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The State Of U.P. Through ... v. The State Of U P Through
Factual and Procedural Background
The petition was filed as a Public Interest Litigation seeking, inter alia, writs of mandamus restraining respondent(s) (the Bajaj Group / respondent nos. 6–8) from installing and running a sugar mill at Nekofal @ Bilai, District Bijnor; directing compliance with environmental requirements before installing mills; and enforcing an agreement said to have been executed on 15.04.2005. The petitioners claimed to represent poor villagers and alleged violations of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, non-obtainment of necessary permissions (including from the U.P. Pollution Control Board), and other environmental and statutory violations.
On the first hearing, respondents 6–8 filed a compilation of documents (permissions, No Objection Certificates under the Water and Air pollution statutes, test certificate for effluent water, and other permissions) and contended that the petition was motivated by an ulterior purpose: petitioner No.1 had been awarded a contract for constructing the drainage which was later cancelled for delay, and the petitioners relied on a forged agreement (Annex.2). Affidavits were filed by respondents and by the U.P. Pollution Control Board, producing copies of No Objection Certificates (valid up to 31.12.2005). The petitioners were directed to explain alleged suppression of material facts but did not adequately do so; counsel sought to withdraw the petition, which the Court refused citing S.P. Anand.
After examining the record and relevant jurisprudence on locus standi, PIL and abuse of process, the Court found material suppression of facts, a forged agreement, and that the petition had been filed after the mill had already started commercial production. The Court concluded the petitioners misled the Court, dismissed the petition with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/-, framed criminal contempt charges against the petitioners, directed recovery of costs via the District Collector, and listed the matter for a contempt hearing with directions on filing a reply.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioners, as public-spirited persons filing a Public Interest Litigation, had locus standi / standing to invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 against the respondents for alleged statutory and environmental violations.
- Whether the respondents were running or establishing the sugar mill without necessary statutory permissions (including NOCs from pollution control authorities) and whether the sale/land conversion complied with statutory requirements.
- Whether the alleged agreement dated 15.04.2005 (Annex.2) relied upon by the petitioners was enforceable and genuine.
- Whether the petition amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court (including filing on false averments and reliance on a forged document), thereby warranting dismissal, costs, and criminal contempt proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners, claiming to represent poor villagers, alleged that respondent nos. 6–8 purchased land in contravention of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, without requisite permissions for conversion of agricultural land.
- They sought enforcement of an agreement (Annex.2) said to have obligations by respondents to provide employment and public facilities (pipeline, free light, water), and alleged environmental non-compliance (e.g., lack of No Objection Certificate from U.P. Pollution Control Board, improper drainage causing foul smell and diseases, risk to adjacent agricultural land).
- The petitioners sought directions restraining installation and operation of the mill and mandating statutory environmental compliance prior to operation.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondents 6–8 filed a compilation of documents (permissions, NOCs under Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, effluent test certificate, permissions for drain construction) asserting that the mill was established in conformity with law and had commenced sugar production on 03.11.2005.
- They alleged petitioner No.1 had been awarded the drainage contract but failed to complete it in time; his contract was cancelled. The petitioners filed the writ petition with ulterior motive linked to that contract and produced a forged agreement (Annex.2) purportedly signed on behalf of the respondents.
- Respondents contended the petitioners suppressed material facts, filed false allegations and forged documents, and therefore the petition should be dismissed and the petitioners held accountable for abuse of process.
U.P. Pollution Control Board
- The Board filed an affidavit annexing copies of No Objection Certificates issued from time to time and stated the NOC was valid up to 31.12.2005, producing photocopies of permissions/NOCs.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Case |
|---|---|---|
| S.P. Anand v. S.D. Deve Gowda and Ors | PIL matters cannot be permitted to be withdrawn where withdrawal would permit forum abuse; courts must guard against use of PIL for ulterior purposes. | Cited to refuse the petitioners' oral prayer to withdraw the PIL; used to justify continued scrutiny of the petition despite the petitioners' counsel seeking withdrawal. |
| Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietor Ltd.) v. State of West Bengal and Ors | Requirement that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is to enforce statutory or legal rights of a person who has suffered legal injury. | Listed among authorities establishing that only persons with judicially enforceable rights can invoke writ jurisdiction; used to assess locus standi of petitioners. |
| Mani Subrat Jain and Ors. v. State of Haryana | Writ jurisdiction requires existence of a legal or statutory right and injury to that right. | Relied upon as part of the jurisprudence on locus standi and the need to show legal injury to invoke Article 226. |
| State of Kerala v. Smt A. Lakshmikutty and Ors | Principles regarding standing under Article 226 and who can approach the High Court. | Referred to in the Court's survey of locus standi authorities to determine if petitioners had a judicially enforceable right. |
| State of Kerala and Ors. v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai and Ors | Authority on writ jurisdiction and locus standi principles. | Used as part of the body of precedent that frames the Court's approach to standing and public interest litigation. |
| Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh | Support for the proposition that Article 226 enforcement requires a legal right and aggrieved person. | Cited among cases confirming the necessity of a legal right for invoking writ jurisdiction. |
| Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor and Ors | Reinforces that writs are maintainable by aggrieved persons to enforce statutory/legal rights. | Included in the Court's compendium of locus standi cases to evaluate petitioners' position. |
| Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi and Ors | Principle that writ jurisdiction enforces legally protected rights and requires an aggrieved person. | Referred to in the Court's analysis of standing. |
| Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed | Only an aggrieved person (one with a particular or peculiar interest beyond the general public) can maintain a writ; requirement of showing legal injury. | Cited to support the proposition that petitioners must demonstrate particular legal injury; used to conclude petitioners did not meet that standard. |
| M.S. Jayaraj v. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala | The Court must examine locus standi from all angles and require disclosure of the legal injury suffered. | Cited to justify requiring the petitioners to disclose the legal injury and to scrutinize their locus standi closely. |
| Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrimadas (2000) 7 SCC 465 | Referenced as part of the jurisprudence on examining locus standi in detail. | Used within the M.S. Jayaraj discussion and included in the locus standi analysis applied by the Court. |
| Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and Ors | Article 226 remedies are enforceable by aggrieved persons; exception for habeas corpus and quo warranto; liberal approach to locus standi in public interest matters but petitioner must not be a mere stranger. | Quoted to explain that while liberal approaches exist, a petitioner must show some genuine interest and legal right; used to evaluate petitioners' bona fides. |
| Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors | Relaxation of strict locus standi where disadvantaged persons cannot approach courts; unregistered associations may espouse causes of the downtrodden if bona fide and not meddlesome. | Relied upon to note that exceptions to strict standing rules exist but petitioners must be bona fide and not intermeddlers. |
| Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India and Ors | PIL and class actions are instruments of participative justice; standing in such litigation should be broad-based and people-oriented. | Used to contextualize the nature and purpose of PIL and to stress the Court's duty to ensure bona fides of petitioners. |
| Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.), Sindri v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 344) | PIL is part of participative justice and should receive liberal reception at judicial doorsteps. | Cited to acknowledge the liberal approach to standing in PILs while balancing it against safeguards to prevent abuse. |
| S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors | Court must ensure petitioners approaching under public garb are bona fide and not motivated by private gain; process should not be abused. | Invoked to justify careful scrutiny of petitioners' motives and to caution against misuse of judicial process. |
| Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors | Similar caution against misuse of public interest mechanisms for private ends. | Used as authority to support the Court's vigilance against petitions motivated by oblique considerations. |
| Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar | Role of law requires protection of poor and ignorant; courts should uphold basic human rights of weaker sections. | Cited as part of the jurisprudential backdrop of PIL's purpose to protect vulnerable sections, against which misuse must be contrasted. |
| State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a Student of Medical College | Court intervention where executive is remiss in discharging obligations that affect poor and under-privileged; courts can compel implementation of social/economic entitlements. | Referred to illustrate the remedial scope of PIL when legitimate public injury is shown; used to compare with facts of present case. |
| Sachidanand Pandey (Supra) | Court should not take cognizance of matters merely by attractive name; petitioner must be above suspicion and inspire confidence. | Cited to stress the need for bona fides and reliability of petitioners in PIL petitions; used to find petitioners lacking credibility. |
| Ram Saran Ayotan Parasi v. Union of India | PIL intended to make basic human rights meaningful to deprived and vulnerable sections. | Invoked to reiterate the purpose of PIL and to contrast it with the petitioners' conduct in this case. |
| Giani Devender Singh Sant Sepoy Sikh v. Union of India and Ors | High Court must indicate how public interest is involved when entertaining a PIL. | Cited to underline the Court's requirement that the petition demonstrate public interest involvement; used to assess adequacy of petitioners' pleading. |
| R.K. Jain v. Union of India | Generally, it is for the aggrieved person to assail illegality; third parties lack locus standi to challenge actions unless they show infringement of their legal rights. | Used to support the proposition that third-party challenges require demonstration of legal injury; applied in assessing petitioners' locus. |
| Mohmmed Anis v. Union of India and Ors (1994 Supp) | Case should not be entertained unless petitioner points out infringement of his legal rights. | Reiterated the need for petitioners to show personal legal injury; employed in the Court's standing analysis. |
| Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and Ors | PIL should not be a cloak for attaining private ends; courts may examine the public service record of petitioners and weigh conflicting public interests. | Relied upon to caution against allowing PIL to be a cover for private disputes (such as contractor grievance) and to justify weighing public vs private interest. |
| BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors | Observation that PIL is increasingly abused as publicity or private interest litigation; courts must guard against such abuse. | Used to support the conclusion that PIL jurisdiction can be abused and to justify strict response to such abuse. |
| Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharastra and Ors | PIL is a powerful weapon that must not be misused for private malice, vested interest, or publicity seeking; courts should be vigilant. | Cited to reinforce that misuse of PIL for private ends mandates judicial caution and may justify rejecting petitions. |
