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Prof. Ram Naresh Chaudhry & Anr. v. State Of U.P & Ors.

Allahabad High Court
Dec 4, 2007
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from an order dated 20-4-2004 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 14, Gorakhpur in Misc. Application No. 140 of 2004, whereby the S.H.O., P.S. Cantt., Gorakhpur was directed to investigate a case after lodging an F.I.R. The application that led to that order was filed by Prof. Anirudh Prasad on 10-3-2004 under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., alleging that Km. Sanyogita (identified as Sanyogita Misra) obtained admission to LL.B. on the basis of a forged OBC caste certificate in collusion with Prof. Ram Naresh Chaudhry and Dr. Girija Shanker Tiwari (the present revisionists). The magistrate called for reports from the S.H.O. and university authorities and, by the impugned order, directed registration of an F.I.R. and investigation. The revisionists challenged that order by filing the present revision petition. Counsel for the revisionists, the State, and Prof. Anirudh Prasad were heard. Pursuant to the impugned order an F.I.R. was registered at P.S. Cantt., Gorakhpur as crime No. 3/2004 under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467 and 468 IPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revision against an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing registration of an F.I.R. and investigation is maintainable.
  2. Whether a proposed accused (or alleged accused) has a right to challenge an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. (including by way of revision or under Section 482 Cr.P.C.).
  3. Whether the subsequent lodging of an F.I.R. pursuant to the impugned order renders the present revision infructuous or otherwise affects the propriety of interference by the revisional Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Revisionists' Arguments

  • The order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing investigation is a judicial order that seriously affects the rights of the persons against whom it is made and therefore can be challenged in revision.
  • Prof. Anirudh Prasad had no locus standi to move the Section 156(3) application in respect of the alleged offences.
  • On enquiry the OBC caste certificate of Km. Sanyogita was found genuine; accordingly no cognizable offence requiring investigation is made out.

State and Opposite Party No. 3 (Prof. Anirudh Prasad) — Arguments in Opposition

  • The revision is not maintainable because an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing the police to investigate is a pre-cognizance stage order and is barred from revision by Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.
  • The proposed accused has no right to challenge an order allowing an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.; such an order is interlocutory/administrative in nature and cannot be attacked by the proposed accused by revision or under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
  • An F.I.R. has already been lodged pursuant to the impugned order (crime No. 3/2004 under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468 IPC), and that fact makes the instant revision infructuous; in revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C. the Court cannot quash the FIR.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2001) 2 SCC 628; AIR 2001 SC 571 When a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII (Section 156(3)), he does so before taking cognizance; investigation under Section 156 and Chapter XII is a pre-cognizance step. Cited to support the proposition that Section 156(3) orders are pre-cognizance and therefore do not amount to proceedings against an accused that can be challenged by revision at that stage.
Mohd. Yusuf v. Smt. Afaq Jahan, (2006) 1 SCC 627; AIR 2006 SC 705 Investigation steps under Section 156 and Chapter XII culminate only in the report under Section 173; Magistrate-ordered investigations are not a different kind of investigation and occur before cognizance. Used to explain the nature of investigation under Section 156 and to show that a magistrate's order under Section 156(3) is a pre-cognizance administrative direction.
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal 437 If the Magistrate applies his mind only to ordering investigation (e.g., under Section 156(3)) or issuing search warrants for investigation purposes, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. Cited to reinforce that ordering investigation under Section 156(3) is not taking cognizance and thus does not attract the procedural protections of proceedings against an accused.
Devarappalli Lakshaminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, (1976) ACC 230 An order under Section 156(3) to register and investigate is effectively an intimation or reminder to the police to exercise investigative power under Section 156(1). Relied upon to characterize Section 156(3) orders as administrative reminders to the police rather than adjudicatory proceedings that could be challenged by the accused.
Karan Singh v. State, 1997 (34) ACC 163 The Code does not provide that a Magistrate must hear the accused before issuing a direction under Section 156(3); a prospective accused has no right to be heard at that stage and is not an "aggrieved person" under Section 397 for this purpose. Applied to hold that the alleged accused cannot challenge an order under Section 156(3) by revision.
Ajay Malviya v. State of U.P., 2000 (41) ACC 435 (Division Bench ruling distinguished by the Court in later decisions.) Noted as distinguished by this Court when applying the contrary line of authority supporting non-maintainability of revision by alleged accused against Section 156(3) orders.
Rakesh Puri v. State of U.P., 2006 (56) ACC 910 : 2007 1 All LJ 169 Alleged accused has no right to challenge an order under Section 156(3) at pre-cognizance stage; revision under Section 397(1) is barred by Section 397(2) and Section 482 application is not maintainable for the accused in such circumstances. Relied upon to conclude that revision is not maintainable at the instance of the alleged accused and that Section 482 cannot be invoked to frustrate lawful registration/investigation initiated by an aggrieved person's application.
Smt. Rekha Verma v. State of U.P., 2007 (57) ACC 241 : 2007 1 All LJ 123 Order under Section 156(3) to direct registration is not revisable; applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not maintainable by alleged accused at that stage. Used to support the conclusion that Section 156(3) orders are interlocutory and not amenable to revision by the accused.
Rakesh Mohan Sharma v. State of U.P., 2007 (57) ACC 488 : 2007 1 All LJ 124 Order under Section 156(3) is an interlocutory order; revision is barred by Section 397(2). Reiterated the interlocutory nature of Section 156(3) orders and the consequent bar on revision by the accused.
Chandan v. State of U.P., 2007 (57) ACC 508 : 2007 1 All LJ 7 Accused does not have any right to challenge an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Cited to reinforce the consistent view that alleged accused cannot challenge Section 156(3) orders.
Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 3 SCC 333; AIR 2001 SC 668 Authority concerning non-participation of prospective accused in ex-parte proceedings and the propriety of allowing investigation orders without pre-FIR hearing of proposed accused. Relied upon to support the view that permitting prospective accused to oppose registration/investigation would frustrate investigation and is not contemplated by law.
Om Prakash Singh v. State of U.P., 2004 (49) ACC 341 : 2004 All LJ 2189 The authority or jurisdiction of the police to investigate is not curtailed by rejection of a Section 156(3) application. Applied to show that even if an application under Section 156(3) were rejected, the police retain authority to investigate; also used to justify refusal to interfere with the impugned order in revisional jurisdiction.
Dorey Lal v. State of U.P., 2005 (52) ACC 140 Similar view as Om Prakash Singh: police authority to investigate is not whittled away by rejection of Section 156(3) application. Cited as further support for the proposition that revisional interference with Section 156(3) orders is not appropriate and does not affect police power to investigate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered rival submissions and concluded as follows, based only on the reasoning contained in the opinion:

