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Hindustan Bone Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Trade Tax, U.P, Lucknow

Allahabad High Court
Nov 5, 2004
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Judgment Summary — Rajes Kumar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

These revisions under section 11 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 challenge Tribunal orders dated June 30, 1995 relating to assessment years 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82 and 1982-83.

The applicant carried on the business of manufacturing crushed bone from raw bones. Raw bone was purchased from unregistered dealers; crushed bone was liable to tax at the point of sale to the consumer. The assessing authority levied tax on the purchase turnover of raw bone under section 3-AAAA for the years in question. On appeal the levy under section 3-AAAA was confirmed; in the second appeal the Tribunal deleted the tax levied under section 3-AAAA relying on a Division Bench decision in Pioneer Tanneries & Glue Works, Kanpur which had declared section 3-AAAA ultra vires.

The Legislature reintroduced the provisions of section 3-AAAA retrospectively by Act No. 8 of 1992 with effect from April 1, 1974. The Supreme Court decision in Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh overruled Pioneer Tanneries and held section 3-AAAA (before and after amendment) valid. In light of the amendment and the apex Court decision, applications under section 22 of the Act were moved before the Tribunal on August 20, 1993 seeking rectification.

The Tribunal initially rejected those applications by order dated October 25, 1994 on the ground that, under section 17(2) of Act No. 8 of 1992, review applications had to be filed by September 30, 1992 and the applications filed on August 20, 1993 were therefore time-barred. The Commissioner then applied under section 22 for rectification of the October 25, 1994 order. The Tribunal, by the impugned order dated June 30, 1995, allowed the applications and restored the levy of tax under section 3-AAAA. The present revisions challenge that June 30, 1995 order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal erred in allowing rectification under section 22 of the Act where, according to the applicant, there was no "mistake apparent on the face of the record" but only an alleged error of judgment.
  2. Whether the applications filed on August 20, 1993 under section 22 were barred by limitation having regard to section 17(2) and section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992.
  3. Whether section 22 of the principal Act or the validation / review provisions of section 17(2) / section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992 govern rectification of earlier Tribunal orders in circumstances where a provision was declared ultra vires but later reintroduced with retrospective effect and upheld by the apex Court.
  4. Whether the Tribunal's initial rejection (October 25, 1994) of the section 22 applications as time-barred was a patent error capable of rectification under section 22.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (as presented to the Court)

  • The Tribunal erred in allowing rectification under section 22 because the impugned orders did not contain a "mistake apparent on the face of the record" but at best an error of judgment; section 22 permits only rectification of such apparent mistakes.
  • If section 17(3) were applicable, rectification would have to be done within three years from the date of the order or within one year from the date of amendment; the orders dated November 14, 1991 and May 16, 1991 could therefore not be rectified beyond the three-year period and rectification in June 1995 was beyond that limit.
  • Accordingly, rectification by the Tribunal of its earlier orders (by the June 30, 1995 order) was erroneous and without jurisdiction.

Respondent / Standing Counsel's Arguments

  • The Tribunal's order allowing rectification under section 22 is correct and must be sustained: the applications of August 20, 1993 were filed under section 22 and should be disposed of under section 22, not under section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992.
  • The Tribunal had wrongly treated the section 22 applications as review applications under section 17(2) and therefore erroneously rejected them as time-barred; that was a patent error.
  • Under section 22 the limitation for filing an application is three years; where an application is filed within three years it may be disposed of even beyond that period (per the proviso), and therefore the applications dated August 20, 1993 were within time and properly entertained.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pioneer Tanneries & Glue Works, Kanpur v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1991] 83 STC 1; 1991 UPTC 585 Division Bench had declared section 3-AAAA ultra vires (basis for earlier deletion of tax by Tribunal). The Court notes that the Tribunal originally deleted the levy under section 3-AAAA relying on this decision; that decision was subsequently overruled by the apex Court.
Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1993] 88 STC 98; 1993 UPTC 318 (SC) Apex Court overruled Pioneer Tanneries and held that section 3-AAAA (before and after amendment) is valid. The Court relies on this apex Court decision as justification that the earlier Tribunal orders (that deleted the levy) could be revisited when section 3-AAAA was reintroduced and upheld.
Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1976] 38 STC 593 (SC); 1976 UPTC 671 Principle that when a decision relied upon has been overruled, or a provision is reintroduced with retrospective effect, orders may be rectified under section 22 on the basis of the apex Court's decision and amended provisions. The Court cites this authority to support the proposition that the Tribunal could rectify earlier orders under section 22 in light of subsequent overruling and legislative validation.
Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Prakash Chandra Narendra Kumar, Meerut, [2006] 144 STC 125 (All.); 2003 UPTC 843 Authority cited in support of the principle that rectification under section 22 is available where legislative amendment and higher-court decisions justify revisiting earlier orders. The Court refers to this case as further support for allowing rectification under section 22 in circumstances similar to the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court set out the relevant statutory provisions (section 22 of the principal Act; section 17(2) and section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992; and section 3-AAAA) and analyzed their interplay and application to the facts before it.

