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Smt. Radha Tiwari v. State Of U.P And Others

Allahabad High Court
Dec 17, 2002
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.P. Srivastava, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed to the post of temporary Munsif on the recommendations of the Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh, said to be on the basis of the competitive examination held in 1993, and by an order dated 22-7-1985 (as recorded in the opinion) took charge as Munsif at Faizabad on 5-12-1985. Her character roll entries and other material, as referred to in the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 2, reflected unsatisfactory performance, and doubts were raised about her integrity. She was subjected to several departmental enquiries which could not be completed due to non-cooperation and other reasons.

The Administrative Committee, after considering the situation, recommended termination under Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975; the Full Court, in its meeting on 7-3-1998 (after an Administrative Committee meeting on 24-10-1997), noted that the officer was facing three departmental enquiries at different stages and decided to abandon/drop the disciplinary proceedings and to terminate her services under Rule 3 of the 1975 Rules. The State Government then passed an order dated 27-4-1998 terminating her services, which the petitioner challenged by filing the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner’s appointment was a temporary appointment governed by the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975, or a substantive appointment on probation under the Uttar Pradesh Nyayik Sewa Niyamavali, 1951 (in particular Rule 23), with consequential protection against summary termination.
  2. Whether completion of a period of probation or long continuance in service (about 13 years as asserted by the petitioner) gives rise to a deemed confirmation or right not to be terminated under the 1975 Rules.
  3. Whether the impugned termination order was punitive/stigmatic and vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice where disciplinary proceedings had been initiated but were abandoned before conclusion.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that her appointment was made under the U.P. Nyayik Sewa Niyamavali, 1951 and therefore fell within Rule 23 of those Rules as an appointment on probation for two years.
  • She argued that having crossed the two-year probationary period she ought to be treated as confirmed; by the date of the impugned order she had about 13 years of service, which entitled her to protection and an opportunity of hearing before termination under the Niyamavali (1951) procedure applicable to confirmed employees.
  • The petitioner further contended that the impugned order was punitive in nature since three separate disciplinary proceedings/charge-sheets had been issued and the termination, in light of those antecedent circumstances, was effectively punishment without proper disciplinary conclusions and in breach of natural justice.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The contesting respondent urged that the appointment was purely temporary as per the appointment order and therefore governed by the definition of temporary service in Rule 3 of the 1975 Rules; consequently the 1975 Rules regulated termination.
  • It was argued that the petitioner accepted the temporary appointment and cannot now contend that it was other than temporary.
  • The respondents relied on the proposition that the U.P. Nyayik Sewa Rules, 1951 allow for temporary/officiating appointments and do not contemplate automatic confirmation after expiry of probation; confirmation requires a recommendation by the Full Court and an order by the Governor, hence confirmation is not automatic.
  • On the natural justice/punitive point, respondents argued the impugned order was innocuous/non-stigmatic and not founded on the misconduct charges because the disciplinary proceedings had been abandoned by the Full Court; therefore the order was not vitiated.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lihazur Rehman v. State of U.P, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14647 of 1995 (15-3-1996) (reported in 1996 All LJ 1162) Holds that Rules of 1951 contemplate temporary/officiating appointments and such temporary appointments are governed by the 1975 Rules; confirmation is not automatic on expiry of probation. The court followed the Division Bench's view in Lihazur Rehman to conclude the petitioner’s appointment could be temporary and therefore terminable under the 1975 Rules; the court found no reason to depart from that view.
State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 Used as supporting authority for the proposition that confirmation is not automatic and that the confirming authority must exercise judgment in confirmation matters. The Division Bench (whose reasoning the court adopted) drew support from this Constitution Bench opinion to emphasize that confirmation under the Rules is not automatic merely by passage of time.
Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U.P, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 524 : AIR 1992 SC 496 Support for the proposition that long service/period of service does not prevent application of rules governing termination of temporary employees. The court relied on this precedent (as cited by the Division Bench) to reject the contention that long continuance in service precludes the applicability of the 1975 Rules.
State of U.P v. Prem Lata Mishra, (1994) 4 SCC 189 : AIR 1994 SC 2411 Support for the view that completion of a specified period of service does not automatically confer confirmation or bar summary termination under rules applicable to temporary service. The court referenced this authority (as relied on by the Division Bench) when determining that long service did not confer automatic confirmation or protection from termination under the 1975 Rules.
State of U.P v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 : (1991 AIR SCW 793) Authority indicating that a temporary employee has no inherent right to hold the post and that temporary status may justify termination without the protections accorded to confirmed employees. The court invoked this precedent (as relied upon by a larger Bench) to support the proposition that temporary employees do not have a right to retain posts and that the impugned order was not invalid for that reason.
Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, (1999) 3 SCC 60 : AIR 1999 SC 983 (1999 1 Serv LR 622) Holds that where findings are reached in an enquiry or an enquiry is conducted behind the back of the officer, a simple termination may be treated as founded on the allegations and be bad; if no enquiry/results exist and employer declines enquiry but wishes not to continue an employee, the order may be only motive-based and not invalid. The court applied this principle to distinguish a punitive/stigmatic termination from a non-punitive termination where disciplinary proceedings were abandoned; it concluded the impugned order was not founded on findings of misconduct and so was not invalid on that ground.
Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur, (1968) 3 SCR 234 : AIR 1968 SC 1089 Example where charge memo was served, reply given, proceedings dropped and a simple termination was issued; such termination was not founded on findings of misconduct. The court relied on this case (as cited in Dipti Prakash Banerjee) to support the view that dropping disciplinary proceedings and issuing a simple termination does not necessarily render the termination punitive or vitiate it for lack of natural justice.
A.S. Benjamin v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 1341 of 1966 (decided 13-12-1996) (reported in 1967 (1) Lab LJ 718) Illustrates that where disciplinary proceedings are dropped because they would take too long and the employer chooses termination instead, courts have upheld such termination. The opinion relied on this example to illustrate circumstances in which a dropped disciplinary enquiry followed by simple termination has been upheld; the court used it to support the validity of the impugned order in the present factual matrix.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the nature of the appointment and the applicable rules. It noted the following analytical steps explicitly contained in the opinion:

