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Gauri Shanker And Others v. State Of U.P And Others

Allahabad High Court
Aug 25, 2004
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (M. Katju, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This special appeal challenged the judgment of a learned single Judge dated 7-8-2004. The appeal arises from a sequence of Government orders and a statutory amendment. By Government Order dated 24-4-1999 (Annexure 2 to the appeal) employees of certain State Government departments were sent to work in various Gram Panchayats. Concern that the 24-4-1999 order might be declared illegal led to amendment of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act by U.P. Act No. 27 of 1999 (effective 27-6-1999), which inserted S.25 and S.25-A empowering the State Government to transfer employees to serve under Gram Panchayats while preserving their terms and conditions of service, and empowering appointment of a Secretary from amongst those employees.

A fresh Government order dated 1-7-1999 (Annexure 8) transferred U.P. Government servants of eight departments as Gram Panchayat Vikas Adhikaris. The petitioners belonged to three of those categories (Kisan Sahayak, Cane Supervisor, Gram Vikas Adhikari). Some categories were returned to the State Government while the petitioners' categories initially remained at the Gram Panchayat level. Subsequently an impugned order dated 20-7-2004 transferred the petitioners and others back to their State Government departments.

The learned single Judge dismissed a writ petition on 6-8-2004 but introduced a condition that petitioners "shall not be compelled to discharge duty under the administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayat" and directed the State Government to pass an appropriate order in light of observations in that judgment. This special appeal challenges the impugned judgment and related orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether State Government employees who were transferred to serve under Gram Panchayats under S.25 cease to be State Government employees (i.e., whether the employer changes to the Gram Panchayat) or remain State Government servants on deputation to Gram Panchayats.
  2. The correct constitutional and statutory interpretation of S.25 and S.25-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1999 (U.P. Act No. 27 of 1999), specifically whether those provisions must be read so as to preserve constitutional validity.
  3. Whether the learned single Judge's condition that employees "shall not be compelled to discharge duty under the administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayat" was legally permissible.
  4. Whether persons who remain State Government servants but are posted at Gram Panchayat level fall within the zone of consideration for appointment as Secretary under S.25-A, and what procedural safeguards (if any) should govern such appointments.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Submitted by Sri Ashok Khare: once transferred to Gram Panchayats by the Government order, the appellants cannot be sent back to the State Government because they cease to be State Government employees and become employees of the Gram Panchayat.
  • Contended that if S.25 were interpreted to mean the employer remains the State Government (i.e., deputation), that interpretation would be incorrect because the statutory language states the State Government "may ... transfer any employee ... to serve under Gram Panchayats," implying change of employer.
  • Argued further that S.25, even if construed as effecting a change of employer to the Gram Panchayat, does not violate fundamental rights and therefore should not be struck down as unconstitutional.
  • Challenged the impugned Government Order dated 20-7-2004 as illegal because, although it purports to withdraw employees to the parent organisation, it again posts them to work at the Gram Panchayat level under administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayat.

