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Icici Bank Ltd., In Re
Judgment Summary — Reference pursuant to Division Bench order dated 9 September 2005 (Ajoy Nath Ray, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from a reference made by an Hon'ble Division Bench on 9 September 2005 in Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 58318 of 2005 (Rakesh Mehta v. State of U.P.). The Division Bench dismissed the habeas corpus petition as infructuous but observed that facts placed on record (including a supplementary affidavit filed by ICICI Bank Ltd.) raised questions of larger public importance, and therefore took suo motu cognizance and directed that the matter be registered as a Public Interest Litigation for consideration by a larger bench.
The underlying factual matrix as described in the Division Bench's judgment: two advocates (Someshwari Prasad and Dhananjay Prasad), who had respectively taken a car loan and a home loan from ICICI Bank, lodged FIRs and alleged that ICICI's private debt collectors had criminally intimidated them and illegally extracted money (figures of approximately Rs. 40,000 and Rs. 60,000). One advocate alleged that the Bank's agents forced him to drive to the Bank premises. ICICI Bank's version was different — it alleged hooliganism at its office and that several advocates were involved, and that the Bank manager was effectively detained and had difficulty arranging bail.
The Division Bench referred a series of questions for consideration, directed the Registrar General to register a Public Interest Litigation and sought constitution of a larger bench. On administrative placement of the file, the Chief Justice (Ajoy Nath Ray, C.J.) constituted a three-judge bench to consider the propriety of that reference and whether the matter should proceed as a PIL under Chapter V Rule 6 of the High Court Rules.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a license under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 or RBI guidelines permits ICICI Bank to recover dues through collection agents who use unlawful means (muscle/bullies) to recover loans?
- Whether the contract between ICICI Bank and Shiv Shakti Consultancy is a legal contract and, if so, what is its effect; specifically whether it absolves the bank from criminal and civil liabilities?
- Whether Shiv Shakti Consultancy is an agent of ICICI Bank and whether the bank is liable for actions of such collection agents who violate criminal or civil laws?
- Whether ICICI Bank is under a legal obligation to follow due process in advancing loans and recovering dues, and whether it can employ collection agents who use muscle power thereby disturbing the rule of law?
- Whether ICICI Bank can recover its dues only in accordance with law, by filing a civil suit?
- Whether ICICI Bank or its collection agency can take coercive action such as snatching vehicles or taking possession of property, or locking an individual in a bank or other place, without following legal procedure?
- Whether recovery charges paid by the bank to collection agents are recoverable from the borrower and what is the percentage of such recovery charges paid by ICICI Bank to collection agents?
- Whether ICICI Bank can ignore provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (bounced cheques) and recover amounts by force through collection agents?
- Whether nationalised banks that recover dues lawfully could be permitted to adopt the same recovery procedures as private banks using collection agents who take the law into their own hands?
- Whether two parallel systems of recovery may exist — one lawful system followed by nationalised banks and the other unlawful system used by some private banks through collection agents?
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion contains specific submissions made by counsel and factual positions advanced by parties. The following summaries reflect those submissions as recorded in the opinion.
Respondents' Counsel (V.P. Srivastava)
- Urged that the Court should direct a CBI inquiry, asserting that in Uttar Pradesh ICICI Bank has granted collection agency work only to “muscle men” and “bullies” who are effectively mafias, and that borrowers are under constant threat and criminal assault.
- The Division Bench noted this submission but did not issue a direction for a CBI inquiry at that stage.
ICICI Bank (Mr. Mitra)
- Presented a radically different factual version: ICICI contended that the Bank suffered hooliganism at the office, and that several advocates were involved in such acts, resulting in the Bank manager being effectively detained and unable to secure bail easily.
- Relied on a Kerala special Bench judgment (Babu Premarajan) to submit that when questions of law of importance arise before a Division Bench, ordinarily the Division Bench should decide them itself rather than refer them to a larger Bench unless there is a conflict of precedent.
- Contended that the writ petition may have been disposed of by the Division Bench's initial paragraphs and thus no appropriate case survived for a PIL reference.
Learned Advocate / Petitioners (Mr. Shashi Nandan on behalf of the advocates)
- Argued for a broad scope of public interest litigation and submitted that the Court could take suo motu cognizance of public facts and inquire into them, relying on precedents such as Ashok Lanka, Friends Colony and Mukti Morcha.
- Submitted that pronouncing upon the Bank–collector contract and taking cognizance would make the matter a bona fide public interest litigation and that the Court's conscience might be sufficiently shocked to warrant such action.
