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M.C.S Reddy v. The State .
Factual and Procedural Background
The Food Inspector filed a complaint against Sri M.C.S Reddy, Manager of the Integrated Milk Project, Milk Cooling Centre, Mydukur, alleging that two samples of milk taken on 28-7-1973 were adulterated as per the Public Analyst's opinion. The accused was charged under Sections 16(a)(i) and 7(i) read with Section 2(i)(a) and (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The accused objected to the prosecution on the ground that, as a public servant, sanction from the State Government under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Criminal P.C) was necessary before prosecution. The Judicial First Class Magistrate, Cuddapah, rejected this objection relying on Supreme Court precedents, holding that the offence was not directly connected with the accused's official duties and thus sanction was not required. The accused filed this revision against the Magistrate's order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether prosecution of a public servant under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act requires prior sanction from the State Government under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code when the alleged offence is not directly connected with the official duties of the accused.
- Whether the Manager of a Government milk project can claim immunity from prosecution by virtue of being a public servant and by invoking Section 197 Criminal P.C in the context of adulterated milk supply.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner is not directly concerned with the technical aspects such as purchasing, standardizing, or maintaining the quality of milk or dispatching it for sale, as these duties are performed by other officers.
- The petitioner should not be held responsible for the lapses of other officers related to the adulterated milk supply.
- Prosecution without obtaining sanction from the State Government under Section 197 Criminal P.C is improper.
- Relied upon decisions in B.K. Varma v. Corporation of Madras and Manibai v. State of Maharashtra to support his claim that sanction was necessary.
Court's (Respondent) Position as Reflected in Magistrate's Order
- The duty to supply milk according to prescribed standards rests on the manager as the administrative head.
- The offence of selling adulterated milk is not an act done in discharge of official duties but an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
- Sanction under Section 197 Criminal P.C is not required when the act complained of is not directly connected with official duties.
- The petitioner, as administrative head, is liable under Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, but may defend himself by proving lack of knowledge or due diligence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Baidyanath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 220 | Principles regarding prosecution of public servants and requirement of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. | Used to support the rejection of the petitioner's objection that sanction was necessary. |
| Chaturbhuj v. Bhojmal, AIR 1953 Vin Pra 7 | Clarification on the scope of official duties and prosecution of public servants. | Supported the view that the act was not within official duties and sanction was not required. |
| Hari Ram Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1939 FC 43 | An offence can never be the official duty of a public servant; the act must be shown to be an official act to require sanction. | Established that the act complained of was not an official act, negating the need for sanction. |
| H.H.B. Gill v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 128 | Defines when a public servant acts in discharge of official duty for the purpose of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. | Applied to determine that the petitioner was not acting within official duties when committing the offence. |
| Prabhakar v. Shanker, AIR 1969 SC 686 | Clarifies that sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is required only if the offence is committed while acting in official duty. | Used to support the conclusion that sanction was not necessary as the offence was not connected to official duties. |
| B.K. Varma v. Corporation of Madras, AIR 1971 Mad. 40; 1972 F.A.C 120 | Responsibility of persons in charge for offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. | Distinguished on facts as it involved a private company and not a government project; thus not applicable. |
| Manibai v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 3 SCC 760; AIR 1974 SC 424; 1973 F.A.C 349 | Liability of person in charge for offences under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. | Distinguished as the accused there was not in charge or conducting business, unlike the petitioner who was administrative head. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully examined Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires sanction for prosecution of public servants only if the alleged offence arises from acts done in the discharge of official duties. The court noted that the offence of selling adulterated milk under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act does not constitute an official act or duty of the accused, who was the administrative head responsible for ensuring compliance with prescribed standards.
The court relied on authoritative precedents establishing that an offence cannot be considered an official act and that sanction under Section 197 is not necessary if the act is outside the scope of official duties. It rejected the petitioner's contention that he was not responsible for the adulteration since technical officers handled those aspects, emphasizing that as the manager and administrative head, he had a bounden duty to ensure milk quality.
The court also distinguished the cases cited by the petitioner, noting that those involved private companies or persons not in charge, unlike the petitioner who held a government managerial position with responsibility for the project. The court held that under Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the manager is deemed responsible for adulterated milk supply, though he may defend himself by proving lack of knowledge or due diligence.
Consequently, the court found no error in the Magistrate's order rejecting the objection to prosecution without sanction and dismissed the revision petition.
Holding and Implications
The revision petition is dismissed.
The direct effect of this decision is that the petitioner, as the administrative head of the Government milk project, is liable to be prosecuted for supplying adulterated milk without the need for prior sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The judgment clarifies that sanction is required only when the offence is committed in the discharge of official duties, and that liability under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act can attach to a public servant even if other officers handle technical aspects. No new precedent beyond the application of established principles was set by this decision.
Punnayya, J.:— This revision is filed against the order passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Cuddapah in C.C No. 212 of 1973.
