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Rahman Siddiqui v. State Of U.P.

Allahabad High Court
Dec 13, 2002
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Judgment Summary — G.P. Mathur, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Land in several villages in Pargana Chail, District Allahabad, was acquired for a public purpose — establishment of a residential colony by the Allahabad Development Authority (the Authority). Notifications under S.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were published on 23-2-1991 and under S.6 on 31-12-1991. The notifications recited urgency and a direction was issued under S.17(1) to take possession; 80% of estimated compensation was paid under sub-sec. (3A) of S.17 before possession.

An award under S.11 was delayed, and following a writ direction the Special Land Acquisition Officer made an award dated 11-10-2000. The Authority was asked to pay compensation, and on 10-1-2001 the Authority's Secretary applied to the Collector to set aside the 11-10-2000 award, alleging it was made without notice and without an opportunity of hearing. The Collector on 1-2-2001 set aside the 11-10-2000 award for that reason.

The Special Land Acquisition Officer then made a fresh award on 5-2-2001 after hearing the parties. The petitioner (Rehman Siddique) filed this petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of the Collector's order dated 1-2-2001 and the award dated 5-2-2001, and sought payment on the basis of the earlier award dated 11-10-2000.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Collector was justified in setting aside the award dated 11-10-2000 on the ground that it had been made ex parte without giving notice or opportunity of hearing to the Allahabad Development Authority.
  2. Whether the subsequent award dated 5-2-2001 could be quashed in a writ petition under Article 226, or whether the remedy provided under the Land Acquisition Act (notably S.18) was the appropriate route for challenging such an award.
  3. Whether the petitioner (Rehman Siddique) is a person "interested" within the meaning of the Act and thus has locus to maintain the writ petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Sri P.C. Srivastava, counsel) — principal submissions

  • The Collector's order dated 1-2-2001 was passed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and is therefore illegal and liable to be set aside.
  • The second award dated 5-2-2001 is invalid because two awards cannot be made for the same land; the tenure holders are entitled to payment according to the earlier award dated 11-10-2000.
  • The petitioner also contended that notice had in fact been given to the Allahabad Development Authority before the 11-10-2000 award, and therefore the Collector erred in holding the award was made without notice/opportunity.
  • The petitioner relied on authority (e.g., Gram Seva Mandal) in support of standing to maintain the writ.

Respondent — Allahabad Development Authority (Sri B.B. Paul, counsel) — principal submissions

  • The writ petition is not maintainable because the petitioner is neither the owner of the acquired land nor a person "interested" within S.3(b) of the Act.
  • After the award of 5-2-2001, notices under S.12 of the Act were issued to recorded persons; recorded tenure holders did not challenge the Collector's order or the award and therefore the petition is not maintainable.
  • The Authority's affidavits averred that the 11-10-2000 award was made ex parte against the Authority and that no notice or opportunity of hearing had been given before making that award.
  • The supplementary affidavit raised the point that the petitioner claimed to have power of attorney from recorded tenure holders but that instrument was not produced before the court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, (1995) 2 SCC 326; AIR 1995 SC 724 Section 50(2) confers on a local authority a right to appear and adduce evidence for determining compensation; it carries with it the right to adequate notice; proviso to S.50(2) does not prevent a local authority from invoking Article 226 when deprived of the right to be heard; denial of notice enables recourse to the High Court under Article 226. The court relied on this authority to hold that the Allahabad Development Authority, being a "local authority" under S.3(aa), had a right to notice and hearing under S.50(2) and to support the Collector's order setting aside the ex parte award dated 11-10-2000.
Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely, (1995) 1 SCC 221; AIR 1995 SC 1004 The beneficiary (local authority/company/statutory authority/co-op society) is an interested person entitled to be heard by the Collector or the Court; if not made a party it can seek leave and file appeal or invoke Article 226 to assail legality or correctness. The court cited this three-Judge-bench authority to reinforce that the Development Authority was entitled to be heard and could challenge an ex parte award; this supported the Collector's decision to set aside the ex parte award.
Raja Harish Chandra v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 The award of the Collector under S.11 is an offer of compensation made by the Government to the claimant. The court used this principle (along with other authorities cited in the same paragraph) to explain that statutory remedies (e.g., S.18 reference) exist for persons interested who wish to seek enhancement or challenge quantum, and therefore the 5-2-2001 award could not be quashed in a writ petition.
Dr. G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 (As cited) Authority for the proposition that an award under S.11 is essentially an offer of compensation. The court invoked this authority to support the conclusion that statutory procedures (including S.18) furnish the appropriate remedy rather than quashing an award by writ.
Periyar & Paree Kanni Rubbers v. State of Kerala, (1991) 4 SCC 195; AIR 1990 SC 2192 (As cited) Further authority that an award under S.11 is an offer and statutory remedies are available to persons interested. Cited to justify the proposition that the 5-2-2001 award could not be quashed in writ proceedings because the Act supplies a complete machinery (e.g., S.18) for challenging or seeking enhancement of compensation.
Gram Seva Mandal v. Collector, Wardha, (1975) 3 SCC 178; AIR 1975 SC 73 (Relied on by petitioner for maintainability) — the text of the judgment as cited by petitioner was relied upon to argue standing. The court considered the authority distinguishable on facts and did not accept it as supporting the petitioner's case on maintainability.
Agra Development Authority v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2000) 2 All WC 1065; 2000 All LJ 1008 (Cited by petitioner) Decision where the development authority had full knowledge of pendency of proceedings for determination of compensation. The court said this decision was of no assistance to the petitioner because, on the material before the court in the present case, the Authority had been deprived of notice and the facts differed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal strands of analysis: (A) whether the Collector correctly set aside the 11-10-2000 award as being ex parte, and (B) whether the subsequent award of 5-2-2001 could be quashed in these writ proceedings and whether the petitioner had locus.

