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State Of U.P v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (V), Meerut And Another
Judgment Summary — Yatindra Singh, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The contesting respondent, Sri Bhim Singh, was employed as an English Typist in the Irrigation Department of the State of Uttar Pradesh (the petitioner). He began working on 25.6.1986 with intermittent periods of work and breaks. He was not permitted to work after 29.2.1992. He raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the State Act). The contesting respondent contended that he was appointed on 25.6.1986 and was continued in service but was illegally not permitted to work from 29.2.1992. The petitioner maintained that the appointment was on a fixed-term ad-hoc basis up to 29.2.1992, that services ended on expiry of that term, and that there was no retrenchment or illegality.
The Labour Court found that the contesting respondent had worked since 25.6.1986 (with breaks), had been retrenched without compensation, that the petitioner had permitted juniors to work (constituting discrimination), and that the contesting respondent ought to have been continued. The Labour Court reinstated him with full back wages from 29.2.1992. The State of Uttar Pradesh filed the present writ petition challenging that Award.
Legal Issues Presented
- Is the Irrigation Department of the State an "industry" within the meaning of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (the State Act)?
- Does the definition of "retrenchment" under the Industrial Disputes Act (the Central Act) apply under the State Act?
- Was the appointment dated 19.6.1991 (for a specific period till 29.2.1992) mala fide; was it a fixed-term appointment; and does non-renewal amount to retrenchment under the State Act?
- Was the action of the petitioner fair and reasonable (i.e., was there discrimination)?
- Is the petitioner entitled to any relief (and what relief should be granted)?
Arguments of the Parties
Contesting Respondent's Arguments
- He was appointed on 25.6.1986 and continued in service (though with some breaks) and was illegally not permitted to work after 29.2.1992.
- The Labour Court's findings include that he was retrenched without compensation and that juniors were permitted to work, indicating discriminatory treatment.
Petitioner's (State's) Arguments
- The contesting respondent was given a fixed-term, ad-hoc appointment, specifically till 29.2.1992; after expiry the services ended and this was not retrenchment.
- The petitioner stated in the writ petition that two juniors (Deo Pal Tyagi and Sangeeta) were given employment on muster roll and that a similar offer of employment was made to the contesting respondent, which he refused (this assertion was not specifically denied in the counter-affidavit).
Counsel Submissions Noted by the Court
- Sri K.M. Sahai appeared for the petitioner; Sri K.P. Agarwal (senior counsel) and Sushri Suman Sirohi appeared for the respondents (as recorded).
- Sri K.P. Agarwal submitted that the Somasetty's case was per incuriam in view of the three-Judge decision in Madhya Pradesh Karmachari Sangh's v. State (this argument was recorded and considered by the Court).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bangalore Water Supply case | Exhaustive treatment of the definition of "industry"; doctrine that sovereign/regal functions of the State are not within "industry" (Justice Krishna Iyer's dictum quoted). | The Court observed that the Bangalore Water Supply case still holds the field because the 1984 amendment to the Central Act has not been enforced; it provides the framework for characterizing sovereign functions as outside "industry". |
| Deshraj v. State of Punjab | Held that the main functioning of the irrigation department, when subjected to the dominant-nature test, comes within the ambit of "industry". | The Court regarded this decision as supporting the proposition that the Irrigation Department may be an industry and described it as the correct view (though it did not finally decide the issue here). |
| Executive Engineer State of Karnataka v. K. Somasetty (Somasetty's case) | Held that the Irrigation Department and Telecommunication Department are not "industry"; public welfare functions are sovereign and the State is not an "industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act. | The Court noted this decision is directly in conflict with Deshraj; it left unresolved which conflicting view to follow because the present case could be decided without resolving that conflict. |
| Union of India v. Jai Narain Singh; State of H.P v. Suresh Kumar Verma | Referenced as authorities supporting the proposition that public welfare functions are sovereign and not within "industry". | These cases were cited within the reasoning of Somasetty's case and noted by the Court as part of the line of decisions finding the State not to be an "industry". |
