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Anil Rice Mills v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rajes Kumar, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Tribunal referred a question under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1986-87 concerning whether the Tribunal was justified in adding certain cash credits to the income of the assessee-firm when the persons in whose names those credits appeared had declared the amounts under an amnesty (voluntary disclosure) scheme and had been assessed on those amounts, despite being closely related to the partners.
The assessee was a partnership firm with two partners (Prayag Narain Gupta and his son Pramod Kumar Gupta). During scrutiny the assessing authority found cash credit entries totalling Rs. 4,80,900 in the names of wives, minor children and one major son of the partners. The assessee explained that these depositors had declared income under the Board's amnesty Circular No. 451 (February 17, 1986), deposited money in banks and then advanced money to the firm by cheques. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the explanation under section 68 and treated the entire deposits as unexplained income of the firm.
The assessee's appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and subsequently to the Tribunal were both rejected. The Tribunal referred the question to this court under section 256(1). The matter before this court involved consideration of the correctness of the Tribunal's addition and whether the voluntary declarations under the amnesty scheme could be relied upon to establish the nature and source of the credits in the firm's books.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Tribunal was justified in adding the cash credits to the income of the assessee-firm when the persons in whose names the cash credits stood had declared the amounts under the amnesty (voluntary disclosure) scheme and had been assessed on those amounts, despite being closely related to the partners of the firm.
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The depositors (wives and children) were genuine assessees whose returns under the amnesty scheme were on record, and deposits were made by cheques from their bank accounts.
- The amnesty scheme (Board Circular No. 451) allowed declarants, including ladies and minors, to have their declared income accepted without disclosing the specific source; hence the declarants' assessed income established their capacity to advance the deposits.
- The payment of interest by the firm to the depositors (not disallowed) indicated the genuineness of the transactions.
- If the partners had actually introduced the money in the names of their relatives, any addition should be in the hands of the partners, not the firm.
- The Tribunal improperly relied upon the amnesty immunity issue; the assessee contended it had discharged the burden under section 68 and the Tribunal's observation that immunity applied only to declarants was irrelevant because the assessee did not claim such immunity.
- The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 was invoked by the assessee below (as argued before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)), asserting that benami-related conclusions should not be sustained (as argued in the assessee's grounds), though this Court's text records this as an argument rather than a decided point.
Revenue / Respondent's Arguments
- The immunity under the amnesty/voluntary disclosure scheme applies only to the declarant and does not preclude enquiry into the genuineness of credits in a third party's books; the assessing authority may probe and treat such sums as the assessee's income if explanations are unsatisfactory.
- The assessee failed to satisfactorily prove the capacity of the depositors (most being wives and minors) to possess and advance such large sums; hence the AO's addition under section 68 was justified.
- Reliance was placed on apex court authority (Commissioner of Income Tax v. United Trading & Construction Co., 2001) and related precedents to support the position that the assessor may disregard voluntary disclosure immunity when investigating a third party's books.
- The findings on the point were factual and within the province of the authorities below to make, and those findings should be affirmed unless perverse.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jamnaprasad Kanhaiyalal v. CIT, [1981] 130 ITR 244 | Voluntary disclosure immunity is confined to the declarant; declarant's declaration does not preclude inquiry into credits in a third party's books under Section 68. | The court relied on it to support the proposition that the amnesty scheme's immunity is available only to declarants and does not automatically validate credits in the assessee firm's books. |
| Commissioner Of Income Tax v. United Trading & Construction Co., [2001] 247 ITR 819 (SC) | Confirmed that immunity under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme is confined to declarant and does not prevent AO from including credited sums in another assessee's income if explanation unsatisfactory. | The court treated this apex court decision as authoritative and observed it supports the proposition that AO may tax credited sums in the firm's hands despite prior declarations by the depositors. |
| ITO v. Rattan Lal, [1984] 145 ITR 183 | Voluntary disclosure scheme immunity confined to declarant; does not extend to a third party's assessment. | Cited (through United Trading & Construction Co.) to reinforce that declarations do not prevent AO from including sums in the assessee's income if not satisfied with explanation. |