A. Right to notice and to be heard (setting aside the 11-10-2000 award)

  • The court observed that S.50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act expressly permits a local authority or company to appear and adduce evidence for determining compensation in proceedings before the Collector or Court. S.3(aa) defines “local authority” and includes planning/town authorities established under law. The Allahabad Development Authority had been constituted under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act and therefore qualified as a "local authority".
  • Affidavits (including the Authority's counter-affidavit) averred that the award dated 11-10-2000 was made ex parte and that no notice or opportunity of hearing had been given to the Authority. No material was produced to show notice had been given prior to the award.
  • The court relied on binding precedents (U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi and Neyvely Lignite) that recognized the right of a local authority to be given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard; denial of that right entitles the authority to approach the High Court under Article 226.
  • Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded the Collector rightly held that S.50(2) had been violated and legitimately set aside the ex parte award dated 11-10-2000. The Collector's view was held to be correct and unimpeachable on the record before the court.

B. Challenge to the fresh award dated 5-2-2001 and availability of statutory remedies

  • The court explained that an award under S.11 is an offer of compensation by the Government; the Act (notably S.18) provides a complete machinery for a person interested who has not accepted an award to move the Collector for making a reference to the Court for determination of compensation.
  • Relying on the authorities cited for that principle, the court held that the award made on 5-2-2001 could not be quashed in a writ petition under Article 226 because the statute itself supplies the remedy for persons interested to seek enhancement or challenge compensation through the Collector/reference process.

C. Maintainability / locus of the petitioner

  • The Authority's counsel maintained the petitioner was neither the owner nor a person interested under the Act; the petitioner claimed to have a power of attorney from recorded tenure-holders but did not produce it before the court.
  • The court did not decide the question whether the petitioner in fact held a valid power of attorney or was entitled to contest on behalf of the recorded owners. The court noted that this question could be examined in any separate proceedings the petitioner may initiate for receiving balance compensation or for enhancement, but for the present writ the court declined to investigate the validity of the claimed power of attorney.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • Direct effects on the parties:
    • The Collector's order dated 1-2-2001 (which set aside the ex parte award dated 11-10-2000) is upheld by this court's reasoning and the petition challenging that order is rejected.
    • The court declined to quash the subsequent award dated 5-2-2001 in the writ petition, observing that the Land Acquisition Act provides the statutory remedies (e.g., S.18 reference) for persons interested to challenge or seek enhancement of compensation.
    • The petitioner's asserted locus (power of attorney/standing) was not established before the court; the court did not adjudicate on the validity of any power of attorney and left that question for any future appropriate proceedings initiated by the petitioner.
  • Broader legal consequences:
    • The decision applies established principles (as summarized in the cited precedents) regarding the right of local authorities to notice and hearing under S.50(2), and the availability of statutory remedies for challenging awards under the Act. The court did not purport to lay down any new legal precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts before it.

Disposition: Petition dismissed with costs.

Show all summary ...

