State Of U.P v. Mahipal Singh Rana

Sunil Ambwani, J.:— We have heard Shri Mahipal Singh Rana the alleged contemnor, Advocate in defence to the reference of this Criminal Contempt Petition at length. His counsel Shri R.N Singh, Senior Advocate had earlier addressed the Court in support of preliminary objections to the interim order 28.10.2004, restraining him to enter the court premises of judgeship at Etah. Shri Vijay Shanker Misra, learned G A. and Sri Sudhir Mehrotra, learned A.G.A has made submissions on behalf of State of U.P

2. Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, the then Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah, made a reference under Section 15 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1972 (in short the Act) to this Court through District Judge, Etah on 7.6.2003 re-cording two separate incidents dated 16.4.2003 in his Court in which the contemnor Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate appeared before him and conducted himself in a manner which falls within the definition of criminal contempt as defined in Section 2 (c) of the Act. These references were forwarded by the District Judge, Etah to the Registrar General of this Court vide his letter No. 105.P.A. Ist/2003 dated June 16, 2003 and were received by S.O Admin, in the office of Registrar General of this Court on 19.6.2003 Under the standing orders of Hon'ble the then Chief Justice, to place such matters first before the Administrative Judge of the concerned judgeship, the matter was placed before the Administrative Judge, Etah on 7.7.2003 His Lordship vide order dated 18.6.2004 perused the records and directed the matter to be placed before Hon'ble Chief Justice. The Registrar General submitted report to Hon'ble Chief Justice on 7.7.2004, who passed an order on 11-7-2004 as follows:—

“Refer to the Bench having contempt determination”

3. The matter came up before the Division Bench presided over by Hon'ble the then Acting Chief Justice and that on 28.10.2004, while issuing notices.to the contemnor to show cause as to why he should not be punished for Contempt of Court in connection with the incidents in the Court of Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah dated 16.6.2003 and on 13.5.2003, an interim order was passed restraining the contemnor from entering the District Court compound of Etah. The interim order dated 28.10.2004 is quoted as below:—

“Issue notice to contemnor Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate, Etah to show cause as to why he should not be punished for Contempt of Court in connection with the incidents in the court of Sri Onkar Singh Yadav, Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah dated 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003

In connection with the aforesaid incidents, Sri Onkar Sing Yadav, Civil Judge (Senior Division) had written a letter to the District Judge, Etah which reads as follows,

(Matter in vernacular omitted………Ed.)

Sri Onkar Singh Yadav, Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah wrote another letter on the same day i.3 7.6.2003 to the Registrar General of this Court which reads as follows;

(Matter in vernacular omitted……Ed.)

A perusal of the letter addressed to the Registrar General shows that there are four cases under Section 302 IPC, five cases under Section 307 IPC and other cases under other provisions of IPC, pending against the contem-nor.

On the basis of aforesaid letters, the Administrative Judge, Etah was of the view that criminal contempt proceedings be initiated against the contemnor Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate.

The question about limitation has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Pallav Seth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549

((2001) 7 SCC 549 : AIR 2001 SC 2763).

We are prima facie of the view that the contemnor Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate, Etah has committed gross contempt of court and hence we are issuing notice against him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court.

We further direct that until further orders of this Court, the contemnor Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate will not be allowed to enter in the District Court compound of Etah. A similar direction was issued by this Court in Criminal Contempt No. 33 of 1999 between

State of U.P v. Sri Shashi Kumar Tyagi.

decided on 11.10.2004

Let a copy of this order be given to learned counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges by tomorrow. A copy of the order will also be sent by the Registrar General of this court to the District Judge, Etah, all District Judges in Uttar Pradesh ans also to the U.P Bar Council and Chief Secretary, U.P The learned standing counsel will communicate this order forthwith to the District Judge, District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police, Etah for strict compliance, of this order. If the contemnor flouts this order it will be immediately reported to this Court.”

4. On an application to recall/modify the order dated 28.10.2004, the matter was nominated to this bench and that on 3.2.2005, we passed an order permitting the contemnor to appear in the courts where he is a plaintiff or defendant or an accused or a witness in any case pending in District Judgeship Etah and the restrained order passed earlier was modified to that extent. The District Judge, Etah was required to sent the records of Suit No. 298/2001, Jag Mohan v. Suman, Suit No. 515/2002 Smt. Sangeeta Sharma v. Manoj Sharma, Suit No. 114/2003 Yadhuveer Singh Chauhan v. U.P Power Corporation and Suit No. 48 of 2003 Roshan Lal v. Naubat Ram. Shri. R.N Singh, Senior Counsel ad dressed the Court on preliminary issues of re straining an advocate from practising in the Court on the basis of judgement of Supreme Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 : AIR 1998 SC 1895 in which the earlier judgement in: Revindra Chandra Misra, JT 1995 (2) SC 587 : 1995 AIR SCW 3488 was reviewed. He also placed reliance upon judgement in Advocate General of Madras v. Ammanullakhan, Advocate, AIR 1967 Mah. 162 where in it was observed while parting with the case, that every lawyer practising in a court is an officer of the Court and may be to certain extent, subject to su pervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. In a matter arising out of a reference of a criminal contempt against 13 advocates in the respect of instance in the Judgeship at Allahabad dated 22.9.2004, similar arguments were raised before a Larger Bench of Five Judges, and thus we found it desirable to reserve our orders on the issue. The matter was thereaf ter listed on 31.3.2005, 28.4.2005, 30.9.2005, and on 21.10.2005, the contemnor made a request to be heard in person. We heard him for two full hours and reserved the judgement.