Key factual-administrative findings applied by the Court:

  • Applicability of section 3-AAAA: It was admitted that raw bone was purchased from unregistered parties, the raw bone was not resold in the same form and condition, and crushed bone was liable to tax at the point of sale to the consumer — therefore section 3-AAAA applied to the transactions in question.
  • Effect of statutory amendment and apex Court ruling: Section 3-AAAA was reintroduced retrospectively by Act No. 8 of 1992 (effective from April 1, 1974) and the apex Court in Hotel Balaji overruled the earlier Division Bench decision in Pioneer Tanneries, holding section 3-AAAA valid. Given this sequence, orders that had deleted the levy relying on Pioneer could be revisited.

On the limitation and procedural points the Court reasoned as follows (step-by-step):

  1. The applications dated August 20, 1993 were filed under section 22 of the principal Act for rectification of earlier Tribunal orders dated November 14, 1991 and May 16, 1991; they were not filed under section 17(2) or section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992.
  2. Section 17(2) pertains to review applications (per the text) and required such review applications to be made by September 30, 1992; that limitation therefore applies to review proceedings under section 17(2), not to applications brought under section 22.
  3. Section 17(3) applies to cases where an authority "suo motu" proposes to rectify its own order; the Court concluded that section 17(3) does not apply to cases where a party has moved an application under section 22. Thus section 17(3) is not applicable to the applicant's section 22 applications in this case.
  4. Section 22 of the principal Act permits rectification of mistakes apparent on the record within three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified, and contains a proviso that where an application is made within that three-year period it may be disposed of even beyond that period. The Court noted that the applications were filed within three years from the date of the orders sought to be rectified.
  5. The Tribunal had treated the section 22 applications as review applications under section 17(2) and rejected them as time-barred; the Court characterized that approach as a patent error in the October 25, 1994 order which was correctable under section 22.
  6. The Court rejected the applicant's contention that only mistakes of fact or "mistakes apparent on the face of the record" could be rectified and that an error of judgment could not be the subject of rectification; instead, the Court found that, on the facts, the Tribunal had committed an obvious legal error in treating a section 22 application as a section 17 review application, and that such error was capable of rectification under section 22 in these circumstances.
  7. Accordingly, rectification by the Tribunal of the earlier orders (by the impugned June 30, 1995 order) fell within the scope of section 22 and was not barred by limitation under section 17(3) (which the Court held did not apply to the present case).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed all four revisions. The core ruling is set out below:

DISMISSED — All four revisions fail and are dismissed.

Implications (direct consequences described in the opinion):

  • The Tribunal's impugned order dated June 30, 1995 (which allowed the section 22 applications and restored the levy of tax under section 3-AAAA) is sustained by this Court's decision dismissing the revisions.
  • The Court held that section 22 of the principal Act applied to the applications filed on August 20, 1993; those applications were within the three-year filing period under section 22 and therefore not time-barred. Section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992 was not applicable to section 22 applications in this case.
  • The opinion does not announce any broader novel precedent beyond applying established principles (as illustrated by the cited authorities) to the facts; the direct effect is the dismissal of the revisions and upholding of the Tribunal's rectification under section 22.

Result: Revisions dismissed. Petitions dismissed.

Show all summary ...