| R & M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and Ors | PIL should be entertained only in rare cases where the public at large stands to suffer; jurisdiction should not serve private ends or professional rivalry. | Used to stress that PIL relief should be reserved for genuine public wrongs and to justify the Court's conservative approach in this case. |
| Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi | Filing totally misconceived petitions amounts to abuse of process of Court; misleading petitions pursued for ulterior purpose constitute abuse. | Cited to support the proposition that misleading petitions filed for ulterior purposes are an abuse of process and must be dealt with seriously. |
| State of Haryana v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. | Principle that totally misconceived petitions may constitute abuse of process. | Relied upon to justify rejecting the petition as an abuse of process where factual misstatements and ulterior motives were found. |
| Sabia Khan and Ors. v. State of U.P and Ors | Filing misleading petitions is an abuse; such litigants are not to be dealt with lightly. | Used to support the Court's finding of abuse and to justify dismissal and further action (costs/contumacious proceedings). |
| Agriculture & Processed Food Products v. Oswal Agro Furane | Suppression of material facts in court filings may justify refusal to proceed to merits; duty of full and true disclosure. | Invoked to support the view that suppression of material facts (forged documents) precludes consideration on merits and warrants adverse consequences. |
| King v. General Commissioner (1917) 1 KB 486 | Where an ex parte application is supported by an affidavit that is not candid and is misleading, the court should refuse to proceed for its own protection and to prevent abuse of process. | Cited to bolster the Court's approach that misleading affidavits/forged documents justify refusal to proceed and punitive measures. |
| Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai and Anr | When the Court concludes that the process is being abused, it may refuse to proceed further and refuse relief to the offending party. | Applied to justify refusal to entertain the petition further and to support discipline against the petitioners for abusing process. |
| S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors | Similar principle that courts can refuse relief where process abuse is established. | Used to justify refusal to proceed and to support imposition of sanctions for abuse. |
| Narain Das v. Government of Madhya Pradesh and Ors | Deliberately and wilfully making misleading statements to obtain favourable orders can amount to criminal contempt as it interferes with judicial proceedings. | Cited to support the proposition that the petitioners' alleged deliberate misleading statements/forgery could be contempt of court and to frame criminal contempt charges. |
| The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and Anr | Not every abuse of process is contempt, but calculated attempts to hamper judicial proceedings amount to contempt and may require punishment to protect administration of justice. | Invoked to explain the circumstances under which abuse of process escalates to criminal contempt and to justify consideration of punishment. |
| The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association v. State of Assam and Anr (AIR 1996 SC 1925) | Filing inaccurate documents deliberately to mislead the court amounts to interference with the due course of justice and is contempt. | Used to support the Court's conclusion that deliberate filing of forged or misleading documents may constitute contempt and attract penal consequences. |
| Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana | Deliberate attempts to impede administration of justice amount to criminal contempt. | Cited in the context of affirming that deliberate misleading conduct can constitute contempt. |
| Rita Markandey v. Surjit Singh Arora | Deliberate interference with administration of justice is contemptuous. | Referred to in support of the contempt analysis against petitioners who allegedly filed forged documents. |
| Afzal & Anr. v. State of Haryana | False and misleading statements deliberately made to obtain favourable orders amount to interference with judicial proceedings and contempt. | Invoked to support framing of contempt charges where deliberate misleading statements were found. |
| Mohan Singh v. Late Amar Singh Through The Lrs. | False and misleading statements in judicial proceedings can amount to contempt because they prejudice due course of judicial process. | Used alongside other precedents to justify contempt charges and to stress obligation of truthful statements before court. |
| Ramjas Foundation and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors | Equity jurisdiction requires petitioners to come with clean hands; those seeking equity must do equity. | Cited to underline the maxim that petitioners must approach the Court with honesty; used to find petitioners' conduct improper. |
| K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand and Ors | Similar equitable principle requiring clean hands when invoking extraordinary jurisdiction. | Referred to in support of the Court's equity-based condemnation of petitioners' conduct. |
| Nooruddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand; Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran; Ramniklal N. Bhutta and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors | Cited for the proposition that judicial process should not be abused, and frivolous/misconceived petitions should not be tolerated. | Relied upon to justify the Court's adverse treatment of petitioners for filing a misleading PIL and to dismiss the petition. |
| J. Jayalalitha v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu; L. Muthukumar v. State of Tamil Nadu; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India; Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan; M & T Consultants v. S.Y. Nawab | Authorities cited to illustrate that PIL may challenge misuse or improper use of public property and that PILs can be entertained to protect larger public interest. | Referenced to note the permissible scope of PIL when public interest is genuinely involved; contrasted against the misuse found in the present petition. |
| Ramniklal N. Bhutta and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors | Emphasizes that courts should be slow in entertaining PILs and that the jurisdiction should be used sparingly. | Used to support the Court's cautious stance toward entertaining PILs and to justify dismissal where misuse was found. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a structured manner:
- Identification of Reliefs: The petition sought prohibition of the mill's installation/operation, mandatory environmental compliance, and enforcement of an alleged agreement dated 15.04.2005.
