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Life Insurance Corporation And Another v. Rajeev Kumar Srivastava
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Special Appeal Against Writ Judgment (24 July 1992)
Factual and Procedural Background
Rajeev Kumar Srivastava (the respondent) filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an alleged oral termination of his service by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (the appellants). The respondent claimed he was engaged as a clerk on a daily-rated contract basis from 12 June 1989 and was paid until June 1990; he alleged that he had worked for longer than 240 days in a year and contended that he fell within the definition of a "workman" and was protected by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (specifically Ss. 2(oo), 25F, 25G and 25H). He sought a writ of mandamus to be treated as a regular employee with equal pay and a writ of certiorari to quash the oral termination.
The Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) filed a counter-affidavit admitting that the respondent had been engaged on a contract/daily-wages basis at Rs. 40 per day and that Annexures and vouchers attached to the writ petition themselves referred to the work as contractual. LIC denied that the respondent's engagement attracted the Industrial Disputes Act protections and asserted the engagement was temporary/contractual as per the facts and its staffing regulations; it also stated that the respondent's engagement ceased from 1 July 1990 because there was no work.
A Single Judge of the Court allowed the writ petition by a judgment dated 24 July 1992. The appellants filed this special appeal against that judgment. The Division Bench heard arguments of both parties and delivered the impugned opinion summarized here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Single Judge was correct in concluding that the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act applied to the respondent's case or whether the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 governs disputes concerning the Life Insurance Corporation of India.
- Whether the respondent, who was engaged on a daily contractual basis, qualified as a "workman" entitled to protection under the Industrial Disputes Act.
- Whether the cessation of the respondent's engagement on expiry/non-renewal (efflux of time) amounted to "retrenchment" under S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, thereby attracting the protections of S.25F (and related provisions).
- Whether subsequent judicial authority (notably Pushpa Srivastava and earlier authorities such as Hindustan Steel) determined that termination upon efflux of a contractual period constitutes retrenchment, and how post-1984 legislative amendment (Clause (bb) to S.2(oo)) affects that conclusion.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (Life Insurance Corporation)
- The Single Judge erred in holding that the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act applied; in disputes concerning LIC the Central Industrial Disputes Act applies and the appropriate Government is the Central Government (per S.2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act).
- The respondent was engaged purely on a contractual/daily-wage basis (admitted in annexures); therefore Industrial Disputes Act protections (including S.2(oo) and S.25F) are not attracted.
- Non-engagement after a contractual period ends is not "retrenchment" within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act.
- LIC had lawful practices of engaging persons on contract (relying on a Division Bench decision in Re: Ashok Kumar Singh v. Zonal Manager, LIC, Kanpur), including because of an undertaking before the National Industrial Tribunal restricting regular appointments, and contractual engagements were therefore permitted.
- Supreme Court authority (Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P v. Pushpa Srivastava) supports that ad hoc/contractual appointments ending by efflux do not give a right to continue, and thus cannot be regularised simply because engagement occurred for an extended period.
Respondent's Arguments (Rajeev Kumar Srivastava)
- The Single Judge's judgment rendered substantial justice and was correct in striking down the oral termination because the requirements of the Industrial Disputes Act (including S.25F) were not complied with.
- Even if the Uttar Pradesh Act did not apply, corresponding provisions of the Central Industrial Disputes Act apply and impose similar conditions; cessation of the respondent's contractual engagement therefore amounted to retrenchment.
- Relied on Hindustan Steel, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Orissa (1976 — II L.L.N 479) to argue that automatic termination on efflux of a contractual period amounts to retrenchment and non-compliance with S.25F is fatal to the employer's action.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Re: Ashok Kumar Singh v. Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation, Kanpur (Division Bench decision; Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3583 of 1988) | Used by the appellants to explain that LIC engaged contractual workers from the open market because of an undertaking before the National Industrial Tribunal that regular appointments should not be made until the reference was disposed. | The Court recorded that the appellants relied on this Division Bench decision to justify contractual engagements; the opinion notes the reliance but does not rest its final decision solely on this precedent. |
| Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava [1992 — II L.L.N 863] | Holds that where appointment is purely ad hoc/contractual and ends by efflux of time, the incumbent has no right to continue in the post even if continued ad hoc for more than a year. | The Court applied the ratio of this Supreme Court decision to the present facts and concluded that contractual employment coming to an end by efflux of time does not amount to retrenchment; therefore S.25F is not attracted. |
| Hindustan Steel, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Orissa [1976 — II L.L.N 479] | Held that automatic termination of service on expiry of contractual period could amount to retrenchment and non-compliance with S.25F was fatal (decision rendered before legislative amendment). | The Court observed that Hindustan Steel was decided before Clause (bb) was added to S.2(oo) by Act 49 of 1984; therefore that decision cannot be the determining factor in the present case because the definition of "retrenchment" has since been amended to exclude non-renewal of a contract under clause (bb). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a step-wise manner:
- Statutory scope — The Court first clarified the correct statutory regime: because the Life Insurance Corporation of India is established under S.3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, disputes concerning LIC fall within the scope of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court relied on S.2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act to conclude that the appropriate Government in disputes concerning LIC is the Central Government; therefore the Single Judge's application of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act was erroneous.