Rajes Kumar, J.:— These four revisions under section 11 of the U.P Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) are directed against the orders of Tribunal dated June 30, 1995 relating to the assessment years 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82 and 1982-83 respectively.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant was carrying on the business of manufacturing of crushed bone from raw bones. The bone was liable to tax at the point of sale to consumer. Applicant had purchased raw bone from unregistered dealer and therefore, assessing authority levied tax on the purchase turnover of raw bone under section 3-AAAA in all the aforesaid years. In the appeal, tax levied under section 3-AAAA was confirmed. In the second appeal, Tribunal deleted the tax levied under section 3-AAAA and allowed the appeal vide orders dated November 14, 1991 and May 16, 1991 on the ground that the provision of section 3-AAAA was declared ultra vires by the division Bench of this Court in the case of Pioneer Tanneries & Glue Works, Kanpur v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in [1991] 83 STC 1; 1991 UPTC 585. Subsequently, by Act No. 8 of 1992 provisions of section 3-AAAA has been reintroduced with effect from April 1, 1974. In the matter of Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in [1993] 88 STC 98 (SC); 1993 UPTC 318, the decision in the case of Pioneer Tanneries & Glue Works, Kanpur v. State of U.P, [1991] 83 STC 1 (All.); 1991 UPTC 585 has been overruled and the provisions of section 3-AAAA before the amendment and after amendment have been held valid. In view of decision of the apex Court in the case of Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1993] 88 STC 98; 1993 UPTC 318 and in view of reintroduction of section 3-AAAA by Act No. 8 of 1992 with effect from April 1, 1974, applications under section 22 of the Act were moved before the Tribunal on August 20, 1993. The said applications under section 22 of the Act were rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated October 25, 1994 on the ground that as per section 17(2) of validation clause of Act No. 8 of 1992, application should be filed by September 30, 1992 for review of assessment order and since in the present case, applications were filed on August 20, 1993 after eleven months from September 30, 1992, applications have been rejected as barred by limitation. Commissioner of Trade Tax further moved application under section 22 for rectification of the order dated October 25, 1994, by which, applications under section 22 were rejected. Applications were mainly moved on the ground that section 17(2) of Act No. 8 of 1992 was subject to section 17(3) and in view of limitation contemplated under section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992, and under section 22 of the Act applications were not barred by time, thus, rejecting the application as barred by limitation was patent error and required rectification. Prayer was also made that the applications moved on August 20, 1993 were not beyond time and they were moved before the time contemplated under section 22 and therefore, application dated August 20, 1993 be allowed and the tax on the raw bone should be restored. Tribunal vide impugned order dated June 30, 1995, allowed the applications. Tribunal held that in the order dated October 25, 1994, limitation contemplated under section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992 and limitation contemplated under section 22 have not been considered by the Tribunal and the Tribunal has committed error in rejecting the application as barred by time. Tribunal restored the levy of tax under section 3-AAAA which was reintroduced by Act No. 8 of 1992 with effect from April 1, 1974 and in view of decision of the apex Court in the case of Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1993] 88 STC 98; 1993 UPTC 318, in which, section 3-AAAA prior to amendment and after the amendment have been held valid. Heard counsel for the parties.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the Tribunal has erred in allowing the application under section 22 of the Act while there was no mistake apparent on the face of record. He submitted that under section 22, only mistake apparent on the face of record, can be rectified and not the error of the judgment. He submitted that the application under section 22 of the Act was moved for rectification of the order dated October 25, 1994 mainly on the ground that section 17(2) was subject to section 17(3) and the application was within limitation contemplated under section 17(3). He further submitted that even if, section 17(3) is to be considered, order under section 22 had to be passed within three years from the date of order or from one year from the date of amendment. He submitted that the orders sought to be rectified were dated November 14, 1991 for the assessment years 1979-80 and 1981-82 and May 16, 1991 for the assessment year 1981-82 and the order was rectified and such order can only be rectified within three years under section 17(3) and therefore, rectification of the said order by the Tribunal vide impugned order dated June 30, 1995 is erroneous and without jurisdiction.