| Shankar Industries v. CIT, [1978] 114 ITR 689 (Cal) | One of the decisions identifying the three conditions to be proved under Section 68 (identity, capacity, genuineness). | Used to support the statement of law that the assessee must establish identity of creditor, capacity to advance money and genuineness of transactions. |
| C. Kant and Co. v. CIT, [1980] 126 ITR 63 (Cal) | Authority for the three conditions required under Section 68. | Listed among cases showing the judicial approach to burden on assessee under Section 68. |
| Prakash Textile Agency v. CIT, [1980] 121 ITR 890 (Cal) | Authority for principles regarding Section 68 (identity, capacity, genuineness). | Included in the list of High Court decisions relied upon for the three-condition formulation. |
| Oriental Wire Industries P. Ltd. v. CIT, [1981] 131 ITR 688 (Cal) | One of the High Court decisions addressing Section 68 requirements. | Cited as part of the jurisprudential support for the three conditions to be satisfied by the assessee. |
| CIT v. Baishnab Charan Mohanty, [1995] 212 ITR 199 (Orissa) | High Court authority on Section 68 jurisprudence. | Used as part of the body of case law stating required conditions and approach under Section 68. |
| Jalan Timbers… v. Commissioner Of Income Tax N.E. Region, Shillong, [1997] 223 ITR 11 (Gauhati) | Confirmed the three important conditions under Section 68 (identity, genuineness, capability). | The court cited it to restate the established three-condition test under Section 68. |
| CIT v. Korlay Trading Co. Ltd., [1998] 232 ITR 820 (Cal) | One of the decisions dealing with Section 68 principles. | Included in the list of authorities that have considered the requirements of Section 68. |
| CIT v. United Commercial and Industrial Co. P. Ltd., [1991] 187 ITR 596 (Cal) | Authority for the principle that once the assessee proves the three conditions, burden shifts to the Revenue to establish that the amount belongs to the assessee. | Cited to explain the shift of burden to the Revenue upon satisfaction of the assessee's initial proof. |
| M.A. Unneeri Kutty v. CIT, [1992] 198 ITR 147 (Ker) | Authority cited in relation to burden shifting once the assessee proves requisite conditions under Section 68. | Included as part of the precedential support for burden-shifting doctrine. |
| CIT v. Precision Finance P. Ltd., [1994] 208 ITR 465 (Cal) | Another case supporting the principle about burden shifting under Section 68. | Used to reinforce the point that after initial proof by assessee, Revenue must show sums belong to assessee. |
| S. Hastimal v. CIT, [1963] 49 ITR 273 (Mad) | Authority for the proposition that assessee is not required to prove the 'source of source' under Section 68. | Cited to show that courts disallow probing into remote origins beyond the immediate source required to be explained. |
| Tolaram Daga v. CIT, [1966] 59 ITR 632 (Assam) | Case cited for the same proposition that 'source of source' need not be proved by the assessee. | Included as supporting precedent on limits of AO's enquiry into origins of funds. |
| CIT v. Daulat Ram Rawatmull, [1973] 87 ITR 349 (SC) | Supreme Court authority emphasizing limits on asking for 'source of source'. | Cited to show established principle that the assessee need not go beyond direct source. |
| Sarogi Credit Corporation v. CIT, [1976] 103 ITR 344 (Patna) | Authority on the principle that proving 'source of source' is unnecessary. | Listed among authorities limiting the scope of enquiry into origin of funds. |
| Sreelekha Banerjee v. CIT, [1963] 49 ITR (SC) 112 | Held that the Department may require the assessee to prove the source of money and cannot unreasonably discard a good explanation. | Cited to state that AO may examine evidence and cannot unreasonably reject satisfactory explanation; rejection must be based on unconvincing evidence. |
| CTT v. Orissa Corporation P. Ltd., [1986] 159 ITR 78 (SC) | If Revenue knows identity of alleged creditors and does not pursue inquiries, the Tribunal may find the assessee discharged its burden. | Applied to illustrate that where Revenue fails to pursue known creditors, a finding that the assessee discharged its burden cannot be faulted. |
| CIT, Ernakulam v. P.K. Noorjahan (Smt), [1999] 237 ITR 570 (SC) (1997) 11 SCC 198 | Interpreting similar language in section 69: 'may' reflects discretionary power of AO; AO is not obliged to treat unexplained source as income in every case. | Cited for the proposition that the AO's decision under parallel provisions is discretionary and must be exercised considering facts of each case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded as follows:
- The court began by identifying the legal framework: Section 68 of the Income-tax Act provides that where any sum is found credited in an assessee's books and the assessee's explanation about nature and source is not, in the AO's opinion, satisfactory, the sum may be charged to tax as the assessee's income.
- The court reviewed the settled judicial approach to Section 68: the assessee must prove three elements — identity of the creditor, capacity of the creditor to advance the money, and genuineness of the transaction. If these three are established, the burden shifts to Revenue to show the amount truly belongs to the assessee.
- The court considered the effect of voluntary disclosure/amnesty schemes. It reviewed authorities (notably Jamnaprasad Kanhaiyalal and later apex court decisions) establishing that immunity under voluntary disclosure applies to the declarant only and does not automatically protect a third party who has entries in his books purporting receipt of such amounts.