- Factual characterization of employment — The Court examined the annexures filed by the respondent (applications and vouchers) and the counter-affidavit and concluded that those documents consistently described the respondent's engagement as contractual/daily-wage clerical work. The certificates and vouchers explicitly referred to contractual work; LIC admitted the respondent ceased to be given work from 1 July 1990 because there was no work available.
- Legal effect of non-renewal/efflux of contract — The Court analysed the definition of "retrenchment" in S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It noted that Clause (bb) — which excludes "termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment ... on its expiry" — was added by Act 49 of 1984 with effect from 18 August 1984. Because Hindustan Steel (1976) predates this amendment, its holding that termination on efflux amounted to retrenchment could not govern the present case. Given the admitted facts that the respondent's engagement ended due to non-availability of work and that his engagement was contractual, the Court held that the position of LIC was saved by Clause (bb) and that the termination on non-renewal did not amount to retrenchment.
- Application of subsequent authority — The Court accepted the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava, which established that ad hoc/contractual appointments coming to an end by efflux of time do not create a right to continue. The Court found that the same principle applied to the respondent, meaning S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act did not apply.
- Conclusion drawn from law and facts — On the combined factual finding (contractual daily engagement admitted in documents and counter-affidavit) and the statutory change in the definition of "retrenchment", the Court concluded that the respondent's cessation of service on account of non-renewal/efflux of contract was not retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act and that the Single Judge's grant of relief was unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The special appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the Single Judge dated 24 July 1992 is set aside; the writ petition fails.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The respondent's claim to be treated as a regular employee and to have been unlawfully retrenched was rejected on the basis that his engagement was contractual and its cessation on efflux/non-renewal did not amount to retrenchment under S.2(oo) (as amended) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
- The Court specifically held that S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act is not attracted in the present facts.
- The Court noted a sympathetic position: it stated (following the approach in Pushpa Srivastava) that it would be open to the appellants to engage the petitioner in service if they so desired; however, the judgment itself does not compel such steps.
- No costs were awarded by the Court.
Broader implications: The opinion applied the post-1984 statutory definition of "retrenchment" (notably Clause (bb) of S.2(oo)) to exclude non-renewal of a contract from being treated as retrenchment. The Court did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond its application of the statutory amendment and existing Supreme Court authority (Pushpa Srivastava) to the facts before it.
By the Court:— This instant special appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 24 July 1992, passed by a learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 7801 of 1990.
2. The relevant facts necessary for the disposal of the special appeal are stated.
3. Rajeev Kumar Srivastava, hereinafter called the respondent, preferred a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging alleged oral termination of his service by the appellants on the ground that they have not” done so in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondent claimed that he is a workman as stipulated under the Industrial Disputes Act, that since 12 June 1989, the respondent had been working in the Life Insurance Corporation as a clerk and he had been getting salary as such as a daily-rated employee up to the month of June 1990, that the respondent is getting salary from appellant 2, after getting applications from him. Some of the applications and vouchers had been attached as Annexures 1 to 6 to the writ petition. The respondent claimed that he worked satisfactorily and as a workman who had worked for longer period than 240 days in a year he could not have been retrenched because of the provisions of Ss. 2(oo), 25F, 25G and 25H of Industrial Disputes Act. The respondent also claimed that his employment on contract basis is wholly one sided and like other regular employees of Class III of the Corporation, he is also entitled to equal pay for equal work. The alleged retrenchment was, therefore, challenged on the ground that the provisions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act having not been followed the same is bad and illegal, that when sanctioned post is available the respondent could not have been retrenched and that oral termination is arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. The respondent, therefore, claimed the relief that a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued commanding the opposite parties not to dispense with the respondent's service on the post of clerk and to treat him as a regular employee on the said post and to pay equal salary for equal work as if the respondent was a regular employee. A writ of certiorari to quash the oral order of termination of the respondent was also prayed for.