Respondent / State

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's pleaded arguments; the Court's reasoning primarily addresses the appellants' submissions and relevant authorities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manbodh Kumar Lal v. State of U.P (Div. Bench) Held that State Government employees sent under S.25(1) continue to be Government employees. Court relied on and respectfully followed this Division Bench decision in concluding appellants remain State Government servants.
State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (Supreme Court, 1983) Once a person attains status of Government servant it cannot be extinguished except by abolition of post or termination under Art. 311; differentiation contrary to Art. 14 not permissible. Adopted as controlling precedent to support the view that transferred employees retain Government-servant status and cannot be deprived of it without compliance with Art.311/Art.14.
Krishna Kant Tiwari v. State of U.P (single Judge and Div. Bench) Held such Government employees sent to Gram Panchayats under S.25 are on deputation. Court followed this authority to hold appellants were on deputation to Gram Panchayats.
Subhash Chand Pandey v. State of U.P Reiterated view that employees sent under S.25 remain Government servants/on deputation. Cited in support of the conclusion that appellants are U.P. Government servants on deputation.
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India Presumption in favour of constitutional validity of State action/statute. Used to support approach that, if statutory language admits two interpretations, court should adopt interpretation preserving constitutionality.
Madhu Limaye v. S.D.A Presumption of constitutionality of statute. Referred for the general principle of preferring interpretations that uphold statutes.
P.N. Krishnalal v. Government of Kerala Presumption in favour of constitutional validity (cited among authorities). Relied upon as part of the body of authorities on respecting legislative competence and presumption of validity.
Jilu Bhai Nan Bhai v. State of Gujarat Authority cited for presumption of constitutionality. Placed among authorities supporting preference for constitutional interpretation.
Rt. Re v. Msgr. Mark Netto (1979) (Constitution Bench) Court can read down a statutory provision to make it constitutional. Invoked to justify narrowing construction of S.25 to avoid constitutional infirmity.
Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration (Constitution Bench) Constitutional defence can lead Courts to construe statutes narrowly to preserve validity. Used to support the proposition that provisions should be interpreted in a way that sustains validity rather than invalidates them.
Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. Presumption that legislature does not exceed jurisdiction; prefer interpretation keeping statute operative. Cited to support choosing an interpretation of S.25 that keeps it within legislative competence.
State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. Authority cited for presumption that legislature does not exceed jurisdiction. Referred to as part of the general canon of statutory interpretation sustaining validity.
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel Principle that if one construction renders statute ultra vires and another keeps it valid, the latter should be preferred. Applied to prefer the interpretation that S.25 effects deputation rather than change of employer.
State of Kerala v. Krishnan Nayar Similar rule of preferring constitutional interpretation. Included among authorities supporting the interpretive approach adopted by the Court.
Rayala Corporation v. Director of Enforcement Principle of narrowing construction to avoid unconstitutionality. Part of cited authorities underpinning the interpretive approach.
Jothi Timber Mart v. Corporation of Calicut Rule of reading statute to preserve validity. Referred to in the context of interpreting general words narrowly to sustain statutes.
K.S. Venkataraman & Co. v. State of Madras Canon that courts prefer an interpretation that keeps statute within competence. Referred among authorities supporting narrow constructions to maintain validity.
Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema Statute should be read so as to make it valid; interpret doubtful words in a validating manner. Invoked to justify construction of S.25 that preserves constitutional validity.
Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan Example of restricting words to avoid violation of fundamental rights. Used as authority for reading legislative words narrowly to avoid constitutional conflict.
Kedarnath v. State of Bihar Narrow construction of S.124-A IPC to avoid violating Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(2). Illustrated willingness to limit statutory scope to preserve constitutionality; relied upon as precedent for interpretive technique.
State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi Presumption that legislature does not intend to exceed jurisdiction; prefer operative construction. Cited in support of interpretive principles favouring validity.
Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India Authority on preferring an interpretation that keeps an enactment valid. Referred to as part of the consistent line of authority on constitutionally favourable construction.
New Delhi Municipal Committee v. State of Punjab General words in a statute may be construed narrowly to sustain validity (applied to tax/properties). Referred to in the argument that general statutory language may be limited by implication to preserve constitutionality.
A.G. Gambia v. Momodon Jobe (PC) Support for implying limits in statutory language to uphold validity (privy council authority cited). Used as part of international authorities supporting narrow/read‑down constructions.
Hector v. Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda (PC) Authority for adopting narrow construction to preserve validity (privy council). Referred to in support of read-down approach.
Hindu Women's Right to Property Act (Federal Court) Example where the word "property" was construed as excluding agricultural land to keep the Act within competence. Used as an illustration that courts may limit meanings of broad words to avoid constitutional invalidity.
R.L. Arora v. State of U.P Narrow construction of statutory words to avoid conflict with constitutional provisions. Cited as an instance of restricting statutory meaning to maintain constitutionality.
New India Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax Wide definitions may be restricted by construction to avoid attributing competence beyond legislature. Referred in support of read-down approach for statutory language.
Indian Oil Corporation v. Municipal Corporation Read down wide language (e.g., "imported into the city") to preserve legislative competence. Used as an example of narrowing statutory language to sustain validity.
Shining Tailors v. Industrial Tribunal Supervision/control test alone is not decisive; multiple factors should be considered to determine employer-employee relationship. Relied on to explain that supervision/control at Gram Panchayat level does not by itself convert the employer to the Gram Panchayat.
Ram Singh v. Union Territory Advocated a multiple pragmatic approach to determine employment status. Applied to support a multifactor approach rather than a single control test in deciding deputation/employer status.
Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B Staff Canteen Workers Union Warned against rigid single-test approaches; multiple factors should guide the inquiry. Used to justify considering multiple indicia rather than only supervision/control.
Kunal Nanda v. Union of India Principle that a deputationist has no right to remain on deputation and can be recalled by parent department. Cited to support the conclusion that appellants on deputation could be sent back to the parent department at any time.
State of Punjab v. Inder Singh Authority for recalling deputationists to their parent departments. Relied upon to reinforce that deputationist has no right to continue on deputation indefinitely.
Mahesh Kumar Parmar v. S.I.G Authority on deputation/repatriation principles (cited). Used among authorities to support that deputation can be terminated by parent employer.
Ratilal Soni v. State of Gujarat Authority concerning status and control in deputation/transfer contexts (cited). Included among precedents supporting the Court's conclusion on deputation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a statutory and constitutional analysis focused on two possible constructions of S.25:

  1. Construction 1: The transfer under S.25 changes the employer from the State Government to the Gram Panchayat (employees become Gram Panchayat employees).
  2. Construction 2: The employer remains the State Government and the employees are sent on deputation to Gram Panchayats.