- Applying those principles to the present facts, the court found that the Tribunal and the authorities below were correct in law to the extent that the voluntary disclosure did not automatically validate the credits in the firm's books; the AO was entitled to probe genuineness and capacity.
- However, the court observed that the Tribunal's order was defective in certain respects: it rejected the assessee's explanation principally on the basis that immunity under the amnesty scheme applied only to the declarant, without appreciating that the assessee had not sought to avail itself of that immunity. The Tribunal had also failed to address specific factual matters put forward by the assessee, notably the assessee's contention that the partners had introduced money in the names of their relatives (which would make any addition attributable to the partners rather than to the firm) and that interest paid to the depositors had not been disallowed (which tended to support genuineness).
- Regarding Sri Anil Kumar Gupta (the one major depositor), the court found the Tribunal had not examined his capacity and the evidence properly: while the Tribunal doubted his capacity, the court noted that he was an income-tax assessee and had transactional entries; nonetheless, the court thought the Tribunal had not considered the matter with sufficient care and remanded for fresh consideration.
- On balance the court concluded that the Tribunal's conclusions were not sustainable because of the incomplete consideration of relevant factual aspects and the misdirected emphasis on amnesty immunity; therefore, the matter required fresh examination by the Tribunal in light of the observations recorded.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court answered the referred question in the negative — that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Direct consequence: The court held that the Tribunal's order was not sustainable and directed the Tribunal to rehear and decide afresh the issue of additions towards the cash credits, having regard to:
- That the assessee did not claim amnesty immunity and therefore the Tribunal should not have rejected explanations solely on that basis;
- The need to consider the assessee's contention that the partners had introduced the money in the names of relatives (which, if accepted, would affect whether the firm or the partners should be assessed);
- The fact that interest paid to the depositors was not disallowed, which the court considered a relevant fact when assessing genuineness;
- The requirement to examine properly the capacity and transactions of Sri Anil Kumar Gupta as a depositor.
Broader implications: The court applied and reiterated existing precedents on voluntary disclosures and Section 68; it did not purport to lay down a new legal principle. The immediate effect is procedural — a remand for fresh consideration by the Tribunal — rather than the creation of a new precedent.
Rajes Kumar, J.:— The Tribunal has referred the following question under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1986-87 for the opinion of this court:
“Whether the Tribunal was justified in adding the cash credits in the income of the assessee when persons in whose names were the cash credits, had declared the same under amnesty scheme and had also been assessed as such on the respective amount credited in the account, despite the fact that those persons were closely related to the partners of the assessee-firm?”
2. Brief facts of the case are as follows: The applicant-assessee (hereinafter referred to as “the assessee”) was a partnership firm consisting of two partners, Sri Prayag Narain Gupta and his son Pramod Kumar Gupta, having equal shares. The assessee derived its income from manufacturing and sale of rice and rice bran and also from purchase and sale of foodgrains, pulses and oil seed. In the course of scrutiny of the account the assessing authority found the following cash credit entries during the relevant accounting period:
Sl. No. Name Old balance New deposits Interest Total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1. Smt. Sharda Gupta, w/o Sri Prayag Narain Gupta, partner 8,166 61,900 6,332 76,398 2. Sri Anil Kumar Gupta, s/o Sri Prayag N. Gupta, partner 26,449 99,000 7,225 32,674 3. Km. Meera Gupta (M), d/o Sri Prayag N. Gupta, partner 6,790 61,500 5,810 74,100 4. Smt. Arvind Gupta (M), wife of Prayag N. Gupta, partner — 59,900 4,835 64,735 5. Smt. Pushpa Gupta, w/o Sri Pramod Kr. Gupta partner _ 60,900 4,968 65,868
6. Km. Trupati Gupta (Minor), s/o Sri Pramod Kumar Gupta, partner _ 31,900 2,223 34,123 7. Km. Dipti Gupta (Minor), s/o Sri Pramod Kumar Gupta, partner _ 44,900 3,560 48,460 8. Mast. Rahul Gupta (M), s/o Pramod Kr. Gupta, partner _ 60,900 3,848 64,748 41,405 4,80,900 38,801 5,61,106
3. The depositors were the wife and minor children of Prayag Narain Gupta and Pramod Kumar Gupta, partners of the firm, except Sri Anil Kumar Gupta, who was major son of Prayag Narain Gupta. The Assessing Authority asked the assessee to explain the new cash credits in terms of section 68 of the Act. The assessee filed written explanation and explained that the above depositors are genuine and true and all the depositors were old assessee. Their assessment orders have also been filed. It was explained that all of them got themselves assessed in the amnesty scheme in view of the Board's Circular No. 451 (see [1986] 158 ITR (St.) 135) and deposited their respective money in the different banks and in order to earn more interest money was advanced by the depositors to the assessee-firm by way of cheques. It was further explained that Km. Meera Gupta, Smt. Sharda Gupta and Anil Kumar Gupta had old balance apart from the fresh deposits made in this year and their deposits have been accepted as genuine and true by the Department. In this way it was submitted that the nature and source of the deposits are explained, inasmuch as the identity of the person, genuineness of the transactions and the capacity of the payment have been established. The Assessing Authority had not accepted the explanation and made the addition of the entire deposits towards unexplained income under section 68 of the Act. The Income-tax Officer further observed as follows:
“The explanation of the assessee is not satisfactory as he could not explain the ability and capacity of the creditors to make such heavy deposits. Initially to make deposits in the bank and then to make deposits with the assessee-firm by withdrawing the amounts by cheque does not prove the capacity of the creditors to make the deposits with the assessee unless they prove their sources of income with documentary evidence. All the above creditors had no independent source of income except Shri Anil Kumar Gupta who carried on truck plying business. He has been assessed on the following total income:
A.Y Truck income Interest Other sources Total 1983-84 9,098 7,000 16,100 1984-85 9,790 — 25,000 15,210 1985-86 16,100 59 — 14,690
In the assessment year 1985-86, Shri Anil Kumar Gupta purchased a truck No. URM-1635 for Rs. 80,000 on August 2, 1994. Hence he was not in a position to advance such a heavy amount of Rs. 99,000 to the assessee-firm. As regards the other creditors they are minors and ladies and closely related to both the partners. From the scrutiny of the facts it appears that both the partners have introduced the cash creditors in the names of their family members in proportion to their capital in the assessee-firm.
The assessee has explained that they have introduced their money under the amnesty scheme and deposited in the bank accounts and by withdrawing from bank accounts, they have deposited with the assessee-firm. The assessee cannot take any benefit of the amnesty scheme introduced by the Board by issuing various circulars in this regard. Circular No. 451, dated February 17, 1986 (see [1986] 158 ITR (St.) 135), in the question and answer from Question No. 11 is very much relevant on this issue which is reproduced below (page 137):
‘Question No. 11. Whether ladies and minors can avail of the immunity given by the circulars?
Answer : Yes. In respect of their own income or wealth certainly. But taxpayers who try to introduce black money and benami investments in the names of ladies or minors will be doing so at their own risk.’
Hence the Board had specifically mentioned that bogus and benami declarations are not allowable under the amnesty scheme. The assessee has nowhere furnished evidence regarding the source of income declared by the creditors in their returns of income under the amnesty scheme. From the perusal of these returns filed by above creditors under amnesty scheme it appears that they had not furnished any evidence regarding the source of their income in the returns, income has been declared under the head ‘Income from other sources’ or cash gifts received from relations and friends other than husbands. But due to lack of evidence or details regarding their source of income, it can, therefore, be proved that the creditors do not even deserve the immunity granted by the amnesty scheme as they have not proved their own income as laid down by the Board in answer to question No. 11 of the above-mentioned Circular No. 451.
Even if for the sake of argument it is admitted that immunity has been granted to the creditors under the amnesty scheme and they were not bound to disclose their sources of income, the assessee cannot take any benefit in its own case in view of the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jamnaprasad Kanhaiyalal v. CIT, [1981] 130 ITR 244. This decision has set at rest a controversy among different High Courts regarding voluntary disclosures. It has held that voluntary disclosure scheme cannot be construed as concerning any benefit or immunity to any person other than the person making the declaration under that scheme. There was nothing in that scheme which prevented the Income-tax Officer, if he was not satisfied with the explanation of the assessee about the genuineness or source of the amount found credited in its books, in spite of its already being made a subject of the declaration by the creditor and taxed under the scheme, from investigating the true nature and source of the credits. There is no question of double taxation; once it was found that the income declared by the creditors did not belong to them there was nothing to prevent the same being taxed in the hands of the assessee to whom it actually belongs.
In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that the explanation offered by the assessee regarding the total sum of Rs. 4,80,900 credited in its books of account in the names of the wives, 5 minor children and one major child of the partners is not satisfactory as it could not prove their capacity to make the deposits with the assessee-firm. Hence the total sum of Rs. 4,80,900 so credited is charged to income-tax as the income of the assessee from undisclosed sources for this year and added to its total income.”
4. The assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) which was rejected. The applicant further filed appeal before the Tribunal, which too has been rejected. Before the Tribunal the assessee raised the following submissions:
“2. That the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has failed to appreciate that the interest on these deposits has been duly accepted by the Income-tax Officer, which indirectly proves that he has partially accepted the credits.
3. That the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has failed to appreciate that each of the creditors were regular assessees on record and had deposited fund with the assessee by means of cheques drawn by them in favour of the assessee-firm on their personal bank account.