5. Before proceeding to consider the sub mission, we may refer to the list of criminal cases which were initiated against the con temnor and have referred to in the reference made by Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah dated 7.6.2003:

A. Caes filed against alleged contemnor in kotwali District Etah

1. Criminal case N. 557/1992 under Section 323, 325, 506, IPC

2. Crime No. 530/97 under Section 147, 323, 594, 427, IPC

3. Crime No. 587/98 under Section 147/148/149/307/504/506 IPC

4. Crime No. 87/96 under Section 323/504/5061 PC

5. Crime No. 604/1998 under Section 3 of U.P Goondas Act

6. Crime No. 705/1999 under Section 147/504/506 IPC and 3 (1) 10 SC/ST Act and 3 (1) 10 SC/ST Act.

B. Cases filed against alleged contemnor at P.S Jalesar, district Etah

1. Crime No. 202/2000 under Section 147/148/149/307 IPC.

2. Crime No. 149/2000 under Section 147/148/149/307 IPC.

3. Crime No. 67/77 under Section 147/148/149/302 IPC.

4. Crime No. 149/76 under Section 147/148/149/307/323 IPC.

5. Crime No. 226/1974 under Section 302/201 IPC.

6. Crime No. 48/1973 under Section 147/148/149/323 IPC

7. Crime No. 207/67 under Section 147/148/323/307 IPC.

6. Reference is also made to the orders passed by this Court in criminal contempt matters against the petitioner in which he was held guilty of contumacious conduct, but the notices were discharged without holding any trial, on his tendering unconditional apology. The order passed in Criminal Contempt No. 21 of 1998 dated 3.8.1999 is quoted as below;

“This criminal contempt proceeding was initiated against Sri MRS. Rana, Advocate in respect of an incident that had taken place on 15.12.1997 in the Court of Smt. Sadhana Chaudhary, Special Judge (E.C Act) Etah where it appears that the alleged contemnor along with his junior came at about 2.30 p.m in the court and in a very rude manner uttered the following words;

“Kya Baat Hai, Kya Pareshani Hai Apko. Na to Bahas Karoonga, Na Darkhwasta Doonga. Apka Thora Samaya Katne Hain. Baat Dabi Dhaki Rehey to Theek Hai. Yehan Par Dadagiri Nahin Chalegi.

BEYEEMANI KARTI HAI WA DADAGIRI KARTI HAI.”

The complaint was lodged by the officer concerned before District Judge, Etah and also a report was submitted to this Court by the officer concerned dated 17.1.1998

A preliminary objection has been taken by learned counsel for alleged contemner that since the alleged contempt had taken place on 15th day of December, 1997 and this Court has taken cognizance by issuing notice on March 16, 1999, the contempt was barred in view of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. However a counter affidavit has been filed by the alleged contemnor in court today and in paragraph thereof, it is stated that the alleged contemner has tendered unconditional apology to this Hon'ble Court and in para 13 thereof the contemner has further stated that he undertakes that in future he shall be more careful, guarded in his language and shall always respect the majesty and dignity of the Court. Subsequently a supplementary affidavit has also been filed by the contemnor. In para 2 of the same, he undertakes not to do any such act in future which undermines the dignity of the Court.

Though the alleged act of the alleged contemnor is contumacious which cannot be denied in any way, but in view of the facts stated above and undertaking given by the alleged contemnor, we do not propose to continue with the proceeding, any further. The alleged undertaking is accepted and the contempt proceeding is dropped. Let counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit filed be by the contemnor be kept on record.

The notice is accordingly discharged.

Sd/- N.K Mitra, C.J

Sd/- S.R Singh, J.

3.8.1999

7. The order passed in Criminal Contempt No. 6 of 1998 dated 11.11.2003 is quoted as below;

The contemnor is present in the Court.

The contemnor submits that he shall tender unconditional apology and shall file on affidavit before the District Judge, Etah as well as before this Court. Such affidavit shall be affirmed in this Court in course of the day and before District Judge, Etah, within two weeks. In the event of not filing such affidavits, the contempt proceeding shall continue and if such affidavits are filed the contempt notice shall stand discharged and need not be proceeded any further.”

Sd/- S.K Sen, C.J

Sd/- Ashok Bhusham, J.

11.11.2002

8. The contemnor has also placed on record the proceedings of the Bar Council of LLP. Allahabad vide resolution No. 2427/2005 between Shri Jai Ram Verma v. Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate, Etah in which the complaint against him was summarily rejected. The resolution is quoted as follows

“Resolution No. 2427/2005.

Read the complaint of Sri Jairam Verma against Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate, Etah.

The Bar Council of U.P has perused the contents of the complaint and has reason to believe that the Advocate concerned is not prima facie guilty of professional misconduct/other misconduct, accordingly it is resolved that the complaint is therefore summarily rejected.”

Chairman, Bar Council of U.P

Allahabad”

9. Shri Mahipal Singh Rana clearly states that he fully understands the allegations against him and that it would not serve any purpose if charges are framed against him. He submits that he has nothing further to say in his defence and that the Court may pass any orders’, which the Court may deem fit.

