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Agra District Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Prescribed Authority, Labour Court

Allahabad High Court
Mar 10, 1998
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition challenges the award dated 16 August 1996 passed in Adjudication Case Nos. 143/1982 and 149/1982. The petitioner (represented by Mr. H.N. Tripathi) attacked the award on multiple grounds relating to recruitment and appointment under Regulation 5 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulation, 1975, as amended by the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service (Second Amendment) Regulations, 1979. An interim order had been granted on 31 January 1997; the parties agreed to dispose of the petition finally on merits rather than decide the interim application. The Labour Court had earlier made findings on matters including the constitution of the Selection Committee, issuance of the appointment letter, and the legality of its cancellation; the High Court heard argument and reviewed those findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether selection for Category IV posts (typists and clerks in lowest pay scales) under Regulation 5 (as amended in 1979) could be validly made by the Selection Committee without sending a requisition to the Board (i.e., whether Clauses (iv) and (vii) required compliance for recruitment under Clause (vi)).
  2. Whether the constitution of the Selection Committee was vitiated because the Additional District Cooperative Officer participated in place of the Assistant Registrar, thus rendering the selection invalid.
  3. Whether an appointment letter issued by the Secretary (Sachiv) or by the Committee of Management (as found by the Labour Court) was effective when the appointing authority later purported to cancel the selection by resolution.
  4. Whether the cancellation/resolution of 9 May 1980 (leading to termination effective 21 May 1980) invalidated the appointment and selection, and whether the Labour Court’s findings on these facts ought to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Mr. H.N. Tripathi) Arguments

  • Regulation 5 requires selection to be made only by the Board; any selection by a Selection Committee other than the Board is unsustainable.
  • Even if selection by a Selection Committee is permitted under the 1979 Amendment to Rule 5, such selection is valid only after a requisition is sent to the Board — no such requisition was sent here, therefore the selection is bad.
  • The 1979 Amendment required the Selection Committee to consist of Chairman, Assistant Registrar and the Secretary; the present committee included the Additional District Cooperative Officer instead of the Assistant Registrar, so constitution was bad and committee incompetent.
  • The appointment letter was issued by the Secretary (Sachiv) and not by the appointing authority; further, the appointing authority cancelled the selection by a resolution dated 21 May 1980, so the respondent cannot claim rights based on an unauthorized appointment letter.
  • Relied on case law (e.g., Ashwani Kumar; Vikramaditya Pandey) to support propositions about invalidity of selection/appointment made by unauthorized persons and limits on resort to the Industrial Disputes Act for cooperatives.

Respondent's (Mr. Arun Tandon) Arguments

  • The 1979 Amendment of Regulation 5 removed the requirement of sending a requisition to the Board for such selections; thus no requisition was necessary for recruitment under Clause (vi) as amended.
  • The amended Clause (vi) expressly allows selection by the Selection Committee constituted under the amended regulation.
  • A Government Order (G.O.) permitted the Assistant Registrar, when unable to participate, to nominate an Additional District Cooperative Officer to participate in the Selection Committee; that G.O. had not been challenged in the writ petition, so the petitioner's objection to the nominee’s participation cannot be entertained.
  • The Labour Court found that the appointment letter was issued by the Committee of Management and that this was pleaded in the employer’s written statement; the petitioner did not place the written statement on record or dispute the Labour Court’s factual finding — factual findings by the Labour Court should not be disturbed in writ jurisdiction unless perverse.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1997) 2 SCC 1 : AIR 1997 SC 1628 Held that where a person is wrongly selected and the appointment letter is issued by an unauthorised officer, the selection and appointment are void and cannot be upheld. The Court held this authority inapplicable on the facts: Labour Court had found the committee was competent, the selection was not vitiated, the appointment was made by the Committee of Management and cancellation was illegal; therefore Ashwani Kumar did not attract the present facts.
Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal, (1997) 1 UPLBEC 517 : 1997 Lab IC 604 Principle that exclusion of the Industrial Disputes Act requires that the specific statutory provision intended to exclude it must be given effect; S.135 of the U.P. Act (as relied upon in that decision) had not been brought into effect, so Industrial Disputes Act could not be held excluded. The Court found this decision distinguishable and held it did not assist the petitioner: the factual and statutory matrix differs and the principle in that case did not aid the petitioner's contention.
R.C. Tiwari v. M.P. State Cooperative Marketing Federation Limited, (1997) 5 JT (SC) 95 : (1997) 5 SCC 125 : AIR 1997 SC 2652 Decision about scope of Industrial Disputes Act in context of M.P. Co-operative Societies Act (ratio proceeded on provisions of the M.P. Act as present in that case). The Court declined to apply this authority because it did not relate to the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act and Rules; no material was produced to show the provisions were similar, so the ratio could not be relied upon here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each contention in turn and explained the legal basis for accepting the Labour Court's findings and rejecting the petitioner’s challenges:

  1. On the requisition requirement:
    • The Court examined Regulation 5 as originally framed and as amended in 1979. It noted Clauses (i), (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) and their interrelationship as spelled out in the regulation text quoted in the award.
    • The critical textual point relied upon by the Court was that Clauses (v) and (vi) begin with a "notwithstanding anything contained in Cl. (i)" provision. The Court interpreted this to mean recruitment under Clauses (v) and (vi) operates independently of the Board's primary recruitment power under Clause (i).
    • Clauses (iv) (annual communication of approximate vacancies) and (vii) (requisition to Board at least three months before filling a vacancy) were found to relate to Clause (i) and to be mechanisms enabling the Board to perform duties under Clause (i). Because Clauses (v) and (vi) are framed as exceptions to Clause (i) (via a non-obstante clause), the Court concluded Clauses (iv) and (vii) do not apply to recruitment made under Clause (vi).
    • Accordingly, the Court held that for recruitment under Clause (vi) (as amended in 1979), a requisition to the Board is not required.
  2. On composition of the Selection Committee and participation of a nominee:
    • The Court accepted that Clause (vi) expressly names the Assistant Registrar as a member of the Selection Committee and that, on its face, substitution by a nominee could be objectionable.
    • However, the Labour Court had relied upon a Government Order dated 27-7-1979 permitting the Assistant Registrar, when unable to participate, to nominate an Additional District Cooperative Officer to participate in the Committee.
    • Because that Government Order had not been challenged in the writ petition, the High Court declined to adjudicate its validity and held it was not incumbent on the Court to decide the issue. While noting that participation by a nominee would ordinarily vitiate the committee, the Court said that so long as the G.O. remained unchallenged, the Labour Court’s reliance on it could not be assailed.
  3. On the issuance of the appointment letter:
    • The Labour Court found that the Managing Committee (Committee of Management) had issued the appointment letter on 29-4-1980; this was pleaded in the employer’s additional written statement.
    • The petitioner had not placed the additional written statement on record to show that this finding was perverse or that no such case was made out. The petitioner also did not contend that this was not pleaded.
    • The Court emphasized that it will not re-open disputed questions of fact in writ jurisdiction absent material showing perversity; in these circumstances the Court would not disturb the Labour Court's factual finding that the appointment letter was issued by the Committee of Management.
  4. On cancellation of the appointment and its legal effect:
    • The Labour Court had characterised the Committee’s resolution cancelling the appointment as in effect being a termination of service without notice. The appointment (dated 28-4-1980) was cancelled by a resolution dated 9-5-1980 with effect from 21-5-1980.
    • The High Court accepted the Labour Court’s finding that, whether described as cancellation of appointment or otherwise, the resolution effected a termination. Because the Court found the Selection Committee was legally constituted and the appointment had been validly issued by the Committee of Management, it was difficult to accept that the selection was vitiated and therefore liable to be cancelled.
  5. On precedents relied upon by the petitioner:
    • The Court examined the authorities relied upon by the petitioner (including Ashwani Kumar; Vikramaditya Pandey; R.C. Tiwari) and found them distinguishable on facts or statutory matrix. In particular, Ashwani Kumar involved facts where appointment was held void because the appointment letter was issued by an unauthorised officer — facts different from the present finding that the Committee of Management had competence and had issued the appointment.
    • Vikramaditya Pandey and R.C. Tiwari were also held not to assist the petitioner because they related to different statutory provisions or the M.P. Act rather than the U.P. Act; similarity of statutory provisions had not been shown.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The Court declined to interfere with the impugned award and discharged the interim order.

