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Waqf Mausooma Syed Husain And Wali Begum And Another v. Dillep Kumar Jain And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs instituted Original Suit No. 206 of 2001 on 5-12-2001. According to the affidavit in support of the stay application, the notice of the suit was served on the defendant in December 2001 and the defendant appeared in Court on 14-1-2001. Time was repeatedly granted to the defendants to file a written statement. The trial Court last granted an opportunity on 29-4-2002 but the written statement was not filed. On 4-12-2002 the defendants filed an application (referred to as application 52-C) seeking that their written statement be taken on record and that the delay be condoned; the plaintiffs opposed that application. By the impugned order dated 30-1-2003 the trial Court condoned the delay and took the written statement on record on payment of costs. That order was challenged by the applicants in this revision.
The opinion also records statutory background relevant to the dispute: the Code of Civil Procedure was amended by Act No. 46 of 1999; further amendments were made by Act No. 22 of 2002; the amendments (to Act No. 46 of 1999 together with amendments in the principal Act by Act No. 22 of 2001) came into force with effect from 1st July, 2002. The central procedural change at issue is the amended timing for filing written statements under Order VIII, Rule 1 (30 days from service, with court power to extend to not later than 90 days).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, and to what extent, the amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (in particular Order VIII, Rule 1 as amended) apply to suits that were pending when those amendments came into force.
- If the amended Order VIII, Rule 1 (providing 30 days from service of summons to file written statement and permitting extension up to 90 days) applies, whether the trial Court had power to condone the delay in filing the written statement in the present case where the statement was filed beyond 90 days from service.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments (as recorded)
- Learned counsel for the applicant (Sri M.A. Qadeer) submitted that the amendments are procedural and therefore operate retrospectively to suits pending at the time of their commencement.
- He relied on provisions of the amending Acts (Sections 15 and 16 of Act 22 of 2002 and Section 32 of Act No. 46 of 1999) to argue that Order VIII, Rule 1 is not listed among provisions excluded from retrospective operation, and therefore the amended Order VIII, Rule 1 should apply to pending suits.
- He further suggested an interpretation that, in pending suits, the 30-day period in the amended provision should be taken to run from the commencement date of the amending Act (rather than from the earlier service date), so as to give effect to the amended time limit without penalizing defendants who had been served before the amendment came into force.
Plaintiffs / Other Parties
The opinion records that the plaintiffs opposed the defendants' application to take the written statement on record and to condone delay. The opinion does not set out a detailed account of the plaintiffs' legal arguments in opposition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of U.P. v. Dharam Singh Mehra, AIR 1983 All 130 | Interpretation of the phrase "to appear and answer" (in context of Order XXVII, Rule 5) — showing that "appear and answer" does not necessarily mean filing a written statement. | The Court relied on this authority to show historical judicial interpretation that "appear and answer" is not synonymous with filing the written statement; this supports the analysis of the unamended procedural scheme where date of appearance/first hearing governed filing time. |
| Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. I.T. Commissioner, AIR 1927 PC 242 | Principle on retrospectivity of procedural amendments (cited as precedent on presumption that procedural amendments are ordinarily retrospective but subject to textual and contextual limits). | Referenced as part of the general principle that procedural amendments are presumptively retrospective, but the Court emphasized that this presumption yields to textual indications to the contrary. |
| Jose Da Costa v. Bascora, Sadasiva, (1976) 2 SCC 917 : AIR 1975 SC 1843 | Authority on construction related to retrospectivity/presumptions concerning amendments (cited alongside other authorities). | Invoked in discussion of the presumption about retrospective operation of procedural amendments; the Court treated these authorities as supporting the general rule but subject to textual limitations. |
| Vinod Gurudas Rai Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 333 : AIR 1991 SC 2156 | Deals with whether condonation power under a new statute governs when an accident occurred under the old statute but claim/petition was filed after the new Act — distinguishing between filing of substantive claim and an application for condonation arising after repeal. | The Court distinguished this case: it was not a pending suit situation (the claim petition was filed after the new Motor Vehicles Act), so it does not support applying the new procedural provision to pending suits in the present matter. |
| Mohd. Ashfaque v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1976) 4 SCC 330 : AIR 1976 SC 2161 | Discusses inapplicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act (and thereby Section 5) where a specific statutory time limit and a limited discretion are provided in the principal Act. | Used to demonstrate that decisions under the Limitation Act or other statutes having specific time-limits are not analogous to the present situation; the Court held such authorities do not apply here. |
| Mer Ramdas Bejanand Bhai v. Harshad Bhai Mala Bhai; Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Parsan Tools, (1975) 4 SCC 22 : AIR 1975 SC 1039 | Application of Sections 5 and 14(2) of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Sales Tax Act — principles about applicability of general limitation provisions where specific statutory provisions exist. | The Court noted these decisions but stated they have no application to the present case (since Sections 14(2) or 5 of the Limitation Act are not pressed in the present matter). |
| Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1964 SC 260 | Case referred to in context of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act being invoked in other contexts. | Cited as one of several decisions concerning Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act; the Court held such decisions are not applicable to the facts before it. |
| Hukum Dev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133 : AIR 1974 SC 480 | Another decision in the batch of cases on Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. | Noted by the Court but regarded as inapplicable to the present dispute about amended Order VIII, Rule 1 in pending suits. |
| Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Raman Bhai Prabhat Bhai, (1987) 3 SCC 234 : AIR 1987 SC 1690 | Held that certain Motor Vehicles Act provisions supersede earlier legislation (illustrating how new statutory provisions can replace prior regimes). | Cited for the proposition that new provisions can supersede prior law, but the Court found this line of authority not applicable to the present factual and legal situation involving pending suits and the specific textual scheme of exclusions in the amending Acts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a textual and structural analysis of (a) the pre-amendment scheme of the Code and Rules and (b) the amended scheme, and examined the compatibility of applying the amended timing provisions to suits pending at the time of commencement of the amendments.