- Examination of Respondents' Documentary Record: Respondents produced multiple permissions and No Objection Certificates (including those from the U.P. Pollution Control Board and permissions under the Water and Air pollution statutes), effluent test certificate and documents relating to drain construction; these showed statutory permissions had been obtained and the mill had commenced production on a commercial scale on 03.11.2005, prior to the petition being filed.
- Scrutiny of Petitioners' Conduct and Pleadings: The Court directed the petitioners to explain alleged suppression of material facts. The record showed that petitioner No.1 had been awarded, and later had his contract cancelled, for construction of the drainage. The petitioners did not satisfactorily explain why this material fact was not disclosed; moreover, the agreement (Annex.2) relied upon by petitioners was found to be forged or not signed on behalf of the respondents.
- Application of Locus Standi Principles: The Court surveyed settled Supreme Court authorities emphasizing that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 requires a legal right or legal injury and ordinarily must be invoked by an aggrieved person, subject to recognized exceptions for bona fide public interest litigations. The Court observed that while the law has relaxed standing in appropriate circumstances, petitioners must be bona fide and not meddlesome.
- Evaluation of Purpose and Bona Fides of the Petition: Applying precedents cautioning against misuse of PILs (including the requirement that PILs not serve private or ulterior ends), the Court found that the petition was motivated by private interests linked to the cancelled contract and that the petitioners employed a forged document to mislead the Court.
- Conclusion on Abuse of Process and Contempt: Considering authorities on suppression of material facts and the criminality of deliberately misleading the Court, the Court held that the petitioners had approached the Court without clean hands, that their conduct amounted to misuse of the judicial process, and that there was sufficient basis to charge them with criminal contempt.
- Remedial and Protective Measures: In response to the abuse and forged documents, the Court dismissed the petition, imposed costs, directed recovery and deposit of those costs by the District Collector to the High Court Legal Services Committee, framed particular contempt charges against the petitioners, allowed two weeks to file a reply to the charge, and listed the matter before a bench competent to try contempt on a specified date with directions for personal appearance.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
DISMISSED — The petition is dismissed for being filed on false averments and in reliance upon a forged document; the petitioners' conduct was condemned as an abuse of the court process.
Direct consequences ordered by the Court:
- Costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only) were imposed on the petitioners, to be recovered equally from both petitioners by the District Collector, Bijnor, as arrears of land revenue within four weeks and deposited with the High Court Legal Services Committee, Allahabad.
- The petitioners were charged with criminal contempt by a specific charge alleging suppression of material facts and filing of a forged agreement; they were given two weeks to file a reply to the charge.
- The matter was listed before an appropriate Bench having jurisdiction to try contempt on 05.01.2006, with directions for both petitioners to be personally present.
- The Registry was directed to transmit a copy of the order to the District Collector for compliance forthwith.
Implications:
The decision directly effects the parties by dismissing the writ petition, imposing monetary costs, initiating contempt proceedings, and ordering administrative recovery of costs. The Court relied on established Supreme Court authorities on locus standi, bona fides in PILs, abuse of process, suppression of material facts, and contempt to reach its conclusions. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent; it applies and synthesizes existing authorities to the facts of this case and imposes sanctions for misuse of the judicial process.
1. The present petition has been filed as Public Interest Litigation by the petitioners claiming the following reliefs:-
1. A writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents/Bajaj Groups not to install and run their Mill in village Nekofal @ Bilai, Pargana Dara Nagar, Tehsil Sadar, District Bijnor.
2. A writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to comply with all environmental needs as required under law before installing Mills.
3. A writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents/Bajaj Groups to immediate comply with agreement said to be executed by D.G.M. (Cane) namely Surya Prakash Ojha dated 15.04.2005 (Annex.2).
2. The aforesaid reliefs have been claimed by the petitioners submitting that they are public spirited persons representing the interest of the poor, downtrodden villagers who have been cheated by the respondent nos. 6 to 8 in purchasing their land in contravention of the statutory provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the 'Act, 1950'). They further prayed for enforcement of the agreement executed by said respondent nos. 6 to 8 providing that they would provide employment to the dependents of the farmers who have sold their land to them; there would be a pipeline upto five kilometres and the said respondents would supply free light over the roads and water to the villagers; the Mill has been established without getting No Objection Certificate from the U.P. Pollution Control Board which is mandatorily required; the drainage is not being made as promised rather the permission has been sought to establish the said drainage on 11.08.2005 from the officials which is nothing but a conspiracy between the statutory authorities and the Bajaj Groups which is creating a lot of problems to the villagers as it will always create a very foul smell vis-a-vis it will generate several diseases like Malaria, Filaria and it would be dangerous adjacent agricultural land as chemical going through water will also damage agricultural land adjacent to the said drainage; the environmental pollution would adversely affect the health of the villagers and would cause environmental hazards to the land, plant and agriculture lying over the land; the land had been purchased from the farmers without seeking permission from the Competent Authority to convert the agricultural land into non-agricultural land, in violation of the Legislative mandate to protect the farmers to be misutilised by the persons who are land grabbers or Mill owners; by running of the Mill, the health and the properties of large number of people would have an adverse affect and the future generation would also be adversely affected; the sale deeds obtained by the said respondent nos. 6 to 8 are void as no permission from the Competent Authority under Section 143 of the Act has been taken. Thus, the Mill is being established by illegal method for grabbing the public properties without taking prior permission.