| General Manager Telecom v. A. Sri Niwas | Three-Judge decision that overruled that part of Somasetty's case concerning Telecommunication Department not being an "industry". | The Court recorded that the telecommunication aspect of Somasetty was overruled by this three-Judge decision, but that the irrigation-related holding in Somasetty has not been overruled. |
| Madhya Pradesh Karmachari Sangh's v. State | Referred to as indicating that an earlier Madhya Pradesh High Court decision (finding irrigation to be an industry) had been affirmed by the Supreme Court on 20.7.1978 (as asserted by counsel). | The Court noted the counsel's reliance on this case to contend that Somasetty was per incuriam, but also recorded the absence of a clear speaking order or availability of the affirmation and declined to hold Somasetty per incuriam on that basis. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Rameshwar Lal Gahlot | Held that where an appointment is for a fixed period, Section 25-F does not apply because clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) covers it; to treat such an appointment as retrenchment it must be shown that the appointment was a colourable exercise of power or misuse by the management. | The Court applied this principle to hold that the 19.6.1991 letter (a fixed-term appointment till 29.2.1992) could not be treated as retrenchment in the absence of a finding that the appointment was mala fide or a colourable exercise of power. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the five points of determination in sequence and applied legal principles and precedents explicitly discussed in the opinion:
- Whether the Irrigation Department is an "industry": The Court reviewed conflicting authorities. It observed that the definitions in the State and Central Acts were the same for present purposes and that the Bangalore Water Supply case remains authoritative. There were two conflicting Supreme Court two-judge decisions—Deshraj (holding irrigation is an industry) and Somasetty (holding it is not). A three-Judge decision (General Manager Telecom v. A. Sri Niwas) overruled only Somasetty's telecommunication holding, not the irrigation holding. The Court noted conflicting full-bench decisions in its own Court on the rule about which conflicting decision to follow and concluded that it would not resolve the conflict because the present case could be decided without determining whether the Irrigation Department is an industry.
- Definition of "retrenchment": The Court noted the Central Act was amended in 1984 to add clause (bb) to the definition of retrenchment (excluding termination on non-renewal of contract), but that clause is not in the State Act. By reference to Article 254 of the Constitution, the Court held that the Central Act's definition of retrenchment prevails over the State Act's definition; accordingly the Central Act's exclusion applies.
- Legality of the 19.6.1991 fixed-term appointment and termination: The Labour Court found the contesting respondent had intermittent service from 1986 to 1991 and that he was last appointed by the 19.6.1991 letter for a fixed term until 29.2.1992. Although the Labour Court found the non-renewal to be mala fide generally, there was no specific finding that the appointment letter itself was mala fide or a colourable exercise of power. Applying the principle from State of Rajasthan v. Rameshwar Lal Gahlot, the Court held that where an appointment is for a fixed period, termination on expiry is not retrenchment unless it is established that the fixed-term appointment was a misuse or colourable exercise. Therefore, termination on 29.2.1992 was not retrenchment in the absence of a finding of mala fides regarding the appointment letter. The Court concluded that the Labour Court's award was illegal to the extent it treated the termination as retrenchment (and reinstated solely on that basis).
- Discrimination and fairness of the petitioner's action: The Court observed that irrespective of whether the Irrigation Department is an "industry," it is a limb of the State and therefore comes within Article 12. Its actions must be fair and not discriminatory; Articles 14 and 16 prohibit such discrimination. It was an admitted fact (and/or not specifically denied) that two juniors—Deo Pal Tyagi and Sangeeta—were working while the contesting respondent was not permitted to work. The petitioner had asserted that those juniors were on muster roll and that a similar offer was made to the contesting respondent which he refused; this assertion was not specifically denied in the counter-affidavit. The Labour Court had found discrimination. The Court concluded that the petitioner had discriminated and that the contesting respondent should have been treated in the same manner as the juniors.
