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U.P Medical College ... v. Union Of India And O...

Allahabad High Court

Jul 8, 1999

Judgment

Subsequent
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ashok A. Desai, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Pursuant to a Cabinet decision, the State Government, by an order dated 2 April 1998, directed conversion of six Government Allopathic Medical Colleges into individual autonomous societies and the transfer of properties and equipment of each college to its corresponding society. The Minister of Medical Education was nominated as Chairman of the Board of Governors for each society, and the Government prepared model bye-laws by circular dated 14 September 1998. On 17 October 1998 six societies were registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Several writ petitions were filed challenging the validity, propriety and motivation of the Government's decisions and the subsequent registration of societies; these petitions were heard together and decided by this common judgment.

During hearings, an affidavit by Shri Amarjit, Deputy Secretary of Medical Education, was filed stating that the Government had only entrusted management and use of college property to the societies and did not transfer ownership; ownership would remain vested in the State Government. Following that affidavit, the court held that the challenge under Article 298 to the transfer of property did not survive.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Government's decision to convert Government Medical Colleges into autonomous societies and the registration of those societies is valid and within executive competence.
Whether the conversion and related acts amount to a transfer of Government property and, if so, whether the Government acted within the scope of Article 298 of the Constitution (as challenged by petitioners).
Whether the decision and its implementation violate Article 21 of the Constitution (right to life) and the Directive Principles (Article 47), by potentially affecting public health and medical education.
Whether the impugned decision was induced by mala fide intent (commercialisation of medical education) and whether it exposes Government resources to private exploitation.
Whether the process of forming and registering the societies complies with the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (including voluntariness of members, proper formation, and Registrar's duty to call objections).
Whether withdrawal of recruitment posts from the purview of the Public Service Commission (and thereby avoiding its consultation) was permissible or constitutionally objectionable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

The conversion to societies violated Article 21 by compromising public health and the right to life; the Government's duty under Article 47 was cited as relevant.
The decision was tainted by mala fide intention to commercialize medical education — bringing Government colleges in line with private colleges that charge high fees, capitation and donations.
The reasons given by the Government were non-germane, arbitrary and constituted an abuse/misuse of executive power for potential wrongful gain.
The societies, as constituted, created a risk that Government assets and income could be exploited (e.g., societies allowed to accept donations, fix fees, and retain income instead of depositing it in the Government treasury).
The formation and registration of societies offended the Societies Registration Act because the members were nominated by the Government (not voluntary seven or more persons acquainted with the society's purposes), the Registrar failed to perform statutory duties with respect to objections, and bye-laws removed statutory freedoms (no general body elections, Board composed mainly of ex-officio members).
Withdrawing recruitment posts from the Public Service Commission's purview was questioned as antithetical to the constitutional sanctity of the Commission and its objective to ensure purity and quality of public employment selection.

Respondent / Government's Arguments (as presented by the Advocate General)

The petitioners' locus was questioned initially: one petitioning teachers association (in Writ Petition No. 3604 of 1998) was said to be unregistered; however the Advocate General ultimately accepted that members are public and that the matter involves public interest, permitting the petitions to be maintained.
The Government asserted competence to decide policy matters under Entry No. 25 of the State List (Seventh Schedule) and that what ought to be policy cannot be the subject of judicial review (relying on cited Supreme Court precedents).
The decision was said to be a policy change warranted by changing circumstances; it would not be open to judicial interference unless arbitrary or violative of constitutional guarantees.
The Government relied on operational deficiencies in existing administration (delays in promotion/recruitment, lack of equipment, political interference, cumbersome budgetary procedures, and failure to prioritize medical education) as grounds for decentralization and granting autonomous status to improve standards and efficiency.
It was contended the societies would, for all practical purposes, continue to be governmental in character and the colleges would remain State institutions despite autonomous status.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
(1971) 2 SCC 410 : AIR 1973 SC 588	Authority cited by the Advocate General for the proposition that what ought to be policy cannot be a matter of judicial review.	The Advocate General relied on this authority to argue that policy decisions of the Government are generally not reviewable. The court acknowledged the competence of the Government to change policy but held that where policy changes have far-reaching consequences on public interest, the Government must prima facie demonstrate relevant and adequate reasons; the court therefore subjected the relevancy of reasons to scrutiny.
1995 (4) SCC 15 : AIR 1995 SC 1607	Invoked to support the submission that policy change itself is not ordinarily a ground for judicial challenge unless arbitrary or violative of constitutional guarantees.	The court accepted the general principle relied upon but proceeded to assess whether the Government had demonstrated relevant grounds for this particular drastic policy change affecting public interest, implying review limited to relevancy and reasonableness of the decision-making process.
1998 (4) SCC 117 : AIR 1998 SC 1703	Referred to for the proposition that under changing circumstances policy adjustments may be necessary and not susceptible to judicial interference unless arbitrary.	The court noted the cited precedent but emphasized that even valid policy changes with significant public consequences require prima facie justification; it examined the Government's explanations and found them general, inadequate and insufficiently relevant to justify the conversion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a multi-faceted analysis, addressing jurisdictional, constitutional and statutory dimensions in sequence:

Article 298 challenge: The court accepted the affidavit by the Deputy Secretary that the Government intended only to entrust management and use to societies while retaining ownership of property; accordingly, the specific challenge regarding competence under Article 298 to transfer ownership did not survive.
Locus: The Advocate General questioned locus because one teachers association was unregistered. The court concluded petitioners (including the association's members and its president) could maintain the petitions because the matters raised were of vital public importance and the petitioners had substantial interest in medical education and academic affairs.
Article 21 claim: Petitioners argued the conversion violated Article 21 and Article 47 duties. The court observed the institutions were not being withdrawn or closed and therefore found no direct violation of Article 21 on that ground.
Standard of review of policy change: The court accepted that government competence to change policy is well established and that courts should not substitute their view for policy choices. However, it emphasized that a dramatic policy change with far-reaching public interest consequences requires the Government to prima facie demonstrate that the change was necessary and relevantly justified. The court would examine relevancy of reasons rather than their sufficiency.
Examination of Government's stated reasons: The Government's counter-affidavit and internal notes cited operational deficiencies (delays in promotion/recruitment, lack of equipment, political interference, cumbersome budget procedures, failure to prioritize medical education) as grounds for decentralization. The court found these explanations general, unspecific, and in several respects self-critical of Government functioning without showing why the Government could not reform its own administrative processes. The court characterized some explanations as an alibi or camouflage rather than genuine necessity.
Practical effects and contradictions: The court analyzed the impugned order and bye-laws and noted several troubling features:
- Boards of Governors were largely composed of Government officials and societies were represented as for all practical purposes governmental, yet societies were empowered to retain college income in their own accounts instead of depositing it in the Treasury.
- Bye-laws included attached hospitals even though the impugned order did not explicitly transfer them; the deputation of staff arrangements seemed contrary to settled norms and risked administrative chaos (e.g., Government employees declared to remain Government servants while rendering services to societies).
- Societies were allowed to accept donations and fix fees, raising the potential for capitation and commercialization; societies as private persons would not be obliged to follow Directive Principles on public health, creating risks of private exploitation of Government resources.
- Under the Societies Act, societies can alter objects or amalgamate; although bye-laws required Government approval for amendments, the statutory power could still allow substantive change, creating danger that societies could abrogate their public purposes without effective accountability.
Societies Registration Act compliance: The court examined statutory requirements. It noted Section 1's voluntary association requirement and Section 3's public notice and objection procedure. The court found that the societies were formed according to Government directive with nominated persons (not voluntary subscribers acquainted with the society's purposes), and that the Registrar rejected objections by referring them to the Government rather than discharging statutory duties. The court viewed the Registrar's conduct as neglectful and as acting in the Government's interest rather than as an independent statutory officer.
Public Service Commission concern: The court expressed serious concern about depriving many public employment posts of the Public Service Commission's consultative role. It observed the constitutional sanctity of the UPSC's function to ensure purity and quality of selection. The court noted that if an emergency existed, the proviso to Article 320 could be invoked to exclude posts for a time, but the Government had not used that constitutional mechanism and instead used executive fiat to effect a structural change — an action the court described as a "fanciful and irrational venture."
Overall assessment and conclusion: For the cumulative reasons — inadequacy and generality of stated grounds, potential for commercialization and misuse, statutory non-compliance in formation and registration, Registrar's abdication of duty, and the threat to the role of the Public Service Commission — the court concluded the impugned Government order and the subsequent registration of the six societies were unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that the impugned Government order dated 2-4-1998 and the registration of the six societies on 17-10-1998 were not sustainable and therefore were quashed and set aside. The petitions were allowed.