10. Before we proceed to consider the submissions made by Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, the contemnor on limitation and on merit, it would be appropriate to dispose of the objections regarding the interim order passed by us on 28.10.2004, restraining him from entering the court premises of the Judgeship at Etah except in those cases he was appearing as plaintiff/defendant/complainant/witness/.

11. Shri R.N Singh, Senior Advocate, submitted, that there is no provision either under the Contempt of Court Acts, 1971 or under the Rules framed by Allahabad High Court to pass any interim orders before the trial takes place. He submits that where Acts or Rules provide a procedure to be followed, it is to be done in the manner provided and that all other mode of performance of the duties is necessarily forbidden. For this proposition, he has relied upon the judgement of Supreme Court in Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, AIR 1974 SC 915.

12. He submits that the question whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to prevent an Advocate from practising and carrying on his legal profession, has been settled in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (supra). Further the Supreme Court in Dr. L.P Misra v. State of U.P, (1998) 7 SCC 379 : (1998 All LJ 2547), has held that procedure contemplated for punishing an action for contempt, must be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law i.e under Chapter XXXV-E of the Allahabad High Court Rules 1952.

13. Sri R.N Singh submitted that where an Advocate behaves in a manner which is unbecoming of him, he can be proceeded against under Advocates Act, 1961 for professional misconduct. But for this purpose to find out guilt of professional misconduct summary procedure of contempt cannot be used. The Court should not lay down law only because the acts are very bad. Bad facts make bad laws, and hence the same should be avoided. He submits that the law laid down in Supreme Court Bar Association's case (supra) should not be sidelined as law of precedent prohibits such course of action (vide Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Limited., (1985) 1 SCC 260 : AIR 1985 SC 330: Union of India v. Raghuvir Singh (dead) by LRs., AIR 1989 SC 1993; Sundarias Kanyalal Bhathija v. the Collector, Thane, (1989) 3 SCC 396 : AIR 1990 SC 261; Produce Brokerss Co. Ltd. v. Qlympis Oils & Cake Co. Ltd., (1916) AC 314: Velazquez Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioner, (1914) 3 KB 458; and Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P, (1980) 3 SCC 719 : AIR 1980 SC 1762).

14. It is further submitted that in the instant case interim order preventing the alleged contemnor entering the Court premises have been made without verifying the facts from the alleged contemnor and that too after a lapse of one and half years when the Presiding Officer, who had made report against the alleged contemnor was transferred from that place.

15. Shri Vijai Misra, learned A.GA contended that this criminal contempt matter has been initiated under Section 15 of the Act, after the allegations have been perused by Hon'ble the Chief Justice under Rule-4 of Chapter-XXX V-E of the Rules framed by this Court under Section 4(e) of the Contempt of Court Acts, 1971. The Court in exercise of its powers to punish for contempt, if the allegations are so serious, and the alleged contem-nor becomes a threat to the free flow of justice, can pass restraint order for peaceful functioning of the Court. In the present case, the alleged contemnor is facing several criminal charges has committed several acts of contempt. In two such matter, the Division Benches had earlier accepted his apology. He, however, did not cease his nefarious activities and has again committed serious acts of contempt at his free will, abusing and threatening the Judges and thereby scandalising the administration of justice at Etah.

16. In Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, (1988) 3 SCC 370 : AIR 1988 SC 1395 (vide para 14) the Supreme Court observed:

“Under the Constitution, the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary. While exercising that control it is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers. An honest strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side, nojudicial officer would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for Rule of law. If judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling matters and if High Court encourages anonymous complaints to hold the filed the subordinate judiciary will not be able to administer justice in an independent and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that the High court should also take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.”

17. The powers of the High Court of su perintendence and control over the subordi nate judiciary under Article 235 of the Con stitution include within its ambit the duty to protect members of the subordinate judiciary.

In Pravin C. Shah v. K.A Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650 : (AIR 2001 SC 3041) it was observed (vide paras 16 to 18):

16 ……………“The right of the advocate to practise envelopes a lot of acts to be performed by him in discharge of his professional duties. Apart from appearing in the Courts he can be consulted by his clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought for, he can draft instruments, pleadings, affidavits or any other documents, he can participate in any conference involving legal discussions etc. Rule 11 has nothing to do with all the Acts done by an advocate during his practice except his performance inside the Court. Conduct in Court is a matter concerning the Court and hence the Bar Council cannot claim that what should happen inside the Court could also be regulated by the Bar Council in exercise of its disciplinary powers. The right to practise, no doubt, is the genus of which the right to appear and conduct cases in the Court may be a specie. But the right to appear and conduct cases in the Courts is a matter on which the Court must have the major supervisory power. Hence the Court cannot be divested of the control or supervision of the court merely because it may involve the right of an advocate.

17. When the Rules stipulate that a person who committed contempt of Court cannot have the unreserved right to continue to appear and plead and conduct cases in the courts without any qualm or remorse, the Bar Council cannot overrule such a regulation concerning the orderly conduct of Court proceedings. Courts of law are structured in such design as to evoke respect and reverence to the majesty of law and justice. The machinery for dispensation of justice according to law is operated by the Court. Proceedings inside the Courts are always expected to be held in a dignified and orderly manner. The very sight of an advocate, who was found guilty of contempt of Court on the previous hour, standing in the Court and arguing a case or cross-examining a witness on the same city, unaffected by the contemptuous behaviour he hurled at the Court, would erode the dignity of the Court and even corrode the majesty of it besides impairing the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the institution of the Courts. This necessitates vesting of power with the High Court to formulate rules for regulating the proceedings inside the Court including the conduct of advocates during such proceedings. That power should not be confused with the right to practise law. While the Bar Council can exercise control over the latter, the High Court should be in control ofthe former.