  1. Nature of Section 156(3) orders: The Court held that an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is passed at the pre-cognizance stage (Chapter XII) and, although judicial in form, is administrative in nature — functioning as a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its investigative powers under Section 156(1). The Court referenced higher judicial authority that such an order is made before taking cognizance.
  2. Procedural consequences for the accused: Because the order is pre-cognizance and administrative, the accused does not come into the picture at this stage and has no locus to be heard. The Court emphasized that there is no provision in the Code that confers upon a prospective accused a right to pre-FIR registration hearing or to object to a magistrate's direction under Section 156(3).
  3. Bar on revisional jurisdiction: The Court relied on Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., which bars revision against interlocutory orders, and concluded that a revision at the instance of a proposed accused against a Section 156(3) order is not maintainable. The Court also held that Section 482 Cr.P.C. applications by the accused to frustrate registration/investigation are not maintainable in such circumstances.
  4. Effect of subsequent F.I.R.: The Court noted that an F.I.R. had already been lodged (crime No. 3/2004) pursuant to the impugned order and observed that in revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C. the Court cannot quash the FIR. Consequently, even if the Court allowed the revision and set aside the impugned order, the already-registered FIR would not be quashed in revision, rendering interference inappropriate at this stage.
  5. Remedies available to accused: The Court observed that the accused may seek extraordinary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution in appropriate cases to quash FIRs where no offence is made out, but such relief is distinct from revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C. The investigative process must proceed and culminate in a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., after which legal remedies and objections can be raised in the appropriate forum.
  6. Merits of the underlying application: The Court noted that from the averments in the Section 156(3) application there was prima facie disclosure of a cognizable offence of serious nature requiring investigation; assessment of truth or falsity of those averments is a matter for the investigating officer during investigation and for later stages, not for revisional interference at the Section 156(3) stage.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision dismissed.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The revision filed by the alleged accused challenging the order dated 20-4-2004 under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability.
  • The interim stay dated 17-5-2004 (if any) stands vacated.
  • A copy of the judgment is to be sent to the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 14, Gorakhpur for necessary action.
  • The F.I.R. registered as crime No. 3/2004 pursuant to the impugned order remains on the files and the police are to submit a report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. after investigation.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies and follows existing precedent that Section 156(3) orders are pre-cognizance, interlocutory or administrative in character and not amenable to revision by the alleged accused under Section 397(1) read with Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., nor by way of a Section 482 Cr.P.C. application in that context. The Court did not purport to lay down a new principle of law; it relied on and applied previously decided authorities to the facts before it. The direct effect is the dismissal of the revision and the continuation of the investigative process; the opinion does not purport to create a novel precedent beyond applying the cited authorities.