  1. Examination of the record showed the petitioner had been appointed temporarily and that character roll entries and departmental actions recorded unsatisfactory performance and doubts regarding integrity; departmental enquiries remained incomplete largely due to non-cooperation and other delays.
  2. The Administrative Committee had recommended termination under Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975, and the Full Court resolved to abandon the disciplinary proceedings and to recommend termination under Rule 3; the State Government then issued the termination order dated 27-4-1998.
  3. The court reviewed the contention that the 1951 Rules (notably Rule 23) necessarily produced appointments that were substantive and on probation, leading to confirmation after two years. The court referred to the Division Bench decision in Lihazur Rehman Khan which had interpreted Rules 4, 5, 23, 24 and 25 of the 1951 Rules to permit temporary/officiating appointments and held that such appointments are governed by the 1975 Rules.
  4. The court adopted the Division Bench’s analysis (Lihazur Rehman) that confirmation under the 1951 Rules is not automatic; Rule 25 requires a recommendation by the Full Court and an order by the Governor for confirmation and notifications in the Gazette, and Rule 33 permits extension of probation without a maximum limit — thereby undercutting any argument of deemed confirmation merely by lapse of time.
  5. The court addressed the petitioner’s reliance on long service (about 13 years) and on the need for an opportunity to be heard prior to termination. It relied on precedents (Triveni Shanker Saxena, State of U.P v. Prem Lata Mishra, State of U.P v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla) cited by the Division Bench to hold that long service does not preclude application of the 1975 Rules and does not automatically entitle a temporary employee to protection from termination.
  6. Regarding the natural justice/punitive argument, the court analyzed whether the impugned order was punitive or stigmatic. It relied on the principle articulated in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (and the supporting authorities Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur and A.S. Benjamin) distinguishing termination founded on enquiry findings from termination where enquiries were not pursued and no findings had been recorded. The court concluded that because the Full Court had abandoned the disciplinary proceedings and no findings of misconduct were the basis of the termination, the order was not punitive or stigmatic in law.
  7. The court concluded that, applying the cited authorities and the facts (temporary appointment, abandoned enquiries, and Full Court’s recommendation under Rule 3 of the 1975 Rules), there was no sufficient ground to interfere with the State Government’s termination order while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The writ petition is DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The impugned termination order dated 27-4-1998, terminating the petitioner’s services under Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975, was upheld and not interfered with by this Court.
  • The court held that the appointment could properly be treated as temporary and terminable under the 1975 Rules; completion of probation or long service did not give rise to deemed confirmation in the absence of the specific confirmation procedure under the 1951 Rules.
  • The court further held that the termination order was not vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice as, on the facts, it was not punitive or based on concluded findings of misconduct (disciplinary proceedings had been abandoned).
  • No broader or novel legal principle was announced by this Court in the opinion; the court followed and applied earlier judicial authorities and Division Bench reasoning to the facts at hand. The direct legal consequence was dismissal of the petition and validation of the termination order; the opinion does not purport to create a new precedent beyond applying the authorities it cites.

