Bookmark
PDF
Share
CaseIQ

Cannon India Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of U.P And Others

Allahabad High Court

Dec 2, 2002

Judgment

Subsequent
References

CaseIQ

Important Paras

Please sign up to view Important Paras.

Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of Judicial Opinion (M. Katju, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a wholly owned Indian subsidiary of Cannon Singapore Pvt. Ltd., incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, with its factory at Noida. The company started operations in India in 1997 and manufactured, imported and distributed electronic products including photocopiers. The petitioner treated and had been assessed its photocopier sales as "electronic goods" under the Central Sales Tax Act and the U.P. Trade Tax Act, collecting Central Sales Tax at 2% pursuant to a State notification dated October 10, 1995, and obtaining an eligibility certificate from the C.E.O., Noida.

Subsequently, respondent authorities (through a directive dated March 18, 2002 and a circular dated March 21, 2002) took the view that such photocopiers are "duplicating machines" and not "electronic goods." Notices were issued in March 2002 and final assessment orders were passed on March 23, 2002. An order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Trade Tax, dated July 18, 2002 was also passed. The petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking certiorari to quash the directive, the circular and the impugned orders and, by mandamus, to direct respondents to assess the petitioner's photocopiers as electronic goods under the Central Sales Tax Act and the U.P. Trade Tax Act.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the petitioner's photocopier machines qualify as "electronic goods" and therefore must be assessed as such under the Central Sales Tax Act and the U.P. Trade Tax Act.
Whether the directive dated March 18, 2002, the circular dated March 21, 2002, the assessment orders dated March 23, 2002, and the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) order dated July 18, 2002 should be quashed.
Whether, given the factual record and the legal issues, the High Court should exercise writ jurisdiction rather than relegating the petitioner to alternate statutory remedies.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Photocopiers manufactured and sold by the petitioner are advanced, fully automated electronic machines that operate and are controlled by microprocessors, microchips and printed circuit boards. The petition details the electronic components (microchips, resistors, capacitors, transistors, integrated circuits) and the multi-step automated photocopying process controlled electronically.
Such photocopiers integrate digital technologies (e.g., digital copying, printing, scanning, faxing, computer interfacing) and therefore fall within the category of "electronic goods" (entry No. 74) rather than "duplicating machines" (entry No. 45), as reflected in the State notifications and the petitioner's earlier assessments.
The State Government had previously treated photocopiers as electronic goods (including an eligibility certificate from the C.E.O., Noida), and the petitioner's turnover had been assessed as electronic goods for assessment years 1997-98 and 1998-99 without objection.
The decisions relied on by the respondents (e.g., Bhuji Products) are distinguishable or inapplicable because the statutory entries in Gujarat differ from those in Uttar Pradesh; the petitioner relied on dictionary definitions and on Supreme Court authority (BPL Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh) to show that fully automated machines controlled by microprocessors are electronic goods.