Key steps in the Court's reasoning (as recorded):
- Outlined the unamended procedural scheme: Section 27, Order V (Rules 1, 5 and 6) and Order VIII, Rule 1 then in force showed that the date for filing a written statement was governed by the date of appearance, the first hearing, or the date of framing of issues — not by the date of service of summons. Under the unamended law a defendant could as of right file a written statement on or before the first hearing; thereafter grant of further time was discretionary with the Court.
- Explained the amended scheme: Section 27 (as amended) introduces a limit on service not beyond thirty days from institution; Order V, Rule 1 (as amended) and Order VIII, Rule 1 require the written statement to be filed within 30 days from the date of service of summons, with a proviso permitting the Court (for reasons recorded) to extend that time but to a date not later than 90 days from service.
- Identified a structural difficulty in mixing the two schemes: if summons were issued under the unamended law (which did not make the date of service the starting point for calculating last date for filing written statement) it may be unjust to treat the defendant as having failed under the newly-introduced 30-day rule because the first hearing or adjourned first hearing in many suits might fall beyond 30 or even 90 days from service. The Court emphasized that the proviso to the amended Order VIII, Rule 1 (permitting extension up to 90 days) is contingent upon the main provision being applicable (i.e., being a case where a defendant has "failed" to file within 30 days); if the main provision cannot be applied, the proviso also cannot be invoked.
- Considered the applicants' textual arguments about the amending Acts and exclusions: the Court examined the scheme of the amending provisions (Sections 15 and 16 of Act 22 of 2002 and Section 32 of Act 46 of 1999) and noted that certain specific rules were expressly made inapplicable to pending suits. In particular the Court noted that the amended Order V, Rule 1 provision (which would have required filing within 30 days from service) was rendered inapplicable to pending suits by explicit provisions of Section 15(b) of Act 22 of 2002.
- Addressed the presumption that procedural amendments are retrospective: the Court acknowledged the general presumption that procedural amendments operate retrospectively but explained that this presumption is rebuttable and cannot be applied where textual construction makes retrospectivity inadmissible. The Court concluded that the text and scheme of the amendments render application of the amended Order VIII, Rule 1 to pending suits textually and practically inadmissible.
- Distinguished the authorities relied upon by the applicant: the Court analyzed the precedents cited and found them inapposite for reasons recorded in the text (for example, some decisions concerned claims filed after the new statute came into force rather than suits pending when the statute commenced; others dealt with limitation questions under different statutory frameworks).
- Concluded that it is not possible in practice or in law to apply selectively the amended procedure (i.e., apply old law up to service and new law thereafter) for computing the time to file written statements; therefore the time for filing in the present case must be governed by the pre-amendment provisions as they stood prior to the amendments introduced by Act No. 46 of 1999 and Act No. 24 of 2002.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that the time for filing the written statement in the present case was governed by the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 1, C.P.C., as it stood before the amendments introduced by Act No. 46 of 1999 and Act No. 24 of 2002. Consequently, the impugned trial Court order condoning the delay in filing the written statement could not be faulted. The revision has no merit and was dismissed.
Direct Implications for the Parties:
- The trial Court's order dated 30-1-2003 condoning the delay and taking the written statement on record (on payment of costs) stands; the revision challenging that order has been dismissed.