18. In the above context it is useful to quote the following observations made by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Prayag Das v. Civil Judge, Bulandshahr, AIR 1974 All 133 (para 9)

“The High Court has a power to regulate the appearance of advocates in Court. The right to practise and the right to appear in Court are not synonymous. An advocate may carry on chamber practice or even practise in courts in various other ways, e.g Drafting and filing of pleadings and Vakalatnama for performing those acts. For that purpose his physical appearance in Courts may not at all be necessary. For the purpose of regulating his appearance in Courts the High Court should be the appropriate authority to make rules and on a proper construction of Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act it must be inferred that the High Court has the power to make rules for regulating the appearance of Advocates and proceedings inside the Courts. Obviously the High Court is the only authority to be entrusted with this responsibility.

19. In our view, the legal position has been correctly delineated in the above statements made by the Allahabad High Court. The context for making those statements was that an advocate questioned the powers ofthe High Court in making dress regulations for the advocates while appearing in courts.

20. Lord Denning had observed as follows in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson: (all ER p. 575 B-C)

“………… I am ofthe opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order ofthe court is not of itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good reason is shown why it should not be removed.”

In Yoginath D. Badge v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 7 SCC 739 : (AIR 1999 SC 3734) the Supreme Court in para-49 observed as follows;

“49. Under Article 235 ofthe Constitution, the High Court has a duty to protect the officers ofthe subordinate judiciary from unscrupulous litigant and lawyers. In Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana it was, inter alia, observed that the High court while exercising its power of control overthe subordinate judiciary is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers. It was further observed that an honest and strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries in the moffussil courts: if trifling complains relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side are entertained, no judicial officer would feel protected; and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties honestly and independently. It is therefore, imperative for the High Court to protect its honest judicial officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.”

Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45 : (AIR 2003 SC 739), the Supreme Court in para 34 observed as follows:

“On the contrary, it will be their duty to see that such a rule is strictly abided by. Courts of law are structured in such a design as to evoke respect and reference to the majesty of law and justice. The machinery for dispensation of justice according to law is operated by the Court. Proceedings inside the courts are always expected to be held in a dignified and orderly manner. The very sight of an advocate, who is guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or unprofessional conduct, standing in the court would erode the dignity of the court and even corrode its majesty besides impairing the confidence ofthe public in the efficacy of the institution of the courts. The power to frame such rules should not be confused with the right to practise law. While the Bar Council can exercise control over the latter, the courts are in control of the former. This distinction is clearly brought about by the difference in language in Section 49 of the Advocates Act on the one hand and Article 145 of the Constitution of India and Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act on the other. Section 49 merely empowers the Bar Council to frame rules laying down conditions subject to which an advocate shall have a right to practise i.e Do all the other acts set out above. However, Article 145 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to make rules for regulating this practice and procedure of the court including inter alia rules as to persons practising before this Court. Similarly Section 34 of the Advocates Act empowers High Court to frame rules, inter alia to lay down conditions on which an advocate shall be permitted to practise in courts. Article 145 of the Constitution of India and Section 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute right to an advocate to appear in a Court. An advocate appears in a court subject to such conditions as are laid down by the court. It must be remembered that Section 30 has not been brought into force and this also shows that there is no absolute right to appear in a court. Even if Section 30 were to be brought into force control of proceedings in court will always remain with the court.. Thus even then the right to appear in court will be subject to complying with conditions laid down by courts just as practice outside courts would be subject to conditions laid down by the Bar Council of India. There is thus no conflict or clash between other provisions of the Advocates Act on the one hand and Section 34 or Article 145 of the Constitution of India on the other.”

18. In Supreme Court Bar Association (supra), the Supreme Court, held that the powers of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of court though quite wide are not unlimited and cannot be expanded to include the power to determine whether an advocate is also guilty of professional misconduct, in a summary manner, giving a go bye to the procedure prescribed under the Advocates Act.

19. The Supreme Court, however, in para, 54, 78 and 79 carved out an exception as follows:

“54……In a given case, an advocate found guilty of committing contempt of Court may also be guilty of committing “professional misconduct”, depending upon the gravity or nature of his contumacious conduct, but the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct and exercisable by different forums by following separate and distinct procedures. The power to punish an Advocate, by suspending his licence or by removal of his name from the roll of the State Bar Council, for proven professional misconduct, vests exclusively in the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961, whi le the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of Court vests exclusively in the Courts.

78. In a given case it may be possible, for this court or the High Court, to prevent the contemner Advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practice as an Advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record, this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-on-Record because that privilege is conferred by this court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practice as an Advocate in other Courts or Tribunals.

