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Pramod Kumar Singh v. State Of U.P And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petitioner was a candidate for an examination administered by the Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad. The advertisement prescribing "how to apply" stated that a complete application must reach the Secretary, Public Service Commission, U.P., 10 Kasturba Gandhi Marg, Allahabad, either by registered post or by hand by 5:00 p.m. on or before 22nd July, 2005—thus providing two modes of submission.
The petitioner alleged that he posted his application by registered post on 14th July, 2005 from a location about 100 kilometres from the Commission's office, but the Commission refused to accept it because it was received on 28th July, 2005, after the last date. The petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction seeking a direction that the Commission accept his application and permit him to sit for the interview, or alternatively that the Commission be directed to decide his representation dated 22nd August, 2005.
The central procedural question before the Court was whether the postal authorities (Post Office) should be treated as the agent of the Commission for the purpose of receiving applications so that, upon posting, the applicant's duty would be discharged and the Commission would be responsible for any late receipt.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Post Office functions as the agent of the Public Service Commission in this context so that an application is effectively delivered when posted by the sender.
- Whether, when an advertisement prescribes more than one mode of submission (here: registered post or by hand), the Commission can be held responsible for late receipt of an application posted by the applicant.
- Whether the Commission was obliged to accept the petitioner's late-received application (sent by registered post) or to extend the last date in view of the postal delay.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner asserted that he dispatched his application by registered post on 14th July, 2005 from about 100 km away and therefore had done all that was required of him.
- He contended there was no fault on his part in making the application and that the Commission should have accepted it despite its receipt after the last date.
- He sought an order directing the Commission to accept his application and permit him to attend the interview, or alternatively to decide his representation dated 22nd August, 2005.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent Commission's separate legal arguments in a party-by-party format beyond the Commission's position reflected in the Court's reasoning and the factual refusal to accept the late application.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shashi Bhushan Kumar v. U.P. Higher Education Services Commission and Anr., 2000 (4) E.S.C. 2483 (All.) | Held that the Higher Education Services Commission should entertain an application received after the last date where the condition specified transmission by Parcel/Speed Post. | The Court noted this Division Bench decision as one line of authority where a specified postal mode (parcel/speed post) led to acceptance despite late receipt; it contrasted this with other authorities and acknowledged that differing factual prescriptions justify differing outcomes. |
| Ram Autar v. Public Service Commission and Ors., 1987 UPLBEC 316 | Held that an application sent by registered post if received after expiry of the last date is liable to be rejected where the advertisement did not establish an agreement to receive applications through the post office. | The Court relied on the distinction drawn in Shashi Bhushan Kumar and observed that Ram Autar was factually distinguishable because the advertisement in that case did not imply an arrangement that made the post office the addressee's agent. |
| Union of India v. Mohd. Nazim (citation referenced) | Ratio stated that the post office accepts responsibility of the sender when it accepts postal articles for transmission; the postal service is a public service and is not to be treated as an agent like a common carrier nor as entering into contract by mere acceptance of postal articles. | The Court cited this authority to explain the general legal position of the post office as a public service that does not automatically become the agent of the addressee merely by accepting postal articles, absent other factors (such as an express or implied request by the addressee). |
| Unit Trust of India v. Ravinder Kumar Shukla (Appeal (Civil) No. 1619 of 2005; judgment dated 19 Sept 2005) | Held that in the absence of any contract or request from the payee, mere posting would not amount to payment; post office may continue to act as agent of the drawer and loss falls on the drawer. | The Court used this authority to explain that where there is no request or contract from the payee/addressee, mere posting does not make the post office the addressee's agent and any loss in transit is on the sender. |
| Indore Malwa United Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Bombay, AIR 1966 SC 1466 | If the creditor authorises payment by cheque to be sent by post (express or implied), the post office is the agent of the creditor and the creditor receives payment as soon as the cheque is posted. | The Court cited this passage to demonstrate that where the addressee has authorised or requested receipt by post, posting may effect delivery to the addressee—distinguishing such cases from situations where no such authorisation/request exists. |
| Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay South v. Messrs Ogale Glass Works Ltd. (Vol.41, C.N.104) | As between sender and addressee, the addressee's request that a cheque be sent by post makes the post office the agent of the addressee; after such a request the addressee cannot deny agency and cast loss on the sender. | The Court cited this authority to reinforce that an addressee's request for postal transmission converts the post office into the addressee's agent for that purpose; such requests remove the sender's argument that the post office was his agent alone. |
| Post Office Act, 1898 (referenced) | Referenced in the context of a sender's limited right to reclaim postal items under the Act. | The Court referred to the Act in discussing the limited statutory reclamation rights available to a sender and how some precedents have invoked these limits when allocating loss in transit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first framed the pivotal question whether the Post Office acted as the Commission's agent such that posting would discharge the applicant's duty. It reviewed relevant precedents from this High Court and the Supreme Court which take different factual positions depending on whether the addressee had prescribed or requested postal transmission as the mode of receiving the instrument or application.