The Court observed that a literal reading of S.25 might permit either construction. However, constitutional constraints (notably Articles 14 and 311 and the hierarchy of laws) and precedent require preference for an interpretation that preserves validity. The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in State of Gujarat v. Ramanlal which establishes that once Government‑servant status accrues, it cannot be taken away except by abolition of the post or termination under Art.311, and that arbitrary differentiation would offend Art.14.

Applying well-established interpretive canons—presumption of constitutionality, preference for readings that keep statutes within legislative competence, and the power to read down or narrow general words—the Court concluded that S.25 should be read as effecting deputation rather than changing the employer. The Court cited a sequence of authorities (Manbodh Kumar Lal, Krishna Kant Tiwari, Subhash Chand Pandey and others) that expressly held transferred employees continue as Government servants/on deputation, and accepted those holdings.

The Court addressed the factual circumstance that employees were working under supervision and control of Gram Panchayats and explained that the supervision/control test is not exclusively determinative; modern jurisprudence requires a multifactor, pragmatic approach (Shining Tailors; Ram Singh; Indian Overseas Bank). Thus, physical posting under Panchayat control does not ipso facto change employer status.

Concerning the single Judge's condition that petitioners "shall not be compelled to discharge duty under the administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayat," the Court rejected that condition. The Court reasoned that an employer (here the State Government) may lawfully specify under whose supervision or control its servant should work; that does not alter employer status. The Court clarified that while the Gram Panchayat may exercise supervision and control for work purposes, it cannot terminate the employees' service—termination remains a function of the employer (State Government).

On S.25-A (appointment of Secretary), the Court held that employees on deputation to Gram Panchayats who are posted at the Gram Panchayat level under administrative and financial control will fall within S.25(1)(b) and can be considered for appointment as Secretaries under S.25‑A. However, the Court made two points:

  • The Court only held they may be appointed as Secretary; it did not mandate appointment—choice remains the State Government's discretion or that of the empowered authority.
  • To prevent arbitrariness and abuses (pick and choose, nepotism, discrimination), the State Government must adopt objective, rational criteria and procedures for appointment of Secretaries under S.25-A.

Finally, the Court clarified that if a repatriated employee is not subsequently posted at Gram Panchayat level under administrative and financial control, that employee will not be in the zone of consideration for appointment as Secretary under S.25‑A.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Court held that the employees transferred to Gram Panchayats under S.25 remain U.P. Government servants and are regarded as being on deputation to Gram Panchayats; the appeal is disposed of with these observations.

Direct implications and consequences arising from the holding:

  • The appellants remain State Government servants on deputation and therefore the State Government remains their employer; they can be repatriated to their parent department without violating Art.311 because no loss of Government-servant status is being effected by the transfer.
  • The State Government may lawfully direct under whose supervision and control its employees shall work; being placed under supervision/control of a Gram Panchayat does not themselves convert the Gram Panchayat into the employer.
  • The Gram Panchayat cannot terminate the service of these employees; only the State Government can effect termination in accordance with constitutional protections.
  • Employees who, after repatriation, are posted again at Gram Panchayat level under administrative and financial control will be within the class eligible to be considered for appointment as Secretary under S.25-A; the State Government retains discretion whether to appoint any particular person.
  • The Court directed the State Government to formulate objective and rational criteria and procedures for appointments under S.25‑A to guard against arbitrariness (pick and choose, nepotism, discrimination).
  • No broader novel constitutional principle was laid down; the Court applied and followed existing precedents and interpretive canons to resolve the statutory construction and the parties' dispute.

Final Disposition: With the above clarifications and directions the appeal was disposed of and the order accordingly issued by the Court.

Show all summary ...

M. Katju, J.:— Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This special appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge dated 7-8-2004. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the impugned judgment. The facts have been given in detail in the judgment of the learned single Judge and we are only referring to the same as and where necessary.

