Ram Kripal Singh v. U.P State Road Transport Corporation And Others

1. The preliminary objection taken by Mr. Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the respondents 1, 2 and 3 is that the appeal is not maintainable under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules. He pointed out that in the writ petition the relief sought for, was in respect of an award passed by the labour Court. Therefore, in view of the provisions provided in Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules such appeal is not maintainable against an order of a single Judge passed in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of an award passed by the tribunal.

2. Mr. B.N Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, however, pointed out that it was not an award which was challenged in the writ petition. He pointed out that it was the duty of the State Government to lodge appropriate complaint for non-implementation of an award by the respondent who is bound by the award. According to him, as contemplated in Section 14-A of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cognizance can only be taken in terms of Section 16 of the said Act only on a report of the District Magistrate or by any officer other than a District Magistrate with the previous sanction in writing of the District Magistrate. Thus cognizance can be taken only on the basis of a complaint lodged by the District Magistrate. The petitioner/appellant seeks mandamus on the authorities to discharge their statutory duty cast upon them under Section 14-A read with Section 16 of the said Act. Therefore, it had no relation with the award. The award is not a subject matter in the writ petition or the appeal. It was a subject matter of the proceeding before the labour Court but not in these proceedings.

3. We have heard both the learned counsel at length. It appears that Mr. B.N Singh has advanced a very attractive arguments which almost impelled us to take a different view. But a proper reading of the prayers made show that whatever relief was asked for was in respect of an award viz.:

“1. Issue a writ, order, direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay Rs. 200/- per day for breach of award as provided under Section 14-A of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 from 15-2-1997 till the date of payment.

“2. Issue a further writ, order, direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to pay entire back wages, leave encashment/ex-gratia along with 18% interest.”

4. In other words in the said writ petition the implementation of the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal through Section 14-A of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is the principal relief that has been sought for. An award passed by the Labour Court or the Industrial Court is capable of being executed. U.P Industrial Disputes Act in Section 14-A provides that in case of non implementation of the award by the employer, the employee may seek compensation while providing for penal action in addition. Such penal action however can be taken against an employer in the mode provided in Section 16 of the said Act.

5. Thus the relief sought for under Section 14-A of the said Act is in effect a relief relating to the implementation of the award. An order passed in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution seeking implementation of an award is an order passed in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 of the Constitution in respect of an “award (a) of a tribunal made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or Central Act………………………”

6. Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules lays down that an appeal lies to the Court from a judgment……………… in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made……………… in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Arts. 226 or 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award — (a) of a tribunal made …………………in the exercise…………………… of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act of one Judge.” Thus in order to be appellable, the order shall not be an order in respect of an award made by a tribunal under any Uttar Pradesh Act or any Central Act.

7. In the present case the subject matter is in respect of the implementation of an award. The expression “in respect of…… award” does not mean that the award is to be challenged. The phrase in respect of means in relation to or relating to or arising out of or connected with or concerning or pursuant to or on the basis of. It is wide enough to include doing of something pursuant to or on the basis of or taking any steps relating to or concerning the award. Implementation of award includes exercising jurisdiction under Section 14-A read with Section 16 of the Act. Thus the steps to be taken under Section 14-A read with Section 16 is in respect of the award, the implementation of which is sought for. Anything to be done or any order to be passed in relation to the implementation of an award is in effect an order in respect of an award of a tribunal.

8. The word Tribunal has not been defined in the Rules, but now it is a principle of law that a Tribunal is a body or an authority invested with judicial power to adjudicate on questions of law or fact affecting the rights of the parties in a judicial manner. It is so held in the case Sudershan Singh Bedi v. Additional District Magistrate, (1993) 1 All WC 916(DB). A Tribunal or a Labour Court constituted under the U.P Industrial Disputes Act is an authority invested with judicial power to determine the rights of the parties before it judicially on questions of law or fact and thus satisfies the test.

9. A right of appeal is a creature of Statute. A litigant does not have any inherent right to prefer an appeal against an order unless such a right is conferred on the litigant by law. This proposition is well settled in law and since been reiterated by the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : (AIR 1981 SC 1786).

10. Whether the right of an appeal is available to a litigant is a question dependant on the Statute creating the right to appeal. In order to be appeallable the order must be an order made appeallable by the Statute. It has to satisfy the test with regard to the characteristics of the order that is made appeallable by the Statute.

11. As observed above, in the present case the order does not fall within the category of orders that are made appeallable under Rule 5 Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules. On the other hand it is an order falling within one of the exempted or prohibited category. It is an order which is expressly excluded from being appeallable under Rule 5 Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules.

12. Therefore, we find sufficient force in the submission of Mr. Vivek Saran that this appeal having sought the relief of the implementation of an award, the same comes within the prohibited zone as provided in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules. Therefore, the appeal is not maintainable. We, therefore, held that the appeal is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

13. Appeal dismissed.