4. That the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has misdirected himself in stating that the partners have introduced the cash credits in proportion to their capital in the assessee-firm. There is no basis for such observation. In any case, even if these credits represent the credits made by the partners then also these cannot be included as an income of the firm.
5. That the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has misdirected himself in confirming the Assessing Officer's conclusion that the assessee had brought back undeclared income in the form of declaration by the above creditors under the amnesty scheme and no advantage of such deposits can be taken by the assessee. These findings of the Assessing Officer are without any evidence or material on record and are based on mere suspicion and conjectures.
6. That the entire thrust of the arguments and pleading of the Assessing Officer in confirming the cash credits has been only emphasis that the alleged cash creditors are benamidars of the asses-see-firm's partners and as such the income is liable to be included in the hands of the assessee-firm under section 68. This entire approach is prima facie erroneous in law and cannot be sustained specially in view of the provision contained in the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, which is retrospective in application and is universally applicable in India.
7. That the Assessing Officer and the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) have failed to note that the creditors are all regular assessees on record who have paid the moneys by means of cheques and have duly confirmed the deposits. The assessment of the creditors have been duly completed before the present assessment in the hands of the assessee and accordingly there is no warrant for such addition or conclusion as arrived by the authorities below.”
5. The Tribunal held as follows:
“We have heard the parties at length and also carefully perused the entire facts on record. In this case, the facts are not much in dispute. It is admitted that the persons, in whose names the cash credits stood, were wives and minor sons of the partners. It is also admitted that these persons had filed returns under the amnesty scheme and had been assessed on certain incomes, which were deposited in the respective bank accounts. Thereafter, the amounts deposited with the assessee were made through cheques. It is also correct that under the amnesty scheme a person who declares his income will be accepted as such by the Department and the person who declares will not be required to disclose the source of his income or any other details of the return filed by him. The only point in dispute is as to how far the said declaration made by the creditors will got to prove the genuineness of the cash credits made in the accounts of the assessee. The hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jamnaprasad Kanhaiyalal v. CIT, [1981] 130 ITR 244 had held that the declaration under section 24(2) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965, had to relate to income actually earned by the declarant and the Act granted immunity to the declarant alone and not to other persons to whom the income really belonged. The legal fiction created by section 24(3) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965, was limited in its scope and could not be invoked in assessment proceedings relating to any other person, other than a person who is making the declaration under the Act, so as to rule out the applicability of Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The facts of this case were that there were certain cash credits in the names of sons of managing partners and the sons were having an independent source of income. Disclosure was made by the sons under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme. Such disclosure did not preclude enquiry into the genuineness of the cash credits and their assessment as the firm's income from undisclosed sources under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, as held by their Lordships in the said case.
On these decisions of various High Courts and those of the hon'ble Supreme Court it is established that the immunity or the acceptance of the disclosures or the voluntary returns filed by the creditors applies to the persons who made the declarations and it does not extend to a third person in whose books cash credits are entered. The Assessing Officer was perfectly justified in probing into the genuineness of the cash credits and the capacity of the creditors to advance the alleged loans. In this case the creditors being the wives and the minor sons, there is absolutely no explanation on record to show as to what was the source of income and how they happened to possess such huge amounts. The only explanation offered is that they have made voluntary disclosures and the income in their hands was from other source or cash gifts received from relations and friends other than the partners. But due to lack of evidence, the same was to be credited as income. This mere explanation is very vague. No evidence of possession has been given by the assessee to prove that these creditors were having any independent source of income from which they could get the said amount in their possession so as to advance the same to the assessee. Section 68 of the Income-tax Act casts responsibility on the assessee, in whose account the cash credits are entered, to prove the nature and source of the cash credits and if the explanation is not found to be satisfactory, then the said sums so credited may be charged to income-tax as the income of the assessee of that previous year. In the absence of any proper explanation by the assessee, section 68 is a deeming provision and gives a right to the Assessing Officer to treat the said cash credit as income of the assessee. Here, as we have seen from the above description that the only explanation by the assessee is that the creditors had made voluntary disclosures and had been assessed as such under section 143(1) and thereby they had the capacity to advance the loans. That mere explanation, in our opinion, was not sufficient to explain the source of income or the amount in the possession of the creditors and more specially when the creditors were the wives and minor sons of the assessee ordinarily the natural presumption will be that these amounts have been declared voluntarily in the names of the wives and minors just to dilute the impact of taxation while, in fact, the amount really belonged to the assessee. As the amount has been declared in the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme by the wives and minors, the assessee cannot be allowed to take the advantage of the said disclosure. The hon'ble High Courts and the hon'ble Supreme Court, have been very specific on this point that such immunity cannot be availed of by a third person other than the declarant. Hence we are of the opinion that the conclusions arrived at by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) were perfectly correct and justified and do not suffer from any infirmity.