3. By the 73rd Constitutional amendment Art. 243-G was inserted in the Constitution of India. Art. 243-G reads as follows:—

“243-G. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats.— Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-Government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to—

(a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice;

(b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.”

4. By Government order dated 24-4-1999 copy of which is Annexure 2 to the special appeal the employees of certain State Government departments were sent to work in different village Gram Panchayats. Thereafter it was apparently felt by the Government that the aforesaid Government order dated 24-4-1999 may be declared illegal by the Courts as the employer of these employees was being changed by the said Government order inasmuch as these employees being U.P Government servants would become servants of Gram Panchayat. Hence with effect from 27-6-1999 the U.P Panchayat Raj Act was amended by U.P Act No. 27 of 1999 which states as follows:—

“25. Staff.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, any Uttar Pradesh Act, rules, regulations, or bye-laws or in any judgment decree or order of any Court.—

(a) the State Government may, by general or special order, transfer any employee or class of employees serving in connection with the affairs of the State to serve under Gram Panchayats with such designation as may be specified in the order and thereupon posting of such employee or employees in Gram Panchayats of a district shall be made by such authority in such manner as may be notified by the State Government.

(b) the employee or employees on being so transferred and posted in a Gram Panchayat, shall serve under the supervision and control of the Gram Panchayat on the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as to retirement benefits and other matters including promotion as would have been applicable to him immediately before such transfer and shall perform such duties as may be specified from to time by the State Government.”

5. We may also refer to S. 25-A which was also introduced by the same amendment by U.P Act No. 27 of 1999. Section 25-A reads as follows:—

“25-A. Secretary.— The State Government, or such officer or authority or may be empowered by it in this behalf shall appoint a Secretary from amongst the employees referred to in Cl. (b) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of S. 25, who shall act as Secretary of such Gram Panchayat or Gram Panchayats, the Gram Sabhas concerned and the Nyaya Panchayats within those territorial limits such Gram Panchayats are situated and perform such other duties as may be specified by the State Government or such officer or authority as may be empowered in this behalf by the State Government.”

6. Thus by the new S. 25 the State Government was empowered to transfer certain Government employees to serve under Gram Panchayats which would have the power of supervision and control over them but they were to continue to enjoy the same terms and conditions of service which they enjoyed before their transfer.

7. Subsequently by Government order dated 30-6-1999 the Government order dated 12-4-1999 was cancelled and a fresh Government order dated 1-7-1999 was issued by which U.P Government servants of 8 departments were transferred under S. 25(1) as Gram Panchayat Vikas Adhikaris to various Gram Panchayats vide Annexure 8 to the special appeal. The petitioners were working in 3 out of these 8 departments whose employees were transferred namely Kisan Sahayak of Agriculture Department. Cane Supervisor of Cane Department and Gram Vikas Adhikari or Rural Development Department in the year 2001. Out of the 8 categories of State Government employees who had been transferred to Gram Panchayats 3 categories were sent back to the State Government but not the petitioners. Thereafter the impugned order dated 20-7-2004 was passed by which the petitioners and others in the above 3 categories namely Kisan Sahayak of Agriculture Department, Cane Supervisor of Cane Department and Gram Vikas Adhikari of Rural Development Department were also transferred back to the State Government to their respective departments.

8. The submission of Sri Ashok Khare learned counsel for the appellants is that the appellants having been transferred to the Gram Panchayat cannot be sent back to the State Government, as they are no longer State Government employees. We do not agree.

9. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Manbodh Kumar lal v. State of U.P, Writ Petition No. 33920 of 1999 with Special Appeal Nos. 591 and 709 of 1999 decided on 1-2-2000 that the State Government employees who were sent to the Gram Panchayats under S. 25(1) continue to be Government employees. The Division Bench relied on the Supreme Court decision in State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni, (1983) 2 SCC 33 : AIR 1984 SC 161 : (1983 Lab IC 391). In paragraph 51 of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court it has been observed:—