The Court observed that:
- When the addressee expressly or impliedly requests or authorises that submissions be sent by post (for example, where the advertisement prescribes mailing by a particular postal mode), the post office may be treated as the addressee's agent and posting may be treated as delivery to the addressee (citing Indore Malwa United Mills and Ogale Glass Works authorities).
- Where there is no such agreement, request or prescription making the post office the addressee's agent, the post office does not become the agent of the addressee merely by accepting postal articles; the postal service is a public service and does not automatically enter into contract on behalf of the addressee (citing Union of India v. Mohd. Nazim and Unit Trust of India v. Ravinder Kumar Shukla).
- Earlier Division Bench decisions of this High Court (Shashi Bhushan Kumar and Ram Autar) were discussed and distinguished on their facts: in one case a specific postal mode was prescribed and acceptance after the last date was directed; in the other no such prescription existed and the application was liable to be rejected. The Court concluded that both decisions are appropriate on their respective facts and that the questions could have warranted consideration by a Larger Bench.
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court found that where an advertisement prescribes two alternative modes of submission (registered post or by hand), a candidate who elects to use the postal mode bears the risk associated with postal transmission if the addressee has not exclusively and effectively made the post office its agent for receipt of applications. Because more than one mode was prescribed here, the Commission was not at fault for the late receipt occasioned by postal delay when the petitioner had chosen the postal mode.
The Court further explained that a writ court cannot reallocate the risk of postal transmission or order equitable compensation against the Commission when the advertisement provided alternative modes; if the petitioner seeks compensation or remedy arising from postal mishandling, his remedy lies against the postal authorities under appropriate proceedings.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's final order was that the writ petition stands dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Commission is not directed to accept the petitioner's application or to permit him to participate in the interview; the petition is dismissed and no order as to costs was made.
- Remedies preserved for petitioner: The petitioner is not precluded from pursuing action against the postal authority for wrongful discharge of public duty if so advised; the Court explicitly left open the avenue of remedies against the Post Office.
- Precedential effect: The Court treated earlier High Court and Supreme Court decisions as fact-specific and distinguished them on their facts. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule overriding those authorities; rather it applied established principles to the facts that two alternative modes were prescribed in the advertisement and, on that basis, allocated the risk to the sender.
1. An interesting point is involved in the writ petition. The writ petitioner is a candidate of an examination to be held under the supervision of Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad. One of the conditions about the modes of making application "how to apply" speaks as under:
"...Application complete in all respects must reach the "Secretary, (Deptt No...) Public Service Commission, U.P., 10 Kasturba Gandhi Marg, Allahabad-211018" at the Commission's office either by registered post or by hand upto 5.00 p.m. on or before 22nd July, 2005."
2. Therefore, there are two modes of making application as aforesaid.
3. The petitioner contended that he sent his application through registered post on 14th July, 2005 from a place 100 Kms. from the Commission's office at Allahabad but the Commission refused to accept the same since it was reached to the office on 28th July, 2005 after expiry of the last date. According to the petitioner, there is no fault on the part of the petitioner in making the application. Therefore, such application should have been accepted by the Commission. Since the same has not been done, the writ jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of giving direction upon the Commission to accept the application and to permit the petitioner to sit for the interview. In the alternative for a direction upon such authority to decide the petitioner's representation dated 22nd August, 2005.
4. A question arose before this Court whether the Post Office is an agent of the Public Service Commission in this case or not. If so, as soon as the application is posted with the local post office the duty of the applicant is discharged. Responsibility lies with the Commission, if not received within the time prescribed in the advertisement inviting applications.
5. We have come across several important judgments either passed by this High Court or the Supreme Court to come to a definite conclusion in respect of the subject matter herein. In 2000 (4) E.S.C. 2483 (All.) (Shashi Bhushan Kumar v. U.P. Higher Education Services Commission and Anr.) a Division Bench of this Court directed the Higher Education Services Commission to entertain the application although it was received to it after expiry of the last date. There the condition was that it will be sent by Parcel/Speed Post. In the same judgment the Division Bench of our High Court distinguished the ratio of another judgment reported in 1987 UPLBEC 316 (Ram Autar v. Public Service Commission and Ors.) In distinguishing part it has held that so far as the decision of the Division Bench in Ram Autar (supra) is concerned it was no doubt held therein that the application sent by registered post if received after expiry of the last date, it will be liable to be rejected. But the relevant portion of the advertisement as quoted by the Division Bench in its judgment do not expressly or by necessary implication establish an agreement inviting the applications through post office and as such the Division Bench decision on facts is not applicable. As we have understood from the prescriptions in both the judgments that when in the earlier case no mode of making application was prescribed, in the later case only one mode of making application by parcel/speed post was prescribed. Therefore, according to us both the Division Bench judgments are justified on their own stand. Neither of the cases prescribed having two modes when one mode is availed and other mode is not availed, Commission can be held liable or not. Having so, matter should have been sent to the Larger Bench.