79-80. We are conscious of the fact that the conduct of the contemner in V.C Misra's case (1995 AIR SCW 3488) was highly contumacious and even atrocious. It was unpardonable. The contemner therein had abused his professional privileges while practising as an Advocate. He was holding a very senior position in the Bar Council of India and was expected to act in a more reasonable way. He did not. These factors appear to have influenced the Bench in that case to itself punish him by suspending his licence to practise also while imposing a suspended sentence of imprisonment for committing contempt of Court but while doing so this court vested itself with a jurisdiction where none exists.The position would have been different had a reference been made to the Bar Council and the Bar Council did not take any action against the concerned Advocate. In that event, as already observed, this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, might have exercised sue moto power and sent for the proceedings from the Bar Council and passed appropriate orders for punishing the contemner Advocate for professional misconduct after putting him on notice as required by the proviso to Section 38 which reads thus:—

Provided that no order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India shall be varied by the supreme court so as to prejudicially affect the person aggrieved without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

20. We are reminded of the observations of the Advocate General of Madras (supra).(para-8) as follows;

“8. Finally, before taking leave of the case, we desire to add this brief observation that Courts must see to it that confidence in their objectivity is secured and maintained, because it is essential that justice should not merely be done, but should appear to be done, and that, as a matter to be equally stressed by us, legal practitioners are not merely agents of parties pleading a particular case, but are officers of Court, expected to assist in the administration of justice, and to sustain unimpaired dignity of Courts, by all means in their power.”

21. Extraordinary situations demand ex traordinary remedies. The subordinate courts in Uttar Pradesh are witnessing disturbing period. In most of the subordinate courts, the Advocates or their groups and Bar Associa tions have been virtually taken over the ad ministration of justice to ransom. These Ad vocates even threaten and intimidate the Judges to obtain favourable orders. The Judicial Officers often belonging to different districts are not able to resist the pressure and fal 1 prey to these Advocates. This disturbs the equilibrium between Bar and the Bench giving undue advantage and premium to the Bar. In these extraordinary situations the High Court can not abdicate its constitutional duties to protect the judicial officers.

22. While dealing with an unprecedented case, the Court has to innovate the law and may also pass unconventional order keeping in mind that extraordinary situation requires extraordinary remedies. In B.P Achala Anand v. S. Appi Reddv, (2005) 3 SCC 313 : (AIR 2005 SC 986) the Supreme Court observed as follows;

“Unusual fact situation posing issues for resolution is an opportunity for innovation. Law as administered by Courts, transforms into justice.”

Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in R. Ravindra Kumar Goel v. State of U.P, (2004) 2 ALR 807: and U.P Nursing Home Association v. Raiesh Kumar Srivastava, 2004 (55) ALR 815.

23. The procedure contemplated in taking cognizance and for issuing an action for con tempt must be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, i.e the Con tempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Rules framed by the Court in Chapter XXXV-E of the Allahabad High Court Rules 1952. The Court, however, did not take any action, of punishing the alleged contemnor, when we took cognizance of the matter. We only tried to protect its officers and free flow of the ad ministration of justice in the judgeship at Etah. The criminal history of the contemnor, the ac ceptance of facts in which his actions were found contumacious and he was discharged on submitting apologies on two previous oc casions, and the allegations against him in which he was found to continue with intimi dating the judicial officers compelled us to issue interim orders restraining entry of the contemnor in the judgeship at Etah. The Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh, is fully aware of his activities but has chosen not to take any action in the matter. In fact the Bar Council hardly takes cognizance of such matters at all. The Court did not interfere with the statutory powers of the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to take appropriate proceedings against the contemnor with regard to his right of practice, and did not take away right of practice vested in him by virtue of his registration with the Bar Council. He was not debarred from practice but was only restrained to appear in the judgeship at Etah in the cases he was engaged as an Advocate. The repeated contumacious conduct, without any respect to the Court committed by him repeatedly by intimidating and brow beating the judicial officers, called for maintaining discipline, protecting the judicial officers and for maintaining peace in the premises of judgeship at Etah.

24. Should the High Court allow such ad vocate to continue to terrorise, brow beat and bully the judicial officers ? It is submitted that he has a large practice. We are not concerned here whether the contemnor or such advocates are acquiring large practice by intimidating judicial officers. These are questions to be raised before the Bar Council. We, however, must perform our constitutional duty to pro tect our judicial officers. This is one such case illustrated in para 78, of the Supreme Court Bar Association's case (supra), in which the occasion had arisen to prevent the contem nor to appear before courts at Etah. The with drawal of such privilege did not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to prac tice as an advocate in other courts or tribu nal, drafting the petitions and advising his clients. It only prevented him from intimidat ing the judicial officers and from vitiating the atmosphere conducive for administration of justice in the judgeship at Etah.