3. Shri R.K. Ojha, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently pressed the aforesaid submissions and asked for the reliefs sought in this petition.
4. On the other hand, when the matter was heard on the first date, i.e. 21.11.2005, Shri V.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8, filed a compilation containing 23 documents running into 81 pages which contained the permission of the Statutory Authority regarding purchase of land; No Objection Certificate under the provisions of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter called the 'Act 19740; No Objection Certificate from the U.P. Pollution Control Board dated 15.07.2004; Permission under Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 ( hereinafter called the Act, 1981) dated 21.10.2005; permission under Section 21/22 of the Act, 1981; permission under Section 25/26 of the Act, 1974 dated 21-10-2005; Test Certificate dated 09.11.2005 regarding effluent water; report regarding construction of main drain from factory to Vaan river, and submitted that the petition has been filed to achieve an ulterior purpose as petitioner No. 1 had been awarded contract for construction of the said drainage against which main grievance has been raised by him. Since he did not complete the work in time, his contract was cancelled. The agreement purported to have been executed on behalf of respondent nos. 6 to 8 filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition is a forged document as there is no such person in the employment of the said respondent nos. 6 to 8 nor any agreement has ever been signed by any other person. The petitioners did not disclose the material fact that they were themselves responsible for delaying the drainage from sugar Mill to river and a blackmailing tactics is being adopted inspite of the fact that the construction of the Mill has been established strictly in accordance with law and it started the sugar production with effect from 03.11.2005 and this petition has been filed on 17.11.2005 on the facts which are totally false.
5. The copy of the compilation filed by Shri V.K. Upadhyay was served upon Shri R.K. Ojha and he was asked to take instructions and file an affidavit in this regard. As the compilation was not supported by any affidavit, Shri V.K. Upadhyay was also asked to file an affidavit in support of the same which was filed. A counter affidavit has also been filed by Shri V.K. Upadhyay pointing out that petitioner No. 1 is inimical to the said respondents as his contract for construction of drainage, which according to the petitioners would be a cause of pollution was delayed by him without any reason, has been cancelled vide order dated 30.06.2005. The copies awarding contract vide letter dated 20.05.2005 and the cancellation order dated 11.07.2005 have been filed along with the affidavit. It has further been submitted in paragraph 7 of the affidavit that the Annexure 2 is a forged document as it is purported to have been signed by Shri Satya Prakash Ojha and there was no such person in the name of Satya Prakash Ojha in the employment of the said respondents and there has been no agreement with any person whose land was acquired.
6. An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the U.P. Pollution Control Board annexing the copies of the No Objection Certificate issued from time to time and it has been submitted that the No Object Certificate was valid upto 31.12.2005 and the photo copies of the said Permissions/No Objection Certificates have been filed.
7. The petitioners were directed to explain their conduct as how the petition had been filed suppressing the facts and on false premises. They filed a supplementary affidavit on 29.11.2005 without disclosing any reason as under what circumstances this writ petition has been filed without disclosing the factum that petitioner No. 1 was given the contract for construction of the said drainage which, according to him would cause serious pollution problem in the area. He has not disputed that he has been given the contract. He has produced certain bills having certain disputes regarding payment of bills. He has not explained as under what circumstances he has taken the factual averments regarding not taking the permission for purchasing the land from statutory authorities and for its conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use and under what circumstances it has been stated that the Permission/No Objection Certificate has not been obtained from the Pollution Control Board. First time in this affidavit, it has been submitted that petitioner No. 1 is having a Mango grove in a land measuring .019 hectares and the said garden will be spoiled, but the facts remain admitted that the petitioners are not bonafide persons nor they have filed this petition in public interest. The Court not being satisfied from the affidavit filed by the petitioners on 29.11.2005 the case further. On 30.11.2005 it was again adjourned for 02.12.2005 and on that date a specific direction was given to the petitioners to explain their conduct and file a proper affidavit as under what circumstances they could muster the courage to abuse the process of the Court and why did they not disclose the true facts. In response to the said order, no reply has been filed. Today, Mr. R.K. Ojha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are not in a position to submit any reply or explain their conduct as under what circumstances the petition has been filed. Shri Ojha prayed that he should be permitted to withdraw the writ petition as the petitioners are not interested to prosecute the case further. However, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P. Anand v. S.D. Deve Gowda and Ors. , as the Public Interest Litigation cannot be permitted to be withdrawn as Court's cannot be permitted to be a forum to be used to achieve an ulterior purpose, we rejected the oral prayed made by Shri Ojha.