6. It is to be remembered that we can deal with the cause against the Commission but not against the Postal authorities, unless of course, it is proved beyond doubt that such authorities are the exclusively agent of their principal i.e. Commission. It can only be done when addressee i.e. Commission expressly or impliedly made such arrangement. Here both the avenues i.e. principal to principal and principal to agent are open. The question is that whether right of making application is otherwise preserved/protected by the Commission or not. If it is protected otherwise and if not availed, the Commission can not be held responsible.
7. As per the ratio of (Union Of India v. Mohd. Nazim.) a post office accepts responsibility of the sender when it accepts postal articles to send to the addressee. It is a public service. It can neither be treated as agent like common carrier nor it enter upon any contract by the acceptance of postal article either with the sender or addressee. However, in a recent judgment dated 19th September, 2005 in Appeal (Civil) No. 1619 of 2005 (Unit Trust of India v. Ravinder Kumar Shukla, etc. etc.) the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any contract or request from the payee, mere posting would not amount to payment. In cases where there is no contract or request, either expressly or impliedly, the post office would continue to act as an agent of the drawer. In that case the loss is of the drawer. If two situations are seen side by side, the question of responsibility will be understandable. In the instant case, request is there on the part of the addressee. Therefore, the addressee is responsible provided post office alone has been made agent for the purpose of receiving application as per the request. There the shoe pinches. When two modes are prescribed by the Commission and one mode is availed, the same is the risk and responsibility of the sender himself. Writ Court can not evaluate amount of risk and responsibility to compensate the petitioner. If the petitioner is entitled for any compensation in accordance with law from the post office, he can seek advise for the same but Commission can not be held responsible by extending time for availing the postal mode only. It has argued that if someone is stationed in a far away place and is not able to come to file such application personally, second mode can not help such candidate. We can understand the agony but in such case we can not compel the Commission for accepting application because post office is agent only in respect of the service through it. Moreover, according to us, question is not the distance, but non-availability of other mode. Commission is to discharge public duty to all. It can not find out individual difficulty to meet the same. Otherwise it will become never ending process. Two very important Supreme Court judgments have been referred herein. First one is reported in AIR 1966 SC 1466 (V 56 C 288) (The Indore Malwa United Mills Ltd. v. The Comissioner of Income-tax (Central) Bombay). This is in respect of Income Tax Act but even therein the Supreme Court categorically held as follows:
"If by an agreement, express or implied, by the creditor, the debtor is authorised to pay the debt by a cheque and to send the cheque to the creditor by post, the post office is the agent of the creditor to receive the cheque and the creditor receives payment as soon as the cheque is posted to him. "(Emphasis supplied)
8. Therefore, the mode of sending the cheque was only by post.
9. In (Vol.41, C.N.104) (Commr. of Income tax, Bombay South, Bombay v. Messrs Ogale Glass Works Ltd., Ogale Wadi) the Supreme Court held again in a case of Income Tax Act and Contract Act about sending cheques by post, as under:
"There can be no doubt that as between the sender and the addressee it is the request of the addressee that the cheque be sent by post that makes the post office the agent of the addressee. After such request the addressee cannot be heard to say that the post office was not his agent and, therefore, the loss of the cheque in transit must fall on the sender on the specious plea that the sender having the very limited right to reclaim the cheque under the Post Office Act, 1898, the Post Office was his agent, when in fact there was no such reclamation."(Emphasis Supplied)
10. Again in this case we find that a request was made by the addressee to the sender to send the cheque by post and for the same he could not avoid the responsibility. Sometimes in the cases between landlord and tenant we find notice is required to be served by post in accordance with law and if not served following such prescription, such notice can not be construed as a valid notice.
11. Therefore, what we get from the above analysis? We get the answer that either in the law or in the contract or in the advertisement or in the necessary document if mode is prescribed, such mode will be the guiding principle in determining the issue as regards service. If the mode is one, one has no other alternative but to follow the same. If the mode is more than one then the alternative mode can be exercised. If one chooses to apply adopting one mode and failed to exercise other mode, the responsibility lies with the sender not with the addressee because the post office is the agent only in respect of one mode. In the instant case, fault might have been committed by the post office be it agent of either of the parties or be it a public service mechanism. But so far as the Commission is concerned, it is not at fault whenever more than one mode is prescribed in the advertisement. Frankly speaking we are very much sympathetic to the candidate, who lost the opportunity of making application, but we are sorry to say that we can not render any equitable justice in favour of the petitioner against the Commission in such circumstances.
12. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed.
13. However, no order is passed as to costs.
14. However, this petitioner is not prevented from taking action against the postal authority in connection with wrongful discharge of public duty, if so advised.
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