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Panchu Ram v. State Of U.P And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Tarun Agarwala, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner claims ownership of two plots (No. 25/1 measuring 43 decimals and No. 22 measuring 20.5 decimals) at village Habibpura, Varanasi, having purchased the land by a registered sale deed dated 24.1.1971 from Smt. Bhutani. After purchase the petitioner applied for mutation, but a co-sharer (Ram Kishore) objected and litigation in revenue and civil courts prevented mutation. The petitioner learned that notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (dated 19.11.1981 and 30.11.1981 respectively) had been issued for acquisition of the land. On 24.3.2000 respondent staff reportedly began measuring the land.
The petitioner alleged non-compliance with public announcement requirements and contended that acquisition proceedings had lapsed under section 11-A of the Act because an award was not made within two years of publication of the declaration; alternatively he argued that possession and other steps under sections 8, 9 and 11 were not completed and hence acquisition lapsed. The petitioner sought a mandamus restraining respondents from measuring, mapping or taking possession of his plot.
Respondents (State of U.P., District Magistrate, Varanasi, and Varanasi Development Authority) filed counter-affidavits denying key assertions: they averred that notifications were published in the gazette and public notices placed at convenient places, that notices under section 9 were served after demarcation and survey under section 8, and that several tenure-holders had filed writ petitions which had stayed possession; after dismissal of those writs (knowledge communicated via letter dated 8.5.2000) possession was taken and handed to the Varanasi Development Authority on 10.5.2000. The petitioner did not specifically deny many of these averments in his rejoinder.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the petitioner's plots had lapsed under section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, because an award was not made within two years from publication of the declaration.
- Whether the invocation of section 17(1) (possession prior to award) excludes application of section 11-A so that acquisition does not lapse.
- Whether non-compliance with public announcement requirements and/or failure to serve notices under section 9 invalidates the notifications under sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act.
- Whether the petition should be dismissed on grounds of laches/delay and in light of the petitioner’s conduct (including litigation with co-sharer that contributed to delay).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner asserted ownership of the plots by registered sale deed and that his name was not mutated due to pending litigation with a co-sharer.
- He contended that the respondents failed to make the required public announcement (beat of drum or public notice in locality) after issuance of notifications under sections 4 and 6, and therefore the declaration was invalid.
- He argued that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under section 11-A because no award was made within two years from the publication of the declaration and possession was not taken within the period; alternatively, even after writ petitions were finally decided, respondents did not take possession or make award within two years.
- The petitioner relied on several authorities (including Ram Jiyawan, Yusuf Bhai Noor Mohammed Nendoliya, and Abdul Majeed Sahib) for the proposition that failure to make an award within two years from publication of declaration leads to lapse of acquisition proceedings.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondents contended that notifications under sections 4(1) and 6 were duly published in the gazette and public notices of substance were placed at convenient places in the locality as required.
- They asserted that demarcation and survey under section 8 were carried out and notices under section 9(1) were served on recorded tenureholders on 16.12.1982; some tenure-holders filed objections.
- They pointed out that several tenure-holders filed writ petitions and interim orders in those petitions restrained dispossession; consequently, possession could not be taken earlier. Once the writ petitions were dismissed (information received on 8.5.2000), steps were taken and possession was taken and handed over on 10.5.2000.