2. The Food Inspector filed the complaint against Sri M.C.S Reddy, Manager, Integrated Milk Project, Milk Cooling Centre, Mydukur, alleging that the two samples of milk taken on 28-7-1973 at about 4-30 a.m from the milk supplied, by the project was adulterated, as-opined by the Public Analyst and as such the accused committed an offence under Sections 16(a)(i) and 7 (i) read with Section 2(i)(a) and (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
3. The accused raised objection against the prosecution. He contended that since he is a public servant, prosecution without obtaining sanction from State Government under Section 197, Criminal P.C is bad and, therefore, prayed the Magistrate to pass an order to that effect and reject the complaint
4. The learned Magistrate, taking into consideration the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Baidyanath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 220 and Chaturbhuj v. Bhojmal, AIR 1953 Vin Pra 7 rejected the objection, holding that there is a duty cast on the manager to supply milk as per the standard prescribed, that it could not be contended that adulteration was done by him while he was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties and that as the act complained of against the accused was not directly concerned with his official duties; no sanction of the State Government is required under Section 197, Criminal P.C to prosecute the accused.
5. Aggrieved with the said order of the Magistrate, the petitioner filed this revision.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is not directly concerned with the technical side of the organisation, that is, purchasing or standardising milk or maintenance of quality or milk despatches for sale etc., that there are other officers to attend on these duties, that for the latches committed by the other officers in not maintaining the requisite standards in the milk supplied by the project, he cannot be held responsible and that the petitioner cannot be prosecuted without sanction of the State Government under S. 197, Criminal P.C
7. I do not think that the petitioner's case comes within the purview of Section 197, Criminal P.C It is true that this section requires the sanction of the appropriate authority to be obtained before starting the prosecution. But it is not in respect of every offence committed by a public servant sanction for prosecution is necessary under Section 197, Criminal P.C Sanction under this action is necessary only if the acts with which the official is charged fall within the purview of his official duties and can be justified by him and done by virtue of his office. But if the act complained of constitutes an offence even if it was done by an official sanction of prosecution under Section 197, Criminal P.C is not necessary.
8. In Hari Ram Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1939 FC 43 it was held that “The act which constitutes offence could never be the official duty of the public servant because an offence can never be the official duty of a public servant, that it is not enough if it is merely established that the person proceeded against is a public servant and that it must further be established that the act complained of was an official act.” In H.H.B Gill v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 128 the Privy Council held that “a pub ic servant can only be said to act or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty and that the test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that what he does, he does in virtue of his office.” The Supreme Court in Prabhakar v. Shanker, AIR 1969 SC 686 held:—
“The language of Section 197 clearly is that no Court can take cognisance of an offence alleged to have been committed by any person belonging to the categories mentioned in the section, when he is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. What has to be found out is whether the act and official duty were so inter-related that one could postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. It is not every offence committed by a public servant which required sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1), Criminal P.C nor even every act done by him while he was actually engaged in the performance of his official duty. But if the act complained of was directly concerned with his official duties, so that if questioned it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary and that would be so irrespectively of whether it was in fact a proper discharge of his duty or not.”
9. Though the revision petitioner is a public servant, he cannot claim that the sale of the adulterated milk was made in discharge of his official duties, as the sale of adulterated milk is undoubtedly an offence under Sections 16(1)(a) find 7(i) raad with Section 2(i)(a) and (1) of the Act. In other words the petitioner cannot claim that he is entitled to ??? the adulterated milk in per formance of his duties as manager of the milk project.
10. The petitioner, of course, claims that he is not responsible for the sale of the adulterated milk since some other officials are directly connected with the technical side of standardising milk or despatching milk for sale and they are responsible.
11. Admittedly he is the Manager and as such he is administrative head of the milk project, Mydukur. As administrative head of the project, his bounden duty is to supply milk according to the standards prescribed under the provisions of the Act. When he fails to do so and supplies adulterated milk, he is deemed under section 17 of the Prevention of Food Aulteration Act to have committed offence and hence sanction under Section 197, Criminal P.C is not necessary for prosecuting him. Under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, he is entitled to take the defence that the offence was committed Without his knowledge and that there are other officers that are connected with that technical side of the organisation or that he exercised all the due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence and if he is able to succeed in his defence, the prosecution will fail. But for invoking the benefit under Section 197, Criminal P.C, he cannot take such a plea since, he, as the administrative head of the milk project, is liable for the supply of adulterated milk under the provisions of the Act.
12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions in B.K Varma…Petitioner-Accused; v. Corporation Of Madras…-Complainant., AIR 1971 Mad. 40 1972 F.A.C 120 and Manibai v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 3 SCC 760 : AIR 1974 SC 424 : 1973 F.A.C 349. Those decisions do not deal with cases under Section 197, Criminal P.C In AIR 1971 Mad. 40; 1972 F.A.C 120 prosecution was launched against the superintendent of coca cola plant under Sections 16, 2 and 7 of the Act. It was held that there was nothing to show that the plant superintendent was a person responsible or in charge of or responsible to the manufacture or sale of coca cola and it was doubtful whether the revision petitioner was in charge of the firm in respect of the manufacture, or sale of coca cola. But that was a private company while the milk project for which the petitioner is the manager in Government concern. The petitioner being administrative head, it cannot be said, at this juncture, that he was not responsible when his milk project was supplying adulterated milk. Hence the decision does not apply to the petitioner's case. Even the decision of the Supreme Court in (1974) 3 SCC 760 : AIR 1974 SC 434 : 1973 F.A.C 349 cited by the petitioner's Counsel does not help the petitioner as the appellant in that case was not in charge of, nor was conducting the business at the shop. But the case of the petitioner is different so far as his duties in supply of milk are concerned.
13. In view of my above discussion and findings, I find myself unable to accept the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. I am, therefore, not able to hold that the order of the lower Court is improper or erroneous. The revision is accordingly dismissed.
14. Revision dismissed.
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