Respondents' Arguments

The respondents (through their counter-affidavit and submissions) relied upon various State notifications (including the notification dated October 10, 1995 and subsequent notifications) to contend that the Government's intention was to treat photocopying machines under the heading "Office machines and appliances" (Sl. No. 45, later Sl. No. 70(i)) and that there was no infirmity in the impugned assessment orders.
The Assistant Commissioner treated the petitioner's machines as duplicating machines pursuant to the directive and circular issued by higher authorities; the directive relied upon certain precedents (including Everest Copiers, Bhuji Products and Sales Tax Officer v. Kores (India) Ltd.).
The learned Standing Counsel for the State contended that the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy (i.e., appeal), although the Court was informed of and referenced case law on when alternative remedies do not bar writ jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Everest Copiers v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1996] 103 STC 360 (SC)	Originally relied upon by the directive; concerned whether contract for making copies was a works contract or a sale.	The Court held that Everest Copiers was not applicable to the present classification issue because that case dealt only with whether a contract was a works contract or a sale.
Bhuji Products v. State of Gujarat, [1992] 84 STC 328 (Guj)	Relied upon by respondents' directive; decision under Gujarat statute (entry 79 of Schedule II, Part A).	The Court held that Bhuji Products had no application in Uttar Pradesh because the statutory entries in Gujarat differ from those in U.P.; the decision was therefore inapplicable to the petitioner's case.
Sales Tax Officer v. Kores (India) Ltd., [1989] 29 STC 225 (sic)	One of the authorities cited in the impugned directive relied upon by respondents.	The opinion records that the directive relied upon this decision; the petitioner alleged such reliance was misplaced. The Court did not treat this authority as controlling for the classification issue.
BPL Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2001] 121 STC 450; (2001) UPTC 246; (2001) 2 SCC 139	Whether fully automated washing machines are "electronic goods" because their functions are controlled by microprocessor technology; Supreme Court guidance on classification where microprocessor control is central.	The Court considered BPL to squarely cover the present facts and applied its reasoning: since fully automated photocopiers' functions are controlled exclusively and directly by microprocessors and microchips, they fall within "electronic goods" and not "duplicating machines". This precedent was a primary basis for allowing the writ.
Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 : AIR 1985 SC 1147	General principle that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction.	The Court cited the principle and observed that because the facts were undisputed, it was appropriate to decide the controversy by writ instead of relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy.
Filterco v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, [1986] 61 STC 318 (SC); (1986) 2 SCC 103 : AIR 1986 SC 626	Authority invoked in context of when High Courts should decide recurring legal questions of law rather than dismissing writ petitions for alternative remedy.	The Court relied on this line of authority to justify exercising writ jurisdiction because the controversy involved legal questions of a recurring nature and did not involve disputed facts.
Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P., [1995] 97 STC 386 (All.); 1995 UPTC 723	Cited in the same context regarding exercise of writ jurisdiction on recurring legal questions where facts are not disputed.	Used as supporting precedent for the proposition that the High Court should decide recurring legal issues rather than dismissing on grounds of an alternative remedy.
Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1978] 41 STC 147 (All.); 1977 UPTC 81	Cited in the context of when writ jurisdiction is appropriate despite alternative remedies.	Referenced as part of the jurisprudential support for deciding the legal question in writ jurisdiction.
Union of India v. State of Haryana, (2000) 10 SCC 482	Cited in the context of principles governing when writ petitions should be entertained on questions of law of recurring/public importance.	Referenced as authority supporting the Court's decision to decide the matter on writ despite the existence of an alternative remedy.
State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., [1977] 39 STC 355 (SC); (1977) UPTC 282 (SC); (1977) 2 SCC 724 : AIR 1977 SC 1132	Authority establishing that where a controversy is likely to recur and involves essentially questions of law rather than disputed facts, the High Court should decide it rather than dismissing for alternative remedy.	The Court treated this line of authority as supporting its exercise of writ jurisdiction to resolve the classification issue without relegating the petitioner to appeal remedies.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in these main steps:

Factual findings and admissions: The Court observed that the petitioner provided detailed factual allegations about the electronic nature of its photocopiers (microprocessors, printed circuit boards, integrated circuits, automatic operation, multifunctionality). Those factual allegations in paragraph 4 of the petition were not specifically denied in the respondents' counter-affidavit; respondents only stated they were technical matters they were not conversant with. The Court held that a bald/general denial was insufficient and therefore treated the petitioner's factual averments as admitted. Because there were no disputed facts, the Court concluded the matter could be decided by writ.
Characterisation of the machines: The Court examined the technological features as pleaded — that fully automated photocopiers run by microprocessors and microchips and perform multiple electronic functions (copying, printing, scanning, faxing, interfacing), controlled by programmed electronic current. The Court noted the petition relied on dictionary definitions of "electronic" and "electronics" (Webster's and the Concise Oxford Dictionary) to show that machines with microchips and transistors that control electronic current qualify as electronic machines.
Precedential guidance: The Court relied principally on the Supreme Court decision in BPL Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, which held that fully automated washing machines controlled by microprocessor technology could be regarded as electronic goods. The Court found that reasoning squarely applicable to fully automated photocopiers, because both categories involve machines whose functions are directed and controlled by microprocessors.
Distinguishing other authorities: The Court held that the Gujarat High Court decision in Bhuji Products did not apply in Uttar Pradesh because the legislative entries under the respective statutes differed. Everest Copiers was not relevant because it dealt with the distinct question of whether a contract was a works contract or a sale. The Court also observed that the history of State notifications suggested that prior to June 27, 2002, the State had treated electronic goods as distinct from office machines/duplicating machines; photocopiers were included under the duplicating machine entry only by the June 27, 2002 notification.
Exercise of writ jurisdiction despite alternative remedy: The Court considered the respondents' contention about alternative remedies but invoked established authorities (e.g., Ram and Shyam; Filterco; Indian Hume Pipe) stating that when the controversy is recurring in nature, involves questions of law and not disputed facts, the High Court may appropriately decide the matter by writ instead of dismissing on the ground of alternate remedies. Because the facts were undisputed and the legal question was covered by Supreme Court authority, the Court exercised writ jurisdiction.
Relief and practical directions: Applying BPL and the admitted facts, the Court concluded that the petitioner's fully automated photocopiers are electronic goods and should be treated and assessed as such. It therefore quashed the directive, circular and impugned orders and directed the respondents to assess the petitioner's photocopiers under the Central Sales Tax Act and the U.P. Trade Tax Act as electronic goods. The Court also ordered refund of any amounts deposited pursuant to the interim order within one month.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ petition was allowed. Specifically, the Court QUASHED the directive dated March 18, 2002 (annexure 1), the circular dated March 21, 2002 (annexure 2), the assessment orders dated March 23, 2002 (annexure 3) and the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Trade Tax dated July 18, 2002 (annexure 16). The respondents were directed to treat the petitioner's photocopiers as electronic goods under the Central Sales Tax Act and the U.P. Trade Tax Act and to assess them accordingly. Any amounts deposited by the petitioner under the interim order of the Court were to be refunded within one month.