- Respondents relied on the proposition that where possession is taken under section 17(1), section 11-A does not apply because land vests in Government on taking possession under section 17(1).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Jiyawan v. State of U.P, AIR 1994 Alld. 38 | Authority cited by petitioner for proposition that where award not made within two years from declaration under section 6(1), acquisition lapses. | Cited by petitioner but Court found it distinguishable because section 17(1) was not invoked in those cases; therefore not applicable to present facts. |
| Yusuf Bhai Noor Mohammed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2153 (1991 4 SCC 531) | Explains the Explanation to section 11-A: benefit is for landholders who do not obtain interim orders delaying proceedings; award must be made within two years of declaration or acquisition lapses. | Court relied on this to state the principle that a landholder seeking benefit of section 11-A must not have obtained interim relief that delayed proceedings; applied to conclude that those who secured interim orders contributed to delay and cannot claim benefit. |
| Abdul Majeed Sahib v. The District Collector, AIR 1997 SC 2130 | Authority cited by petitioner for the general proposition that failure to make award within two years from declaration leads to lapse. | Cited by petitioner but Court found it distinguishable on facts because section 17(1) had been invoked in the present case. |
| Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P, 1993 22 ALR 500 SC | Held that when section 17(1) is applied and Government takes possession, section 11-A cannot apply; land vests in Government and cannot revert to owner. | Court relied on this Supreme Court dicta to hold that invocation of section 17(1) precludes application of section 11-A and that acquisition did not lapse. |
| Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1996 27 ALR 24 Sum. | Reiterated that where Government had taken possession under section 17(1), section 11-A is not attracted and acquisition does not lapse even if no award was made within period. | Court cited this to support the proposition that possession under section 17(1) means acquisition is not subject to section 11-A lapse. |
| Sushil Kumar v. State of U.P, 1999 35 ALR 285 | Held that where possession under section 17(1) was not taken before expiry of two years, section 11-A could be attracted and acquisition could lapse. | Court distinguished Sushil Kumar on facts: here possession was taken within stipulated period (having regard to knowledge of dismissal), hence Sushil Kumar inapplicable. |
| Smt. Kamla Pandey v. Collector Agra, 1989 15 ALR 436 | Held that where landowner contributes to delay, acquisition proceedings should not be quashed in exercise of Article 226; public purpose and larger public interest weigh against quashing. | Court relied on this reasoning to exercise discretion under Article 226 and refused to quash acquisition where petitioner's own litigative conduct contributed to delay. |
| Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 1998 4 SCC 387 | Holds writ challenges to notifications under sections 4 and 6 can be dismissed for delay and laches if not brought within reasonable time; cannot sit on fence and later challenge. | Cited to support the conclusion that the petitioner's long delay (over 18 years) and conduct attract laches and justify dismissal of writ on that ground. |
| Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P.) Ltd. | Principle that courts should be loath to quash notifications where there is inordinate delay and steps in acquisition have become final; award and possession are material considerations in Article 226. | Court applied this pragmatic approach to decline to quash acquisition in view of possession taken and other final steps; reinforced rejection of petition on delay/merit. |
| Northern India Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh, 2003 1 SCC 335 | Reiterates disfavor towards quashing acquisition where landowner approaches court after many years (example cited: 17 years). | Cited to reinforce the Court's view on laches and the impropriety of belated challenges to acquisition proceedings. |
| Atma Ram Dhaniya v. State of U.P (C.M.W.P. No. 14885 of 1982) decided 10.9.1990; Tuliya v. State (WP No. 15173 of 1982) decided 25.11.1997; Bhagwan Das v. State of U.P (WP No. 15175 of 1982) decided 25.11.1997; Chandra Shekhar Pandey v. State of U.P (WP No. 1769 of 1982) decided 18.11.1997; Ram Kishore v. State of U.P (WP No. 66 of 1983) decided 30.10.1995 | Series of writ petitions filed by tenure-holders challenging the same notifications; some interim orders restrained dispossession; these writs were dismissed on various dates. | Court used these factual precedents to explain why possession could not be earlier taken (interim stays) and to establish the timeline culminating in knowledge of dismissal on 8.5.2000 and possession on 10.5.2000. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis based strictly on facts and cited authorities:
- The core factual finding was that the notification dated 30.11.1981 was issued under section 6 read with section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, authorizing the Collector to take possession after issuance of section 9(1) notice even though the award under section 11 had not been made. Notices under section 9 were issued and demarcation and survey under section 8 were carried out; some tenure-holders filed objections and obtained interim orders which restrained dispossession.
- The Court observed that respondents received information of dismissal of relevant writ petitions only on 8.5.2000, and possession was taken and handed over to Varanasi Development Authority on 10.5.2000. The petitioner did not deny these material averments in his rejoinder.
- The Court relied on Supreme Court jurisprudence (notably Satendra Prasad Jain and Awadh Bihari Yadav) holding that when section 17(1) is applied and Government takes possession, section 11-A cannot apply because the land vests in Government and there is no statutory provision for reversion of land vested in Government. Consequently, section 11-A's lapse provision does not apply where section 17(1) has been invoked and possession has been taken.
- The Court distinguished the decisions cited by the petitioner (which supported lapse under section 11-A) on the ground that in those cases section 17(1) had not been invoked; hence those authorities were not applicable here.
- Even on the petitioner's alternative argument that possession or award were not completed within two years after the final disposal of writ petitions, the Court found that the period to be excluded under the Explanation to section 11-A ran until respondents acquired knowledge of dismissal (8.5.2000). Possession was taken on 10.5.2000, which the Court treated as within the permissible period when the Explanation is applied; therefore Sushil Kumar (which held lapse where possession not taken within two years) did not apply.
