires, the State Legislature cannot be accepted.

12. The next submission is that the provisions of the impugned Act are repugnant to the Central Excise and Salt Act if the expression ‘land’ is construed so as to include lands in which salt is being manufactured.

13. It was argued that in such an event prohibition of alienation of such land would seriously interfere with the manufacture and production of salt. As the Central Legislature has already legistated on the subject, regulation and control of manufacture, supply and distribution of salt under item 58, of List I, it is not open to the State legislature to legistate so as to interfere with the powers of the Central Legislature. Reference is also made to certain rules in the Central Excise Rules, 1944. Under rule 102 no salt shall be manufactured and no natural salt and except under the provisions of rule 106, no salt-earth shall be excavated or collected or removed, otherwise than by the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence to be granted by the Collector. Under rule 112 salt works for which licences have been cancelled or relinquished shall be at the disposal of the Collector who shall determine whether the salt works shall be retained with the factory or not. If the Collector directs that the salt works shall be retained within the factory, the proprietory right of other persons therein, if any, shall thereupon vest in the Government and the Collector shall pay the value of such proprietory right to the licensee. Under rule 130, if the licensee fails to execute the works or whenever it appears desirable that any such work should be under-taken by the Central Excise Department, the Collector may cause such works to be executed. It was therefore, argued that if the petitioners are prevented from alienating the lands, it will not only interfere with their right to manufacture salt but also with the right of the Central Government under the Act. We are unable to see how the impugned Act in any way impinges on the Central Government's power to regulate and control the manufacture and production of salt. It merely prohibits the owner from alienating the lands. The power of the Central Govt. to regulate and control the manufacture of salt is untouched. Even assuming that the prohibition of alienation has to some extent the effect of interfering with the production, and manufacture of salt or the Central Government's power to regulate and control such manufacture and production, we do not agree that the definition of ‘land’ in the impugned Act is ultra vires for that reason.

14. The pith and substance of the impugned legislation is to prohibit transfer of agricultural lands. This falls squarely within the item 18 of List II, Sch. VII and hence the State Legislature is entitled to enact that legislation. Even assuming in some respects it affects the Central Legislation namely the Salt Act, it cannot in any way render the State Act ultra-vires. Once law ‘in pith and substance’ falls within a legislative entry, an Incidental encroachment on an entry in another List does not effect its validity. In Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd. Khulna (7) 74 I.A p. 23 -1947 FCR 28 the Privy council held that the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940 was in pith and substance a law in respect of ‘Money lending and money lenders’ (Entries 27 List II of the Government of India Act) and was valid even though it trenched incidentally on ‘promissory notes’ and ‘banking’ (entries 28 and 38 respectively of list I). In the recent decision of the Supreme court in K.D.H.P Co. v. State of Kerala (8) (1972) 2 SCC 218 : A.I.R 1972 S.C P. 2301 dealing with Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act it was held by the Supreme Court that the State had legislative competence to legislate on Entry 18, List II and Entry 42, List III. This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on an industry controlled under Entry 52, List I. It was observed that ‘effect’ is not the same thing as ‘Subject-matter’. If a State Act, otherwise valid, has effect on a matter in list I it does not cease to be a legislation with respect to an entry in list II or list III. This decision, in our view, applies to the facts of this case. The mere fact that the impugned legislation would have the effect of preventing the persons carrying on business of manufacture of salt, from alienating their lands and thus affects to some extent the regulation, manufacture and control of salt under the Salt Act passed by the Central Legislature, would not make the State Legislature ultravires. This contention is also therefore, negatived.

15. Lastly it is contended that the petitioner's lands are not lands used or capable of being used for agriculture and therefore the Act is not applicable to them. It is seen that the land in question was not used for the purpose of agriculture on the date when the Act came into force, namely, 2nd May, 1972. By that time, the lands had been converted into salt pans and salt was being manufactured on the said lands. Licences had been obtained for the purpose of manufacture and the provisions of the salt Act prevented the petitioners from using the lands for any purposes other than the purpose of manufacture of salt. It is therefore clear that the land cannot be said to be land used for the purpose of agriculture within the meaning of the first part of Sec. 3(c). It was however, contended on behalf of the respondents that it is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture. It is submitted that though the land was inundated by sea water and was therefore converted into salt pans. It can still be used for purpose of agriculture at any time when the petitioners desire to do so. It may be that during the time when they hold a licence for the purpose of manufacture of salt they are prevented from using it for any purpose other than manufacture of salt. But it is always open to the petitioners to desist from manufacturing salt and use the land for the purpose of agriculture. The petitioners on the other hand contend that the land is not capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture. They rely upon condition 4 of the conditions of licence which says that the licensee shall not use the land for any purpose unconnected with the manufacture and storage of salt. It is further submitted that after the land is used for the purpose of manufacture of salt it would require enormous amount of money and effort to bring the land to cultivation. It is therefore, necessary to consider what is the meaning of the expression ‘capable of being used’ for the purpose of agriculture. In Court of Wards, Paigah v. Commr. W. Tax (3) it was observed as follows:—