Immediate implications for the parties:

  • The Labour Court’s award and factual findings (that the Selection Committee was competent, the appointment was issued by the Committee of Management, and the purported cancellation amounted to termination) stand and are not disturbed by the High Court in this writ petition.
  • The petitioner's challenges based on absence of requisition to the Board, improper composition of the Selection Committee (due to participation of Additional District Cooperative Officer), and alleged unauthorised issuance of appointment letter were rejected for the reasons stated by the Court.
  • The interim order previously in place is discharged.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Broader legal implications:
The Court did not purport to lay down any new, general precedent beyond the application of the regulatory text and the particular factual findings in this case. The decision principally affirms the Labour Court’s factual determinations and interprets the interplay of Clauses (i), (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) of Regulation 5 as indicating that recruitment under Clause (vi) (as amended in 1979) does not require prior requisition to the Board. The Court explicitly distinguished earlier Supreme Court and other decisions relied on by the petitioner where factual and statutory contexts differed.

Disposition

Petition dismissed. Interim order discharged. No order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

1. The award dated 16th August, 1996 passed in Adjudication Case No. 143/1982 and 149/1982 has been challenged by means of this writ petition. Mr. H.N Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner assails the order on the ground that in view of Regulation 5 of U.P Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulation, 1975, selection could be made only by the Board and the selection made by the Selection Committee other than the Board, cannot be sustained. Secondly, he contends that even if such selection can be made by the Selection Committee as provided under Rule 5 as amended by U.P Cooperative Societies Employees Service (Second Amendment) Regulations, 1979, even then such selection can be made only after a requisition is sent to the Board. In the present case, such requisition having not been sent, the selection made is bad. His next contention was that under 1979 Amendment, the Selection Committee should consist of Chairman, Assistant Registrar and the Secretary, whereas in the present case admittedly the Additional District Cooperative Officer had participated in the selection instead of Assistant Registrar of the district. Therefore, according to him, constitution of the Selection Committee was bad and as such the Committee was incompetent to make the selection. He next contended that the appointment letter was issued to the petitioner by the ‘Sachiv’ and not by the appointing authority. On the other hand, the appointing authority had cancelled the said selection by resolution dated 21st May, 1980 and therefore the respondent cannot claim any right on the basis of unauthorised appointment letter issued by the Secretary.

2. Mr. Arun Tandon, learned counsel representing the respondents on the other hand, contends that by reason of 1979 Amendment of Regulation 5, no requisition is necessary to be sent to the Board for selection. Secondly, such selection can be made under such amended provision by the Selection Committee as provided in the amended regulation Cl. (6) of Regulation 5. He next contends that by reason of a Government order issued by the department whenever the Assistant Registrar is unable to participate in the Selection Committee, in that even it is open to him to nominate an Additional District Cooperative Officer for participating in the Selection Committee in his place. Since the said G.O has not been challenged in the present writ petition, therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that participation of Additional District Cooperative Officer has vitiated constitution of the Selection Committee. He next contends that in the written statement the petitioner had contended that appointment letter was issued by the Committee of Management. It was also so found by the Labour Court in the award itself, and the learned counsel for the petitioner having not disputed the same particularly when written statement has not been made part of the record, for which, according to the learned counsel, an adverse presumption may be drawn against the petitioner, the finding of fact so arrived at by the Labour Court cannot be interfered with in the writ jurisdiction and the same being a finding of fact, that Court should be slow interfering with the same unless it is perverse.