- Relief to be granted: Balancing the legal conclusion that termination on expiry was not retrenchment with the factual conclusion of discriminatory treatment, the Court modified the Labour Court's Award rather than wholly setting it aside. It directed that the contesting respondent be reinstated to a post at par with those held by Deo Pal Tyagi and Sangeeta (if they were still working) or else to the same post he held prior to 29.2.1992. The reinstatement was to occur within two months. The contesting respondent would be entitled to salary and emoluments from the date of reinstatement or from 1 September 1999, whichever was earlier. For seniority, he would be treated as senior to Deo Pal Tyagi and Sangeeta and to any person engaged after them.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The writ petition is disposed of with modification of the Labour Court's Award: the contesting respondent is to be reinstated with specified terms (reinstatement within two months to a post at par with the juniors or to his pre-29.2.1992 post, entitlement to salary/emoluments from reinstatement or 1.9.1999 whichever is earlier, and seniority treated as senior to the juniors).
Implications:
- The Court held that a termination on expiry of a fixed-term appointment cannot be treated as "retrenchment" under the applicable definition (Central Act's definition prevailing) unless the appointment itself is shown to be mala fide or a colourable exercise of power. Accordingly, the Labour Court's award to reinstate solely on the ground that retrenchment procedures were not followed was legally unsound in that respect.
- However, because the petitioner discriminated by permitting juniors to continue in work while not continuing the contesting respondent, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement (with back pay from the date of reinstatement or 1.9.1999, whichever earlier) and favourable seniority was granted.
- The Court expressly avoided resolving the unresolved conflict in authorities on whether the Irrigation Department is an "industry" and declined to lay down a new binding precedent on that point, noting the matter could be decided without resolving that question.
- The decision's direct effect is to order the reinstatement and the specified monetary and seniority consequences for the contesting respondent; the opinion did not purport to create a broader legal rule beyond the application of existing precedents and constitutional principles to the facts of this case.
Disposition: Writ petition disposed with the directions summarized above.
Yatindra Singh, J.:— Sri Bhim Singh, (the contesting respondent) was working as English Typist in the Irrigation Department of the State of Uttar Pradesh (the petitioner). He was not permitted to work after 29.2.1992 and he raised an industrial dispute, which was referred to the Labour Court under U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the State Act for short). According to the contesting respondent he was appointed on 25.6.1986 and was continued in service and was illegally not permitted to work from 29.2.1992 The petitioner says that: the contesting respondent was given a fixed term appointment; he was appointed till 29.2.1992 on ad-hoc basis and after expiry of that period his services came to an end; it is not a retrenchment; and there is no illegality in terminating the services. The Labour Court has held that:
* the contesting respondent had started working from 25.6.1986 (though there were some breaks);
* the contesting respondent has been retrenched without offering any compensation;
* there is work as persons junior than the contesting respondent have been permitted to work; the action of the petitioner is discriminatory; and
* the contesting respondent ought to have been continued on the post.
2. The Labour Court has reinstated the contesting respondent in service with full back wages from the date of termination of his service i.e 29.2.92 The State of Uttar Pradesh (the petitioner) has filed present writ petition against this Award.
POINTS OF DETERMINATION
3. I have heard Sri K.M Sahai learned standing counsel for the petitioner and Sri K.P Agarwal senior counsel and Sushri Suman Sirohi, learned counsel for the respondents. The following points arise for determination:—
(i) Is the Irrigation Department of the State an Industry within the meaning of the State Act?
(ii) Is the definition of retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act (the Central Act for short) apply under the State Act?
(iii) The contesting respondent was lastly appointed by the letter dated 19th June, 1991 for a specific period till 29.2.1992 Was this action mala fide? Was it a fixed term appointment? Does the non-renewal of contract or work amount to retrenchment under the State Act?
(iv) Was the action of the petitioner fair and reasonable?
(v) Is the petitioner entitled to any relief?
1st POINT—IS THE IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT AN INDUSTRY?