4. Learned Standing Counsel submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal is absolutely correct and in accordance with law. He submitted that the applications filed under section 22 of the Act dated August 20, 1993 should be disposed of under the provisions of section 22 of the Act and not under section 17(3) of the Act No. 8 of 1992. He submitted that the Tribunal has rejected the application dated August 20, 1993 moved under section 22 of the Act treating them as a review applications and rejecting the same as time barred being filed on September 30, 1992, limitation contemplated under section 17(2), was patent error. He submitted that when the applications were moved on August 20, 1993, limitation for three years was available for rectifying the order under section 17(3). He further submitted that in the present case, it was not necessary to consider the application under section 22 dated August 20, 1993 for rectification of the order of Tribunal under section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992. Application should be considered only under the provision of section 22 of the Act. He submitted that under section 22 limitation for moving application was three years and in case application was filed within three years, there was no further limitation for passing any order. He submitted that the application dated August 20, 1993 was within three years and therefore, it was within time.

5. Having heard counsel for the parties, I have perused the order of Tribunal and authorities below. Section 22 of the Act, section 17(2) and section 17(3) which are a validation provision of the Act No. 8 of 1992 and section 3-AAAA read as follows:

“Section 22. Rectification of mistakes.—(1) Any officer or authority or the Tribunal or the High Court may, on its own motion or on the application of dealer or any other interested person rectify any mistake in any order passed by him or it under this Act apparent on the record within three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified:

Provided that where an application under this sub-section has been made within such period of three years, it may be disposed of even beyond such period:

Provided further that no such rectification as has the effect of enhancing the assessment, penalty, fees or other dues shall be made unless reasonable opportunity of being heard has been given to the dealer or other person likely to be affected by such enhancement.

(2) Where such rectification has the effect of enhancing the assessment, the assessing authority concerned shall serve on the dealer a revised notice of demand in the prescribed form and therefrom all the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder shall apply as if such notice had been served in the first instance.”

section 17(2) of Act No. 8 of 1992:

“Where before the commencement of this section any authority or court has, in any proceeding made, any assessment, levy or collection of any tax passed or an order imposing any penalty or making any other demand under the principal Act, or passed any order modifying, setting aside or quashing (wholly or in part), such assessment, levy, collection, penalty or demand and such assessment or order becomes inconsistent with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act then, subject to the provisions of sub-sec-tion (3) of any party to the proceeding or the Commissioner of Sales Tax may by September 30, 1992, make an application to such authority or court for review of the assessment or order and thereupon, such authority or court may review the proceeding and make such order, varying or revising the order previously made, as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act.”

section 17(3) of Act No. 8 of 1992:

“The assessing, appellate or revising authority, as the case may be, may within a period of one year from the commencement of this section or within the period specified in section 22 of the principal Act, whichever expires later, make any rectification in any order passed by it where such rectification becomes necessary in consequence of the amendment of the principal Act:

Provided that no rectification which has the effect of enhancing the assessment, penalty or other dues, shall be made unless the authority concerned has given notice to the dealer or person concerned of his intention to do so and has allowed him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

“Section 3-AAAA. Liability to tax on purchase of goods in certain circumstances.—Subject to the provision of section 3, every dealer who purchases any goods liable to tax at the point of sale to consumer—

(a) from any registered dealer in circumstances in which no tax is payable by such registered dealer, shall be liable to pay tax on the purchase price of such goods at the same rate at which, but for such circumstances, tax would have been payable on the sale of such goods;

(b) from any person other than a registered dealer whether or not tax is payable by such person, shall be liable to pay tax on the purchase price of such goods at the same rate at which tax is payable on the sale of such goods:

Provided that no tax shall be leviable on the purchase price of such goods in the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) and (b), if—

(i) such goods purchased from a registered dealer have already been subjected to tax or may be subjected to tax under section 3-AAA;

(ii) tax has already been paid in respect of such goods purchased from any person other than a registered dealer;

(iii) the purchasing dealer resells such goods within the State or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or exports out of the territory of India, in the same form and condition in which he had purchased them;

(iv) such goods are liable to be exempted under section 4-A of the Act.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section and of section 3-AAA the sale of—

(i) ginned cotton after ginning raw cotton purchased as aforesaid; or

(ii) dressed hides and skins or tanned leather after dressing or tanning raw hides and skins purchased as aforesaid; or

(iii) rice during the period commencing on September 2, 1976 and ending with April 30, 1977 after hulling paddy purchased as aforesaid, shall be deemed to be in the same form and condition.”