Broader Implications / Precedential Effect:
The opinion reasons that, although the amendments to procedural law would ordinarily be treated as retrospective, textual indications in the amending Acts and the structural impossibility of selectively applying new timing provisions to suits already at certain procedural stages mean that the amended Order VIII, Rule 1 does not apply to suits that were pending when the amendments came into force. The Court did not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond its textual interpretation of the specific amending provisions; it declined to apply the amended timing regime to the present pending suit. The opinion, as written, confines itself to the facts and statutory scheme before the Court and does not announce a broader departure from settled principles beyond that statutory/textual analysis.
Disposition: Revision dismissed.
1. The facts of this case need not detain us for long.
2. The applicants in this revision are the plaintiffs in Original Suit No. 206 of 2001, which was filed on 5-12-2001. It is stated in paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed in support of the stay application that the notice of the suit was served upon the defendant in December 2001 and they appeared in Court on 14-1-2001. It appears that time was repeatedly granted thereafter to the defendants to file a written statement and last opportunity was granted by the trial Court on 29-4-2002 but the written statement was not filed and it was only on 4-12-2002 that an application 52-C was filed by the defendants stating that the written statement being filed be taken on record and the delay be condoned. The application was opposed by the plaintiffs. By the impugned order dated 30-1-2003 the trial Court condoned the delay and took the written statement on record on payment of costs. This order is under challenge in this revision. The Code of Civil Procedure was amended by Act No. 46 of 1999, which was to come into force on such date as the Central Government would appoint and different dates could be appointed for different provisions of the Act and for different states. Before the Act could be enforced amendments were again made by Act No. 22 of 2002 in Act No. 46 of 1999 as well as in the principal Act. The amendments made in Act No. 46 of 1999 together with the amendment made in the principal Act by Act No. 22 of 2001 were enforced with effect from 1st July, 2002.
3. The issue in this case is about the extent to which the provisions of the amended Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable in regard the time for filing the written statement in suits, which were pending when the amendments came into force. Under the amended Order 8, Rule 1 the written statement is to be filed within 30 days from the date of service of summons. However under the proviso thereto the Court may for reasons to be recorded in writing extend the time to a date not later than 90 days from the date of service of summons. If this provision is applied to the present case the time taken in filing the written statement being more than 90 days from the date of service of summons the Court had no power to condone the delay.
4. To appreciate the controversy reference may be made to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules before the aforesaid amendments were enforced. Section 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided for a summons to be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim and for service of the summons in the prescribed manner. There was no time limit for service provided in the section. Order 5, Rule 1 provided that on the institution of the suit a summons be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim on a day to be therein specified. Under the proviso to this Rule the Court was empowered to direct the defendant to file the written statement of his defence on the date of appearance and to cause an entry to be made to that effect in the summons. The power conferred upon the Court by the proviso was discretionary and if an entry as referred to was not made in the summons, the summons were required to indicate the date for the defendant's appearance to answer the claim. The words ‘answer the claim’ have been interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court in AIR 1983 All 130, State of U.P v. Dharam Singh Mehra in the context of Order 27, Rule 5. C.P.C wherein in reference to suits against the Government the words “to appear and answer” have been interpreted to mean not necessarily the filing of the written statement but to instructions of the Government, the defendant, to be conveyed to the Court regarding the plaintiffs claim. Order 5, Rule 5 provided that the Court shall determine at the time of issuing summons whether it shall be for the settlement of issues only or for the final disposal of the suit and the summons were required to contain a direction accordingly but in a civil suit beard by a Court of Small Causes the summons were to be for the final disposal of the suit. Order 5, Rule 6 provided that the day for appearance of the defendants was to be fixed with reference to the current business of the Court, the place of residence of the defendant and the time necessary for the service of summons and the day was to be so fixed as to allow the defendants sufficient time to enable him “to appear and answer on such day”. It is to be noted that the expression “to appear and answer” used in this provision is identical to the expression above referred to in Order 27, Rule 5. It is also to be noted that there was no provision specifying the maximum time limit for service of summons or for fixing of a day for the appearance. Order 8, Rule 1 provided that the defendant shall on or before the first hearing or within such time as the Court may permit present a written statement of his defence. The effect of this provision was that the defendant as of right could file a written statement on or before the first hearing but thereafter it was not the right of the defendant to obtain time but it was the discretion of the Court to grant it. The scheme of the aforesaid provisions indicates that it was not incumbent upon the Court to specify in the summons the date for filing the written statement but merely to indicate the date for appearance and answer the claim. Of course, under the proviso to Rule 1 of Order 5 the Court had discretion to direct the defendant to file the written statement on the date of his appearance. The cumulative effect of this provision and of Order 5, Rule 5 and of Order 8, Rule 1 is that the defendant was required to file a written statement by the first day of hearing, which has been held to be the date on which the Court proposes to apply its mind to the controversy i.e the date of framing of issues. From the scheme of the provisions referred to above, one thing is clear that the date of service of summons was not the basis for calculating the last date for filing the written statement. The date for filing the written statement was either the date of appearance if so provided in the summons or the date of framing of issues or for final disposal as the case may be.