8. It is settled law that a person who suffers from legal injury only can challenge the act/action/order etc. Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by the petitioner that there is a breach of the statutory duty on the part of the respondents. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right for the enforcement on which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of the said right is the condition precedent to invoke the writ jurisdiction. (Vide Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietor Ltd.) v. State of West Bengal and Ors. ; Mani Subrat Jain and Ors. v. State of Haryana ; State of Kerala v. Smt A. Lakshmikutty and Ors. ; State of Kerala and Ors. v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai and Ors. ; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh ; Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor and Ors. ; & Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi and Ors. ).
9. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed , the Apex Court has held that only a person who is aggrieved by an order, can maintain a writ petition. The expression "aggrieved person" has been explained by the Apex Court observing that such a person must show that he has more particular or peculiar interest on his own beyond that of general public in seeing that the law is properly administered.
10. In M.S. Jayaraj v. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the matter at length and placed reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including the Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrimadas (2000) 7 SCC 465; and held that the Court must examine the issue of locus standi from all angles and the petitioner should be asked to disclose as what is the legal injury suffered by him.
11. In Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the similar issue and observed as under:-
There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid article. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in our country and the constitutional courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hyper-technical grounds.---------In Other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi.
12. The party has to satisfy as what is the legal injury caused by that violation of law for the redressal of which the party has approached the Court.
13. However, need was felt to relax the rule of locus standi wherever person aggrieved could not have the resources to approach the Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court entertained the petition even of unregistered Association espousing the cause of over down-trodden or its members observing that the cause of "little Indians" can be espoused by any person having no interest in the matter. However, the said person should be bona fide, not a intermeddler or busy-body. (Vide Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors. ).
14. In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of locus standi observed as under:-
Our current processual jurisprudence is not an individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad based and people-oriented, and envisions access to justice through
"class actions', 'Public Interest Litigation', and representative proceedings'. Indeed, little Indians in larger numbers seeking remedies in courts through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of "cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions.
15. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.), Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1981 SC 344, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
Public Interest Litigation is part of the process of participate justice and 'standing' in civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial doorsteps.
16. Public Interest Litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation. The purpose of P.I.L. is to promote the public interest which mandates that violation of legal or constitutional rights of a large number of persons, poor, down-trodden, ignorant, socially or economically disadvantaged should not go un-redressed. The Court can take cognizance in P.I.L. when there are complaints which shocks the judicial conscience. P.I.L. is pro bono publico and should not smack of any ulterior motive and no person has a right to achieve any ulterior purpose through such litigations.
17. In S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors. , the Hon'ble Apex Court has warned by saying that the Court must be careful that the members of the public who approach the court are acting bona fide and not in personal garb of private profit or political motivation or other oblique considerations. "The Court must not allow its process to be abused". Similar view has been taken in Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors. 1994 (Supp) 2 SCC 116.
18. In Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar 7 Ors. , the Apex Court has observed that the role of law requires to be played for the poor and ignorant who constitute a large bulk of humanity in this country and the Court must uphold the basic human rights of weaker sections of the society.
19. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a Student of Medical College , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
Where the Court finds, on being moved by an aggrieved party or by any public spirited individual or social action group, that the executive is remiss in discharging its obligation under the Constitution or the law, so that the poor and the under-privileged continued to be subjected to exploitation and injustice or are deprived of their social and economic entitlements or that social and economic entitlements or that social legislation enacted for their benefit is not being implemented thus depriving of their rights and benefits conferred upon them, the Courts certainly can be must intervene and compel the executive to carry out its constitutional and legal obligations and ensure that the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community are no longer subjected to exploitation or injustice and they are able to realise their social and economical rights.
20. In Sachidanand Pandey (Supra), the Apex Court observed that the Court should not take cognizance in such matters merely because of its attractive name. The petitioner must inspire the confidence of the Court and must be above suspicion.
21. In Ram Saran Ayotan Parasi v. Union of India , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the P.I.L. Is for making basic human rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and to assure them social, economic and political justice.
22. In Giani Devender Singh Sant Sepoy Sikh v. Union of India and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court, while entertaining a P.I.L must indicate how the public interest was involved in the case.
23. In R.K Jain v. Union Of India.. , the Apex Court observed that it was for the aggrieved person to assail the illegality of the offending action and no third party has a locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Similarly, in Mohmmed Anis v. Union of India and Ors. 1994 (Supp) 1 SCC 145, the Apex Court has held that a case should not be entertained unless the petitioner points out that his legal rights have been infringed.
24. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
If a person wants a relief in a Court independent of a statutory remedy, he must show that he is injured or subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong. The Courts can interfere only where legal rights are involved. In fact legal wrong requires judicially enforceable right and 'the touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right'. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse effect on the interest of a person or right of a person is sufficient to give him the 'standing to sue'. Again, the 'adverse effect' and the requisite for 'standing to sue' must be an illegal effect Such persons are merely busy body of middlesome interloper...They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the...judicial process...from improper motives... The High Court should do well to reject the application of all such busybodies at the threshold.