G.P Mathur, J.:— This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed praying that the order dated 1-2-2001 of Collector, Allahabad and the award dated 5-2-2001 of Special Land Acquisition Officer be quashed. A further prayer has been made that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the Special Land Acquisition Officer to pay compensation on the basis of award dated 11-10-2000.

2. Some land situate in Villages Shaha alias Peepal Gawn, Jhalwa, Harwara, Deoghat. Pargana Chail District Allahabad was acquired for a public purpose namely for establishment of residential colony under a planned development scheme by the Allahabad Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the Authority). The notification under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published in U.P Gazette on 23-2-1991 and the notification under S. 6 of the Act was published in the Gazette on 31-12-1991. It was recited in both the notifications that the Government was satisfied that the case was one of urgency and accordingly a direction was issued under S. 17(1) of the Act to the Collector. Allahabad to take possession of the land mentioned in the schedule appended to the notifications though no award under S. 11 had been made. In view of the fact that S. 17 of the Act was made applicable, the landholders were paid 80% of the estimated amount of compensation before taking possession as provided in sub-sec. (3-A) of S. 17 of the Act. It appears that the award was not made promptly and accordingly a direction was issued on 1-5-2000 in writ petition No. 17406 of 1994 to make an award within three months. Thereafter, the Special Land Acquisition Officer made an award on 11-10-2000. The Allahabad Development Authority was thereafter asked to make payment of compensation to the landholders. Thereafter the Secretary of the Allahabad Development Authority moved an application before the Collector, Allahabad on 10-1-2001 for setting aside and cancelling the award dt. 11-10-2000 as the same had been made without issuing any notice and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the Development Authority. The Collector, Allahabad by his order dated 1-2-2001 set aside the award dated 11-10-2000 on the ground that before making the award the Special Land Acquisition Officer had not given any notice to Allahabad Development Authority and had not afforded any opportunity of hearing to it. Subsequent thereto, the Special Land Acquisition Officer made a fresh award after hearing the parties on 5-2-2001.

3. Sri P.C Srivastava learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order dated 1-2-2001 was passed by the Collector, Allahabad without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and therefore the same is illegal and is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel has further submitted that the second award made on 5-2-2001 is also liable to be set aside as two awards cannot be made for the same land and the tenure holders are entitled to be paid compensation in accordance with the earlier award dated 11-10-2000. Learned counsel has also urged that notice had in fact been given to the Allahabad Development Authority before making the award dated 11-10-2000 by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the Collector has erred in holding that the said award was made without giving any opportunity to it and therefore the order dated 1-2-2001 can not be sustained in law. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Allahabad Development Authority (sworn by Sri P.K Pandey on 13-3-2001), it is specifically averred in paras 10 and 11 that the award dated 11-10-2000 was made ex parte against the Allahabad Development Authority and it was on this ground that an application was moved before the Collector. Allahabad on 10-1-2001 for setting aside the ex parte award dated 11-10-2000 made by the Special Land Acquisition. No material has been placed on record to show that before making the award, any notice was ever issued to the Allahabad Development Authority or any opportunity of hearing was given to it. From the averments made in the affidavits filed by the parties, we are satisfied that the award dated 11-10-2000 was made without giving any opportunity of hearing to the Allahabad Development Authority.

4. Sub-section (2) of S. 50 of the Act provides that in any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or Company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Section 3(aa) of the Act defines “local authority” and it includes a town planning authority (by whatever name called) set up under any law for the time being in force). The Allahabad Development Authority has been constituted in accordance with the provisions of U.P Urban Planning and Development Act and therefore it is a ‘local authority’ within the meaning of S. 3(aa) of the Act. The Allahabad Development Authority was consequently entitled to appear and adduce evidence before the Collector before making of the award. The Collector in the impugned order dated 1-2-2001 has held that as the opportunity of hearing was not given to the Allahabad Development Authority before making the award dated 11-10-2000. there was violation of S. 50(2) of the Act and consequently the award was liable to be set aside. In our opinion, the view taken by the Collector is perfectly correct and cannot be faulted on any ground.

5. The ambit and scope of sub-sec. (2) of S. 50 of the Act was examined by a Constitution bench in U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, (1995) 2 SCC 326 : AIR 1995 SC 724 : (1995 All LJ 363) and it was held as under:

“1. Section 50(2) of the L.A Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

2. The said right carries with it the right to-be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference court before whom acquisition proceedings are pending of the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up.

3. That proviso to S. 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determining of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference Court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A Act.

4. In the event of denial of the right conferred by S. 50(2) on account of failure of the Collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings the local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

5. Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226.

