1. The petitioners-employers Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board, by means of present writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, have challenged the award of the Industrial Tribunal (I), U.P, at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), dated 9 August, 1985, copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition.

2. The facts leading to the filing of present writ petition are that the contesting respondent-workman, namely, Mohd. Jameel was employed with the employers, as would be clear from the narration of fact and the written statement filed by the parties and referred to by the Tribunal in the award, which reveals that “the workman concerned Mohd. Jameel was employed as pump operator-cum-electrician with the employers with effect from 1 June, 1977. The services of the workman concerned were wrongfully terminated by the employers on 1 February, 1979. The workman through the respective union raised an industrial dispute, which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, and was registered by the Tribunal as Adjudication Case No. 168 of 1980. The Tribunal vide its award, dated 17 August, 1981, published on 3 October, 1981, held that the termination of the workman concerned Mohd. Jameel from service by the employers was illegal. The Tribunal directed for reinstatement with continuity of service and back-wages for the workman. The workman concerned thereafter moved an application that under S. 6-E of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the second issue referred to has not been decided. For disposal of the case, it would be convenient to peruse the reference that has been made by the State Government under S. 4-K of the Act, which runs as under:

3. As already stated, when the services of the workman concerned were terminated with effect from 1 February, 1979, a dispute was raised which has been answered in favour of the workman for reinstatement with continuity of service and back-wages. The Tribunal directed for reinstatement vide its award, dated 17 August, 1981. Pursuant to the aforesaid award, the employers reinstated the workman and started paying Rs. 10 per day, as according to the employers the workman was employed on daily wage basis. In this circumstance, the second issue, which was referred to by the State Government for adjudication, the Tribunal has answered both the issues in favour of the workman by the award impugned in the present petition holding that the termination of the services of the concerned workman with effect from 1 February, 1979, were illegal, inasmuch as the provisions of S. 6-N of the Act, which is pari materia of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, have not been complied with. The Tribunal has also directed reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and back-wages. With regard to the second issue, the Tribunal have directed that the workman is in continuous service since 1977 and has put in more than eight years till 19 June, 1984. The Tribunal has recorded finding that indeed it is too long a period to keep a workman employed on casual/daily wage basis, which is the connotation of muster-roll employees and, therefore, the Tribunal has directed the employers to consider seriously the possibility of the absorbing the workman concerned on regular basis. Learned counsel for the petitioners-employers have raised the argument that a perusal of the order of termination, dated 19 June, 1984, Annexure 2 to the writ petition, clearly demonstrates that the order purports to comply with all requirements of Ss. 6-N/S. 25-F of the Act, as according to the petitioner's counsel, it is not necessary that the amount as contemplated under Ss. 6-N/25-F of the Act must be paid at the time of the retrenchment, but if the order contemplates the offer to collect the amount contemplated under S. 25-F of the Act, it is the substantial compliance of the said provision and the Tribunal has erred in holding otherwise. A perusal of the termination order, dated 19 June, 1984, clearly demonstrates that it purports to terminate the services of the workman and informs the workman concerned that he may collect the retrenchment compensation and wages for one month's notice. This, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, amounts to substantial compliance and nothing further is required to be complied with, particularly when there is a report of the peon that when the notice was offered to the workman concerned, he refused to accept the same and told the peon that the same may be sent to his home address, which was admittedly sent after two days, i.e, 21 June, 1984; whereas, as per notice Annexure 2 to the writ petition, the services of the workman stand terminated with effect from 19 June, 1984. Curiously and particularly in the teeth of the denial by the workman concerned that the order of termination was never offered to him and that he never denied to receive the same. The workman also denied that he received the registered letter, which was sent to his home address after three days and he came to know with regard to the termination of his services only when he came to office for collecting the wages at the end of the month. The employers have not produced the person, who was scribe of the report, whereby report has been submitted that with regard to the service of the order of termination, dated 19 June, 1984, to the effect that the workman has refused to accept the same. The Tribunal has further dealt with the working and the calculation, etc., of the retrenchment compensation on the account slip and have arrived at the conclusion that the same has admittedly been done after the termination of the services of the workman with effect from 19 June, 1984. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not disputed, nor challenged the findings recorded by the Tribunal on this account. He thereafter insisted upon that since substantial compliance have been done with regard to Ss. 6-N/25-F of the Act, the view taken by the Tribunal to the contrary, i.e, Ss. 6-N/25-F have not been complied with, deserves to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a decision in Ratnesh Hydromachs v. Labour Court, Hubli, [1985 (1) L.L.N 940]. The another decision relied upon by petitioners' counsel is in B.N Elias and Company (Private), Ltd. v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal, [A.I.R 1965 Cal. 166], in support of this contention.

4. Sri K.P Agarwal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the workman concerned has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court, in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, [A.I.R 1960 S.C 610], which is a judgment of three-Judge Bench. The Apex Court has held:

“On a plain reading of S. 25-F(b) which is pari materia of S. 6-N of U.P Industrial Disputes Act, it is clear that the requirement prescribed by is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of the workman. The section provides that workman shall be retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied. It is difficult to accede to the argument that when the section imposes in mandatory terms a condition precedent, non-compliance with the said condition would not render the impugned retrenchment invalid. Therefore, we see no substance in the argument that the Court of appeal has misconstrued S. 25-F(b). That being so, failure to comply with the said provision renders the impugned orders invalid and inoperative.”

5. The next decision relied upon by Sri Agarwal is in State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramony, [1975 (2) L.L.N 101], which is equivalent to State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramony, [1976 (2) L.L.N 5], wherein the Apex Court has approved the judgment reported in A.I.R 1960 S.C 600. The Apex Court has held as under, in Para. 8, at page 8:

“Without further ado, we, reach the conclusion that if the workman swims into the harbour of S. 25-F, he cannot be retrenched without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed as prescribed therein read with S. 25-B(2). But argues the appellant, all these obligations flow only out of retrenchment, not termination outside that species of snapping employment. What, then, is retrenchment? They key to this vexed question is to be found in S. 2(oo), which reads thus:

2(oo) ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include—

(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or

(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or

(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.”

6. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, referred to above, the findings recorded by the Tribunal that the termination of the workman concerned, in the present case, has been done without compliance of the provisions of S. 6-N of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which is pari materia to S. 25-F of the aforesaid Act, do not warrant any interference by means of this writ petition.

7. In view of what has been stated above, this writ petition is devoid of any merits and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. However, the parties shall bear their own cost.