4. The Life Insurance Corporation contested the petitioner's case. It filed a counter-affidavit. The stand taken in the counter-affidavit was that the respondent was engaged on contract basis at Rs. 40 per day for doing the given work for fixed period. Reference was made to Annexures 1, 3 and 5 to the writ petition wherein the respondent himself had confirmed that he worked on contract basis. It was said that Industrial Disputes Act will not be applicable in this case as the respondent was engaged on purely contract basis. It was further asserted that the respondent was given office work on contract basis on different occasions wherever there was a need for taking such work and he was paid salary as a daily-rated contract employee. It was admitted that after 1 July 1990, the petitioner was not given any work since there was no work to be performed in the appellant's office on contract basis. It was also alleged in the counter-affidavit that on similar terms and conditions Sushil Mishra, Purshottam Singh and Chhitij Shukla mentioned in Para 11 of the writ petition worked for fixed number of days but none of these persons are continuing to work in the Corporation. The status of the respondent as a workman was strongly refuted. It was asserted that work on contract basis as was done by the respondent did not attract the provisions of Ss. 2(oo), 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was said that when the respondent's work was on contract basis, he could not be said to have been retrenched. The stand of the Corporation had been that it has statutory powers to make temporary and regular appointment under the Life Insurance Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1960. The procedure for making regular appointment is entirely different to that of temporary appointment and the respondent is free to apply either to temporary or for regular appointment in the clerical cadre whenever there is vacancy provided he fulfils the terms and conditions for the said appointment. Annexure 1 with supporting vouchers and the respondent's applications stating therein that he has done clerical work on contractual basis were also filed.
5. The petitioner-respondent filed rejoinder-affidavit. In the rejoinder-affidavit mainly the allegations of the writ petition were reiterated. It was also submitted that the Corporation has no power under its (Staff) Regulations to keep a person on contract basis.
6. The writ petition was heard by learned Single Judge of this Court. He has been pleased to allow the writ petition by judgment, dated 24 July 1992. It is against this judgment, that this special appeal has been preferred.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
8. The submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Single Judge has wrongly held that the Life Insurance Corporation of India is governed by the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and the petitioner comes within the definition of “a workman” as given under the definition clause of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. He has further submitted that cessation of the Service of the petitioner cannot be regulated by the provisions of S. 6N of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. It was also urged that no permission of the State Government is necessary and that the petitioner's non-engagement on contractual basis after the period of engagement came to an end does not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. The learned counsel submitted that the Life Insurance Corporation is a Corporation established under S. 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, and as per definition given in S. 2(a) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the appropriate Government is the Central Government. According to the learned counsel the petitioner's case is not covered by S. 2(oo) of the said Act. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to annexures attached with the writ petition as well as annexures attached with the counter-affidavit to point out that it is the own admission of the respondent that he worked on contract basis for fixed period on daily wages. For each day's work, the respondent as per contract was paid Rs. 40 and whenever the work came to an end the petitioner ceased to function. Thus the learned counsel pointed out that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is untenable under Law. The appellant's counsel has drawn our attention to a Division Bench decision of this Court passed in Re: Ashok Kumar Singh v. Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation, Kanpur [Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 3583 of 1988] alongwith several other writ petitions. With reference to the said judgment it has been urged that because of the undertaking given before the National Industrial Tribunal that the Corporation should not make regular appointments till the hearing and disposal of the reference, from the open market, the Corporation had been taking work on contract basis. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on a judgment in Director, Institute of Management Development, Uttar Pradesh v. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava [1992 — II L.L.N 863]. The learned counsel submits that in the said case it has been firmly laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court that where the appointment is purely on ad hoc basis and is contractual and by efflux of time, the appointment comes to an end, the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the post. This is so even if, the person is continued from time to time on ad hoc basis for more than a year he cannot claim regularisation in service on the basis that he was appointed on ad hoc basis for more than a year. He has thus urged that the impugned judgment of learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside and the appeal be allowed.
9. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the judgment does substantial justice between the parties. He has submitted that even if the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act do not not apply the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act do apply and the conditions laid down in the Central Act also impose the same conditions which are contained in Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. As such the cessation of petitioner's work does amount to retrenchment. Hence the action of the appellants to discontinue the respondent's service without following the procedure envisaged in the Central Act has rightly been struck down. In support of his submission the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment reported in Hindustan Steel, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Orissa [1976 — II L.L.N 479]. The learned counsel says that in this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken into account the provisions of Ss. 2(oo) and 25 F and has held that automatic termination of service on efflux of contractual period amounts to retrenchment and non-compliance of provisions 25 F is fatal. The learned counsel has urged that the facts apply with full force to the facts of the present case and the respondent who is workman cannot be deprived benefit of his employment on the ground that he was merely working on contract basis for fixed period.