“51. Now, in 1978 before the Amending Act was passed, thanks to the provisions of the Principal Act of 1961, the ex-Municipal employees who had been allocated to the Panchayat Service as Secretaries, officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats, had achieved the status of Government servants. Their status as Government servants could not be extinguished, so long as the posts were not abolished and their services were not terminated in accordance with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. Nor was it permissible to single them out for differential treatment. That would offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. An attempt was made to justify the purported differentiation on the basis of history and ancestry, as it were. It was said that Talatis and Kotwals who became Secretaries, officers and servants of the Gram and Nagar Panchayats were Government servants, even to start with, while Municipal employees who became such Secretaries, officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats were not. Each carried the mark or the ‘brand’ of his orgin and a classification on the basis of the source from which they came into the service, it was claimed, was permissible. We are clear that it is not. Once they had joined the common stream of service to perform the same duties, it is clearly not permissible to make any classification on the basis of their origin. Such a classification would be unreasonable and entirely irrelevant to the object sought to be achieved. It is to navigate around these two obstacles of Art. 311 and Art. 14 that the Amending Act is sought to be made retrospective to bring about an artificial situation as if the erstwhile Municipal employees never became members of a service under the State. Can a law be made to destroy today's accrued constitutional rights by artificially reverting to a situation which existed seventeen years ago? No.”

10. A perusal of the above observations of the Supreme Court shows that once a person gets the status of a Government servant he cannot be deprived of that status unless the post is abolished or his service is terminated in accordance with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution.

11. It may be noted that in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court the factual position was that certain employees of Municipalities had by an amendment of 1961 been made employees of the State Government. Thereafter in the year 1978 another Act was passed purporting to again revert their status to that of Municipalities employees instead of State Government employees. In this connection the Supreme Court observed— “Their status as Government servant could not be extinguished, so long as the posts were not abolished and their serv-ices were not terminated in accordance with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution.” The Supreme Court went on to observe that once the Municipality employees became Government servants then they join the common stream of Government employees and they could not be treated differently from employees who had right from the beginning been Government servants. The Supreme Court further observed that once a person becomes a Government servant certain constitutional rights accrue to him, and if he is deprived of his status of a Government servant there would be violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The present case is an even better case since the appellants in the present case from the beginning had been Government servants. Hence, we are of the view that the Division Bench decision in Manbodh Kumar Lal's case (supra) holding that the employees sent to the Gram Panchayat continue to remain Government servants is correct and we respectfully agree with the said view. The same view has been taken by a learned single Judge in Krishna Kant Tiwari v. State of U.P. (2002) 1 UPLBEC 475 : (2002 All LJ 753) vide paragraph 26.

12. In the aforeasid decision it has been held that such Government employees who were sent to the Gram Panchayats under S. 25 are on deputation to the Gram Panchayats. The aforesaid decision was confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 94 of 2002 Krishan Kant Tiwari v. State of U.P decided on 28-1-2002. Against the Division Bench decision in SLP was filed in the Supreme Court which has been dismissed. Subsequently, the same view was reiterated by a learned single Judge in Subhash Chand Pandey v. State of U.P In Writ Petition No. 31085 of 2004 decided on 20-8-2004. We respectfully agree with the view taken in these decisions and hold that the appellants/petitioners are still U.P Government servants and they have to be treated as on deputation to Gram Panchayats for the period during which they were posted there.

13. Section 25 can have two interpretations : (1) that the employer of the transferred employee is changed on such transfer, and it becomes the Gram Panchayat, (2) the employer is not changed on such transfer, and it remains the State Government, while the employee is regarded as on deputation to the Gram Panchayat.

14. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants cannot be treated as on deputation. He relied on the language of the S. 25 in which it is stated that the State Government, can transfer its employees to serve under Gram Panchayats. We have already observed that if it is held that State Government employees can be deprived of their status of State Government employees and regarded as employees of the Gram Panchayat then this will be in violation of Arts. 14 and 311 of the Constitution as held by the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Ramanlal (supra). It is well settled that if two interpretations of a statute are possible then the interpretation which makes the statute constitutional should be preferred to the one which makes it unconstitutional. Hence we have to hold that persons sent on transfer by the State Government to the Gram Panchayat are being sent on deputation, for logically there is no other view we can take (unless we take a view which makes S. 25 unconstitutional).

15. It is well settled that there is a presumption in favour of the constitutional validity of a State vide Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 : (AIR 1951 SC 41); Madhu Limaye v. S.D.A, (1970) 3 SCC 739 : AIR 1971 SC 2481; P.N Krishnalal v. Government of Kerala, 1995 AIR SCW 1325; Jilu Bhai Nan Bhai v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 708 : AIR 1993 SC 142 etc.

16. If two interpretations are reasonably possible the Court should take an interpretation which would uphold the constitutional validity of the statute even if that involves narrowing down the scope of the statutory provision.