4. Industry has been defined under the State Act as well as under the Central Act. There is no difference between the two. This definition has been subject matter of the interpretation in many decisions. It was exhaustively dealt with in the Bangalore Water Supply case.1 Subsequently the word ‘industry’ in the Central Act has been amended in 1984 but this amendment has not been enforced till today. The result is that the old definition of industry continues and the Bangalore Water Supply case still holds the field. The sovereign or regal functions of the State are not within the definition of the industry. The Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide in that respect. The activities of the petitioner which are regal or sovereign are outside the scope of the word industry. This has been explained by Justice Krishna Iyer in Paragraph No. 143 of the Bangalore Water Supply case ‘Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign functions strictly understood, (alone) qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by Government or statutory bodies.’ But this case did not spell out the activities of the Government, which could be called sovereign functions.
5. Is irrigation activity of the Government a sovereign function? Is this activity beyond the meaning of the word industry? Does it qualify for exemption as understood in the Bangalore Water Supply case? There have been conflicting decisions about it. A full bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, held that irrigation department does not come within the ambit of industry. A contrary view has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court.2 This matter was considered in detail by a bench of two Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Deshraj v. State of Punjab,3 (the Deshraj case) and the Court in paragraph No. 13 held ‘the main functioning of the irrigation department when subjected to the dominant nature test clearly come within the ambit of industry.’ If this was the only case it was end of the matter. There has been another case; Executive Engineer State of Karnataka v. K. Somasetty (the Somasetty's case).4 It is also a decision by the two Judges of the Supreme Court. It was held in this case that ‘It is now well settled legal position that the Irrigation Department and Telecommunication Department are not an “industry” within the meaning of definition under the Industrial Disputes Act as held in Union India v. Jai Narain Singh and in State of H.P v. Suresh Kumar Verma. The function of public welfare of the State is sovereign function. It is the constitutional mandate under the Directive Principles that the Government should bring about Welfare State by executive and legislative actions. Under these circumstances, the State is not an “industry” under the Industrial Disputes Act.’
6. The Somasetty's case is in direct conflict with the Deshraj's case. Sri K.P Agarwal learned counsel for the contesting respondents says that the Somasetty's case is per incurium in view of the three Judges decision of the Supreme Court in Madhya Pradesh Karmachari Sangh's v. State.5 In this case in paragraph 2 it is mentioned that earlier Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that Irrigation Department is an industry and that was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 20th July, 1978. But this decision of 20th July, 1978 affirming the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court is not available. It is not clear that as to how many Judges had decided it or only leave was refused without there being a speaking order. It can not be said that two Judges decision in the Somasetty's case is per incurium on this ground.
7. The observations of the Somasetty's case holding the Telecommunication Department not to be an industry has been specifically over-ruled by three Judge decision of the Supreme Court reported in General Manager Telecom v. A. Sri Niwas.6 But that part of Somasetty's case holding that Irrigation Department is not an industry, has not been overruled. I am left with two conflicting decisions of equal strength. Should the latter one be followed or the one which I think is correct be followed?
8. The question, if there are two conflicting decisions then which one should be followed, has been subject matter of some debate in this Court. In the two Full Bench decisions of this Court, it has been held that in such a situation it is later one which should be followed. But the third and the last full bench decision holds that in such a situation the correct one, in place of latter one, should be followed. The third full bench decision differs from the first two. If the third full bench decision is to be followed, then correct decision which according to me is Deshraj's decision, namely the Irrigation Department is an industry should be followed. If the first two full benches is to be followed then the latter decision of the Somasetty's case should be followed. These three full benches are of equal strength of three Judges and the third full bench decision does not refer to the earlier two. In case I was of the opinion that Irrigation Department is not an industry it was easy for me to follow the latter decision of the Somasetty's case. That would have been consistent with three full bench decisions of this Court. But as I am of the view that the decision in the Deshraj's case holding the Irrigation Department to be an industry is the correct one, I can not do so unless the three full bench decisions are reconciled by a larger bench of five or more Judges. I would have referred the matter to a larger bench but for the fact that the case can be decided without deciding this issue.