DISPOSITION: Petitions allowed; impugned order and registrations quashed.

Implications

Direct effect: The immediate consequence is that the Government's order converting the six Government Allopathic Medical Colleges into societies and the consequent registrations were annulled; the status quo prior to those actions is restored by the court's decision.

Broader implications: The opinion subjects executive policy changes that have wide public consequences to a relevance-based judicial review: while recognizing the Government's competence to change policy, the court requires the Government to prima facie demonstrate relevant and non-arbitrary reasons when the change impacts public interest significantly. The court also reaffirmed statutory safeguards under the Societies Registration Act and the constitutional importance of the Public Service Commission's role in public employment. The judgment, however, does not purport to set aside general principles quoted from precedent; rather, it applies those principles while insisting on adequate justification and statutory compliance.

This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add any information beyond what appeared in the text.

Show all summary ...

Ashok A. Desai, J.:— These four writ petitions since raise common question of facts and law have been heard together and are decided by a common judgment.

2. Pursuant to Cabinet decision, the Government, by order dated 2-4-1998, directed to convert six Government Allopathic Medical Colleges into each individual autonomous Societies and to transfer of properties and equipments of Medical College to the corresponding Societies. Minister of Medical Education, in each Society has been nominated as Chairman of Board of Governors. Model bye-laws to be prepared by the Government, have to be adopted by the concerned Society. Accordingly, vide Circular dated 14-9-1998 model bye-laws were issued. On 17-10-1998 six Societies were independently registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to the Act). These petitions have questioned validity, propriety and motivation of these decisions.

3. During the course of hearing, the learned Advocate General presented affidavit sworn by Shri Amarjit Deputy Secretary of Medical Education who has averred in paragraph 2 as thus:

“That the Government has only entrusted the Management and user of its Medical Colleges property including equipment to the Societies for use by the respective Medical Colleges to be run by the said Societies. The ownership or interest in the property of the Government Medical Colleges is not transferred to the Societies nor is intended to be transferred to the Societies. The ownership of the properties of the Government Medical Colleges shall continue to remain vested in the State Government.”

4. In view of the change in decision, challenge of the petitioner, which relates to competence of the Government under Article 298 of the Constitution, to the transfer of property of Government Medical Colleges to the Societies, does not survive.

5. The learned Advocate General at the outset questioned locus of the petitioner to maintain the instant petition. According to him petitioner No. 1 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3604 of 1998 a Teachers Association, is not a registered organization. The organization cannot challenge the decision of the Government on behalf of the teachers. It is reported the U.P Medical College Teachers Association (Writ Petition No. 2263 of 1999) is a registered organisation and other associations are its branches. The organization even if not registered, the members thereof are the members of the public. The decision under challenge is of vital and public importance. Public interest is substantially involved in the petitions. Even as teachers, they are substantially interested in Medical Education and academic affairs of the Colleges. Petitioner No. 1 organization and petitioner No. 2 as its president, therefore, can maintain the petitioners.

6. S/Sri L.P Naithani and Sunil Ambwani tried to urge that the decision to convert Government Medical Colleges into Society is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government under Article 47 has a primary duty to improve public health, which is an integral part of right to life of the member of public. The impugned decision, to convert Government Medical Colleges into Societies, therefore, violates Article 21 of the Constitution.

7. By the impugned decision the management of the Medical Colleges along with the teaching hospitals are being transferred to the respective Societies. These institutions are not being withdrawn or closed down by the Government. As such it does not in any manner violate the right under Article 21 of the Constitution.

8. According to the petitioner, the decision to convert Government Medical Colleges into Societies has been induced by mala fides. The only design, which is explicit, is to commercialize the Medical Education. Prevailing experience testifies that private Medical Colleges have become money-generating institutions. High rate of tuition fee, charging of capitation and extraction of donation somehow become the recognized and assured devices to float money. Design of the impugned decision is to bring Government Medical Colleges in line with those private Colleges. Reasons assigned for taking impugned decision are non-real and non-germane. Decision is completely misuse of the Executive power and taken more for wrongful gain. It is tainted with malice and operates as fraud on public as well public resources.