25. Shri Rana submits that he was not heard before the restraint order was made upon him. The Court should have considered the provi sions of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1973 and Section 228 IPC. The District Judge should have sent noticed to him before sending complaint/reference to this Court, as the complaint moved by him against the of ficer was pending before the District Judge on which he had called comments from the Presiding Officer. He has alleged malafides against Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, the then Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah and submits that the brother in law of Mr. Onkar Singh Yadav namely Amar Singh and other persons of his family were tried in a double murder case under Section 302 IPC, and in that case he was engaged as a special counsel by the State Government to prosecute. Shri Amar Singh was acquitted and that with the assistance of the applicant, a criminal revision against aquittal was filed by the complainant. A Government Appeal was also filed and both have been admitted and are pending in the High Court. After acquittal of his brother-in-law and during the pendency of the appeal, Shri Onkar Singh Yadav approached the applicant for not doing pairavi to favour his brother-in-law, and since the applicants refused to do so, Shri Onkar Singh Yadav took personal grudge and enmity with him. The father of Sri Onkar Singh Yadav is practising advocate at District Mainpuri. Shri Onkar Singh Yadav started harassing the applicant and his juniors on one pretext or other. Several complaints were made against Shri Onkar Singh Yadav by the advocates and also from the Bar Association in which enquiries are going on and in some of them enquiry reports have also been filed with the Administrative Judge in which the applicant has taken vital part. Shri Yadav became very much annoyed with the applicant and made false allegations against him. In para 27 of his affidavit the contemnor has referred to the complaints made by Bar Associations of Budaun, Fironabad, Etah and Allahabad against Shri Onkar Singh Yadav with regard to his misbehaviour with advocates and also of receiving illegal gratifications. These facts according to Shri Rana were withheld by Sri Onkar Singh Yadav from this Court. The friends and relatives of Shri Onkar Singh Yadav practising at district Etah where he had completed his school education were taking advantage from him. In para 32 of his affidavit Sri Rana submits that no criminal case is pending against him under Section 302/307 IPC and he is big landlord/old Zamindar of District Etah. There are number of Civil and Ceiling cases pending against him in which he is protecting his properties from outsider/trespassers.

26. Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, the alleged contemnor has not tendered apology in any of his affidavits, of the conduct which has given rise to this reference. During the course of hearing, he was repeatedly asked by the Court whether he has any remorse and is prepared to apologise. Shri Rana clearly stated that he is not prepared to give any apology and rather explained that on the previous two occasions his apologies were taken under mistaken legal advise given to him by his counsel, who had assured him of quick disposal of the contempt cases against him.

27. In the counter affidavit filed on 19.1.2005 Shri Rana who had not denied the incidents in his earlier affidavit dated 29.11.2004, has denied the incidents dated 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003 in the Court of Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah and has tried to explain his conduct. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of his supplementary affidavit are quoted as below;

“2. That, in the complaint filed by Mr. O.S Yadav, Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah, he has alleged that when he was hearing Original Suit No. 114 of 2003 on 16.4.2003, the answering respondent came in the Court room and abused and caused interference in the hearing of the case and said that how the order has been passed against his client in the case of Kanchan Singh v. Ratan Singh. It is submitted before this Hon'ble Court that this allegation of the complainant is absolutely false, baseless and concocted one. In fact no such incident has taken place on 16.4.2003 in the Court of complainant. The answering respondent had never gone in the Court of the complainant on 16.4.2003 as alleged in the complaint/letter of the complainant.

3. That it is also relevant to submit before this Hon'ble Court that the reference of O.S No. 114 of 2003, Yaduvir Singh Chauhan v. U.P Power Corporation, has been given on account of the fact that the answering respondent has opposed and was witness in the case of State v. Yaduvir Singh Chauhan, and the answering respondent has supported the case of the State/prosecution against Yaduvir Singh Chauhan. In the above case, Yaduvir Singh Chauhan has assaulted the Assistant Prosecuting Officer, namely Mr. Yatindra Singh Rana in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah and the answering respondent has seen the occurrence and, as such is witness from the side of the prosecution. The complainant and Mr. Yaduvir Singh Chauhan (Advocate) are in collusion with each other and consequently, the.present complaint has been prepared and sent before this Hon'ble court and also the order sheet has been prepared as such in the aforesaid O.S No. 114 of 2003. The aforesaid suit was going on ex parte and, as such, the order sheets have been changed and written according to the complainant. It is also submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the learned Advocate engaged on behalf of Mr. Yaduvir Singh Chauhan, namely, Sri Shiv Shanker Agrawal has also denied about the incident, which has been alleged by the complainant.

4. That it is also submitted before this Hon'ble Court that in the complaint it has been alleged that on 13.5.2003, when the complainant was hearing the O.S No. 48 of 2003, Roshan Lal v. Naubat Ram, the answering respondent appeared and told in a loud manner that his O.S No. 298 of 2001, Jagmohan v. Smt. Suman, has not been called upon in that manner, whereas, in fact, in the aforesaid O.S No. 298 of 2001, the date was already fixed for 23.5.2003 and, as such, in these circumstances, there was no occasion to appear in the court of the complainant and to resist the hearing of the case by the answering respondent, as alleged in the complaint. All these facts clearly show the false allegation of the complainant against the answering respondent. The answering respondents has never appeared on 13.5.2003 in the Court of the complainant/Mr. O.S Yadav. In fact, on 13.5.2003 the answering respondent has not gone to the Court because just one day before on 12.5.2003 there was function of “Grih Pravesh” at his house.

5. That it has also wrongly stated in the complaint that the answering respondent has thrown out the papers upon the learned Advocate of Smt. Suman, whereas, the answering respondent has never gone on the said date in the court room of the complainant and neither the date was fixed in O.S No. 298 of 2001 nor he appeared in the Court and, as such there was no occassion to give papers by the learned Counsel of Smt. Suman to the answering respondent. Moreover, in the aforesaid O.S No. 298 of 2001, the date was fixed 23.5.2003 Thereafter, again the date was fixed and later on it has been decided ex parte finally. The allegation as alleged in the complaint are absolutely false and baseless.