5. The impact of the amended provisions may now be examined. Section 27 which originally provided that on a suit being instituted a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim to be served in the manner prescribed now contains a time limit and reads as follows;
“27. Summons to defendants.— Where a suit has been duly instituted, a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim and may be served in the manner prescribed on such day not beyond thirty days from the date of institution of the suit.”
6. Order 5, Rule 1 now provides for the summons to be issued to the defendant not only to appear and answer the claim but to file the written statement of his defence as well and that too within 30 days from the date of service of summons on that defendant. Under the proviso the Court can extend the time for reasons to be recorded in writing but the date for filing the written statement shall not be later than 90 days from the date of service of summons. It is to be noted that while under the unamended provision the date of service of summons was not relevant for determining the date by which the written statement could as of right be filed by the defendant but under the amended provisions the date of service of summons is the starting point for calculating the time within which the defendant can file the written statement. While there is no change in the provisions of Order 5, Rule 5. C.P.C but Rule 6 of Order 5 has been amended and instead of the date of ‘appearance and answer’ which was required to be specified under that Rule the amended provision refers to ‘the date under sub-rule (1) of Rule 1’ i.e the date not of mere appearance and answer to the claim but to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons. While the amended provisions of Section 27, Order 5, Rule 1, Order 5, Rule 6 and Order 8, Rule 1 carve out a workable integrated scheme as a whole it is difficult to integrate the procedure of the unamended provisions with that of the amended provisions by adhering to the unamended provisions in part and to switching over to the amended provisions for the rest of the part in the matter of filing of the written statement. Under the unamended provisions where the Court had not exercised the power under the proviso to Rule 1 of Order 5, C.P.C by indicating in the summons that the written statement was to be filed on the date of appearance the defendant could file the written statement as of right on the date of first hearing and he could not be said to be a defaulter. Under the amended provisions, however, the date of service of summons is the crucial date and not the date of first hearing and if the defendant does not file the written statement within 30 days of the service it would be treated that he had failed to file the same and the Court could then extend the time only to a date not being beyond 90 days from the date of service. Under the unamended provision there was no embargo on the power of the Court to fix a date for appearance at its discretion. Thus if the provisions of the amended Order 8, Rule 1 are applied to a pending suit where the summons were issued and a date of appearance was provided according to the unamended provisions the concept of calculating the time from the date of service of summons would result in injustice as in many cases the date for appearance or of first hearing or the adjourned date of first hearing would be more than 30 days after the date of service. In many cases the adjourned date of first hearing would be more than 90 days after the date of service. In such a case the application of the Rule of 30 days for filing the written statement from the date of service would be incapable of being applied. Even otherwise there being no indication in the summons sent under the unamended provision that the written statement would have to be filed within 30 days of service it would be unjust to treat the non-filing of the written statement within this period as a default by applying the amended provisions. The proviso to Order 8, Rule 1 empowering the Court to extend the date is applicable only to those cases where the defendant had ‘failed’ to file the written statement within 30 days of service provided under the main provision. The proviso would therefore be applicable only to cases where the main amended provision applies as the exercise of the power under it is contingent to the failure to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of service. Now if the main provision is incapable of being applied the proviso too cannot be invoked. It therefore appears that in the matter of time of filing a written statement either the scheme as provided under the unamended provisions would apply as a whole or the scheme provided under the amended provision as a whole and it may become impossible to apply the procedure under the old Code upto the stage of service of summons and to apply the amended provision as regards the time limit for filing the written statement.