2nd POINT—DEFINITION OF RETRENCHMENT
9. The word ‘retrenchment’ has been defined under the State Act as well as under the Central Act. Initially the definition in the two Acts was substantially the same. Thereafter the Central Act has been amended in 1984 and a clause has been added in the definition of retrenchment. According to this new sub-clause (bb), the termination of the service of a workman as a result of non-renewal of contract on its expiry or termination under stipulation contained in the contract is not a retrenchment. This clause is not in the State Act. Will this definition of retrenchment apply to retrenchment under the State Act? This was also subject matter of some debate. In view of Article 254 of the Constitution, it has been held, that the definition of retrenchment in the Central Act will prevail over the definition of retrenchment under the State Act. I also hold accordingly.
3RD POINT—LEGALITY OF RETRENCHMENT.
10. Was the letter dated 19th June, 1991 malafide? It is correct that the Labour Court has given a finding that the petitioner started working with effect from 25.6.1986 He worked for different periods from 1986 to 1991. This was intermittent, there were breaks. He was lastly appointed by letter dated 19.6.1991 for a fixed term i.e till 29.2.1992 Though there is a finding that the non-renewal is malafide but there is no finding that the letter dated 19th June 1991 was malafide or colourable exercise of power. In absence of the same it can not be said that the termination of work from 29.2.1992 is a retrenchment as the services of the contesting respondent had been terminated on expiry of his term as stipulated in the appointment letter. Such action now cannot be termed as retrenchment unless there was a finding that this appointment letter was malafide or this was done purposely to avoid the benefits to a workman under the Labour laws. This has been so held by the Supreme Court. The Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Rameshwar Lal Gahlot, held ‘Once an appointment is for fixed period, Section 25-F does not apply as it is covered by clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. …. It must be established that in each case power was misused by the management or the appointment for a fixed period was a colourable exercise of power’.
Is termination illegal as no retrenchment compensation was offered?
11. The appointment of the contesting respondent was a fixed term appointment. Its termination did not amount to retrenchment and the contesting respondent can not be reinstated simply because no retrenchment compensation was given or the provisions under Section 6-N were not complied with. The award of the Labour Court is illegal on this score. But should it be set aside? What relief is to be granted will depend on the consideration of the next point.
4th POINT—WAS ACTION DISCRIMINATORY?
12. The Irrigation Department may or may not be an industry within the meaning of the State Act but it is a limb of the State Government. It is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Its action can not but be fair and reasonable. It can not discriminate. This is prohibited by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is admitted case that two persons namely Deo Pal Tyagi and Sangeeta who are juniors than the contesting respondent are working. There is no reason for not giving similar treatment to the contesting respondent. He should have been continued like others. The petitioner in paragraph 5 of the writ petition has stated that Deo Pal Tyagi and Sangeeta are given employment on muster roll and the contesting respondent was similarly offered employment, which he refused. This paragraph of the writ petition is not specifically denied in the counter affidavit; probably as the Labour Court had also held that there was discrimination. The fact remains that the petitioner is discriminating. This can not be done. The contesting respondent should have been given the same treatment as has been given to Deo Pal Tyagi and Sangeeta.
5th POINT—TO WHAT RELIEF PETITIONER IS ENTITLED?
13. I have already held that the services of the contesting respondent were terminated on the expiry of the contract in pursuance of the terms stipulated in the contract and this does not amount to retrenchment. But I have also held that action of the petitioner was discriminatory. The contesting respondent should have been re-employed. In these circumstances it would be best if the award is modified to the extent that the contesting respondent will be reinstated on a post which is at par with the job held by Deo Pal Tyagi and Sangeeta, if they are still working, in case they are no longer working then on the same post on which the contesting respondent was working prior to 29.2.1992 This may be done within two months from today. The contesting respondent shall be entitled to his salary and emoluments from the date of his reinstatement or from 1st September, 1999 whichever is earlier. But so far as his seniority is concerned he will be treated senior than Deo Pal Tyagi and Sangeeta or any one else engaged after them.
14. With these directions, the writ petition is disposed of.
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