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Mohd. Arif v. M/S Mirza Glass Works And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion addresses a preliminary objection raised by the respondents' counsel that the special appeal filed by the appellant is not maintainable. The appellant had filed a writ petition challenging an order passed by the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The issue arose in the context of the maintainability of a special appeal against such an order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 qualifies as a Tribunal for the purposes of appeal jurisdiction.
- Whether a special appeal lies against a judgment of a Single Judge passed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by such a Tribunal or authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Arguments
- The special appeal is not maintainable because the writ petition was filed against an order passed by the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
- Chapter-VIII, Rule 5 of the Court's Rules bars special appeals from judgments passed under Articles 226/227 in respect of orders of a Tribunal or statutory arbitrator.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellant's arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined Chapter-VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court, which bars special appeals against judgments passed by a Single Judge under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution concerning orders of a Tribunal or statutory arbitrator. The court analyzed Section 15(1) and Section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Section 15(1) empowers the State Government to appoint authorities, including presiding officers of Labour Courts or Industrial Tribunals, to hear and decide claims related to deductions or delay in payment of wages. Section 18 confers upon these authorities the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including taking evidence and enforcing attendance of witnesses.
From the combined reading of these provisions, the court concluded that the Prescribed Authority possesses the characteristics and powers of a Civil Court and thus qualifies as a Tribunal. Consequently, any order passed by this authority under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act is considered an order of a Tribunal. Therefore, as per the Court's Rules, a special appeal is barred against an order of a Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution arising from such a Tribunal's order. The preliminary objection raised by the respondents was thus upheld.
Holding and Implications
The special appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.
The direct effect of this decision is that appeals against orders passed by the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, through writ petitions under Articles 226/227, cannot be entertained as special appeals under the Court's Rules. No broader precedent beyond this procedural bar was established by the court in this opinion.
Ajoy Nath Ray, C.J and Ashok Bhushan, J.:— A preliminary objection has been raised by Counsel for the respondents that this special appeal is not maintainable in view of the fact that writ petition was filed against an order passed by Prescribed Authority against the appellant under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
2. Chapter-VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court provides that special appeal shall not lie from a judgment of learned Single Judge passed in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226/227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, or order or award of a Tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator. Chapter-VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court is extracted below:—
5. Special Appeal.—An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Suprintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its or Superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction [or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award (a) of a Tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh” Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.]”
3. The question for consideration is as to whether the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is a Tribunal. Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 provides that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint the Presiding Officer of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes or any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court to be authority to hear and decide all claims.
4. Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is extracted below:—
“15. Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of vmges and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims.—(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint [a presiding officer of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State or] any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other office with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendirary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of wages, [of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters, incidental to such claims……………………………………………………………………”]
5. Section 18 provides for powers of authorities appointed under section 15 which is extracted below:—
“18. Powers of authorities appointed under section 15.—Every authority appointed under sub-section (1) of section 15 shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents, and every such authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and of [Chapter-XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).]”
6. From a conjoint reading of section 15(1) with section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, it is clear that the authority empowered to decide claims arising out of deduction from wages is entrusted all the powers of Civil Court under, the Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes of taking evidence and for attendance and compelling the protection of documents. Thus, the said authority has trapping of Court and is a Tribunal. Any order, thus passed by authority under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is an order passed by Tribunal the special appeal being barred against an order of one Judge exercising jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution arising out of a writ petition from an order of Tribunal, the preliminary objection raised by Counsel for the respondents has substance.
7. The appeal is barred under Chapter-VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court and is dismissed as not maintainable.
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