Note: This summary is drawn strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal propositions beyond what appears in the text.

Show all summary ...

S.P Srtvastava, J.:— Heard the petitioner, who has appeared in person, Shri Sudhir Agarwal the learned counsel representing the respondent No. 2 as well as the learned Standing Counsel representing the respondent Nos. 1 and 3.

2. Perused the record.

3. The petitioner, who had been appointed on the post of temporary Munsif, on the recommendations of the Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh, made on the basis of the competitive examination held in the year 1993, on 22-7-1985 has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition feeling aggrieved by the order dated 27-4-1998 passed by the State Government terminating her services exercis ing the jurisdiction contemplated under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 indicating that the services of the petitioner were no longer required. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this writ petition lie in a narrow compass.

4. Pursuant to the order of appointment referred to herein above, the petitioner had taken over charge as Munsif at Faizabad on 5-12-1985. The character roll entries awarded to the petitioner during the period elapsing between the date of her appointment and the date of termination of service which have been referred to in detail in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent No. 2, in opposition to the writ petition indicating that her work, performance and conduct had remained far from satisfactory. Even doubt had been raised against her integrity. She was subjected to various departmental enquiries which could not be completed on account of her non-co-operation and ultimately on being appraised of the situation the Administrative Committee passed a resolution referring the matter for consideration of the Full Court recommending the termination of her services under Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Services) Rules, 1975. The Full Court in its meeting held on 7-3-1998 after considering the recommendation of the Administrative Committee made in its meeting held on 24-10-1997 and observing that the officer was facing 3 departmental enquiries on different charges and even though the proceedings had been initiated against her long before, they could not be concluded for different reasons and were pending at different stages, on a careful consideration of the relevant aspect of the matter decided to abandon/drop the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner and to terminate her services under Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975.

5. It was thereafter that the State Government passed the impugned order which is being challenged in the present proceedings.

6. It may be noticed that the Full Bench in its resolution dated 7-3-1998 had come to the conclusion that from the scrutiny of the record it was apparent that the petitioner had been holding the post on temporary basis and her services were terminable under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. It may also be noticed that by mistake pursuant to the Government Order dated 7-2-1990 for the grant of senior pay scale of the officers of U.P Nayayik Sewa Niyamavali, 1951, who had completed regular and satisfactory service of 5 years, the petitioner was also granted senior pay scale along with 215 Officers of U.P Nayayik Sewa but on the mistake having been brought to the notice of the Court it was rectified and the Court's notification dated 29-9-1992 was modified.

7. The petitioner has strenuously urged that by the date of the issuance of the impugned order terminating her services, she had to her credit about 13 years of service and since she had been appointed under the provisions contained in U.P Nyaylk Sewa Niyamavali. 1951, her appointment could only be taken to be an appointment as contemplated under Rule 23 of the aforesaid Rules on probation for a period of 2 years.

8. The contention urged is that since she was allowed to cross the two year's period of probation, she had to be treated to have been confirmed and consequently her services could not be terminated in purported exercise of the jurisdiction vesting in the appointing authority under the Rules of 1975 and if at all it could have been terminated after complying with the procedure prescribed under the Niyamavli of 1951 as applicable to the confirmed employees of the U.P Nyayik Sewa.