7. Sri M.A Qadeer, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the amendments made are in respect of procedure and hence would operate retrospectively to pending suits. Sections 15 and 16 of the amending Act 22 of 2002 and Section 32 of Act No. 46 of 1999 he submits, specify the provisions in respect of which the amendment shall not apply and as Order 8, Rule 1 is not included in the list given in these Sections the amended provisions of Order 8, Rule 1 would apply. It is true that reference to certain provisions to which the amended provisions would not apply has been given in the amending Acts 22 of 2002 for instance Section 15(b)(ii) of Act 22 of 2002 amends Section 32 of Clause (j) of Act 46 of 1999 and provides that Rules 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 9-A, 19-A, 21, 24 and 25 of Order V as amended would not apply to pending suits. Similarly Section 15(b)(iv) of Act 22 of 2002 provides that Order VIII, Rules 1, 1-A, 8-A, 9 and 10 as amended shall not apply to written statement filed before commencement of Section 18 of Act 44 of 1999 or Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act 2002. But from this fact itself no conclusive inference can be drawn and the scheme of the Amending Act, which has been analysed above is to be considered to draw out the legislative intent. No doubt an amendment in the law of procedure would ordinarily be retrospective but that is only a presumption and where a construction giving retrospectivity to a provision is textually inadmissible it would have to be taken that the provision is prospective in operation. Reference may be made to the decisions in Delhi Cloth and General Mill Company Ltd. v. I.T Commissioner, AIR 1927 PC 242 Jose Da Costa v. Bascora, Sadasiva, (1976) 2 SCC 917 : AIR 1975 SC 1843.
8. It is also to be noted that Order 5, Rule 1 as introduced by the amendment also contains a provision like Order 8, Rule 1 requiring the written statement to be filed within 30 days from the date of service of summons and confers power upon the Court for reasons to be recorded to extend time for filing the written statement to a day not later than 90 days from the date of service of summons. This provision has been made inapplicable to pending suits by virtue of the provisions of Section 15-b of Act 22 of 2002. The scheme of the amended provisions which has been discussed above indicates that in the matter of time for filing the written statement the amended provisions of Order 8, Rule 1 would not be applicable to pending suits and although the provision is procedural retrospectivity is textually inadmissible. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the amended Order 8, Rule 1 should be so interpreted as to mean that the time of 30 days provided therein would start running in pending suits from the date of commencement of the Amending Act. Such an interpretation would amount to modifying the words of the provision itself and there are no compelling reasons in this case to resort to an interpretation by committing violence upon the language employed.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant relied upon certain decisions which may now be considered. In (1991) 4 SCC 333 : AIR 1991 SC 2156, Vinod Gurudas Rai Kumar v. National Insurance Company Ltd., the Apex Court took the view that question of condoning the delay in filing a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act would be governed by the new Act No. 59 of 1988 and not by the “Old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939” even though the accident took place when the old Act was enforced. In that case the period of limitation for filing the claim petition both under the old Act as well as under the new Act was six months but under the new Act the power of the Court to condone the delay was limited to a delay of six months. It was held that there was a vital difference between an application claiming compensation and prayer to condone the delay in filing such application. In that case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay arose only after repeal of the old Act. That was not a case of a pending suit but the claim petition was filed after the new Motor Vehicles Act. In (1976) 4 SCC 330 : AIR 1976 SC 2161, Mohd. Ashfaque v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal it was held that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which makes Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to certain proceedings would have no application to the time for filing application for renewal of permit as a specified time limit had been fixed in Section 58, sub-section (2) and a discretion was conferred under sub-section (3) upon the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application for renewal if it is beyond time but if the delay was not more than 15 days. Similar view was taken by the Gujarat High Court in 1992 (1) ACC 717 : (AIR 1992 Guj 122), Mer Ramdas Bejanand Bhai v. Harshad Bhai Mala Bhai, Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P v. Parsan Tools, (1975) 4 SCC 22 : AIR 1975 SC 1039 also relates to the application of Sections 5 and 14(2) of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Sales Tax Act. That was a case where revision was filed beyond time prescribed by Section 10 of the U.P Sales Tax Act. The decision has no application to the facts of the present case as Section 14(2) or Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not being pressed. AIR 1964 SC 260, Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh and (1974) 2 SCC 133 : AIR 1974 SC 480, Hukum Dev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra were also cases where Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was being sought to be invoked and these decisions too have no application. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Raman Bhai Prabhat Bhai, 1987 (2) Acc CJ 56 : ((1987) 3 SCC 234 : AIR 1987 SC 1690) it was held that the provision of Section 110-A and Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act relating to persons for whose benefits an application can be made and the manner of distribution of compensation supersede the provision of the Fatal Accident Act. None of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the applicant applies to the situation in the present case.
10. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the time for filing the written statement in the present case was governed by the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1, C.P.C as it stood before the amendment introduced by Act No. 46 of 1999 and Act No. 24 of 2002.
11. As such the impugned order condoning the delay in filing the written statement cannot be excepted to.
12. In the result, there is no merit in this revision. Dismissed.
13. Revision dismissed.
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