17. In Rt. Re v. Msgr. Mark Netto, (1979) 1 SCC 23 : (AIR 1979 SC 83) (vide para 6) a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court read down a statutory provision so as to make it constitutional. In that case the constitutional question was whether R. 12(iii) of the Kerala Tax Rules, 1959 was violative of Art. 30 of the Constitution. A plain and literal interpretation of the provision would make it violative of Art. 30 of the Constitution, and hence the Supreme Court narrowed down the scope of the said rule so as to sustain its validity.

18. Similarly in Sunil Batra (Ii); v. Delhi Administration., (1978) 4 SCC 494 : AIR 1978 SC 1675 : (1978 Cri LJ 1741) (vide para 38) another Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court observed:

“Constitutional defence to the legislature and the democratic assumption that people's representatives express the wisdom of the community lead Courts into interpretation of statutes which preserves and sustains the validity of the provision.”

19. There is always a presumption that the legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction vide Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., (2001) 4 SCC 139 : AIR 2001 SC 724 (page 733); State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., (1997) 2 SCC 453 : AIR 1997 SC 1511 (1519) etc.

20. It follows from the above principle that if one construction of the statute will make it ultra vires whereas another construction will sustain its constitutional validity the Court should prefer the latter on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to have intended to exceed its jurisdiction vide Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1986) 3 SCC 398 : AIR 1986 SC 1541; State of Kerala v. Krishnan Nayar, (1978) 1 SCC 552 : AIR 1978 SC 747 : 1978 Lab IC 723 (759); Rayala Corporation v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 : AIR 1970 SC 494 (499) : (1970 Cri LJ 588); Jothi Timber Mart v. Corporation of Calicut, (1969) 2 SCC 348 : AIR 1970 SC 264 (266); K.S Venkataraman and Co. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 (1104); Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 (1113); Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638 (1655); Kedarnath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (969); State of Bihar v. Charusiladasi, AIR 1959 SC 1002 (1010) and Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578 (623).

21. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the general words in a statute may be construed narrowly in order to sustain its validity vide New Delhi Municipal Committee v. State of Punjab, (1997) 7 SCC 339 : AIR 1997 SC 2847 (2901). Hence if it is possible to read a statutory language as subject to an implied term to sustain its validity the Court should be very ready to make such an implication vide A.G Gambia v. Momodon Jobe (1984) AC 689 (702) (PC, Hector v. Attorney General of Antique and Barbuda (1990) 2 All ER 103, p. 107 (PC).

22. In re, Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, AIR 1941 FC 72, the Federal Court upheld the validity of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1947 by construing the word ‘property’ as meaning ‘property other than agricultural land’.

23. In that decision Gwyer, C.J observed: “If that word ‘property’ necessarily and inevitably comprises all forms of property, including agricultural land, then clearly the Act went beyond the powers of the legislature, but when a legislature with limited and restricted powers makes use of a word of such wide and general import, the presumption must surely be that it is using it with reference to that kind of property with respect to which it is competent to legislate and to no other.”

24. The learned Chief Justice further observed:

“There is a general presumption that a legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction, and there is ample authority for the proposition that general words in a statute are to be construed with reference to the powers of the legislature which enacts it.”

25. The above rule was applied by the Supreme Court in Kedarnath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 953 and the Supreme Court took a narrow construction of S. 124-A of the Indian Penal Code so as to avoid making it unconstitutional in view of Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution.

26. Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code which relates to sedition makes a person punishable who ‘by words either spoken or written or by sign or visible representations or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites disaffection towards the Government established by law’.

27. A perusal of the above provision shows that if it is construed in a plain or wide manner it will violate Art. 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution. Hence, the Supreme Court, in order to make the provision constitutionally valid, limited the scope “to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder or disturbance of law and order or incitement to violence”.

28. Sinha, C.J speaking for the Court in that decision observed:

“It is well settled that if certain provisions of law, construed in one way, would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction.”

29. In Sunil Batra (Ii); v. Delhi Administration. (supra) the Supreme Court upheld the validity of S. 30(2) of the Prisons Act, 1894, which provides for solitary confinement of a prisoner under sentence of death in a cell and S. 56 of the same Act, which provides for the confinement of a prisoner in irons for his safe custody, by construing these provisions narrowly so as to avoid their being declared invalid on the ground that they were violative of the rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

30. Similarly, in New India Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, AIR 1963 SC 1207, a wide definition of the word ‘sale’ in the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 was restricted by construction to exclude transactions in which property was transferred from one person to another without any previous contract of sale, since a wider construction would have resulted in attributing to the Bihar Legislature an intention to legislate beyond its competence.