As regards Shri Anil Kumar Gupta, it has been emphasised that he had sufficient liquid fund out of which he has deposited Rs. 90,000 on different dates with the assessee-firm. A copy of account of Shri Anil Kumar Gupta in M/s. Anil Rice Mills, that is, the assessee has been filed which shows the pending balance of Rs. 59,645 in 1983-84. It has been stressed that this assessee as back as in 1983-84 had estimated the amount as cash credits standing in the account of the assessee itself and the same was accepted by the Department and thus his capacity to advance the loan at least should have been accepted. A little careful scrutiny of the facts will show that this argument of learned counsel for the assessee does not have much force. Shri Anil Kumar Gupta had withdrawn a sum of Rs. 50,000 on December 23, 1985, from the firm's account to purchase a truck and in this way only Rs. 9,645 were left in the account. This very assessee had been assessed on the following total income in the assessment years 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86:
A.Y Truck income interest Other sources Total 1983-84 — 9,098 7,000 16,100 1984-85 9,790 — 25,000 15,210 1985-86 14,100 593 — 14,690
From this very assessment, it is evident that the assessee did not have much income so as to spare an amount of Rs. 90,000. He was just a marginal assessee filing the return of Rs. 16,000, Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 14,000 and odd in these respective years. We, therefore, are of the opinion that even he too was not in a position to advance that much amount as shown in his name in the books.”
6. Heard Sri R.R Agarwal, learned counsel for the assessee and Sri A.N Mahajan, learned standing counsel.
7. Learned counsel for the assessee submitted that so far as the applicant is concerned, burden has been discharged proving the nature and source of the deposits as required under section 68 of the Act. He submitted that genuineness of the depositors have not been disputed. Since the money has come through cheques the genuineness of the deposits cannot be disputed and, so far as the capacity of the depositors is concerned, it was explained that the depositors have disclosed their income under the amnesty scheme under the Board Circular No. 451 (see [1986] 158 ITR (St.) 135), dated February 17, 1986, and the declarants' income has been assessed under the amnesty scheme treating it as their own income from undisclosed sources and the gift received. He submitted that under the amnesty scheme the Board has allowed the declarant income from other sources also and it was not necessary to disclose the specific source of income. He submitted that the disclosed income has been accepted for the various years under the amnesty scheme and the depositors had savings out of such disclosed income, which were deposited in the bank in their account and subsequently by cheque paid to the assessee. Therefore, the source of the deposits was fully explained and established. He submitted that under the amnesty scheme ladies and minors have also been allowed to avail of the benefit of the immunity. Their returns have been accepted and their incomes have been assessed. Income disclosed by the depositors, minors and ladies, have not been treated as income of their husband and father. He submitted that there is no issue involved relating to the claim of immunity allowed under the amnesty scheme to the declarant by the assessee. If money is found deposited in the account of the assessee it was always open to the Assessing Authority to make the enquiry with regard to such deposit and it is the assessee to prove the nature and source of such deposit as required under section 68 of the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal has unnecessarily raised the issue relating to the immunity under the amnesty scheme. The submission is that on the facts and circumstances the burden which was on the assessee to prove the nature and source of the deposit has been discharged. The assessee was not required under section 68 of the Act to prove the source of the same and how the income has been earned by the depositors and about their source. He further submitted that even the assessing authority observed that the partners of the firm introduced the money in the name of their wives and minors and even if that is accepted, then the addition should be made in the hands of the partners and not in the hands of the assessee-firm. He further submitted that the interest, which was paid by the assessee-firm to the depositors have not been disallowed which also proves the genuineness of the transactions. On these facts it has been submitted that the Tribunal has illegally observed that the deposited amounts belonged to the assessee, which is based on no evidence. Learned standing counsel submitted that the immunity under the Board Circular No. 451, dated February 17, 1986 (see [1986] 158 ITR (St.) 135), was available only to the declarant and not to the assessee and it was open to the assessing authority to make the enquiry with regard to the deposits. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision of the Commissioner Of Income Tax v. United Trading & Construction Co. and Construction Co., [2001] 247 ITR 819 (SC). He further submitted that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness and the source of the deposits and, therefore, it has been rightly treated as income under section 68 of the Act and the findings in this regard is a finding of fact.