- The Court further analyzed the scheme and intent of section 11-A by reference to Yusuf Bhai Noormohmed Nendoliya, concluding that the Explanation is intended to benefit landholders who did not obtain interim orders delaying proceedings. Here, tenure-holders (including the petitioner’s co-sharer) had filed writ petitions and obtained interim reliefs that contributed to delay; thus the petitioner could not claim the benefit of section 11-A.
- Exercising discretionary powers under Article 226, the Court held that it would not quash acquisition proceedings where the landowner had contributed to the delay and where the acquisition served a public purpose. The Court relied on Kamla Pandey, Larsen & Toubro, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Northern India Glass Industries to support refusal to quash on grounds of laches and public interest.
- On the contention that the petitioner personally did not receive notices under section 9, the Court noted that the petitioner’s name was not on the revenue record and so he was not entitled to individual notice; notices were served on the recorded co-sharer. The Court held that failure to serve section 9 notice on the petitioner (who was not recorded) did not invalidate the notifications under sections 4 and 6 up to that stage.
- Finally, the Court observed inordinate delay (the notifications were dated November 1981 and the writ petition was filed in 2000) and rejected the petitioner’s sworn assertion of ignorance as implausible given the publication of notifications and related litigation in which the petitioner’s co-sharer and other tenure-holders were engaged.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The Court's core ruling is: Petition Dismissed.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The Court held that acquisition proceedings did not lapse under section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, because possession was taken after invocation of section 17(1) and, by virtue of section 17(1) and binding Supreme Court authority, section 11-A is not attracted where possession under section 17(1) has occurred.
- The land in question vests with the Government (and was handed to the Varanasi Development Authority on 10.5.2000), free from encumbrances as contemplated by section 17(1).
- The petitioner is not entitled to equitable relief under Article 226 in the circumstances because (a) tenure-holders contributed to delay by obtaining interim orders, (b) there was inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in bringing the challenge (petition filed in 2000 against 1981 notifications), and (c) important public interest considerations militate against quashing the acquisition.
- There shall be no order as to costs.
The opinion applies established Supreme Court principles and distinguished contrary holdings on the factual basis that section 17(1) had been invoked and possession was taken; the Court did not purport to lay down any novel legal doctrine beyond applying existing authority and facts to deny relief.
This summary is strictly based on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or law beyond what the opinion reports.
Tarun Agarwala, J.:— The petitioner claims to be the owner of plot No. 25/1 and plot No. 22 measuring 43 decimal and 20.5 decimal respectively situate at village Habibpura, Pargana Dehat Amanat, Tehsil and District Varanasi. The petitioner alleged that the plot originally belonged to one Gajadhar and upon his death the property was partitioned between his two sons, namely, Lakshmi Narain and Shiv Shanker. After the death of Lakshmi Narain his share developed upon his widow Smt. Bhutani. The petitioner contended that he became the owner of the plot by virtue of the registered sale deed dated 24.1.1971 executed by Smt. Bhutani in his favour. It was further stated that after purchasing the aforesaid property the petitioner moved an application for mutation in his name. The co-sharer, Ram Kishore, son of Shiv Shanker filed an objection and the matter is still pending in the Revenue Court as well as in the Civil Court, on account of which the petitioner's name could not be mutated in the revenue records. The petitioner contended that on 24.3.2000 the staff and the employees of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 started measuring the disputed land. The petitioner made inquiries from the office of the District Magistrate and Varanasi Development Authority, Varanasi and then came to know that the notification under section 4 dated 19.11.1981 and the notification under section 6, dated 30.11.1981 had been issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for acquiring the land for a public purpose.
2. The petitioner contended that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 failed to make the public announcement by beat of drum or by affixing a public notice in the locality after the issuance of the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act, and therefore, the petitioner was unaware of the land acquisition proceedings. It was contended that the non compliance of the public announcement invalidated the notification under section 4 of the Act. The petitioner further contended that the notification under sections 4 and 6 had lapsed and the plot is liable to be reverted back to the petitioner in view of section 11-A of the Act since the award was not made within two years from the date of the publication of the declaration. It was asserted that after issuance of the notification under section 17(1) of the Act, the Collector failed to take possession of the acquired land nor any proceedings were initiated under sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Act and therefore, the acquisition proceedings are deemed to have been lapsed in view of section 11-A of the Act. The petitioner further submitted that other plot owners whose land had also been acquired under the aforesaid notifications had challenged the said notifications by means of various writ petitions, which were finally decided in the year 1995 and even after the said decision the Collector took no steps to start the proceedings under sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Act, nor took possession of the land within two years from the date of the dismissal of the writ petitions and therefore, the acquisition proceedings had lapsed in view of section 11-A of the Act. In view of the assertions made by the petitioner, the petitioner in the present petition prayed that a mandamus be issued to respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 directing them not to measure the land or prepare the map or take possession of the plot of the petitioner.