6. In the present case, there is no much dispute about the applicability of section 3-AAAA. Admittedly, the applicant had purchased raw bone, and manufactured crushed bone, raw bone was purchased from unregistered parties, bone was liable to tax at the point of sale to consumer. Since, raw bone purchased was not sold in the same form and condition, therefore, section 3-AAAA of the Act was applicable. Tribunal has deleted levy of tax under section 3-AAAA only on the ground that the provisions of section 3-AAAA was declared ultra vires by the division Bench of this Court in the case of Pioneer Tanneries & Glue Works v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1991] 83 STC 1; 1991 UPTC 585. Thereafter section 3-AAAA has been introduced by Act No. 8 of 1992 with effect from April 1, 1974 and the decision of division Bench in the case of Pioneer Tanneries, [1991] 83 STC 1 (All.); 1991 UPTC 585 has been overruled and provisions of section 3-AAAA before amendment and after amendment have been held valid by the apex Court in the case of Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in [1993] 88 STC 98; 1993 UPTC 318. It is settled principle of law that if any decision is given placing reliance on the decision which has been overruled or if declared ultra vires, provision is subsequently reintroduced by the amendment with retrospective effect, provision of section 22 applies and that order can be rectified on the basis of decisions of apex Court and on the basis of amended provisions (see Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in [1976] 38 STC 593 (SC); 1976 UPTC 671 and in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Prakash Chandra Narendra Kumar, Meerut reported in [2006] 144 STC 125 infra (All.) [App.]; 2003 UPTC 843, therefore, orders of the Tribunal dated November 14, 1991 and May 16, 1991 could be rectified under section 22 of the Act.

7. Now the question is whether once the Tribunal vide order dated October 25, 1994 rejected the applications under section 22 as barred by limitation, the said orders could be rectified under section 22 on the grounds taken in the applications under section 22 and if it is held that there was a mistake in the order dated October 25, 1994 rejecting the applications under section 22 whether the rectification of the orders dated November 14, 1991 and May 16, 1991 by the Tribunal can be said to be within limitation in reviewing the levy of tax under section 3-AAAA. According to learned counsel for the applicant, mistake or error in the judgment cannot be rectified under section 22 of the Act and only mistake apparent on the face of record, could be rectified. According to him, there was no mistake apparent on the face of record. I do not agree with the submission of learned counsel for the applicant. Applications dated August 20, 1993 filed under section 22 of the Act were for rectification of the order dated November 14, 1991 and May 16, 1991 and these applications were not filed under section 17(2) and 17(3) of the Act No. 8 of 1992. Limitation contemplated under section 17(2) relates to the review application and not to the application under section 22. Limitation under section 17(3) is applicable to the cases where the authorities suo motu proposes to rectify its own order. According to my opinion, section 17(3) has no application to a case where the party moved applications under section 22. If applications were moved under section 22 of the Act, they have to be considered and decided within the ambit of the said provisions. Admittedly, applications were moved within three years from the date of order, the limitation, contemplated under section 22 and therefore, they were within time and should be decided accordingly. Since the Tribunal has wrongly treated the applications as review applications and rejected the same as barred by limitation, there was a patent error in the order of Tribunal and deserves to be rectified. Tribunal has rightly rectified the order dated October 25, 1994 and held that the application under section 22 was within time.

8. I do not agree with the submissions of learned counsel for the applicant that the order could be rectified within three years from the date of order in view of limitation contemplated under section 17(3) of the Act No. 8 of 1992 while the order has been rectified beyond three years. As held earlier, section 17(3) was not applicable in the present case. In the present case, only section 22 of the Act was applicable under which applications were moved, in which limitation to file application was three years and in case, application was filed within three years, there was no limitation for passing the order and therefore, rectification of the order dated November 14, 1991 and May 16, 1991 under section 22 cannot be said to be barred by limitation. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in all the revisions.

9. In the result, all the four revisions fails and are dismissed.

10. Petitions dismissed.