3. In the present case, interim order was granted on 31-1-1997. By means of an application, Mr. Tandon has sought vacation of the interim order. Admittedly, counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. Learned Counsel for both the parties had agreed that this writ petition may be disposed of finally instead of deciding the question of grant of interim order. Accordingly they had addressed the Court on merits of the case.

4. I have heard both Mr. Tripathi and Mr. Tandon for considerable time.

5. So far as the first contention of Mr. Tripathi that it is only the Board which can make selection and appointment is concerned, the same does not stand to reason in-view of provision of Regulation 5 as amended by 1979 Amendment. The Regulation 5 as it stood provided as follows:

“5. (i) Recruitment for all appointments in a co-operative society shall be made through the Board whether the recruitment is:—

(a) direct, or

(b) by promotion from employees already in the service of the society, or

(c) by taking on deputation or otherwise a person who is already in the service of any other society registered or deemed to have been registered under the Act.

(ii) Notwithstanding anything in Cl. (1) no reference to the Board shall be necessary in the following cases:—

(a) When it is proposed to fill with the concurrence of the Registrar any post by means of deputation of a Government servant, or

(b) When officiating promotion is made by the appointing authority from a lower rank to the next higher rank for a period not exceeding six months.

(iii) The Board may, pending selection, permit stopgap arrangements to be made by the appointing authority for such period as the Board may consider necessary. Intimation of such appointment shall be given to the Board within a month of such appointment.

(iv) To facilitate the performance of the duties enjoined upon the Board under Cl. (i), every cooperative society shall communicate to the Board by 31st December every year the approximate number of vacancies likely to arise during the course of the next calendar year by reasons of creation of new posts, retirement, deputation or otherwise.

(v) Notwithstanding anything, contained in Cl. (i), recruitment to the post of Category IV employees mentioned in Regulation No. 6, shall be made by a Selection Committee consisting of (a) Secretary of the appointing society, (b) a nominee of the Board who shall be the Chairman of the Selection Committee and (c) Assistant Registrar of the district concerned.

(vi) Selection made by the Selection Committee referred to in Cl. (v) and appointments made on basis thereof shall be provisional and be subject to the approval of the Board.

(vii) Notwithstanding the provisions of Cl. (iv), a co-operative society in which appointment is to be made shall send to the Board requisition in the form specified in Appendix ‘A’ at least three months before the vacancy is sought to be filled up.

(viii) In making recruitment to any post, the Board may require, the appointing society or the society to which the appointing society is affiliated to send one of its officers to the Board, and when the recruitment is to be made for a technical post or a post requiring specialised knowledge or skill, the Board may also request any appropriate institution or authority to depute a technical adviser to assist the Board.”

6. This regulation was amended from time to time. But for our present purpose, we are concerned with the second Amendment brought into being by 1979 Second Amendment. By the said amendment, Cl. (vi) of Regulation 5 as quoted above was replaced as follows:

“(vi) Notwithstanding anything contained in Cl. (i) recruitment to the posts of typists and clerks in the lowest pay scales in a cooperative society shall be made by a Selection Committee constituted as under:

(1) In the case of District/Central Cooperative Banks, District Co-operative Federations, Wholesale Co-operative Consumers Stores, including Naya Bazars, Uttar Pradesh Postal Employee's Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow and Oudh and Rohelkhand Railway Employees Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow, the Selection Committee shall consist of:

(a) Chairman/Administrator of the appointing society who shall be Chairman of the Selection Committee. If Assistant Registrar of the District is Administrator, Deputy Registrar of the Region shall be the Chairman of the Selection Committee;

(b) Assistant Registrar of the district, who shall be member of the Selection Committee; and

(c) Sachiv of the appointing society, who shall be convener of the Committee.”