3. The State of Uttar Pradesh and the District Magistrate, Varanasi have filed a counter-affidavit. In paragraph-4 of the counter-affidavit it has been contended that the name of Smt. Bhutani does not figure in the revenue records nor her husband's name was ever recorded in the revenue records and only the name of one Kishore had been recorded as Bhumidhar of Plot No. 25/1. In paragraph-9 of the counter-affidavit it has been submitted that the notification under sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act, was duly published in the gazette and public notice of substance was given at convenient places in the locality, as envisaged under the aforesaid section. It was also submitted that the notice under section 9 was also given to the recorded tenureholders of the area as early as on 16.12.1982 after demarcation and survey of the land was made by the competent authority under section 8 of the Act. It was further submitted that some of the tenureholders, who received the notice under section 9 of the Act, had filed objections before the Collector, Varanasi. In paragraph-10 of the counter-affidavit, the respondents contended that several tenure-holders filed writ petitions before this Hon'ble Court challenging the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act, which were decided on various dates namely, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14885 of 1982 (Atma Ram Dhaniya v. State of U.P) decided on 10.9.1990, Writ Petition No. 15173 of 1982 (Tuliya v. State), decided on 25.11.1997, Writ Petition No. 15175 of 1982 (Bhagwan Das v. State of U.P), decided on 25.11.1997, Writ Petition No. 1769 of 1982 (Chandra Shekhar Pandey v. State of U.P.), decided on 18.11.1997, Writ Petition No. 66 of 1983 (Ram Kishore v. State of U.P), decided on 30.10.1995, which relates to the impugned plot in question. The respondents contended that in all the aforesaid writ petitions interim orders were passed by this Hon'ble Court restraining dispossession of the writ petitioners and therefore, the possession of the land could not be taken inspite of the issuance of notice under section 9(1) of the Act. It was further stated that the respondents came to know about the dismissal of the aforesaid writ petitions vide letter dated 8.5.2000 of the Law Officer of Varanasi Development Authority and thereafter steps were initiated for taking possession of the land on 9.5.2000 and the possession was handed over to the Varanasi Development Authority on 10.5.2000 The aforesaid paragraph Nos. 4, 9 and 10 of the counter-affidavit have not been specifically denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit. In paragraph-5 of the rejoinder-affidavit, the petitioner admits that the revenue authorities failed to enter the name of the petitioner in the revenue records inspite of the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Naib Tehsildar, Varanasi on account of litigation with the co-sharer. The petitioner in paragraph-10 of the rejoinder affidavit has not denied that after issuance of notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act, public notice was not made at convenient places in the locality nor has he denied that the notice under section 9 was not given to the recorded tenure holders. The petitioner has also not denied that the respondents have taken possession of the land on 10.5.2000 The petitioner in paragraph-11 of the rejoinder affidavit has not denied that various writ petitions were filed by other tenure holders including the co-sharer challenging the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act, which were dismissed on various dates by this High Court nor has denied that the State Government come to know about the dismissal of the writ petition vide letter dated 8.5.2000 of the Law Officer of Varanasi Development Authority.
4. We have heard Sri S.O.P Agarwal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shrish Chand Khare, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State of U.P and District Magistrate, Varanasi, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned Counsel appearing for Varanasi Development Authority, respondent No. 3.
5. The sheet anchor of the petitioner's plea is that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of section 11-A of the Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that since the award was not made within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration, the entire proceedings in the acquisition of the land lapsed and the said land was liable to be reverted back to the petitioner. It was further contended that the interim order of the Court came to an end, when the writ petitions of other tenureholders were finally decided in the year 1995 and even then no steps were taken by the respondents to complete the proceedings under sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Act nor possession was taken within a period of two years from 1995. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions, namely, Ram Jiyawan v. State of U.P . AIR 1994 Alld. 38., Yusuf Bhai Noor Mohammed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat . AIR 1991 SC 2153., Abdul Majeed Sahib v. The District Collector . AIR 1997 SC 2130.. In the aforesaid decisions it has been held that if the award is not made within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6(1) of the Act, the acquisition proceedings will lapse.
6. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner has no force and is liable to be rejected. The decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are totally distinguishable and are not applicable to the present case. In the aforesaid cases (supra), the provisions of section 17(1) of the Act was not invoked and it became obligatory on the authority to make an award within two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6(1) of the Act.
7. In the present case, the notification dated 30.11.1981 was issued under section 6 read with section 17(1) of the Act, authorizing the Collector to take possession of the land after issuance of notice under section 9(1) even though the award under section 11 had not been made. Pursuant to the said notification, notices under section 9 were issued to the recorded tenure holders, but the possession could not be taken on account of the interim orders passed in various writ petitions. The proceedings for taking possession of the land were again initiated after the disposal of the writ petitions, when the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 received information on 8.5.2000, whereupon, the possession was taken and handed over to the Varanasi Development Authority on 10.5.2000
8. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P . 1993 22 ALR 500 SC. the Supreme Court held:
“When section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly section 11-A, can have no application to cases of acquisition under section 17 because the land has already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.”
9. The same view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar . 1996 27 ALR 24 Sum., wherein it was held:
“In this case, the Government had taken possession of the land in question under section 17(1) of the Act. It is not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition (section 48 of the Act). In such a case, section 11-A of the Act is not attracted and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse, even if it is assumed that no award was made within the period prescribed by section 11-A of the Act.”
10. In view of the clear dictum laid down by the Supreme Court, we hold that since the possession of the land was taken by the Government after invoking section 17(1) of the Act, the provisions of section 11-A is not attracted and the acquisition proceeding in the instant case did not lapse, even though, it is assumed that no award was made within the prescribed period, as envisaged under section 11-A of the Act. We further hold that since the Government took the possession of the land, the land vests absolutely with the Government free from all encumbrances, as contemplated under section 17(1) and cannot be reverted back to the petitioner.
11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that after the dismissal of the writ petition, the respondents did not take possession nor made the award within two years and therefore the revision of section 11-A is attracted. The petitioner since urged that the possession of the land was not taken, nor the award was made within two years, the entire acquisition proceedings lapsed under section 11-A of the Act.
12. According to the petitioner the last of the writ petition was dismissed on 25.11.1997 and excluding the period of stay, the limitation to make an award or take possession stood extended till 25.11.1999 Neither possession was taken nor award was made till 25.11.1999 and therefore, the acquisition proceeding lapsed by operation of law as contemplated under section 11-A of the Act. In support of his contention, the petitioner has placed reliance of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sushil Kumar v. State of U.P . 1999 35 ALR 285., in which it was held that since the possession of the land was not taken under section 17(1) of the Act before the expiry of two years, the provision of section 11-A is attracted and the acquisition proceedings lapsed by operation of law.
13. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The dismissal of the writ petition on 25.11.1997 was brought to the knowledge of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 only on 8.5.2000 whereupon possession of the land was taken and handed over to Varanasi Development Authority on 10.5.2000 The fact that the respondents came to know about the dismissal of the writ petition only on 8.5.2000 has not been denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder-affidavit. Therefore, in our view, the period to be excluded under the Explanation to section 11-A would be upto 8.5.2001, i.e, till the date of knowledge of the dismissal of the writ petition. Admittedly, the possession of the land was taken on 10.5.2000 The decision in Sushil Kumar's case (supra) is therefore not applicable inasmuch as in the present case the possession of the land had already been taken within the stipulated period of two years. Therefore, we hold that since the possession of the land was taken by the respondents within the stipulated period, the acquisition proceedings did not lapse under section 11-A of the Act.
14. At this stage we may look into another aspect of the matter. The provisions of section 11-A was inserted in the Act to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award was made within a period of two years from the date of declaration under section 6 of the Act. The Supreme Court in Yusuf Bhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat . 1991 4 SCC 531 at 535. held:
“On the other hand, it appears to us that the Explanation is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the landholder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a Court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those landholders who do not obtain any order from a Court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired.”
15. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision (supra), is that the owner of the land or a person who is interested in the land and wants to take advantage of section 11-A of the Act, must not have obtained an interim order.