9. The learned Advocate General made endeavour to resist the submissions. He referred to entry No. 25 of Third List of Seventh Schedule and contended that the medical education is equally within the domain of the State Government. The Government within its executive authority is competent to decide the policy. Referring to (1971) 2 SCC 410 : AIR 1973 SC 588 (9) submission made is what ought to be the policy cannot be matter of judicial review. Moreover, the change in policy itself could hot be a ground for challenge. Reliance is placed on 1995 (4) SCC 15 : (AIR 1995 SC 1607) (17). It is asserted that under the changing circumstances there is need to change in the policy. It cannot be called in question unless it suffers from arbitrariness or violation of constitutional guarantee. Reference is made to 1998 (4) SCC 117 (23) : (1998) 4 SCC 117 : AIR 1998 SC 1703.

10. Competence of the Government to change the policy can hardly be debated. What ought to be the policy cannot be subjected to strict judicial review. Still to change a decision or policy, which entails consequences on public interest, cannot be out of free will. The same could not be a fancy of persons in power, Entrusting management of the Government Medical Colleges to the Societies is certainly a drastic change of far reaching consequences. It has a definite bearing on the public interest. The Government is, therefore, not exonerated from obligation to prima facie demonstrate that the change as undertaken was necessary having regard to the facts and aspects relevant thereto. The Government is also under obligation to display that the proposed change was brought to attain the better interest of the public as well of Medical Education. We may not attempt to probe into sufficiency of reasons but certainly look into the relevancy of the aspects, which necessitated the Government to take impugned decision.

11. The counter affidavit of the Government maintains that existing system was not adequate for promotion of health and Medical Education.

12. Note submitted on 25-5-1999 has conveyed that the general reputation of Medical College Hospitals had gone from bad to worst. The main reasons assigned therefor are delay in promotion and recruitment, non availability of equipment, lack of work culture, emphasis of the staff has been more on right than duty, political interference, rigid compartmentalisations of budgetary grant, procedure for getting grant and utilisation is cumbersome and time consuming. Further the Medical Education is not being considered as an important department and hence it does not get priority either with the U.P Public Service Commission or in the Government. The note tried to emphasise that the Engineering Colleges, Nirman Nigam, Jal Nigam are operating successfully under the various bodies.

13. In paragraph 15 of counter affidavit a statement is made that after thorough investigation and enquiry the Government has taken a policy decision for granting autonomous status to these Medical College taking due note of the deteriorating standard of education in these institutions because of unnecessary and extra dose of involvement of the State Government. In paragraph 22 it is averred that the decision is taken with an intention to improve the condition of Medical Colleges run by the Government and to provide them independent and more effective management by reducing Government hustles.

14. The preamble of impugned decision declares that the decision is taken to improve efficiency of Government Medical Colleges, to increase representation of financial and administrative authority and speed up work. The Government by counter affidavit attempted to explain that—

15. To decentralize the day-to-day management of the Medical Colleges and to take the Board and authority on the spot more functionary and effective in order to improve the standard of education in medical field.

16. To tone up the entire medical education and to bring the same to para meters of Medical Council of India.

17. All the statements are general in nature, without any specification.

18. More apparent is that the Government is canvassing grievance against its own style of functioning and taking it as a basis for the impugned decision. It is not explained that apart from the department of medical education as to how the Government as Sovereign body could not surmount difficulties as canvassed? It is not shown that the Government with its prerogative was incapable to bring reform or modulate their own administration and procedure so as to bring betterment in the management of Colleges. Apparent it is that the Government has become victim of their own niceties and modalities.

19. More emphasis it appears to be that the Government is fed up to manage administration of the Government Colleges because of their own hostile, interference and involvement and to escape the responsibility they have entrusted the management to the Society. It is more an alibi on the part of Government. It is not explained how the Government could not eliminate all that hazards which have adverse effect on the Administration. No explanation is offered as to how the prevalent system which was satisfactorily operating for years, become inadequate. Reasons adopted for impugned decision therefore appear to be more a camouflage.