- Also pointed to another writ petition (No. 13778 of 2006) filed by Mr. Prasad specifically challenging the same debt-collector contract as contrary to public policy.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Babu Premarajan, AIR 2000 Kerala 417 (Kerala Special Bench) | That ordinarily a Division Bench should decide important questions of law itself and should not refer them to a larger Bench unless there is a conflict of precedent making it impossible to decide otherwise. | The court followed this principle and held that the Division Bench could and should have decided the questions itself; the Kerala principle supported annulling the reference to a larger Bench under the circumstances. |
| Ashok Lanka, (2005) 5 SCC 598 : AIR 2005 SC 2821 | Demonstrates the Court's discretion to inquire into public facts suo motu in appropriate litigation and the broad reach of PIL jurisdiction in suitable cases. | Cited by Mr. Shashi Nandan to argue for suo motu action and broader PIL jurisdiction; the court considered the submission but concluded that it could not exercise jurisdiction to answer abstract questions of law in the absence of a live case. |
| Friends Colony, (2004) 8 SCC 733 : AIR 2005 SC 1 | Supports the proposition that the Court often takes suo motu action in public interest litigation. | Cited to support entertaining the matter as a PIL; the court acknowledged the principle but held that the presence of public-importance questions alone did not make the matter a proper PIL in the circumstances then before it. |
| Mukti Morcha, (1984) 3 SCC 161 : AIR 1984 S.C. 802 | Sets out an early test for entertaining PIL — whether the Court's conscience is sufficiently shocked; emphasizes that in PIL the whole public or administration may be treated as parties and that it is not adversarial litigation. | Relied upon by counsel for the advocates to urge PIL jurisdiction; the court noted the principle but distinguished it, holding that answering abstract legal questions without a live controversy would be impermissible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeded through distinct analytical steps, closely following the record and the High Court Rules:
- Nature of Reference and Context: The court began by identifying the administrative and judicial steps that led to the reference — a Division Bench dismissed the habeas petition as infructuous but found questions of larger public importance and directed registration as a PIL and reference to a larger bench.
- Factual Observations: The court recited the competing factual narratives (borrowers' allegations of criminal intimidation by debt collectors versus the bank's allegations of hooliganism by advocates) and noted the existence of two named collecting agencies (Shiv Shakti Enterprises and Chetna Enterprises) and the contractual arrangements alleged by the petitioners to be contrary to public policy.
- Threshold Question — Is this a Public Interest Litigation?: The court emphasized a conceptual distinction — the mere presence of questions of law of general public importance does not automatically convert private litigation into a public interest litigation. A PIL is characterized by the court pronouncing upon a representative public interest rather than merely deciding private rights; the existence of private parties with specific interests (for example, Someshwari Prasad seeking a declaration with direct effect on the parties) does not alone found a PIL.
- Relevant Rule — Chapter V Rule 6: The court examined Chapter V Rule 6 of the High Court Rules, which allows the Chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench either administratively or where a Bench hearing a case formulates questions of law for reference. The court parsed the two limbs: (a) Chief Justice's administrative constitution of a Bench and (b) a reference from a Bench hearing a case where the case remains alive.
- Application of Precedent — Kerala Principle: The court relied on the Kerala Special Bench judgment (Babu Premarajan) to underline the ordinary rule that a Division Bench should decide important questions itself unless a conflict of precedent prevents it. Under the facts, there was no such conflict to compel reference.
- Question Whether the Writ Petition Remains Alive: The court noted uncertainty whether the habeas petition survived the Division Bench's initial paragraphs. Mr. Mitra submitted it was disposed; Mr. Shashi Nandan contended it remained alive for the limited purpose of considering a CBI enquiry. The court declined to make a factual determination on that point in this reference.
- Jurisdictional Limits — No Academic Pronouncements: The court stressed a foundational principle: courts do not have jurisdiction to answer abstract questions of law in a vacuum. Legal questions must normally arise incidentally in litigation between parties affecting rights, liabilities or interests; the court cannot act as a mere law professor answering hypotheticals.
- Conclusion on Reference and PIL Characterization: Given the absence of a live controversy (or the uncertainty about it), the lack of conflicting precedent, and the Division Bench's ability to decide the questions itself, the court concluded that branding the matter as a public interest litigation and referring it to a larger Bench under the administrative or second limb of Rule 6 was improper.
- Relief Ordered: The court annulled the reference to the Full Bench and left the substantive questions unanswered, expressly leaving them open for decision, and declared the order and observations to be without prejudice to the parties' rights in any existing or future proceedings (including Writ Petition No. 13778 of 2006).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The reference to the Full Bench (larger bench) was not properly made and is annulled.