Implications:

The immediate consequence is that the petitioner’s photocopiers must be classified and assessed as "electronic goods" for the purposes of Central Sales Tax and U.P. Trade Tax, consistent with the Court's order.
The Court resolved the classification dispute on the basis of admitted facts and binding Supreme Court authority (BPL Ltd.), rather than creating new legal principle; the decision applies to the petitioner and to the impugned directive/circular/orders which were quashed.
The Court exercised writ jurisdiction despite the existence of alternative statutory remedies because the controversy involved undisputed facts and questions of law of a recurring nature; the opinion relies upon established precedent to support that exercise. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying existing Supreme Court authority to the facts at hand.

Disposition: Writ petition allowed.

Show all summary ...

M. Katju, J.:— This writ petition has been filed for a writ of certiorari to quash the directive dated March 18, 2002, by respondent No. 1 (annexure 1 to the petition) and also to quash the circular dated March 21, 2002. The petitioner has also prayed for a certiorari to quash the orders dated March 23, 2002 (annexure 3) and the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Trade Tax, dated July 18, 2002 (annexure 16 to the writ petition). The petitioner has further prayed for a mandamus directing the respondents to assess the turnover of the petitioner pertaining to the sales of photocopiers of the petitioner on the basis that they are electronic goods under the U.P Trade Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act.

2. We have heard Sri Bharatji Agarwal, learned Senior Advocate and Sri Yashwant Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the State Government. The petitioner is a wholly owned subsidiary of Cannon Singapore Pvt. Ltd., incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office at New Delhi and factory at Noida. The petitioner-company started its operations in India in the year 1997 and is engaged, inter alia, in manufacturing, import and distribution of a wide range of electronic products including photocopiers.

3. It is alleged in paragraph 4 of the writ petition it is stated that the photocopiers of the petitioner are one of the most advanced in the world.

4. In paragraph 4(ii) of the writ petition it is alleged that a photocopier like other electronic goods, i.e, transistors, televisions, V.C Rs., V.C Ps., radio receivers, record players, tape deck mechanisms are controlled with or works with the help of microchips or microprocessors. A photocopier is based on and comprises of various electronic printed circuit boards and the entire functioning of the photocopier is automatic. The electronic components of a photocopier include microchips, resisters, capacitors, transistors and integrated circuits, etc. Once data is fed into the machine the electronic component, i.e, the microprocessors of the photocopiers control and direct the carrying out of the various functions of the photocopier. The process of photocopying involves six steps as mentioned in paragraph 4(ii) of the writ petition. All these steps which are consequential in nature are controlled electronically through a microprocessor which is a part of the control board being D.C controller (which is a printed circuit board assembly having several electronic components including integrated circuits, transistors, capacitors, transformers, etc.) which is used to control and perform various functions of the photocopying machine. Details are given in paragraph 4(iii) of the writ petition.

5. The microprocessor is an intelligent device, which contains memory and features, which enable it to be programmed to perform sequences of such functions akin to the C.P.U of a computer which electronically controls the entire functioning of a photocopier. The principal components of a photocopier, which control the entire photocopying process, are given in paragraph 4(iv) of the writ petition.