Prepared strictly from the contents of the provided opinion; no information has been added that is not present in the source text.

Show all summary ...

1. “Whether the revision against an order passed under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing registration of F.I.R and investigation of the case is maintainable”, is the main question that falls for consideration in this revision, which has been preferred against the order dated 20-4-2004 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 14, Gorakhpur in Misc. Application No. 140 of 2004, whereby S.H.O, P.S concerned has been directed to investigate the case after lodging the F.I.R on the basis of the application moved by Prof. Anirudh Prasad (opposite party No. 3).

2. The facts leading to the filing of this revision, in brief, are that Prof. Anirudh Prasad was the Head of Department of Law Faculty in Deen Dayal Upadhyay University, Gorakhpur in the year 2002–03. He moved an application (Annexure-1) under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C for short) in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur on 10-3-2004 with the prayer to direct S.H.O, P.S Cantt., Gorakhpur to lodge the F.I.R and investigate the case. Shorn of unnecessary details, the allegations made in that application, in brief, are that Km. Sanyogita Misra by playing fraud on the University, sought admission in L.L.B 1st year in the year 2002–03 in OBC category on the basis of forged caste certificate in collusion with Prof. Ram Naresh Chaudhry and Dr. Girija Shanker Tiwari (both revisionists). Prof. Ram Naresh Chaudhry was the Dean of Law Faculty at the relevant time and when the applicant made complaints to University authorities, Dr. Girija Shanker Tiwari was the Dean of this faculty, who being fully conversant of all the facts, admitted Km. Sanyogita in L.L.B 2nd year. It is further averred in the application that real name of Km. Sanyogita is Sanyogita Misra, who is the daughter of Raghuwar Dayal Misra, but she sought admission showing her name as Km. Sanyogita Chauhan daughter of Vibhuti Prasad Chauhan on the basis of forged papers, but in spite of complaint made by the applicant, Dr. Girija Shanker Tiwari permitted Km. Sanyogita to continue her studies and admitted her in L.L.B 2 year. After calling for the report from S.H.O, P.S Cantt, Gorakhpur as well as the authorities of Deen Dayal Upadhyay University, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur vide impugned order dated 20-4-2004 directed the S.H.O concerned to investigate the case after lodging the F.I.R and submit his report in accordance with law. Hence, this revision. I have heard Sri V.P Tripathi, learned counsel for the revisionists, learned A.G.A representing the State of U.P and Sri R.K Ojha, learned counsel for Prof. Anirudh Prasad (opposite party No. 3).

3. At the very outset, it was submitted by learned A.G.A as well as by learned counsel for the opposite party No. 3 that revision against the order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to investigate the case after lodging the F.I.R is not maintainable, being barred by Section 397(2) Cr. P.C It was also submitted that the proposed accused has no right to challenge the order allowing the application under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C The contention raised by learned counsel for the opposite parties was that the order passed under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C is an order of pre-cognizance stage, which cannot be challenged in revision at the instance of proposed accused. Next submission made by learned counsel for the opposite parties was that in pursuance of the impugned order, F.I.R has been lodged at P.S Cantt, Gorakhpur and a case under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468 I.P.C has been registered against the revisionists at crime No. 3/2004 and hence, on this ground, instant revision has become infructuous and any interference by this Court in that order will be unwarranted.

4. The learned counsel for the revisionists on the other hand contended that the order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to investigate the case after lodging the F.I.R is judicial order, which seriously affects the rights of the person against whom it is made and hence, such order can be challenged in revision. It was also submitted by learned counsel for the revisionists that Prof. Anirudh Prasad had no locus standi to move the application under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C in respect of alleged offences. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the revisionists that on making enquiry, the caste certificate of O.B.C category of Km. Sanyogita was found genuine and hence, no cognizable offence requiring investigation is made out in this case.

5. Having given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by the parties' counsel, in my considered view, revision at the instance of proposed accused against the order passed under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C directing the police to investigate the case after lodging the F.I.R is not legally maintainable and the proposed accused have no right to challenge such order.