31. In New Delhi Municipal Committee v. State of Punjab, (1997) 7 SCC 339 : AIR 1997 SC 2847 provisions in the Municipal laws levying property tax on lands and buildings did not contain any exception in respect of the property of the State. These provisions was upheld by taking a narrow construction by excluding the property of the State since such property is exempted from taxation under Art. 289 of the Constitution. Although the aforesaid provisions did not expressly exclude property of the State from taxation, yet by adopting a narrow construction the validity of the provisions was sustained.

32. In Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638 the words ‘affairs of the temple’ occurring in S. 16 of the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act were construed as restricted to secular affairs, as on a wider construction the section would have violated Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

33. In R.L Arora v. State of U.P, AIR 1964 SC 1230 (at page 1234) the Supreme Court while construing S. 40(1)(aa) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by Act 31 of 1962 construed the words ‘building or work’ to such building or work which would subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company, for which acquisition is made, is engaged. A wider and literal construction of the clause would have brought it in conflict with Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, and hence the narrower construction was adopted.

34. In Indian Oil Corporation v. Municipal Corporation, (1993) 1 SCC 333 : AIR 1993 SC 844 S. 23 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 which empowered the Corporation to levy octroi on articles and animals ‘imported into the city’ was read down to mean articles and animals ‘imported into the Municipal limits for purposes of consumption, use or sale’, since a wide construction would have made the provision unconstitutional being in excess of the power of the State Legislature conferred by Entry 52 of List II of 7th Schedule.

35. In Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co., (2001) 4 SCC 139 : AIR 2001 SC 724 (733) the Supreme Court observed:

“It is also a cardinal rule of construction that if one construction being given the statute will become ultra vires the powers of the legislature whereas on another construction which may be open, the statute remains effective and operative then the Court will prefer the latter, on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to have intended an excess of jurisdiction.”

36. In Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 (vide paragraph 9) the Supreme Court observed that a statute has to be read so as to make it valid and, if possible, an interpretation leading to a contrary position should be avoided. It has to be construed ut res magis valeat quam parent (vide Broom's Legal, Maxims (10th Ed.) p. 361, Craies on Statute (6th Ed.) p. 95, Maxwell on Statutes (11th Ed.) p. 221, and Cooley's ‘Constitutional Limitations’. In the aforesaid decision the word ‘fee’ in S. 548 of the Calcutta Municipality Act was read as meaning a tax, for any other reading would make the section invalid.

37. In State of Bihar v. Smt. Charusila Dasi, AIR 1959 SC 1002 the Supreme Court observed:

“It is now well settled that there is a general presumption that the legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction, and it is a sound principle of construction that the Act of a sovereign legislature should, if possible, receive such an interpretation as will make it operative and not inoperative.”

38. Sri Ashok Khare learned counsel for the appellants then submitted that S. 25, if understood to mean that it results in change of the employer from the State Government to the Gram Panchayat, cannot be treated as unconstitutional as it does not violate any fundamental right. We do not agree. A statute will be invalid if it violates any of the provisions of the Constitution (except the Directive Principles), and not only if it violates fundamental right.

39. According to the eminent jurist Kelsen, in every country there is a hierarchy of laws and if there is a conflict between a law in a higher layer of the hierarchy and one in a lower layer, then the law in the lower layer has to be declared ultra vires.

40. In our country the hierarchy is like thus:—

(1) The Constitution of India.

(2) Statutory law, which may be either Parliamentary law or law made by the State Legislature.

(3) Delegated legislation which may be in the form of Rules made under a statute, regulations made under a statute, etc.

(4) Government orders, executive instructions etc.

41. Article 311 of the Constitution is in the very first layer in this hierarchy, and hence if any law in the second, third, or fourth layer of the hierarchy violates Art. 311 or Art. 14, the said law will have to be held ultra vires. If we accept the submission of Shri Khare that on transfer to the Gram Panchayat the employer ceases to be State Government, there will be violation of Arts. 311 and 14 of the Constitution as held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the State of Gujarat case (supra).

42. Accordingly we are of the view that the appellants and other similar employees were only on deputation to the Gram Panchayat. It is well settled that a deputationist has no right to remain on deputation and he can be sent back to his parent department at any time wide Kunal Nanda v. Union of India, 2000 (6) JT (SC) 574 : ((2000) 5 SCC 362 : AIR 2000 SC 2076); State of Punjab v. Inder Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 372 : (AIR 1998 SC 7); Mahesh Kumar Parmar v. S.I.G (2002) 9 SCC 485; Ratilal Soni v. State of Gujarat, 1990 (1) JT (SC) 229 : (1990 Supp SCC 243 : AIR 1990 SC 1132) etc. Hence the appellants have no right to remain on deputation in the Gram Panchayats.