6. In paragraph 4(iv) of the writ petition it is stated that the petitioner has added a new dimension to photocopiers with its introduction of digital monochrome photocopiers. These photocopiers integrate digital copying technologies and have led to multifunctional machines that can also be used as printers, scanners and facsimile machines compatible with computer software designed to improve productivity. The petitioner has annexed as annexure 4 to the petition copies of technical/service manuals of the photocopiers of the petitioner to show that all the operations of the photocopier are controlled by the microprocessors.

7. In paragraph 5 of the writ petition it is stated that the State Government with a view to encourage modern technology issued a notification dated October 10, 1995 under section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act whereby it has prescribed lesser Central sales tax at 2 per cent on electronic goods. True copy of the notification dated October 10, 1995 has been annexed as annexure 5 to the writ petition. It is alleged in paragraph 6 of the writ petition that the photocopiers of the petitioner are electronic goods. The petitioner has accordingly been collecting Central sales tax at 2 per cent as per the notification and the trade tax under the U.P Trade Tax Act as applicable to electronic goods. The turnover of the petitioner pertaining to the sale of photocopiers has been subjected to Central sales tax at 2 per cent as per the notification and trade tax as applicable to electronic goods for the assessment years 1997-98 and 1998-99, by the U.P Trade Tax Department without any objection. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition it is stated that the fact that the photocopiers of the petitioner are electronic goods has been accepted by the Chief Executive Officer, Noida, who has issued an eligibility certificate dated August, 9, 1999, on this basis for concession in trade tax for the period May 28, 1998 to May 27, 2006. True copy of the certificate issued by the C.E.O, Noida, has been annexed as annexure 6 to the petition.

8. In paragraph 8 of the writ petition it is stated that the U.P Trade Tax Department thus fully accepted the fact that such photocopiers are “electronic goods” and has accordingly assessed the petitioner's turnover on that basis under the U.P Trade Tax Act and Central Sales Tax Act. However, subsequently the Assistant Commissioner, Trade Tax, Noida has taken the view that the photocopiers are duplicating machines and are liable to be taxed as such both for the purposes of Central sales tax and for the purpose of U.P trade tax. This view of the Assistant Commissioner, Trade Tax, Noida, was on the basis of the impugned directive whereby it has been, inter alia, directed by the Principal Secretary, Institutional Finance, U.P, that the photocopiers are the duplicating machines and should be assessed as such. The directive has relied upon the decisions in Everest Copiers v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1996] 103 STC 360 (SC), Bhuji Products v. State of Gujarat, [1992] 84 STC 328 (Guj) and Sales Tax Officer v. Kores (India) Ltd., [1989] 29 STC 225 (sic). It is alleged in paragraph 8 of the writ petition that reliance on the above decisions is totally misconceived and misplaced for the purposes given in the said paragraph.

9. The Assistant Commissioner, Trade Tax, served the petitioner with notices of March, 2002 to show cause as to why the petitioner's photocopier should not be treated as duplicating machine instead of electronic goods. The petitioner submitted his reply dated March 22, 2002, vide annexure 7 to the writ petition.

10. In paragraph 10 of the writ petition it is stated that based on the directive of the respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 2 through respondent No. 3 had issued the impugned circular whereby respondent No. 3 has directed all Assistant Commissioners of Trade Tax in Uttar Pradesh including the respondent No. 4 and all Trade Tax Officers that they had decided that tax on photocopier machine should be charged as for duplicating machine. The circular issued by the Additional Commissioner, Trade Tax, is identical in content and in reasoning to the impugned directive issued by the Principal Secretary, Institutional Finance. In paragraph 11 of the petition it is stated that the Assistant Commissioner, Trade Tax, has passed the impugned orders purportedly under rule 8, section 9(2) for final tax assessment of the petitioner for the year 1999-2000 without considering to the reply/submissions of the petitioner and the judgment of the Supreme Court in BPL Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2001] 121 STC 450; (2001) UPTC 246 (SC); (2001) 2 SCC 139. It is stated that the respondent No. 4 in a mechanical manner without any examination of the merits of the matter has followed the impugned directive and circular of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in toto and has not taken as independent view also. It is stated that respondents have ignored the Supreme Court judgment in BPL case, [2001] 121 STC 450; (2001) UPTC 246; (2001) 2 SCC 139.