16. In the present case the tenureholders including the co-sharer of the petitioner had filed various writ petitions before this Hon'ble Court challenging the acquisition proceedings thereby stalling the acquisition proceedings on account of interim orders granted by this Court. The tenureholders themselves contributed to the delay and did not allow the respondents from taking possession of the land. Therefore, assuming that the possession of the land was not taken within the stipulated period, we are not inclined to quash the acquisition proceedings in exercise of the discretionary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Similar view was taken by another Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Kamla Pandey v. Collector Agra . 1989 15 ALR 436, wherein their Lordship opined:
“We think where the land owner himself contributes to the delay in making the award, the acquisition proceeding ought not to be quashed in the exercise of the discretionary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The acquisition is undoubtedly for a laudable public purpose, namely, construction of a housing colony. The urgency of providing housing accommodation in urban areas can scarcely be over-emphasized. In the present case in pursuance of the scheme conceived by the Agra Development Authority, houses/flats have already been constructed and thereafter sold or allotted to various individuals. It is not disputed that over the petitioner's land also in implementation of the housing scheme buildings have been constructed. This finds corroboration from the petitioners' applications referred to above in which she had specifically asked for the removal of the malwa existing over her land. Further the scheme is an integrated one and, therefore, it will be inappropriate to quash the acquisition proceedings on the ground that in respect of the petitioner's plot the Special Land Acquisition Officer omitted to determine the amount of compensation. The omission was not a fraud on the statute but was clearly bonafide based on the consideration that there was a move afoot for the release of the land from acquisition. Moreover, the persons who would be hit by the quashing of the acquisition proceedings are not before us. To quash the proceedings at this stage of things would not, in our considered view, be appropriate. It would defeat the larger public interest if we were to quash the proceedings on the technicality, assuming that the omission to make an award in respect of the petitioners' land within time produced the effect of vitiating the entire acquisition proceedings.”
17. Thus, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in exercise of the discretionary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that no notice under section 9 was given to the petitioner and non-compliance of this provision invalidates the notifications issued under sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid submission. Section 9(1) of the Act imposes a legal duty on the Collector to cause service of a general notice to be given at convenient places and the Collector is under a legal obligation to serve notice on the occupier and interested persons under section 9(3) of the Act. In para-9 of the counter affidavit of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, it has been specifically averred that notice of substance was given at convenient places in the locality and notices under section 9(3) were also given to the recorded tenureholders after demarcations and survey of the land made under section 8 of the Act. Some of the tenureholders also filed objections. Proof of the notices sent to the recorded tenureholders and their objections have been annexed to the counter affidavit as Annexures-CA-3, 3A, 3B, 3C, 4 and 5.
19. These averments have not been denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit. It is admitted by the petitioner that his name was not recorded or mutated in the revenue record. Since the petitioner's name was not recorded in the revenue record, he was not entitled to a notice under section 9 of the Act. However, the co-sharer was given notice, who then filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 66 of 1983 with regard to the same plot. The said writ petition was eventually dismissed on 30.10.1995 Even otherwise, the mere fact that notices under section 9 were not served on the petitioner the same could not invalidate or render nugatory the land acquisition proceedings up to the stage of notices under sections 4 and 6 of the Act.
20. Before parting, we would like to add that there has been an inordinate delay in challenging the acquisition proceedings. The notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued on 19.11.1981 and 30.11.1981 The present writ petition was filed in the year 2000 after more than 18 years. The petitioner in para-14 of the writ petition has alleged that he came to know about these proceedings on 24.3.2000, when the respondents started measuring his land. This paragraph has been sworn on the basis of “perusal of records”. Such an averment cannot be sworn on the basis of perusal of records and can only be sworn on personal knowledge. Even otherwise, the notification under sections 4 and 6 was duly published and public notice of substance was given at convenient places in the locality. The petitioner has been litigating with his co-sharer, who had filed a writ petition. Other tenureholders had also filed writ petitions. It is, therefore, impossible to believe that the petitioner had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings.
21. The Supreme Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat . 1998 4 SCC 387 at page 401. held as follows:
“This Court has repeatedly held that writ petition challenging the notifications issued under sections 4 and 6 of the Act is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches if challenge is not made within a reasonable time. This Court has said that the petitioner cannot sit on the fence and allow the State to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that notification under section 4 and the declaration under section 6 were valid and then to attack the notifications on the grounds which were available to him at the time when these were published as otherwise it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics.”
22. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P.) Ltd., held as follows:
“It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under section 4(1) and declaration under section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226.”
23. The same view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Northern India Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh . 2003 1 SCC 335., where the land owner approached the High Court after a period of 17 years after finalisation of the acquisition proceedings.
24. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the petitioner is guilty of laches and the writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay.
25. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition has no merit and is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Petition Dismissed.
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