6. The impugned order was passed under Chapter XII Cr. P.C at pre-cognizance stage. Order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C though a judicial order is administrative in nature. Such order cannot be challenged by the proposed accused by means of revision or moving an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C No accused can stop the registration of F.I.R against him. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in the case of Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2001 (42) ACC 459) : ((2001) 2 SCC 628 : AIR 2001 SC 571) that “the significant point to be noticed is when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter-XII, he does so before he takes cognizance”. In the case of Mohd. Yusuf v. Smt. Afaq Jahan ((2006) 1 SCC 627 : AIR 2006 SC 705), it has been laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court as follows:—

“The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of the Code have been elaborated in Chapter-XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence.”

7. Further it has been held in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee (AIR 1950 Cal 437) as follows:

“When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for the taking action of some other kind, e.g, ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.”

8. At this stage accused does not come into picture at all, nor can he be heard. He has no locus to participate in the proceedings. He can at the most stand and watch the proceedings. It must be remembered that it is pre-cognizance stage. The nature of the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing registration and investigation of case is only a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its power of investigation under Section 156(1) Cr.P.C, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Devarappalli Lakshaminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976 ACC 230). How such a reminder is subject to revisional power of the Court is something which goes beyond comprehension. From the nature of the order itself, it is clear that it is an interlocutory order, not amenable to revisional power of the Court. Section 397(2) Cr.P.C specifically bars revision filed against interlocutory orders.

9. This Court in the case of Karan Singh v. State (1997 (34) ACC 163), has observed as follows:

“Where an order is made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register FIR and investigate the same, the Code no where provides that the Magistrate shall hear the accused before issuing such a direction, nor any person can be supposed to be having a right asking the Court of law for issuing a direction that an FIR should not be registered against him. Where a person has no right of hearing at the stage of making an order under Section 156(3) or during the stage of investigation until Courts takes cognizance and issues process, he cannot be clothed also with a right to challenge the order of the Magistrate by preferring a revision under the Code. He cannot be termed as an “aggrieved person” for purpose of Section 397 of the Code.”

10. Thus at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C any order made by the Magistrate does not adversely affect the right of any person since he has got ample remedy to seek relief at the appropriate stage by raising his objections. It is incomprehensible that accused can not challenge the registration of F.I.R by the police directly, but can challenge the order made by the Magistrate for the registration of the same with the same consequences. Thus, from the discussions made above, it is clear that an accused does not have any right to be heard before he is summoned by the Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he has got no right to raise any objection till the stage of summoning and resultantly he can not be conferred with a right to challenge the order passed prior to his summoning. Further, if the accused does not have a right to instal the investigation, but for the limited grounds available to him under the law, it surpasses all suppositions to comprehend that he possesses a right to resist registration of F.I.R

11. Distinguishing Division Bench ruling in the case of Ajay Malviya v. State of U.P, 2000 (41) ACC 435 : (2000 All LJ 2730) this Court in the case of Rakesh Puri v. State of U.P, 2006 (56) ACC 910 : (2007) 1 All LJ 169 has held as under:

“To sum up the discussions made above it is clear that the alleged accused has no right to challenge an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C at pre-cognizance stage by a Magistrate and no revision lay against such an order at the instance of the alleged accused under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C being barred by Section 397(2) Cr.P.C nor at his instance an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C is maintainable for the simple reason that if cognizable offence is disclosed in an application filed by the aggrieved person, then his such an application must be investigated to bring culprits to books and not to thwart his attempt to get the FIR registered by rejecting such an application which will not amount to securing the ends of justice but will amount to travesty of it.

12. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in the case of Smt. Rekha Verma v. State of U.P, 2007 (57) ACC 241 : (2007) 1 All LJ 123 in which it is held that order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C to direct registration of the case is not revisable and application under Section 482 Cr.P.C also is not maintainable. In the case of Rakesh Mohan Sharma v. State of U.P (2007 (57) ACC 488) : (2007) 1 All LJ 124 also, it is held by this Court that order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order, revision against which is not maintainable being barred by Section 397(2) Cr.P.C In the case of Smt. Rekha Verma v. State of U.P, (2007) 1 All LJ 123 (supra), this Court has observed as follows:

“Thus till the stage of summoning, there is no proceeding so far as the accused is concerned. Thus it is clear that so far accused is concerned he is not a party to any “proceeding” till the stage of summoning and he cannot be heard. Section 397 Cr.P.C deals with “Proceedings”. Thus applying the law laid down by the apex Court so far as accused is concerned, no “Proceedings” has taken place at the stage of Section 156(3) of the Code. Moreover, order under Section 156(3) of the Code is in the nature of an administrative order, because it empowers the Magistrate only to issue a direction to the police to exercise their plenary power of investigation and nothing more. The power which has been conferred on the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) of the Code has been conferred on the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C to check the arbitrary exercise of power by the police echelons and to get the law observed by it and not to flout it. So far as the accused is concerned, he has got no right to object to the registration of FIR against him. He has got no right under any law to appear and say that the Magistrate does not possess the power to order for registration of FIR against him. There is no provision in the Code, which confers such a right to an accused. Conferring such a right through judicial pronouncements will amount to legislation which power the Courts do not possess. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) does not confer pre FIR registration hearing on a prospective accused.”

13. Again this matter was considered in detail by this Court in the case of Chandan v. State of U.P, 2007 (57) ACC 508 : (2007) 1 All LJ 7 in which, it was held that accused does not have any right to challenge an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C

14. Relying upon the decision of Apex Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of Rajasthan (2001 (42) ACC 451) : ((2001) 3 SCC 333 : AIR 2001 SC 668) it was held by this Court in the case of Rakesh Puri v. State, (2007) 1 All LJ 169 (supra) as follow:

“It is preposterous even to cogitate that a person has a right to appear before the Magistrate to oppose an application seeking a direction from him for registration and investigation of the offence when he has no right to participate in the said ex-pare proceeding. If permitted this will amount to killing of foetus of investigation in the womb when it was not there at all. Such power has not been conferred under the law on the prospective accused.

When the accused does not have any right to participate in a proceeding how can he be permitted to challenge an interlocutory order passed in such a proceeding. If an accused cannot stop registration of a complaint under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C howsoever fanciful, mala fide or absurd the allegations may be, he certainly does not possess the power to stall registration of FIR of cognizable offence against him.”

15. For the reasons mentioned herein-above and in view of the law laid down in aforesaid cases, I am of the considered view that the accused has no right to stop registration of F.I.R and the revision filed by him against the order allowing the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is not legally maintainable. Therefore, instant revision is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

16. From the counter affidavit of Anirudh Prasad (opposite party No. 3), it is observed that in pursuance of the impugned order, F.I.R has been lodged at P.S Cantt. Gorakhpur and a case under Section 120-B/419/420/467/468 I.P.C has been registered at crime No. 3/2004. Hence on this ground also, interference by this Court in the impugned order is not warranted now, because even if this revision is allowed and the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is rejected after setting aside the impugned order, then also, the FIR of case crime No. 03/2004, which has come into existence will not be quashed by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. Although extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be availed by the accused person for quashing the F.I.R, and in appropriate cases, FIR can be quashed by this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if no offence is made out from the averments made in the FIR, but in revisional jurisdiction under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C, FIR cannot be quashed. Now a report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C has to be submitted by the police after investigation of case crime No. 03/2004, unless the FIR is quashed in appropriate proceedings by this Court.

17. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Om Prakash Singh v. State of U.P, 2004 (49) ACC 341 : (2004 All LJ 2189) has held that authority or jurisdiction of the police to investigate the case cannot be whittled away in the event of rejection of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C Similar view has been expressed by this Court in the case of Dorey Lal v. State of U.P (2005 (52) ACC 140). Therefore, having regard to the observations made in these cases, this Court in this proceeding under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C will not be justified now to set-aside the impugned order, which does not suffer from any illegality. Moreover, on merit also, the application moved by opposite party No. 3 Prof. Anirudh Prasad under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C cannot be rejected, because from the averments made in this application prima facie cognizable offence of serious nature requiring investigation is made out. Falsehood or truthfulness of the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C cannot be looked into by this Court in revisional jurisdiction and this matter can be seen only by the Investigating Officer during investigation of case crime No. 03/2004. If the allegations made in the F.I.R, which has been registered pursuant to the impugned order, are found false, then final report can be submitted by the investigating officer, but in any case, this Court in the proceeding under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C has no jurisdiction to quash the FIR and hence, on this ground also, interference by this Court in the impugned order will be unwarranted.

18. Consequently, the revision is hereby dismissed. Stay order dated 17-5-2004 stands vacated.

19. Office to send a copy of this judgment to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 14, Gorakhpur for necessary action.

20. Revision dismissed.