10. We have considered the above submission of the learned counsel for the parties.
11. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge goes to show that while adjudicating the case of the parties he was of the view that the case is governed by the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and the petitioner is governed by the definition of “workman” as given in definition clause of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. This position may be clarified. Life Insurance Corporation of India is a Corporation established under S. 3 of Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956). The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in S. 2(a) provides as under:
“2 Definition — In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.
(a) ‘appropriate Government’ means —
(i) in relation to any industrial disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government (Not relevant)….. or the Life Insurance Corporation of India established under S. 3 of Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956) …. (Not relevant) …. Central Government and
(ii) in relation to any other industrial disputes, the State Government;
12. The above definition clearly makes out that in an industrial dispute concerning Life Insurance Corporation the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act will apply and not the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act.
13. Thus the benefit of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act as given by the learned Single Judge to the respondent proceeds on wrong assumption and is rendered unsustainable.
14. The above conclusion leads us to consider as to whether corresponding provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, can be applied to the facts of the present case of the respondent. The respondent's engagement appears to have been done on contract basis by the Life Insurance Corporation of India on daily remuneration from time to time. The Annexures which have been attached by the respondent himself with the writ petition and also those which have been filed as annexures alongwith the counter-affidavit go to establish that the respondent performed the clerical work on contract basis. The Annexures 1, 3 as well as Annexure 5 attached with the writ petition are respondent's application of wages of the days he rendered service. In these applications he had claimed payment for clerical work done on contract basis. The applications begin with a reference in which the above words have been used. The certificate given by the Office Superintendent on these applications also stats that the respondent has worked on contractual basis. The vouchers identically say the same. Thus clearly it is a case where the petitioner was engaged by the Life Insurance Corporation to do clerical work on contract basis from time to time. It is also admitted by the Life Insurance Corporation in its counter-affidavit that the petitioner ceased to work on contract basis from 1 July 1990, as there was no work in the office to be done on contract basis. Now it has to be seen whether automatic cessation of respondents employment on contractual basis by efflux of contractual period amounts to retrenchment as contained in the Industrial Disputes Act and as has been held in the case of Hindustan Steel, Ltd. [1976 — II L.L.N 479], or not.
15. This leads us to consider the definition of “retrenchment” as given in S. 2(oo) under the Industrial Disputes Act. The said definition is quoted below:
“2(oo) ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include:
(a) Voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill health.
16. Clause (bb) in the above definition was added by Act 49 of 1984. It came in force on 18 August 1984. The judgment of Hindustan Steel, Ltd., [1976 — II L.L.N 479] (vide supra), was rendered before addition of the above Cl.(bb) in the above definition of retrenchment. Thus what was held in the decision of Hindustan Steel, Ltd. (vide supra), cannot now be taken as the determining factor to the facts of the present case. Here the petitioner's case as per his own admission is a termination of his service as a result of non-renewal of the contract of the respondent by the employer. It has been stated in the counter-affidavit that there was no work available on which respondent could be kept. The newly added Cl.(bb) to the definition of retrenchment saves the stand of the Life Insurance Corporation that it is not a case of retrenchment of the respondent. We hold accordingly.
17. The next submission of the learned counsel of the appellants is that the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Director, Institute of Management Development Uttar Pradesh [1992 — II L.L.N 863] (vide supra), determines the case of the parties may be seen. In this case Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where the appointment is purely on ad hoc basis and is contractual and by efflux of time the appointment comes to an end the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the said post. We have considered the submissions. The ratio of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court leaves no room for doubt that the petitioner's contractual employment on daily payment basis having come to end by efflux of time, does not amount to retrenchment. Thus the provision of S. 25F of Industrial Disputes Act is also not attracted.
18. For the reason stated above we allow the special appeal. The impugned judgment of learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and we accordingly set it aside. The result is that the writ petition fails.
19. We, however, take a sympathetic view as has been done in the case of Director, Director, Institute Of Management Development, U.P v. Pushpa Srivastava (Smt). [1992 — II L.L.N 863] (vide supra), and say that it will be open to the appellants to engage the petitioner in service if they desire, and this judgment will not come into the way of their taking into consideration the petitioner's engagement on Class III post.
20. No costs.
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