7. Relying of this provisions, Mr. Tripathi contended that Cl. (vi) though replaced by the 1979 Amendment, but Cl. (iv) and (vii) were not replaced, and by reason of Cl. (iv) it is necessary to communicate to the Board the approximate number of vacancies likely to arise during the course of next calendar year. Notwithstanding Cl. (iv), by reason of Cl. (vii) before filling up a vacancy, a requisition is necessary to be sent to the Board by the concerned society. Therefore, unless requisition is sent, no selection under Cl. (vi) could be made.

8. From the scheme of the Regulations, it appears that Cl. (iv) requires a communication to the Board in respect of future vacancies that is likely to arise. But such communication is not sufficient. In addition before seeking filling up a vacancy, a requisition is to be made. But Cl. (iv) relates to Cl. (i) of Regulation 5. Clause (i) is power of the Board to recruit. The communication under Cl. (iv) is made in order to enable the Board to perform its duties enjoined under Cl. (i). In addition to the communication under Cl. (iv), Cl. (vii) requires that a requisition is to be made. When it referred to Cl. (iv), it had omitted to refer Cl. (v) and (vi). Similarly in the 1979 Amendment though Cl. (vi) has been amended, Cl. (vii) was not amended. Clause (iv) refers to Cl. (i). Thus Cl. (vii) also refers to Cl. (i). Both Cl. (iv) and (vii) are necessary to be complied with for the purpose of enabling the Board to perform its duties enjoined under Cl. (i). Thus, Cl. (vii) has no manner of application in respect of recruitment under Cls. (v) and (vi). Since both these Cls. (v) and (vi) begins with non-obstanti clause providing notwithstanding anything contained in Cl. (i) which pre-supposes that despite the provisions contained in Cl. (i) and thus relate to provision contained in Cls. (iv) and (vii), recruitment can be made by the Selection Committee under Cls. (v) and (vi) respectively. Thus, recruitment under Cl. (vi) being independent of Cl. (i), Cls. (iv) and (vii) has no manner of application. Therefore, 1 am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Tripathi and do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the Labour Court that a requisition is not required to be sent for the purpose of recruitment under Cl. (vi).

9. So far as the question of participation of Assistant Registrar of the district is concerned, the provision is explicit. In sub-clause (i)(b) the Assistant Registrar of the district shall be member of the Selection Committee. If we go by the provisions of Cl. (vi), in that event the contention of Mr. Tripathi appears to be of substance and that nominee of the Assistant Registrar cannot be included in the Selection Committee. Participation of the nominee of the Assistant Registrar would thus vitiate the Constitution of the Committee. Though the Labour Court had relied upon a Government order dated 27-7-1979 whereby in case the Assistant Registrar is unable to participate in such selection, he may nominate an additional District Cooperative Officer to participate in the Committee, has been provided for, yet the said Government order has neither been disputed or challenged. Unless the said G.O is challenged, it is not incumbent upon this Court to decide the validity thereof. So long the said G.O remains, unless the same is challenged and is held to be illegal and ultra vires, it is not open for this Court to hold otherwise. The finding of the Labour Court, therefore, cannot be assailed on that score. If it is permitted by the G.O that in cases where the Assistant Registrar is unable to participate, he may nominate an officer which has since been passed by the Registrar of the Cooperative Society, in that event it cannot be said that the constitution of the Committee was vitiated because of non-participation of the Assistant Registrar and participation by his nominee. On these grounds. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the contention of Mr. Tripathi and take a different view other than that of the Labour Court.

10. So far as the question of issuing letter of appointment by the Secretary is concerned, it appears from paragraph 7 of the award itself where the employer's case was noted, that the Managing Committee had issued the appointment letter on 29-4-1980. In the additional written statement, it was so pleaded by the employer. A copy of the additional written statement has not been brought on record to show that the said finding is perverse or that no such case was made out therein. Mr. Tripathi had also not contended that this was not pleaded in the additional written statement of the employer or this finding is perverse. As soon it is admitted by the employer in its pleadings that the appointment letter was issued by the Committee of Management, it is no more open to him to contend that it was not issued by the Committee of Management and that it was issued without any auhority by the Secretary. If such question is to be gone into in the writ jurisdiction, it would be an endeavour to enter into disputed question of fact which this Court normally does not do. No such material has been brought before me to hold otherwise than that of the finding by the Labour Court in that respect. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Tripathi in respect of this contention as well.