“Every land which is presently or prospectively capable of cultivation, can be said to be ‘agricultural land’. If it is shown that the land is actually cultivated either presently or in the immediate past or if it is shown that it is lying fallow, but is capable of being cultivated, so long as the land has not been actually diverted to purposes other than agricultural purposes by construction of buildings thereon and other operations which render the land itself incapable of being cultivated without undertaking some other operations for making it fit for carrying on agricultural operations, it can be said to answer the description, of agricultural land in its widest significance.”

16. Again at page 355 summarising the position it is said:—

1) The words ‘agricultural land’ occuring in Sec. 2(3)(i) of the Wealth Tax Act should be given the same meaning as the said expression bears in Entry 86 of List I and given the widest meaning;

2) The said expression not having been defined in the Constitution, it must be given the meaning which it ordinarily bears in the English language and as understood in ordinary parlance;

3) The actual user of the land for agriculture is one of the Indicia for determining the character of the land, as agricultural land;

4) Land which is left barren but which is capable of being cultivated can also be ‘agricultural land’ unless the said land is actually put to some other non-agricultural purpose, like construction of buildings or an aerodrome, runway etc., thereon, which alters the physical character of the land rendering it unfit for immediate cultivation;

5) If land is assessed to land revenue as agricultural land under the State Revenue law, it is a strong piece of evidence of its character as agricultural land: (Nos. 6, 7 and 8 are omitted as they are unnecessary).

17. Though some of the considerations which should weigh in deciding whether a land is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture are set out in the above decision it is difficult to lay down precisely the various circumstances in which it can be held that a land is one which is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture. That would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It was sought to be argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that it is only in case where the land is kept fallow it can be said to be capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture. If it is already converted for use other than agriculture it ceases to be a land which is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture. We are unable to agree with this contention. Even if a land is being used for purposes other than agriculture it is possible that it can again be used for the purpose of agriculture. In our view capable of being ‘used’ means reasonably capable of being used. If it is capable of being used without incurring large expenditure out of proportion to the value of the land, taking into account the purpose to which it has to be put to use, or without much effort on the part of the petitioners it can be said to be a land which is capable of being used. On the other hand, if it involves enormous expenditure or effort though in theory it may be possible to put it to agricultural use, it cannot be said by any reasonable person that it capable of being put to agricultural use. Bearing these principles in mind it has to be decided in each case whether a land is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture. We are not inclined to agree which the petitioners' contention that merely because one of the conditions of the licence that the land should not be used for any purpose other man manufacture and storage of salt it must be held that the land is not capable of being used for agriculture. That condition subsists only during the period of the licence. In this particular case it may be noted that the licence is only from year to year though, of course, it was intended that the permanent licence would be granted after the approval of the realignment plans. But on the date on which the Act came into force there was no permanent licence in favour of the petitioners. It was contennded on behalf of the Government even if there was a permanent licence the land is still capable of being used for the manufacture of salt in future, for instance, if the licence is cancelled or if the licensee gives up manufacture of salt under the licence. It is however, unnecessary for us to go into that question in this writ petition. We may also point out that the learned Advocate-General sought to contend that as the land was registered as agricultural land in the revenue records, it must be deemed to be a land which is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture. We do not agree with this contention. The mere fact that a land is entered in the Revenue Record as agricultural land, is not determinative of the question whether it is capable of being used. It may be one of the factors in considering the question whether it can be treated as ‘capable of being used for agriculture’. But it is not difficult to imagine cases where lands though entered in Revenue Records as agriculture lands have been diverted for other purposes like building purposes and thereafter they have become Incapable of being used for agricultural purpose. It therefore, depends upon the facts of each case as to whether a land is capable of being used for agricultural purpose or not. This is a question of fact which cannot be properly decided in a writ petition. The proper remedy for the petitioner is to institute a suit in a civil court for a declaration that the Act is not applicable to his lands as the lands are not capable of being used for agricultural purposes. There was a discussion as to whether the burden of proof lies upon the petitioner to show that the lands are not capable of being used for agricultural purposes and hence the provisions of the Act are not attracted or whether the burden of proof lies upon the parties who seek to apply the provisions of the Act to the petitioners to show that the lands are capable of being used for agricultural purpose and thus fall within the net of the enactment. It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on this question at this stage.

18. The Writ Petition is dismissed for the reason above stated with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.