9. The learned counsel for the contest ing respondent has, however, urged that the petitioner's appointment had to be taken to be on purely temporary basis and taking into consideration the definition of temporary service as contained in Rule 3 of the Rules of 1975 had to be taken to be regulated by the provisions contained under the aforesaid Rules, 1975. It is further urged that the petitioner had never objected to the nature of the appointment offered to her and having accepted a temporary appointment with her eyes wide open it is too late for her to urge that the appointment was of a character other than that as specifically indicated in the appointment order.

10. It is also urged.that the scheme.underlying the Uttar Pradesh Nyayik Sewa Rules, 1951, does not contemplate only a substantive appointment on probation and there may be other categories of appointments which may include a temporary appointment on a permanent post or appointment on a temporary post. The contention is that the appointment of the petitioner was not a substantive appointment and had to be treated as purely temporary appointment liable to termination in accordance with the Rules of 1975.

11. It is further urged that even after the completion of the period of probation in the case of a temporary appointment on a substantive post against the permanent post under the Rules, 1951, the confirmation after the expiry of the period of probation is not automatic and unless the High Court as provided under the Rules of the Court recommends confirmation after evaluating the service record of an Officer, the State Government cannot issue an order of confirmation which is a must. The contention is that the petitioner's claim of her being automatically confirmed even in the absence of confirmation is totally misconceived and is baseless.

12. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.

13. The question in regard to the possibility of an appointment other than a substantive appointment on probation as contemplated under Rules 23 of the U.P Nyayik Sewa Niyamavali, 1951 which appointment may be on a purely temporary basis of against a temporary post or in any manner other than being substantive appointment against a permanent post and on probation for 2 years as contemplated under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1951 had come up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lihazur Rehman v. State of U.P, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14647 of 1995 decided on 15-3-1996 (reported in 1996 All LJ 1162). The learned counsel for the contesting respondent has produced the copy of the appointment order issued in favour of Lihazur Rehman Khan to show that the said appointment was identical to the appointment granted to the present petitioner.

14. The Division Bench of this Court in its aforesaid decision after critically analyzing the provisions contained in Rules of 1951 specifically Rules 4, 5, 23, 24 and 25 of the said Rules had come to the conclusion that the Rules contemplate appointment in temporary or officiating vacancies also and the Governor was competent to make appointment as such. It was clarified that the Rules do contemplate making appointment in a temporary capacity and every appointment need not be made in a substantive capacity. Such appointments in a temporary capacity on a temporary post had to be governed by 1975 Rules. This being the position in law, the appointing authority had to be taken to be vested with ample jurisdiction to terminate the services of such an employee accordance with Rules, 1975 once the recommendation to that effect had been made by the High Court.

15. So far as the question relating to the deemed confirmation of an employee on the expiry of the period of probation was concerned, the Division Bench in its aforesaid decision had negatived that contention indicating that the provisions contained in Rules 25 of the Rules specifically dealt with confirmation laying down that if at the end of the period of probation or at the end of extended period of probation in any particular case, the Court recommends that a candidate is fit for confirmation, he shall be confirmed by the Governor in his appointment and that all confirmations under this Rules shall be notified in the official Gazette. It was also emphasized that the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad had framed the Rules in exercise of powers conferred by Art. 225 of the Constitution providing that the matter of confirmation of officers of the subordinate judiciary shall be considered by the Full Court. It was also indicated by the Division Bench that no maximum limit of extension of period of probation has been provided in Rule 33 and, there is no embargo on the power of the Governor to extend the period of probation to any length of time. Moreover, the Rules contemplate a specific order of confirmation to be passed by the Governor and this can be done only after a recommendation to that effect has been made which recommendation can only be made by the Full Court. The underlying policy under the Rules, therefore, indicated that they do not contemplate an automatic confirmation of a member of the judicial service merely on the ground of his having worked for a certain number of years.