20. The Board of Governors as constituted under the impugned order are of the Government officials. The Medical Colleges hereinafter are to run according to direction of the Board. The impugned order also specifies approval of the Government for creation of the post by the Society. The counter affidavit assets that Society created by the impugned order for all practical purposes would continue to be of the Government, and the Medical Colleges even after grant of autonomous status shall continue to be of the State Government and are not private Institutions. Logic of the Statement is in serious difficulty. Apart from that, clause V(iii) of bye-laws provides that in the event of dissolution of society, residue or remaining to be disposed of according to the determination of the Government.

21. If the Government exercises wholesale control on all affairs, we do not see any relational, how the Government can avoid all those ill practices complained of by merely converting Government Medical Colleges into Societies. It appears to be a venture of jumping from oven to frying pan.

22. In the Medical Colleges converted into Societies, building, equipments and instruments are of the Government. Impugned order in Clause IV provides that even after conversion into society, planned and non-planned budget which are being given at present by the Government shall continue to be made available. Peculiarity is that impugned order does not refer to transfer of attached Hospital to the Society. However, the bye-laws have included the same. Deputation of staff is contrary to settled norms. Practically every things connected with the college including manpower is of the Government. Even then it is peculiar to note that in Clause V, the income of the College at present shall not be required to be deposited in Government treasury. The same shall be deposited in the account of the College.

23. “Still more unusual feature is reflected in document dated 2-1-1999” (Annexure 2 of rejoinder affidavit). The Government entered into a compromise with the Association of employees of Class III and Class IV declaring that though they render services to the Society, they shall continue to be the Government Servants. It is a puzzle as to how Government can bear the burden of salary of the personnel who are rendering services to the private Institutions. Since these employees are not on deputation, the Society cannot even exercise any disciplinary authority. All affairs would be in chaos.

24. Still worst is as to how the Government can handover all its asset to Society to manage the Colleges without consideration of any kind, but with licence to make commercial gain? The Board of Governors virtually assumes the character of ostensible owner of the Government property. The conduct is more than charitable and fraud on executive power of the Government.

25. Petitioner particularly in paragraph 11 has accused that the policy was modified with mala fide intention of changing exorbitant amount as capitation fee and to misuse and misutilise the properties, land and resources of the State Medical Colleges. The respondent though stoutly denied in counter affidavit, however, could not repel the accusation successfully. Possibility of exploiting Government resources for private benefit is very much potent.

26. As discussed above, the income of the College though out of Government resources are to be deposited in the account of the Society. The College shall be entitled to borrow the loan subject to permission of the competent authority. The College has the authority to accept donation and gifts from different sources. Accepting donations as a consideration for admission, therefore, cannot be ruled out. Similarly, one of the objects of the society as enumerated in bye laws (Clause III(vii)) provides for to fix and demand such fee and other charges and laid down by the Society. This is sufficiently indicative that the Society is competent to make a demand of capitation fee or such exorbitant fee. Probability to fix certain admission seats only for monetary consideration would be more certain. To raise funds, the Society may also charge patients of the attached hospital making it more as private clinic. The Society being a private person need not respond to the Directive principles to promote and improve general Public Health. This further exposes that the Government resources are kept at the disposal of the Society for trading in Medical Education, and Medical services.

27. The Society Registered, in terms of Section 12 of the Act can alter or abridge the purpose or amalgamate with some other Society. Clause XXXIX of the Bye-laws provides for amendment in the objects of a Society. No doubt, this is made subject to approval of the Government. The same could be superfluous since the statute itself has authorised to bring a change. In view of this, the Board of Directors are capable to completely abrogate the purpose. Since they can do this being the members of the Board, they could not be accountable to the State Government as their officials. Danger is potent and inevitable.

28. From the counter affidavit, notes and arguments advanced more emphasis has been given on the aspect of consultation with the Public Service Commission in the matter of recruitment of teaching staff. Feeding target of staff could not be achieved through U.P.S.C for 8-10 years. The learned Advocate General stressed on the difficulties having been experienced to get the properly selected academic staff from the Public Service Commission. As a result, according to him there could not be adequate recruitment as per the norms of the Medical Council of India. One of the Colleges at Gorkhpur, consequently, had to face de-recognition. Device is, therefore, adopted to entrust the management of the Medical Colleges to the Societies. The normal consequences thereof would be that for a recruitment hereinafter of the teaching staff would not require consultation of the Public Service Commission. Argument of the petitioners is that the Government intends to take advantage of the their own follies.