8. The apex court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. United Trading & Construction Co. and Construction Co., [2001] 247 ITR 819 has considered its earlier decision in the case of ITO v. Rattan Lal, [1984] 145 ITR 183. The apex court held as follows (page 820):
“It is now brought to our notice that this very question has since been decided by this court in ITO v. Rattan Lal, [1984] 145 ITR 183. In the said decision it has been held that the immunity enjoyed by a declarant under section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965, under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme is confined to the declarant alone and is not extended to the assessment of a third party assessee in relation to the income disclosed by the declarant. It was further held that there is nothing in section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act which prevents the Income-tax Officer, if he is not satisfied with the explanation of the assessee about the genuineness of sources of amounts found credited in his books to add them to the assessee's income amount in spite of these having already been made the subject-matter of the declaration made by the depositors/creditors. He is entitled to include them as income of the assessee from undisclosed sources.”
9. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments of learned counsel for the parties.
10. The apex court in case of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. United Trading & Construction Co. and Construction Co., [2001] 247 ITR 819 has only held that there is nothing in section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act which prevents the Income-tax Officer, if he is not satisfied with the explanation of the assessee about the genuineness of sources of amounts found credited in his books to add them to the asses-sees' income amount in spite of these having already been made the subject-matter of the declaration made by the depositors/creditors. There is no quarrel about the proposition of law laid down by the apex court which was relating to the case of declaration of the income under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965. Sections 68 and 69 of the Income-tax Act read as follows:
“68. Cash Credits.—Where any sum is found credited in the books of an assessee maintained for any previous year, and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source thereof or the explanation offered by him is not, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, satisfactory, the sum so credited may be charged to income-tax as the income of the assessee of that previous year.
69. Unexplained investments.—Where in the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year the assessee has made investments which are not recorded in the books of account, if any, maintained by him for any source of income, and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source of the investments or the explanation offered by him is not, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, satisfactory, the value of the investments may be deemed to be the income of the assessee of such financial year.”
11. Under section 68 of the Act if any sum is found credited in the books of account of the assessee and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source thereof or the explanation offered by him is not in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, satisfactory, the sum so credited may be charged to income-tax as the income of the assessee of that previous year. Therefore, what has to be enquired into by the assessing authority is about the nature and source of the deposit. If the explanation with regard to nature and source is found unsatisfactory only then the amount so credited may be treated as income.
12. Section 68 came up for consideration before the various High Courts. The courts have held that the assessee has to prove three conditions : (1) identity of the creditor; (2) capacity of such creditor to advance money; and (3) genuineness of the transactions : (vide Shankar Industries v. CIT, [1978] 114 ITR 689 (Cal); C. Kant and Co. v. CIT, [1980] 126 ITR 63 (Cal); Prakash Textile Agency v. CIT, [1980] 121 ITR 890 (Cal); Oriental Wire Industries P. Ltd. v. CIT, [1981] 131 ITR 688 (Cal); CIT v. Baishnab Charan Mohanty, [1995] 212 ITR 199 (Orissa); Jalan Timbers…Applicant; v. Commissioner Of Income Tax N.E Region, Shillong…., [1997] 223 ITR 11 (Gauhati) and CIT v. Korlay Trading Co. Ltd., [1998] 232 ITR 820 (Cal)).
13. If all the aforesaid three conditions are proved the burden shifts on the Revenue to prove that the amount belong to the assessee (vide CIT v. United Commercial and Industrial Co. P. Ltd., [1991] 187 ITR 596 (Cal); M.A Unneeri Kutty v. CIT, [1992] 198 ITR 147 (Ker) SLP dismissed [1993] 201 ITR (St.) 23; CIT v. Precision Finance P. Ltd., [1994] 208 ITR 465 (Cal)).
14. It has been held by the various High Courts that the assessee cannot be asked to prove source of source or the origin of origin [vide S. Hastimal v. CIT, [1963] 49 ITR 273 (Mad); Tolaram Daga v. CIT, [1966] 59 ITR 632 (Assam); CIT v. Daulat Ram Rawatmull, [1973] 87 ITR 349 (SC); Sarogi Credit Corporation v. CIT, [1976] 103 ITR 344 (Patna)].
15. In the case of Jalan Timbers…Applicant; v. Commissioner Of Income Tax N.E Region, Shillong…., [1997] 223 ITR 11, the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court held that under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, the assessee has to prove three important conditions (1) identity of the person, (2) genuineness of the transaction and (3) capability of the person giving cash credit. On the explanation being given the Assessing Authority can reject the explanation by cogent grounds and if the grounds are based on no ground, presumption against the assessee does not arise.
16. In Sreelekha Banerjee v. CIT, [1963] 49 ITR (SC) 112, the apex court held that if there was an entry in the account books of the assessee which showed the receipt of a sum on conversion of high denominations notes tendered for conversion by the assessee himself, it is necessary for the assessee to establish, if asked, what the source of that money was and to prove that it was not income. The Department was not at that stage required to prove anything. It could ask the assessee to produce any books of account or other documents or evidence pertinent to the explanation if one was furnished and examine the evidence and the explanation. If the explanation showed that the receipt was not of an income nature, the Department could not act unreasonably and reject that explanation to hold that it was income. If, however, the evidence was unconvincing then such rejection could be made. The Department cannot by merely rejecting a good explanation unreasonably, convert good proof into no proof.