Implications and direct effects:
- The court refused to proceed to decide the referred questions as a public interest litigation; the referred questions remain unanswered and are left open for adjudication in appropriate proceedings where they arise in a live controversy.
- The order and observations by the Division Bench and the administrative placement before a Full Bench are set aside and are declared without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in any proceedings, including the writ petition No. 13778 of 2006 or other proceedings.
- The opinion makes clear two practical consequences: (a) if the original writ petition (No. 58318 of 2005) is still alive the Division Bench retains jurisdiction and should ordinarily decide the issues itself, including any question of directing a CBI inquiry; and (b) absent a live controversy, the High Court will not entertain mere academic questions of law or pronounce on them in the abstract.
- No new general precedent on the substantive questions of bank–collector contracts or recovery practices was laid down; the court explicitly left the substantive questions open and confined its ruling to the propriety of the reference and the characterization as a PIL.
Order: "The reference to the Full Bench was not properly made, and it is annulled. The order and observations are without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties..."
Ajoy Nath Ray, C.J:— This is a reference made by an order of an Hon'ble Division Bench passed on the 9th of September, 2005.
2. The reference was made in a Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 58318 of 2005. In the first two paragraphs of the referring judgment, their Lordships said as follows:—
“Today we have dismissed the Habeas Corpus petition No. 58318 of 2005: Rakesh Mehta v. State of U.P as infructuous.
From the averments made in the petition and supplementary affidavit filed by ICICI Bank Ltd., some questions of larger public importance have arisen. This Court cannot lose sight of day to day happenings in the society. Therefore, we have taken suo motu cognizance of the matter on the facts that have been brought on record in the aforesaid Habeas Corpus Petition and Supplementary Affidavit”.
3. In the concluding portion where the reference was ordered, their Lordships said as follows:—
“Shri V.P Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently urged that this court may direct for CBI enquiry and then it would be revealed that in State of V.P collection agency has been granted by ICICI Bank only to muscle men and bullies who are nothing but mafias and all the borrowers of the State of Uttar Pradesh, who have taken loan from the ICICI Bank are under constant threat of the mafias who are also criminally assaulting them. However, we were not issuing any such direction for holding a CBI enquiry at this stage.
From the facts stated above, in our opinion, the following questions of public importance arise for consideration.
(1) Whether license granted to ICICI Bank under the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 or guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India permit the ICICI Bank to recover its dues from the borrowers through collection agents who are bullies who recover the loan by taking law in their own hands?
(2) Whether the contract entered into between the ICICI Bank and Shiv Shakti Consultancy is a legal contract and, if so, its effect? Whether the contract entered into between the ICICI Bank and Shiv Shakti Consultancy absolves the ICICI Bank from all criminal and civil liabilities?
(3) Whether Shiv Shakti Consultancy is an agent of ICICI Bank and whether the bank is liable for all actions of its collection agent or agencies who violate criminal and civil laws.
(4) Whether ICICI Bank is under a legal obligation to follow due process of law for carrying out its banking business of advancement of loans and recovery of its dues? Whether it can disturb the rule of law by engaging collection agent that recovers the dues from the borrowers by using muscle power?
(5) Whether the ICICI Bank can recover its dues only in accordance with law by filing a civil suit?
(6) Whether the ICICI bank or its collection agency can take coercive action against the borrower by snatching the vehicles or taking possession of the property without following the procedure established by law and take further coercive action by locking the individual borrower in the bank or at some other place?
(7) Whether nay recovery charges are paid by the bank to its collection agents and whether it is recoverable by the bank from the borrower or not and, what is the percentage of recovery charges paid by the ICICI Bank to the collection agent.
(8) Whether ICICI Bank can ignore the provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 in case of bounced cheques and proceed to recover the amount of the bounced cheques through their collection agent by force?
(9) Whether the Nationalised Banks which recovers its dues from the borrowers in accordance with law could be permitted to adopt the same procedure for recovery of its dues from the borrowers as adopted by the private banks like ICICI Bank through collection agents who take law in their own hands?
(10) Whether for recovery of any amount from a borrower two different parallel systems couid exist, one in accordance with law followed by the Nationalised Banks and the other followed by the private banks who recover their dues through collection agents in violation of law?
Since this is a matter of vital public importance, interest of justice demands that this matter should be heard by a larger bench.
The Registrar General is directed to register a Public Interest Litigation and place the records along with our order before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for nominating an appropriate larger bench for hearing this public interest matter expeditiously”.