25. In S.P. Anand (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that, "no person has a right to waiver of the locus standi rule and court should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings is in the competent hands of a person, who is genuinely concerned in public interest and is not moved by other extraneous considerations, so also the Court must be careful to ensure that the process of the court is not sought to be abused....
26. P.I.L. can also be filed by any person challenging the misuse or improper use of any public property, including the political party in power for the reason that interest of individuals cannot be placed above or preferred to a larger public interest. But such a petition can be entertained for the protection of the society. (Vide J. Jayalalitha v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu and Ors. ; L. Muthukumar and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. ; and M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. ; Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Anr. v. C.K. Rajan and Ors. ; 5 M & T Consultants Secunderabad v. S.Y. Nawab and Anr. .
27. In Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and Ors. , the Apex Court observed as under:-
The Public Interest Litigation should not be merely a cloak for attaining private ends of a third party or of the party bringing the petition. The Court can examine the previous record of public service rendered by the organization bringing the Public Interest Litigation. Even when a Public Interest Litigation is entertained, the court must be careful to weigh conflicting public interests before intervening.
28. In BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction is being abused by unscrupulous persons for their personal gain. Therefore, the Court must take care that the forum be not abused by any person for personal gain. The Court observed as under:-
There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without any foundation that Public Interest Litigation is now tending to become publicity interest litigation or private interest litigation as a tendency to be counter productive. PIL is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It is essentially meant to protect basic human rights of the weak and disadvantaged and was a procedure which was innovated where a public spirited person files a petition in effect on behalf of such persons who, on account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities could not approach the Court for relief. There have been in recent times, increasingly abuse of PIL.
29. Similarly, in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharastra and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed its anguish on misuse of the forum of the Court under the garb of PIL observing as under:-
Public Interest Litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not be publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta.
30. In R & M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned the Courts that the Public Interest Litigation should be entertained in rare cases where it is satisfied that public at large stands to suffer. The jurisdiction cannot be allowed to be invoked for the purpose of serving private ends and professional rivalry. The Court observed that the Public Interest Litigation is no doubt a very useful handle for redressing the grievances of the people but unfortunately lately it has been abused by some interested persons and it has brought a very bad name. Courts should be very very slow in entertaining petitions involving public interest: in very rare cases where the public at large stand to suffer. This jurisdiction is meant for the purpose of coming to the rescue of the downtrodden. This sacrosanct jurisdiction of public interest litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant and not for the persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity or for the purpose of serving their private ends. It has now become common for unscrupulous people to serve their private ends and jeopardise the rights of innocent people so as to wreak vengeance for their personal ends. This has become very handy to the developers and in matters of public contract. In order to serve their professional rivalry they utilise the service of the innocent people or organisation in filing public interest litigation. The courts are sometimes persuaded to issue certain directions without understanding the implications and giving a handle in the hands of the authorities to misuse it. Therefore, courts should not exercise this jurisdiction lightly but should exercise in very rare and few cases involving public interest of a large number of people who cannot afford litigation and are made to suffer at the hands of the authorities.
31. Thus, in view of the above, the ratio of all these judgments is that there must be a public injury and public wrong caused by wrongful or ultra vires acts or omission of the state or a public authority. It is for the enforcement of basic human rights of weaker sections of the community who are poor, downtrodden, ignorant, illiterates and whose fundamental rights and statutory rights have been violated. In fact, it is for compelling the executive to carry out its constitutional and legal obligations. It must not be frivolous litigation by persons having vested interests.
32. The factual matrix of this case if examined properly, reveals the following facts:-
1. The petition is based on false factual averments.
2 Material facts have been suppressed in order to obtain the favourable order from this Court.
3 Petition for restraining the respondent nos. 6 to 8 to establish the Sugar Mill has been filed after it started production of sugar on commercial level.
4 It has falsely been stated in the petition that land had been purchased for the sugar mills in contravention of the provisions of the Act, 1960 as the said respondents had taken permission from the Competent Authority.
5 It has falsely been pleaded that the respondent nos. 6 to 8 are running the Mills without prior permission/No Objection Certificate from the U.P. Pollution Control Board.
6. Petitioner No. 1 had been awarded the contract to construct the drainage and he could not complete the construction in time, his contract was cancelled vide order dated 30.06.2005.
7 Petitioners filed a forged document (Annex.2) to show that there was some agreement on behalf of the respondent nos. 6 to 8 and the farmers, whose land had been purchased, on the other side. The said document does not bear signature of any person on behalf of the said respondents. Nor there could be any valid agreement unilaterally.
8. Petitioners prayed for enforcement of the unenforceable agreement purported to have been executed on behalf of the said respondents.
33. In view of the above, it is evident that the petitioners did not approach the Court with clean hands. They tried to mislead the Court making totally false averments and relying upon forged and fabricated documents.
34. When a person approaches a Court of Equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, he should approach the Court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. (Vide The Ramjas Foundation and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. ; K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand and Ors. . Thus, who seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim "Jure Naturae Aequum Est Neminem cum Alterius Detrimento Et Injuria Fieri Locupletiorem", means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another.