11. In paragraph 12 of the writ petition it is stated that the photocopier is an electronic machine and hence it is covered by entry No. 74 and there existed a separate entry for duplicating machine being entry 45. The respondents have completely ignored these facts while passing the impugned directive and circular. The photocopiers were specifically classified under the entry electronic goods vide entry No. 74 which is arbitrary one vide annexure 8 to the writ petition as amended vide notification dated October 1, 1994. True copy of the notification dated October 1, 1999 is enclosed as annexure 9 to the writ petition. It is alleged in paragraph 14 of the writ petition that the petitioner's photocopiers are electronic goods, which are an entirely distinct and wholly separate items. Duplicating machines refers to the mechanical duplicating machine, which are distinct in principle and functioning from the petitioner's photocopier, which functions on electronic principles and employs electronic technology. Duplicating machines are covered under entry No. 45 of Schedule I to the Act, which has been quoted in paragraph 14 of the writ petition.

12. In paragraph 15 it is stated that there is a fact that two separate entries for photocopiers and duplicating machine co-existed clearly establishes the fact that the two are distinct appliances. The petitioner has relied on the notification dated September 7, 1981 wherein duplicating machine is a separate entry under entry 45. True copy of the notification dated September 7, 1981 has been annexed as annexure 10 to the petition.

13. In paragraph 16 of the writ petition it is stated that the popular perception in the local markets as well as amongst consumers at large and in the trade circles in the State of Uttar Pradesh, photocopiers are considered as electronic goods. Whereas duplicating machine is regarded as a mechanical appliance vide annexure 12 to the writ petition. In paragraph 19 to the petition the petitioner has referred to the dictionary meaning of electronic and electronic machine. The petitioner has submitted in paragraph 20 that its photocopiers possess all the attributes of electronic, electronics as well as electronic machines as defined in the dictionary. Photocopiers are electronic goods and they cannot be construed as duplicating machine. The petitioner has submitted that the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Bhuji Products case, [1992] 84 STC 328 was in respect of entry 79 of Schedule II, Part A of the Gujarat statute and that entry which is completely different from the entries under consideration.

14. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the petitioner has an alternative remedy. It is well-settled that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition vide, (1985) 3 SCC 267 : AIR 1985 SC 1147 (Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana). In our opinion since the facts are undisputed it would be appropriate to settle the controversy through this writ petition rather than keep the matter lingering for years and without any authoritative adjudication. In fact in this very case the court has passed an interim order on 6th May, 2002 holding that the petitioner need not be relegated to the remedy of appeal.

15. We agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entry of the Gujarat statute is different from that in Uttar Pradesh and hence the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Bhuji Products case, [1992] 84 STC 328 has no application.

16. A counter-affidavit has been filed in this case and we have perused the same. The respondents have relied on the notification dated October 10, 1995, annexure C.A 2, Notification dated November 23, 1998, annexure C.A 3, Notification dated January 15, 2000, annexure C.A 5 and Notification dated June 27, 2002, annexure C.A 6 to the counter-affidavit. On the basis of the same it is contended that the intention of the Government was that photocopying machines are to be treated under the heading “Office machines and appliances” and accordingly the tax was to be levied as such under Sl. No. 45 which has now been changed to Sl. No. 70(i). Hence it is alleged that there is no infirmity in the impugned assessment orders.

17. The allegations in paragraph 4(ii) and (iii) have not been specifically denied in the counter-affidavit. In paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit all that has been stated is that these allegations are technical details with which the respondents are not conversant. The same reply has been given to paragraph 4(iv) and (vii) of the writ petition. It has therefore to be held that the factual allegations, paragraph 4 of the writ petition, are not denied by the respondents. It is well-settled that a bald denial in the counter-affidavit to the allegations in the writ petition is not sufficient and unless a specific denial is given the allegations in the petition have to be treated as correct. Since there is no factual dispute in this case we can dispose of this writ petition without relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy under the Act.

18. The short controversy in this case is whether the petitioner's photocopier machines are electronic goods and have to be assessed accordingly under the Central Sales Tax Act and the U.P Trade Tax Act.