4. On this order, when the file was placed by the Registry, the following order was passed by me on the 14 of September, 2005:—
“Let the p.i.l be heard by Hon. the C.J, Hon. Mr. Justice Sunil Ambwani, and Hon. Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan.
Chief Justice
14.9.2005”
5. In the body of the judgment, the Division Bench gave certain facts. The case arose in this way, that a Habeas Corpus petition was filed by the Manager of the ICICI Bank from Jail. Two FIRs had been lodged against certain persons including the Habeas Corpus applicant by two learned Advocates, namely, Someshwari Prasad and Dhananjay Prasad. They had respectively taken a car loan and a home loan; their complaint was that they were being criminally threatened and that by criminal intimidation, the private debt collectors engaged by the Bank had managed to obtain from them sums of money of the order of Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 60,000/-. It was also said that while one learned Advocate was driving his Car, the Bank's agents, allegedly ruffians, got into the Car and forced him to drive to the Bank premises. The Bank's case was radically different. It alleged that it suffered hooliganism at the office of the Bank premises itself and that several Advocates were involved in such act. The Bank Manager was perforce made to be taken into custody since the learned Advocates were involved; he even found moving an application for bail extremely difficult and almost impossible.
6. Hence the Habeas Corpus petition.
7. The Division Bench rid not record it, but as the Bank Manager had been produced in Court, the purpose of the writ had been served. Although it is not recorded, we assume that from the Court Room, the Bank Manager travelled back not to the Jail again, but to his home or his office premises. The Division Bench felt on the allegations made by the borrowers, i.e the learned Advocates that the collecting method employed by the Bank needed serious legal scrutiny. During the argument before us, we have come across the names of two collecting agencies, namely, Shiv Shakti Enterprises, (on whose behalf, the proprietor “Anubhay” has put his signature) and the other debt collecting agency is Chetna Enterprises.
8. It is said that the Bank screens itself by way of terms in the contract, so that even if their debt collectors overstep legal limits, nobody can reach the Bank. Debt collecting contracts are themselves alleged to be scars on the public system, and it is alleged that those are void and liable to be declared as contrary to public policy. The questions referred by the Division Bench would, no doubt, raise the said question, as the validity of the debt collecting contracts entered into by and between the commercial Banks and their debt collectors is involved.
9. However, we have to examine whether the litigation itself is a public interest litigation or, even though the Division Bench did not itself say or imply it to be so, whether the reference made by the Division Bench comes within the terms of Chapter V Rule 6 of our High Court Rules. If the reference is proper, only then can we give any opinion thereon.
10. The only reason why the Division Bench opined that the matter should be registered as a public interest litigation was that questions of law of general public importance were involved.
11. In our opinion, a litigation does not become a public interest litigation merely because questions of law of general public importance arise in that case. Such important questions are often decided in private litigation and those help the public in general, but public interest litigation is different. P.I.L is where the interest, which the Court pronounces upon, is itself in a representative capacity a public interest.
12. In this case, Mr. Someshwari Prasad would be interested in having the agreement between ICICI and Shiv Shakti Enterprises declared as void and contrary to public policy. Such a declaration would bind Mr. Someshwari Prasad, Shiv Shakti and the ICICI only, but the declaration of law made in that regard would bind others as a precedent. The mere necessity of creating a precedent cannot found a public interest litigation all by itself.
13. We respectfully follow the Kerala special Bench judgment relied upon by Mr. Mitra appeared for ICICI, being the case of Babu Premarajan, reported at AIR 2000 Kerala 417. Passages would be found at page 449 to the effect that if a question of law of whatever importance arises before the Division Bench, ordinarily the Division Bench should decide it itself and not refer it to a larger Bench, unless there is a conflict of precedent, which makes it impossible for the Division Bench to decide this way or the other. This was opined in Kerala, even though there was a rule of the High Court which, on a plain reading, appeared to allow two Hon'ble Judges of a Division Bench to refer any questions to a larger Bench merely on their Lordships agreement.
14. As such, if the writ petition before the Hon'ble Division Bench is still alive, the Division Bench is fully at liberty in its own wisdom to decide all the questions itself and indeed all the questions purportedly got referred to the larger Bench.
15. Whether the writ petition is alive before the Division Bench or not, is not clear. Mr. Mitra says that the writ petition is clearly disposed of by the first two paragraphs and Mr. Shashi Nandan, appearing for the learned Advocate says that it is still alive for the purpose of considering the CBI inquiry.
16. If the petition is alive the questions of law are to be decided by the Division Bench itself and the CBI inquiry might be ordered or not, as the Division Bench might think fit. The Division Bench has jurisdiction to decide itself and that jurisdiction has to be exercised.