43. Sri Ashok Khare learned counsel for the appellants then submitted that the impugned Government order dated 20-7-2004 is illegal because while it withdraws the appellants and other similarly placed employees to the parent organisation, that is the State Government, it is again sending them back to work at the Gram Panchayat level and under the administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayat. The learned single Judge while dismissing the writ petition on 6-8-2004 observed:

“For the reasons and observations to be followed the writ petition is dismissed, subject to condition that the petitioner shall not be compelled to discharge duty under the administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayat. State Government shall pass appropriate Government order forthwith in the light of observation made in the judgment.”

44. The words “subject to condition that the petitioner shall not be compelled to discharge duty under the administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayat” in effect nullifies that part of the Government order dated 20-7-2004 in which it has been held that the employees posted at the Gram Panchayat level will work under the administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayat. We do not agree with this condition placed by the learned single Judge in his order dated 6-8-2004. It is always open to an employer to tell an employee under whose supervision and control the employee will work. For instance, if A appoints a servant and tells him to work in the house of B under the supervision and control of B, that servant continues to be the servant of A be-cause A appointed him, A pays him salary and A can terminate his service even if his servant is working under the supervision and control of B. B cannot terminate his service; he can only send him back to A. Hence since the appellants are the servants of the Government it is for the Government to decide under whose supervision and control they will work. The Government is the master and the Government can send its servants to work under the control of the Gram Panchayat. We see nothing strange or arbitrary in this. However, we make it clear that the Gram Panchayat cannot terminate the service of the appellants.

45. It is no doubt true that the prima facie test of the employer-employee relationship is the supervision and control test. However, as held by the Supreme Court in Shining Tailors v. Industrial Tribunal, (1983) 4 SCC 464 : AIR 1984 SC 23 : (1983 All LJ 1100) (vide para 5), in recent times emphasis in the field has shifted from and no longer rests exclusively or strongly upon the question of control. A search for a formula in the nature of a single test will hence not serve any useful purpose, and several factors have to be considered. As held in Ram Singh v. Union Territory (2004) 1 SCC 126 : (AIR 2004 SC 969) (vide para 15) a multiple pragmatic approach has now to be adopted. As observed in Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B Staff Canteen Workers Union, (2000) 4 SCC 245 : AIR 2000 SC 1508 : 2000 Lab IC 1495.

“It would be not only impossible but also not desirable to lay down abstract principles or rules to serve as a ready reckoner for all situations and thereby attempt to compartmentalise and peg them into any pigeon-hole formulae, to be insisted upon as proof of such relationship.”

46. Hence even though the transferred employees were working under the supervision and control of the Gram Panchayats that does not necessarily mean that such employees became employees of the Gram Panchayats.

47. In view of the interpretation of S. 25-A which we have taken it follows that the employees on deputation to the Gram Panchayat who were withdrawn by the G.O dated 20-7-2004 and then by the same G.O posted at Gram Panchayat level under the administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayats will certainly be employees covered by S. 25(1)(b), of the Act. Hence they can be appointed as Secretaries under S. 25-A.

48. We make it clear that we have only held that such persons can be appointed as Secretary, and not that they must be appointed as Secretary. It is entirely in the discretion of the State Government (or such officer of authority as may be empowered on this behalf) as to who amongst such employees should be appointed as a Secretary, and we are not interfering with that discretion. However, we are of the opinion that there must be some objective criteria as to who should be appointed as Secretary under S. 25-A, otherwise there will be complaints of pick and choose, casteism, nepotism, discrimination, favouritism, etc. It must be remembered that the Secretary will have a lot of funds at his disposal, and hence not persons covered by S. 25(1)(b) would like to become a Secretary. We therefore direct the State Government to fix objective rational criteria and procedures for appointing Secretaries under S. 25-A.

49. As regards the Government order dated 20-7-2004 we clarify that if certain employees have been sent back from the Gram Panchayat to the parent department but they have been again posted at Gram Panchayat level under the administrative and financial control of the Gram Panchayat such employees will be employees covered by S. 25(1)(b) and hence will be within the zone of consideration for being appointed as Secretaries under S. 25-A. However, if an employee after being repatriated from the Gram Panchayat to the State Government is not posted at the Gram Panchayat level under the financial and administrative control of the Gram Panchayat then he will not be in the zone of consideration for being appointed as Secretary under S. 25-A. With these observations this appeal is disposed off.

50. Order accordingly.