6. That it has been falsely stated by the complainant that in order to know about the contempt proceedings against the answering respondent the delay has been occurred whereas in fact all the incidents as alleged in the complaint are absolutely false and after thought only in order to harass the answering respondent because he has already made com plaint before the learned District Judge about his conduct and the learned District judge has also issued notices to the complainant. The detail reference about the representation/com plaint of answering respondent against the complainant/Mr. O.S Yadav has been given in the original affidavit filed along with the stay vacation application.

7. That the complainant has not made com plaint immediately after the so called incident dated 16.4.2003, which clearly proves the ul terior motive and after throught of the com plainant/Mr. O.S Yadav. The complainant has become very much prejudicial on account of the notices served upon him from the learned District Judge on the representation/complaint made by the answering respondent against him. Apart from the complaint of answering respondent several other Advocates have also made complaints against the complainant/Mr. O.S Yadav which has already been given in detail in the earlier affidavit.”

28. Shri Sudhir Mehrotra, learned A.GA appearing on behalf of State has relied upon judgements in State of M.P v. Virendra Singh Parihar, 1999 Cri L.J 2438. Pravae Das (supra). Dr. Sudhash Chandra Pratihar v. Mrs. Leena Chaktrabarti, 1995 Cri. L.J 707. A. Myles Swamy v. State of Kerela, 1995 Cri. L.J 3830 (Full Benchl; Purshottam Das Goel v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.S Dillon, (1997) 4 SCC 266 : AIR 1997 SC 1014, and Pallav Seth (supra) in support of his submission that the beginning of the action prescribed for taking cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the process for action for contempt and subsequent actions taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following or succeeding to such initiation. The contempt actions fall in two categories namely those initiated suo moto by the court and these instituted other wise then on the courts own motion. In suo moto proceeding it is the court itself must initiate proceedings by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can be made by a party filing an application. The proper constructions of Section 20 may not be that the action must be initiated either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notices sue moto within the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act reads as follows;

“20 Limitation for actions for Contempt: No court shall initiate any proceeding for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”

29. After considering the entire case law and over ruling Om Prakash Jaiswal v. K.K Mittal, (2000) 3 SCC 171 : AIR 2000 SC 1136 : 2000 All LJ 720 the Supreme Court held in Pallav Seth's case (supra) as follows;

“40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for taking cognizance of criminal under Section 15 would be initiat ing the proceeding for contempt and the sub sequent action taken thereon of refusal or is suance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following or succeeding such initiation. Similarly in the case of a civil con tempt filing by an application drawing the at tention of the court is necessary for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1973.

41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the court, a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of the contempt having been committed and the same having, been brought to the notice of the court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided”

30. The Supreme Court held that section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid anomaly and hardships both as regards the litigant as also by pacing a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its contempt. In Pal lav Seth the custodian received information of the appellant having committed contempt of taking over benami concerns, transferring.funds to these concerns and operating their accounts, from a letter dated 5.5.1998, received from the Income Tax Au thorities. Soon thereafter on 18.6.1998 a pe tition was filed for initiating action in con tempt and notice were issued by the Court on 9.4.1999 The Supreme Court found that on becoming aware of the forged applications the contempt proceedings were filed on 18.6.1998 well withinthe period of limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Act. The action taken by the special court by its order dated 9.4.1999 directing the applications to be treated as show cause notice, was thus valid and that the contempt action was not barred by Section 20 of the Act.

31. In the present case the alleged contempt was committed in the court of Shri Onkar Singh Yaday, Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah on.16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003 The officer i initiated the proceedings by making reference to the High Court through the District Judge vide his letters dated 7.6.2003, separately in respect of the incidents. These letters were received by the Court with the forwarding letter of the District Judge dated 1.6.2003 and were placed before Administrative Judge on 7.7.2003, who returned the matter to the Registrar General with his order dated 18.6.2004 to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice and that by his order dated 11.7.2004, Hon'ble the Chief Justice referred the matter to court having contempt determination. Show cause notices were issued by the court to the con-temnor on 28.10.2004 In view of the law as explained in Pallav Seth (supra) the contempt proceedings would be taken to be initiated on 7.6.2003 by the Civil judge (Senior Division) Etah, which was well within the period of one year from the date of the incidents prescribed under 20 of the Act.

32. Shri Rana did not deny the incidents in his affidavit dated 29.1.1.2004 in support of application for vacating the stay/modification application. The affidavit was confined only to making allegations of malafides against Shri Onkar Singh Yadav and objections to taking cognizance and of procedure. The denial was brought on record in his affidavit filed on 19.1.2005 In this affidavit filed on almost three months after service of summons the contemnor stated that he had never gone to the court of complainant on 16.4.2003 and that no such incident as alleged had taken place; He further tried to explain that the hearing of Original Suit no. 298 of 2001 was not fixed on that date, it was rather fixed on 23.5.2003 and thus there was no occasion to appear in the court and to resist the hearing of the case. He further states that he never appeared on 13.5.2003 in the Court of Mr. Onkar Singh Yadav because just one day before there was a function of Grih Pravesh’ at his house and strongly relies upon the fact that the complaint was made of the incidents on 7.6.2003 after about one month.