17. In the case of CTT v. Orissa Corporation P. Ltd., [1986] 159 ITR 78 (SC), the apex court observed as follows (page 84):
“In this case, the assessee had given the names and addresses of the alleged creditors. It was in the knowledge of the Revenue that the said creditors were income-tax assessees. Their index numbers were in the file of the Revenue. The Revenue, apart from issuing notices under section 131 at the instance of the assessee, did not pursue the matter further. The Revenue did not examine the source of income of the said alleged creditors to find out whether they were creditworthy or were such who could advance the alleged loans. There was no effort made to pursue the so called alleged creditors. In those circumstances, the assessee could not do any thing further. In the premises, if the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessee has discharged the burden that lay on him, then it could not be said that such a conclusion was unreasonable or perverse or based on no evidence.”
18. The apex court in the case of Cit, Ernakulam v. P.K Noorjahan (Smt). reported in [1999] 237 ITR 570 (SC); (1997) 11 SCC 198 while interpreting similar language used in section 69 has held as follows (page 573 of [1999] 237 ITR and page 200 of [1997] 11 SCC):
“Shri Ranbir Chandra, the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, has urged that the Tribunal as well as the High Court were in error in their interpretation of section 69 of the Act. The submission is that once the explanation offered by the assessee for the sources of the investments are found to be unacceptable the only course open to the Income-tax Officer was to treat the value of the investments to be the income of the assessee. The submission is that the word may in section 69 should be read as ‘shall’. We are unable to agree. As pointed out by the Tribunal, in the corresponding clause in the Bill, which was introduced in Parliament, the word ‘shall’ had been used but during the course of consideration of the Bill and on the recommendation of the Select Committee, the said word was substituted by the word ‘may’. This clearly indicates that the intention of Parliament in enacting section 69 was to confer a discretion on the Income-tax Officer in the matter of treating the source of investment which has not been satisfactorily explained by the assessee as the income of the assessee and the Income-tax Officer is not obliged to treat such source of investment as income in every case where the explanation offered by the assessee is found to be not satisfactory. The question whether the source of the investment should be treated as income or not under section 69 has to be considered in the light of the facts of each case. In other words, a discretion has been conferred on the Income-tax Officer under section 69 of the Act to treat the source of investment as the income of the assessee if the explanation offered by the assessee is not found satisfactory and the said discretion has to be exercised keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”
19. It may be mentioned here that under the amnesty scheme, the new taxpayers were allowed to declare their income for various years and their returns were allowed to be accepted without any charge of penalty and interest. In the present case, with regard to the deposits, the assessee has offered the explanation that the depositors have given the amount by cheque, they were all income-tax assessees assessed to tax under the amnesty scheme and, therefore, their identity, genuineness of the transaction and their creditworthiness were established. It is not the case where the assessee has claimed any immunity on account of the assessment being made in the case of these depositors under the amnesty scheme. As stated above, under section 68 of the Act it is open to the assessing authority to make the enquiry in respect of the identity, genuineness of the transaction and the creditworthiness of the depositors.
20. From the perusal of the order of the Tribunal and the authorities below, it appears that the explanation of the assessee has not been properly examined and has been rejected mainly on the ground that the immunity of the declaration under the amnesty scheme was only available to the declarant and not to the assessee without appreciating that the assessee has not claimed any immunity under the amnesty scheme. Therefore, in our opinion, the explanation of the assessee with regard to these deposits requires fresh consideration. The order of the Tribunal is also not sustainable on the ground that, before the Tribunal, the assessee has categorically submitted that the assessing authority has held that the partners of the firm introduced the money in the name of their wives and minors and, thus, the addition should be made in the hands of the partners and not in the hands of the assessee. The Tribunal has not considered this aspect of the matter. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal is vitiate. The Tribunal has also not considered that the interest paid to the depositors have not been disallowed which proves the genuineness of the transaction. So far as the addition relating to the deposit of Sri Anil Kumar Gupta is concerned, we find that the Tribunal has not examined the matter properly. Admittedly, Sri Anil Kumar Gupta was an income-tax assessee and was carrying on the business. He has not denied the deposit in the firm. The interest paid on such deposit has not been disallowed. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal should examine the matter afresh in the light of the observations made above.
21. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal is not sustainable and the matter requires reconsideration. We answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. However, the Tribunal is directed to decide the issue with regard to the additions towards cash credit afresh.
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