11. The last contention of Mr. Tripathi was that the appointment having been cancelled by resolution dated 21st May, 1980, the appointment letter issued to the petitioner on 28-4-1980 was ineffective. He points out from the award itself that the appointment letter was issued on 28-4-1980 and the same was cancelled by order dated 21-5-1980 pursuant to the resolution dated 9-5-1980. This, question has also been found by the Labour Court to the extent that this resolution is in effect though termed cancellation of the appointment, is termination of service without notice. Admittedly, the appointment was cancelled by resolution dated 9-5-1980, pursuant to which service was terminated with effect from 21-5-1980. Whether the termination was a consequence of cancellation of the appointment or otherwise, is in effect a termination and therefore the resolution to cancel the appointment does not stand on different footing than that of termination of an appointment. Since it has been found that the Selection Committee constituted was legal and had competence of selecting the respondent and the letter of appointment having been issued by the Committee of Management, it is very difficult to accept the contention that the selection having been vitiated and the appointment letter having not been issued by the Secretary under any authority, the said selection was liable to be cancelled.

12. In view of the above findings, the decision referred to by Mr. Tripathi in the case of Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1997) 2 SCC 1 : (AIR 1997 SC 1628), has no manner of application since in the said case it was held that a person selected wrongly and appointment letter having been issued by an unauthorised officer, the appointment and selection being void, the same cannot be upheld. In the present case, the facts are wholly distinguishable to the extent that the Labour Court had found with which I have no reason to differ, that the committee was competent to make selection and the selection was not vitiated and the apointment was duly given by the Committee of Management and that the cancellation was illegal. In such circumstances, the decision in the case of Ashwani Kumar (supra) cannot be attracted in view of distinguishable facts and circumstances of the present case.

13. Similarly, the decision in the case of Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal, (1997) 1 UPLBEC 517 : (1997 Lab IC 604) is also distinguishable on facts. This decision was referred by Mr. Tripathi in order to contend that a person governed under Regulatons, is not entitled to take resort to the Industrial Dispute Act. But in the said decision it was held that such provision was incorporated under S. 135 of the U.P Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 but though all sections of the said Act have been given effect to by notification but S. 135 has not yet been given effect to. Therefore, though there was legislative intention to exclude the operation of Industrial Dispute Act in respect of disputes arising out of Cooperative Societies Act relating to its employees, but S. 135 having not been given effect to, it cannot be said that the application of the Industrial Dispute Act is excluded. When specific provision has been made but has not been given effect to, it cannot be said that the application of the Industrial Dispute Act is excluded so far as such dispute are concerned. Therefore, the said contention also does not help Mr. Tripathi.

14. Relying on the decision in the case of R.C Tiwari v. M.P State Cooperative Marketing Federation Limited, (1997) 5 JT (SC) 95 : ((1997) 5 SCC 125 : AIR 1997 SC 2652), Mr. Tripathi contended that the present dispute cannot be brought under the purview of Industrial Dispute Act. But the said ratio does not relate to U.P Cooperative Societies Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It has not been shown to me that the provisions of M.P Co-operative Societies Act are similar to that of U.P Co-operative Societies Act relating to service of the employees. The said decision proceeds on the basis of the facts given in the said case with reference to the provisions of M.P Co-operative Societies Act. In the absence of any such material to show that those provisions are similar to U.P Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules framed thereunder relating to its employees, it is not possible to place reliance on the said decision.

15. For all these reasons, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned award. The writ petition therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order is discharged.

16. Before parting with the case, I may record appreciation for the arguments advanced by both Mr. Tripathi and Mr. Tandon. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

17. Petition dismissed.