33. In the first incident dated 14.4.2003 Shri Onkar Singh Yadav reported that contemner entered his court while the hearing of Original Suit No. 114 of 2003 was in” progress and demanded to know as to how he had passed orders against Shri Kanchan Singh, who is related to him in a suit between Kanchan Singh v. Ratan Singh and thereafter threatened him using the words which are better quoted in the complaint. The other incident dated 13.5.2003 relates to hearing Suit No. 298 of 2001 between Jag Mohan v. Smt. Suman in which the contemnor wanted the matter to be called out as soon as he entered the court, threatened the officer, threw the papers sought to be served by the counsel of the opposite side, on him and misbehaved with him. The officer has also brought to the notice of the court that several references were made against Shri Mahipal Singh in which he was discharged by tendering apologies and thereafter again started misbehaving with more aggression. He is used to offensive language in his arguments as well as in his pleadings. For example on O.S 515 of 20032 between Smt. Sangeeta Sharma v. Smt. Manoj Sharma, he has used very offensive and indecent language against a lady assassinating her character. The officer has also brought to the notice of the court that there are dozens of the cases pending against the contemnor in which he is accused. There are two cases of murder and five cases of attempt to murder and one under Goondas Act. He argues in a loud voice, uses indecent language affecting judicial work. A reference was also made to the resolution of the Bar Association dated 26.8.2002 by which Shri Mahipal Singh Rana was expelled from the bar for using indecent language against the officers and advocates.

34. The references were made within two months of the incidents. The alleged contemnor has not denied the used of loud voice and indecent language in court, and has rather stated in his arguments that officers of subordinate courts only understand such language.He has accused the entire subordinate judiciary to be corrupt. Shri Rana admitted that he has been accused in various criminal cases in which he was acquitted and was in fact a death row convict in a case in which he was later on acquitted by the High Court. At present he states that no criminal case is pending against him. He claims to have a very large practice and confidence of thousands of litigants for seeking justice through him. He furr ther tried to defend himself by proclaiming himself to be champion of justice. Instead of apologizing for intimidating the officers, using loud and indecent language in court and pleadings, he tried to retract his confession and apologies in the previous two contempt proceedings. We tried to remind him.of his duty as an advocate and his advanced age of seventy four years in which he should be more polite and command respect of the bar. Instead of appreciating his duties as an Advocate, Shri Rana, reminded the court of his superior caste which obliges him to command respect from the judiciary. He made it more than clear to the court that he is not prepared to apologise for his actions, even if the courts comes to conclusion that he had committed an act of contempt.

35. We do not find that the contemnor Shri Mahipal Singh Rana is suffering from any mental imbalance. He is fully conscious of his actions and take responsibility of the same. He suffers from an inflated ego, and has a tremendous superiority complex and claims himself to be a champion for the cause of justice, and would not spare any effort, and would go to the extent of intimidating the judges if he feels the injustice has been done to his client. We found ourselves unable to convince him that the law is above every one, and that even if he is an able lawyer belonging to superior caste, he could still abide by the dignity of court and the decency required from an advocate appearing in any court of law.

36. The due administration of law is of vastly greater importance than the success or failure of any individual, and for that reason public policy as well as good morals require that every Advocate should keep attention to his conduct. An Advocate is an officer of the Court a part of machinery employed for administration of justice, for meeting out to the litigants the exact measure of their legal rights. He is.guilty of a crime if he knowingly sinks his official duty, in what may seem to be his own or his clients temporary advantage.

37. We find that the denial of incidents and allegations of malafides against Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, the then Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah have been made only to save himself from the contumacious conduct.

38. ShrMvlahipal Singh Rana, the contem-nor has refused to tender apologies for his conduct. His affidavit in support of stay vacation/modification and supplementary affidavit do not show any remorse. He has justified himself again and again, in a loud and thundering voice.

39. We find that Shri Mahipal Rana the contemnor is guilty of criminal contempt in intimidation and threatening Shri Onkar Singh Yadav the then Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah in his court on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2006 and of using loud and indecent language both in court and in his pleadings in suit Mo. 515/2002. He was discharged from proceedings of contempt in Criminal Contempt Petition No. 21/1998 and Criminal Contempt No. 60 of 1998 on his tendering unconditionally apology on 3.8.1999 and 11.11.2002 respectively. He however did not mend himself and has rather become more aggressive and disrespectful to the court. He has virtually become nuisance and obstruction to the administration of justice at the Judgeship at Etah. We are satisfied that the repeated acts of criminal contempt committed by him are of such nature thatrthese substantially interfere with the due course of justice. We thus allow the references and punish him under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, with two months imprisonment and also impose fine of Rs. 2000/- on him. In case non-payment of fine he will undergo further a period of imprisonment of two weeks. However, the punishment so imposed shall be kept in abeyance for a period of sixty days to enable the contemner Shri Rana to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if so advised.

40. We also direct the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to take the facts constituted in the complaints of Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, the then Civil Judge (Senior Divison) Etah, the two earlier contempt referred in this judgement, and to draw proceedings against him for professional misconduct.

41. Under the Rules of this Court, the contemnor shall not be permitted to appear in courts in the Judgeship at Etah, until he purges the comtempt. The Registrar General shall draw the order and communicate it to the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and Bar Council of India within a week. The contemnor shall be taken into custody to serve the sentence immediately of the sixty days if no restrain order is passed by the appellate court.

42. Order accordingly.