17. We are therefore of the clear opinion that the direction to have a case registered as a public interest litigation merely because of the public importance of the questions of law involved, was a direction not in accordance with law and as such, the reference made on the administrative side by me, bringing the matter before this Bench as a public interest litigation, is also incorrect and the matter should never have been branded as a public interest litigation either by Hon'ble Division Bench judicially, or by me acting in administrative capacity.
18. The other point is whether it is a reference under Chapter V Rule 6 that the Division Bench has in reality resorted to. The said rule is quoted below:—
“6. Reference to a larger Bench.-The Chief Justice may constitute a Bench of two or more Judges to decide a case or any question, of law formulated by a Bench hearing a case. In the latter event the decision of such Bench on the question so formulated shall be returned to the Bench hearing the case and that Bench shall follow that decision on such question and dispose of the case after deciding the remaining questions, if any, arising therein”.
19. The first part of the rule refers to constitution of a Bench by the Chief Justice himself by use of his own administrative discretion. This is not one such case.
20. So far as the second part of the rule is concerned, where the questions of law are formulated by a Division Bench for reference and decision, the case has to be alive before the Division Bench itself. If the case is alive in the present case, then also a reference under the second limb, is, with the greatest of respect, improper, because nothing prevented the Division Bench from deciding the questions itself. There were no conflicting Division Benches facing their Lordships and as such, the Kerala principle mentioned above applies with full force.
21. Mr. Shashi Nandan submitted that the scope of public interest litigation is sufficiently large for us to entertain these questions as such, even on the facts of the present case and even in the manner those have been referred to us. He gave the case of Ashok Lanka, reported at (2005) 5 SCC 598 : (AIR 2005 SC 2821) and showed us passages from page 618 including paragraph 2 to emphasize that it was within the discretion of the Court in an appropriate litigation even to inquire into public facts suo motu if the exigency of the case so required.
22. He then gave us the case of Friends Colony, reported at (2004) 8 SCC 733 : (AIR 2005 SC 1) and placed paragraph 7 from page 746 to show that the Court should and often does take suo motu action in public interest litigation. Next he cited the comparatively old case of Mukti Morcha, decided in the beginnings of the commencement of public interest litigations, reported at (1984) 3 SCC 161 : AIR 1984 S.C 802. He placed passages from paragraph 9 at page 811 to submit that the test of entertaining a public interest litigation is for the Court to ask itself whether its conscience is sufficiently shocked or troubled. There are no parties in a public interest litigation as such; the whole public at large are parties, and so is the whole of the administration. It is not an adversary litigation, but it is a type of litigation where the Government is often called upon by the court's order to do its duty and the Court sometimes even supervises such action of the Government after it has passed an order to that effect.
23. On these bases, Mr. Shashi Nandan submitted that if we pronounce upon the contract of Shiv Shakti and ICICI, by taking its congnizance ourselves and also of any public facts that we might wish to inquire into, the matter would truly and properly be a public interest litigation.
24. This submission of Mr. Shashi Nandan suffers from one very serious problem. It is the problem of the Court having no jurisdiction to answer questions of law merely academically and in the vacuum. Mr. Prasad has already filed another writ petition No. 13778 of 2006 where by he specifically challenges the same contract of the debt collector as being contrary to public policy. But in the case before the Division Bench, which is before us, either nothing survives or something survives for which the Division Bench is itself to give its decision inclosing (Sic) those points of law.
25. If nothing survives, then our answering the questions referred as public interest law points, would suffer from this problem that, the declaration of law would be wholly academic and a mere enunciation of law made by the Court without there being a case surviving in which to make the pronouncement. That such declaration might be used later on by the parties to have even their own rights declared, in one particular manner, is no reason or argument why the Court can have seisin or jurisdiction over mere points of law referred as such.
26. The Courts have jurisdiction to decide on points of law only when those arise in relation to and are incidental to questions raised by parties affecting their own rights, liabilities and interest. The Court is all the time deciding questions of law, but it is a paradox that the Court has no jurisdiction to decide a question of law, and a question of law only, like a Professor answering questions to a persistent law student.
27. As such, the questions referred are all left open; it is opined that the questions cannot be answered as a subject of public interest litigation. No opinion is given whether Writ Petition No. 58318 of 2005 is still alive or not.
28. The reference to the Full Bench was not properly made, and it is annulled. The order and observations are without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in any proceeding whether in the writ petition No. 13778 of 2006 filed today, or any other matter.
29. Order accordingly.
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