6 ……………………………”

6. In Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely, (1995) 1 SCC 221 : AIR 1995 SC 1004, a three Judge bench held as follows:

“The beneficiary, i.e local authority or company, a co-operative society registered under the relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and is an aggrieved person. The beneficiary has the right to be heard by the Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it is entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend the award of the Collector. If it is not made a party, it is entitled to seek leave of the Court and file the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of the Civil Court under S. 26 or of the judgment and decree under S. 54 or is entitled to file writ petition under Article 226 and assail its legality or correctness …………………”

7. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, there can be no manner of doubt that the Allahabad Development Authority had a right to appear before the Collector and adduce evidence and in the event of denial of such a right conferred by S. 50(2) on account of failure of the Special Land Acquisition Officer to serve a notice, it could approach the Collector for setting aside the award which was made ex parte against it. The Collector was, therefore, perfectly right in entertaining the application moved by the Allahabad Development Authority on 10-1-2001 and in setting aside the award dated 11-10-2000 as the same had been made ex Darte and without giving any opportunity of rearing to it. The challenge of the petitioners the order dated 1-2-2001 of the Collector nas therefore, absolutely no merit and has to be rejected.

8. By way of an amendment application, the petitioner has also sought quashing of the award dated 5-2-2001 and a direction to the respondents to grant him compensation, as per judicial determination dated 31-5-2002 in LAR No. 10 of 2001 (Jagpat v. State of U.P)

9. It is well settled that the award of the Collector made under S. 11 of the Act is nothing more than an offer of compensation made by the Government to the claimant whose property is acquired. (See Raja Harish Chandra v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500, Dr. G.H Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237, Periyar and Paree Kanni Rubbers v. State of Kerala, (1991) 4 SCC 195 : AIR 1990 SC 2192.) Section 18 of the Act confers right upon a person interested who has not accepted the award to move an application to the Collector for making a reference to the Court if he feels aggrieved by the amount of compensation awarded to him. Since the Act itself provides a complete machinery to a person interested for enhancement of compensation by asking the Collector to make a reference to the Court, the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 5-2-2001 cannot be quashed at the instance of a person interested in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

10. Sri B.B Paul learned counsel for the Allahabad Development Authority has submitted that the writ petition at the instance of the present petitioner Rehaman Siddique is not maintainable as neither he is owner of the land, which had been acquired nor he is a person interested within the meaning of S. 3(b) of the Act. Sri Paul has submitted that after the award was made on 5-2-2001, notices under S. 12 of the Act were given to all those persons whose names were recorded over the acquired land. Learned counsel has submitted the recorded tenure holders of the acquired land having not challenged the order of the Collector dated 1-2-2001 and also the award dated 5-2-2001 of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the writ petition is not maintainable. In para 3 of the supplementary counter affidavit, (sworn by Sri D.C Misra on 9-9-2002). it is averred that the petitioner Rehman Siddique claims that he has got a power of attorney from the recorded tenure holders whose land had been acquired but the said power of attorney has not been filed so that the true picture may not be revealed. When confronted with this statement made in the supplementary affidavit, Sri P.C Srivastava learned counsel for the petitioner has asserted that the petitioner has got a power of attorney in his favour from the recorded tenure-holders. However, the said power of attorney was not produced before us. It certainly appears that the petitioner is not one of the recorded tenure holders whose land may have been acquired. For the purpose of deciding the present writ petition, we do not want to examine the question whether the petitioner has a valid power of attorney in his favour, which may entitle him to contest the matter on behalf of those persons who were owners of the land and whose land had been acquired. This question shall be examined when the petitioner Rehman Siddique initiates any other legal proceeding either for receiving the balance amount of compensation or takes any other step in accordance with law for enhancement of the compensation.

11. Sri Srivastava has referred to Gram Seva Mandal v. Collector, Wardha, (1975) 3 SCC 178 : AIR 1975 SC 73 (Sic) in support of his submission that writ petition at the instance of the present petitioner Rahman Siddiqui is maintainable. In our opinion, the authority cited is clearly distinguishable on facts. Learned counsel has also referred to a judgment of this Court in Agra Development Authority v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2000) 2 All WC 1065 : (2000 All LJ 1008). This decision can be of no assistance to the petitioner, as on the material placed before the Court, it was held that the development authority had full knowledge of the pendency of proceedings for determination of compensation. For reasons mentioned above, we find no merit in the writ petition, which is hereby dismissed with cost.

12. Petition dismissed.