29. The statement in this behalf is general and more ambiguous. No particular account is given as to how the Government expeditiously took steps, but the consultation frustrated the schedule of recruitment.

30. This aspect poses numerous questions. One amongst them is, is it desirable in public interest to withdraw numerous important post of Public Employment from the purview of the Public Service Commission? After hearing the learned Advocate General at length, we could not get convincing answer in affirmative. Function of the Public Service Commission has a constitutional sanctity. The Commission functions for a laudable object, to achieve as far as possible highest degree of purity and quality in selection in public employment. The Government in the public interest cannot have a circuitous design to marginalise the function of the Commission.

31. Pertinent it is to note that in case of emergency or grave situation proviso to Art. 320 provides exclusion of certain posts or class of post from the consultation with the Public Service Commission. In case of such a situation the Government could have invoked the said provision so as to avoid disgraceful situation of derecognition of Government Colleges. The Government instead of operating precautionary constitutional mechanism to save the situation, by executive fiat made a fanciful and irrational venture to do away with the constitutional obligation.

32. Next according to the petitioner, formation of societies and registration are offending the express provision of the Act. Exercise of execution power by the Government is a fraud on Legislative Scheme.

33. Section 1 of the Act reads thus:

“Any seven or more persons associated for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as is described in Section 20 of this Act, may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and filing the same with the Registrar form themselves into a society under this Act.”

34. Explicitly it conveys that the formation by any seven members who have acquaintance with any literary, scientific, charitable purpose or as is described in Section 20 of the Act. As seen from impugned order, the society has been formed according to the directives of the Government. Moreover, the formation is not of any seven persons, but by only those of particulars who have been ordained by the Government. Even otherwise the impugned order does not claim that those officials were any way acquainted or associated with any of the purpose envisaged by the provision. Still, more, those persons have not voluntarily subscribed to the memorandum. They are submitting themselves to the dictate of the Government. As such, the act of the person is not voluntary, either in the letter or spirit of the provisions. Moreover, they are not qualified to form Society, as the impugned order has not disclosed their acquaintance with the purpose as envisaged.

35. The impugned order dated 2-4-1998 itself constituted a Board of Governors as a highest decision making body. The impugned order further requires the Government to prepare model bye-laws and Society has no option but to adopt the same without demur. Obvious it is that the Society had no liberty to frame Bye-laws. It was to be by the Committee nominated under the impugned order, even before formation of Society. Entire conduct of the Government was more of bulldozing against statutory provisions.

36. Section 15 of the Act defines a “Member” to be a person who has been admitted according to the Rules and Regulations. Section 4 refers to Annual General Meeting of the Society. The scheme under Section 4 also provides for election of the Board of Governors or the Managing Committee. However, the impugned order or the bye-laws do not refer to any memberships excepting the officials nominated clause XII and clause XIV of Bye-laws refer to a member of the Board other than ex-officio member shall cease to be member if he resigns etc. However, from the impugned order it is apparent that the Board has no member other than ex-officio. Even the Society has no General Body. Bye-law does not provide for election of Board of Governors.

37. Section 3 deals with the registration of society. Proviso thereto requires the Registrar to issue of public notice inviting objection against the proposed registration and consider them before granting. The Teachers Association of S.N Medical College, Agra on 25th Sept. 1998 filed objection-opposing registration and requested for hearing. The Registrar, by order dated 16-10-1998, rejected objection on the ground that the registration is in accordance with the directive of the Government dated 2-4-1998. The Registrar advised that the objection be decided at the level of State Government. The Registrar, thus, neglected to discharge statutory duty. The Registrar has acted not as a statutory, but as an employee of the State Government. The entire conduct of the Registrar is totally derogatory. Section 3-B of the Act requires that any dispute regarding registration or renewal to be referred to the State Government and decision thereof shall be final. Crystally it is clear that Government being the final authority under the statutory scheme itself cannot venture to form society by nominating person.

38. For all these reasons, impugned order dated 2-4-1998 of the Government and Registration of the Societies pursuant thereof cannot be sustained. Impugned order and Registration of six Societies on 17-10-1998 are hereby quashed and set aside. Petitions are accordingly allowed.

39. Petitions allowed.