35. Similarly, judicial process should not become an instrument of oppression or abuse of a means in the process of the Court to subvert justice for the reason that the interest of justice and public interest coalesce. The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis private interest while exercising their discretionary powers. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (Vide Nooruddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand ; Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran and Ors. ; and Ramniklal N. Bhutta and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. ).
36. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi ; State of Haryana v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. ; and Sabia Khan and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that filing totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and such litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly, as petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to abuse of the process of the Court.
37. In Agriculture & Processed Food Products v. Oswal Agro Furane , the Apex Court had taken a serious objection in a case filed by suppressing the material facts and held that if a petitioner is guilty of suppression of very important fact and his case cannot be considered on merits. Thus, a litigant is bound to make "full and true disclosure of facts". While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had placed reliance upon the judgment in King v. General Commissioner (1917) 1 KB 486, wherein it has been observed as under: -
Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of its merits...
38. In Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai and Anr. 2003 AIR SCW 14; and S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that whenever the Court comes to the conclusion that the process of the Court is being abused, the Court would be justified in refusing to proceed further and refuse relief to the party. This rule has been evolved out of need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by deceiving it. However, the suppressed fact must be material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed, it would have led any fact on the on the merit of the case.
39. Legal maxim "Juri Ex Injuria Non Oritur" means that a right cannot arise out of wrong doing, and it becomes applicable in case like this.
40. The facts stated above also amply depict that the manner in which the petition has been drafted exposes the petitioners to be prosecuted for criminal Contempt. It is a settled proposition of law that a false statement made in the Court or in the pleadings, intentionally to mislead the Court and obtain a favourable order, amounts to criminal contempt, as it tends to impede the administration of justice. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narain Das v. Government of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. has held as under:-
Now there can be no doubt that if a wrong or misleading statement is deliberately and wilfully made by a party to a litigation with a view to obtain a favourable order, it would prejudice or interfere with the due course of the judicial proceeding, and thus, amount to contempt of court.
41. In The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and Anr. , the Apex Court held that every abuse of the process of the Court does not necessarily amount to contempt of Court, but a calculated attempt to hamper the due course of the judicial proceeding or administration of justice shall definitely amount to contempt of the Court, and in such a case, punishment to the contemnor is necessary to prevent the abuse and making a mockery of the judicial process, as it adversely affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The Court further held as under.
The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice, and so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression 'contempt of Court' may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with.
42. In The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association v. State of Assam and Anr. AIR 1996 SC 1925, the Apex Court held that filing inaccurate documents deliberately, with a view to mislead the Court, amounts to interference with the due course of justice by attempting to obstruct the Court from reaching a correct conclusion, and thus, amounts to contempt of Court.
43. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana and Ors. ; and Rita Markandey v. Surjit Singh Arora , observing that deliberate attempt to impede the administration of justice or interference or tending to interfere with or obstruct, or tend to obstruct the administration of justice, in any manner, amounts to criminal contempt.
44. In Afzal & Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors. ; and Mohan Singh v. Late Amar Singh Through The Lrs.. , the Apex Court held that a false and a misleading statement deliberately and wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable order, amounts to prejudice or interference with the due course of judicial proceedings, and it will amount to criminal contempt. The Court further held that every party is under a legal obligation to make truthful statement before the Court, for the reason that causing obstruction in the due course of justice
"undermines and obstructs the very flow of the unsoiled stream of justice, which has to be kept clear and pure, and no one can be permitted to take liberties with it by soiling its purity".
45. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that as the petitioners filed a forge document purporting to be an agreement reached on behalf of respondent nos. 6 to 8 (Annex.2), and filed the petition totally on false averments in order to mislead the Court to obtain a favourable order, they are liable to be tried for committing criminal contempt and are further liable to be dealt with heavy hands.
46. Thus we dismiss this petition deprecating the conduct of the petitioners with the cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac Only) and request the learned District Collector, Bijnor to recover the same in equal amount from both the petitioner as arrears of land revenue within a period of four weeks' from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order and deposit the same with the High Court Legal Services Committee, Allahabad.
47. Registry is directed to transmit a copy of this order forthwith to the learned district Collector, Bijnor for compliance.
48. The petitioners are charged for committing criminal contempt on following charge:-
Whereas you Shri Rajeev Kumar and Shri Hem Raj Singh filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 71469 of 2005 suppressing the material facts that you had been awarded the contract which was cancelled vide order dated 30.06.2005 for not completing the work in time and filed the agreement dated 15.04.2005 in the aforesaid writ petition which is admittedly forged and fabricated and tried to mislead the Court in order to obtain a favourable orders, and thereby committed criminal contempt of this Court and you are hereby charged as such.
49. They may file reply to the aforesaid charge within a period of two weeks.
50. List the matter before the appropriate Bench having the jurisdiction for that purpose on 05.01.2006. On that date, both the petitioners are directed to remain present before the said Court.
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