19. It may be mentioned that the present day fully automated photocopiers machines are completely distinct and different in their functioning from the photocopier machines of the past. Today's fully automated photocopier machines represent a quantum jump in technology. They not do the work of photocopying alone but also do printing, faxing, e-mailing, interfacing over internet streams, etc., all with the aid of microprocessors and microchips on the commands of which they run. The fully automated photocopier machines are run by an electronic current which is controlled and administered by microprocessor. These microchips control and direct the electronic current in a programmed manner so as to enable the fully automated photocopier machine to carry out its function. The manner and function of the fully automated machines is set out in paragraph 4(iii) and (iv) of the writ petition and these facts have not been denied by the respondents in the counter-affidavit. Data is fed into the machine and thereupon it is the microprocessor, which controls and directs the carrying out of the various functions of the machines.

20. In paragraph 19 of the petition, the petitioners have relied upon the dictionary meaning of the word electronic which is quoted below:

“Webster's Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary defines ‘electronic’ as: 1. Of or pertaining to electronics or to devices, circuits or systems, developed through electronics. 2. of or pertaining to electronics or to an electron.”

The same dictionary defines “electronics” as “the science dealing with the development and application of devices and systems involving the flow of electrons in a vacuum, in a gases media and in semiconductors.”

The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition, defines “Electronic” as “having components such as microchips and transistors that control and direct electronic current”.

21. In our opinion this writ petition deserves to be allowed in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in BPL Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2001] 121 STC 450; (2001) UPTC 246. In that case the Supreme Court was called upon to answer the question as to whether fully automated washing machine could be regarded as electronic goods so as to attract the lower rate of sales tax. In paragraphs 12 and 13 of that decision the Supreme Court while referring to the dictionary has observed that even washing machine can be regarded as being one which run on centrifugal force but the operation or the running of these machines is completely controlled by the microprocess technology involved in the said machines. The entire functioning of the washing machine is automatic. Data is fed in the machine and thereupon it is the microprocessors which control and direct the carrying out of the various functions of the machines which results in the clothes being washed in the desired manner.

22. In our opinion the decision of the Supreme Court in BPL Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2001] 121 STC 450; (2001) UPTC 246, squarely covers the present case. The petitioner's fully automated photocopier machines also run on electron principles and its functions are controlled exclusively and directly by microprocessor and microchips, hence it has been classified as electronic and not as a duplicating machine.

23. We have already held that the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Bhuji Products v. State of Gujarat, [1992] 84 STC 328 has no application in Uttar Pradesh as here the entries are different. Moreover, assuming there is any conflict in the decision of the Supreme Court and the Gujarat High Court, the view of the Supreme Court has to prevail. As regards the decision in Everest Copiers v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1996] 103 STC 360 (SC), the only question there was whether the contract of making a copy of the documents on payment by a customer was a works contract or a sale, hence that decision has no application here. Moreover, the history of the notifications of the State Government referred to above, clearly indicates that electronic goods have throughout been treated as a commodity distinct from commodities contained in the entry pertaining to office machine, which includes duplicating machine. For the first time by notification dated June 27, 2002, photocopier machines have been specifically included in the entry of duplicating machine. This indicates that prior to June 27, 2002, the State Government never considered photocopier machine to be duplicating machine.

24. As regards the plea of alternative remedy by learned Standing Counsel, the learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner has referred the various decisions, e.g, Filterco v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, [1986] 61 STC 318 (SC); (1986) 2 SCC 103 : AIR 1986 SC 626, Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P, [1995] 97 STC 386 (All.); 1995 UPTC 723, Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1978] 41 STC 147 (All.); 1977 UPTC 81. In Union of India v. State of Haryana, (2000) 10 SCC 482 and State of U.P v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., [1977] 39 STC 355 (SC); (1977) UPTC 282 (SC); (1977) 2 SCC 724 : AIR 1977 SC 1132 it was held that where the controversy is likely to be of a recurring nature and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law then it should be decided by the High Court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy. In our opinion since the facts are covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in BPL Ltd. case, [2001] 121 STC 450; (2001) UPTC 246 this writ petition has to be allowed. The impugned directive dated March 18, 2002, annexure 1 to the writ petition, circular dated 21st March, 2002, annexure 2 to the writ petition, orders dated March 23, 2002, annexure 3 and the order dated July 18, 2002, annexure 16 to the writ petition are quashed. The respondents are directed to treat the petitioner's photocopiers as electronic goods under the Central Sales Tax Act and U.P Trade Tax Act and assess them accordingly. Any amount deposited by the petitioner under the interim order of this Court shall be refunded to it within a month from today.

25. Writ petition allowed.