16. The Division Bench had drawn support for its view from the observations made by a constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210. After examining the ratio of various decisions of the Apex Court, the Division Bench was of the view that the Rules in the present case do not contemplate a right to be confirmed or to be deemed to have been confirmed merely because of the completion of the period of probation. It was also indicated that under the Rules in question the function of confirmation implied the exercise of judgment of the confirming authority on the over all suitability of the employee for permanent absorption in service specially when the Rules do not prohibit the extension of the period of probation beyond any certain maximum period in which situation if the employee is allowed to continue the work beyond that maximum period he may acquire the status of confirmed employee.

17. Much stress has been laid by the petitioner on the fact that she had by the time of the issuance of the impugned order put in about 13 years of service. What has been urged is that in such a situation she was entitled to an opportunity of hearing before taking the decision to dispense with her services. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the Division Bench in its decision in the case of Lihazur Rehman Khan, (1996 All LJ 1162) (supra) had expressed the opinion that the application of the Rules of 1975 could not be taken to be dependent upon the period of service put in by a Government servant and, therefore, the mere fact that the concerned employee had worked for considerable long period could not render invalid an order passed by the competent authority exercising the jurisdiction contemplated under the Rules of 1975. The Division Bench in support of its view had drawn ample support from the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U.P, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 524 : AIR 1992 SC 496 : (1992 All LJ 230), State of U.P v. Prem Lata Mishra, (1994) 4 SCC 189 : AIR 1994 SC 2411 as well as in the case of State of U.P v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 : (1991 AIR SCW 793).

18. We have carefully examined the Rules of 1975 as well as the Rules of 1951 referred to herein above and we are clearly of the opinion that no justifiable ground has been made out for taking a departure from the view expressed by the Division Bench in its decision in Lihazur Rehman Khan, (1996 All LJ 1162) (supra).

19. It has been next contended by the petitioner that the impugned order is really punitive in nature and stands vitiated in law on account of its having been passed in violation of the elementary principles of natural justice. What has been urged is that the impugned order if considered in the light of the antecedent circumstances including the service of three separate charge-sheets and initiation of three different disciplinary proceedings and the nature of the charges levelled against her has to be treated to have been passed as a measure of punishment for the alleged misconduct without taking recourse to conclude the discriminatory proceedings.

20. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent has, however, urged that the impugned order is innocuous in nature and is not at all stigmatic. It is further pointed out that the impugned order is not founded on the alleged misconduct as the enquiry proceedings initiated against the petitioner had been abandoned as is apparent from the resolution passed by the Full Court.

21. In the present case what we find is that the impugned order cannot be held to be punitive in nature and further it cannot be taken to be founded on the charges relating to the misconduct. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its decision in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for basic Sciences, Calcutta, (1999) 1 Serv LR 622 : ((1999) 3 SCC 60 : AIR 1999 SC 983) had clearly indicated that if the findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back to the officer or without a regular department enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as ‘founded’ on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no finding were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad.

22. Apex Court, while observing so, had referred to its earlier decision in the case of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur, (1968) 3 SCR 234 : (AIR 1968 SC 1089). In that case a charge memo for a regular inquiry had been served, reply given and at that stage itself the proceedings were dropped and a simple termination order was issued. It was held that the order of simple termination was not founded on any findings as to misconduct. Reference was also made to the decision in the case of A.S Benjamin v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 1341 of 1966 decided on 13-12-1996 (reported in 1967 (1) Lab LJ 718) wherein it was indicated that where a charge memo was issued, explanation was received, an enquiry officer was also appointed but before the enquiry could be completed, the proceedings were dropped and a simple order of termination was passed, the reason for dropping the proceedings was that ‘departmental proceeding will take much longer time and we are not sure whether after going through all the foundations, we will be able to deal with the accused in the way he deserves’, the termination was upheld.

23. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order cannot, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, be taken to be vitiated in law on account of violation of the principal of natural justice as claimed specia when as indicated by the larger Bench of the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of U.P v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991 AIR SCW 793) (supra) a temporary employee cannot be taken to have any right to hold the post.

24. In view of what has been indicated herein above, we are not satisfied that sufficient ground can be said to have been made out for any interference in the impugned order by this Court while exercising the extra ordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Consequently, this writ petition being devoid of merits deserves to and is hereby dismissed.

25. Petition dismissed.