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Sant Ram Agarwal v. Civil Judge, Mohanlal Ganj, Lucknow And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition challenges an order dated 3-10-1992 in Civil Appeal No. 107 of 1990 (Sant Ram Agarwal v. Smt. Ram Dei and others), which rejected the petitioner's application (No. 27-A) to amend his written statement in Suit No. 29 of 1987. Suit No. 29 of 1987 had been decided by the learned Munsiff (South, Lucknow) on 26-7-1990. The amendment application was made at the hearing of the appeal and sought to add 18 paragraphs to the written statement.
The underlying factual dispute in Suit No. 29 of 1987 (brought by present opposite parties 2 to 4) alleged that on the night of 24-25 December 1986 the petitioner blocked the main door of premises No. 86/248 Ka Mohalla Kurmi Tola Lal Kunwan Lucknow, converted a 13' x 12' area in front of the door into a room with an exit door fixed in it, and thereby took forcible possession of the land in front of that door. Relief sought included demolition of the alleged illegal construction and mandatory and permanent injunctions restraining encroachment.
The petitioner had earlier (in 1982) filed Suit No. 139 of 1982 against different defendants (Ashok Kumar Yadav and Som Prakash Yadav) seeking a permanent injunction in relation to premises No. 86/248 (old No. 110). That suit was decreed in the petitioner's favour by judgment dated 28-1-1985. By the amendment now sought in the appeal arising from Suit No. 29 of 1987, the petitioner sought to incorporate facts relating to the earlier Suit No. 139 of 1982.
Opposite parties 2 and 3 filed objections to the amendment application in the appeal, contending that the amendment sought raised a fresh defence which could have been taken earlier, that it was belated, and that it would cause harassment and require fresh trial. The learned Civil Judge (Mohanlal Ganj) rejected the amendment application on 3-10-1992 on two main grounds: (1) the averments sought by amendment had no relation to the averments and relief claimed in Suit No. 29 of 1987 (i.e., it would introduce a new case), and (2) the application was highly belated with no satisfactory explanation for the delay and no commonality between the two suits.
A writ petition under Article 226 was filed challenging that order. The High Court heard counsel for the petitioner and for opposite parties 2 and 3, considered the authorities cited by both sides, and ultimately dismissed the writ petition with costs, discharging the interim order earlier granted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the amendment to the written statement (seeking to add 18 paragraphs at the appellate stage) should have been permitted, particularly given allegations that it was belated and sought to introduce a new case not connected with the pleadings in Suit No. 29 of 1987.
- Whether the principle of adopting a "liberal view" in allowing amendments (as stated in several Supreme Court decisions) applies when the amendment is alleged to change the nature of the defence, when facts were already within the knowledge of the applicant, or when there is an allegation of mala fide conduct or design to delay.
- Whether documentary material said to be on the record (relating to an earlier suit) can substitute for proper pleadings and thereby justify the belated amendment without oral evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner argued that established Supreme Court and High Court decisions require a liberal approach to permitting amendments; merits of the proposed amendment should not be considered at the leave stage but only at final trial.
- Documents related to Suit No. 139 of 1982 (including a Commissioner's report dated 24-3-1982 and the judgment of 28-1-1985) were already on the record in Suit No. 29 of 1987, and therefore the amendment simply supplied relevant averments that should have been permitted.
- It was alleged in the writ petition that necessary averments were omitted earlier due to the immaturity of the advocate who initially conducted the suit; after engaging a Senior Advocate, the application for amendment was moved on his advice.
- At the hearing before the High Court, counsel for the petitioner also stated that, if the amendment were allowed, the petitioner would not lead any oral evidence, suggesting reliance on the already-filed documents.
Opposite Parties 2 and 3 — Arguments
- The opposite parties contended that the application for amendment sought to introduce a fresh defence that could and should have been taken earlier and therefore could not be permitted at such a belated stage.
- They argued the application was made with mala fide intent to delay and to harass the respondents by dragging them into unnecessary litigation that would require fresh trial.
- They pointed to an internal inconsistency: paragraph 19 of the application for amendment (filed earlier) averred that omission was by mistake and unintentional, whereas the writ petition later alleged immaturity of the previous advocate; this inconsistency undermined the petitioner's explanation for delay.
- They further argued that there was no identity of parties nor any commonality between Suit No. 139 of 1982 and Suit No. 29 of 1987, and therefore documents from the earlier suit could not bind or prejudice them.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1971 SC 361 — Mohd. Mustapha v. Sri Abu Baker | Cited for the general proposition that amendments should not be refused on technical grounds and that courts should adopt a liberal approach to allowing amendments. | The High Court acknowledged this line of authority but held that it was not dispositive because the amendment in the present case would change the nature of the defence, was belated, and the petitioner had not provided a satisfactory explanation for delay; therefore the liberal principle did not mandate allowing the amendment. |
| AIR 1969 SC 1267 — Jaijai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply Gurgaon | Cited as part of the Supreme Court authority endorsing a liberal view in permitting amendments and emphasizing that rules of procedure are aids to justice. | The court accepted the general principle from the Supreme Court decisions but concluded that exceptions (mala fide conduct, prejudice to the other side, or change in nature of case) applied in the present facts, justifying refusal of amendment. |
| AIR 1978 SC 484 — M/S Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram | Cited to support the proposition that courts should generally allow amendments unless there is mala fide conduct or injustice to the opponent that cannot be compensated by costs. | The High Court noted the principle but found the present case fell within exceptions (belated application, facts within the applicant's knowledge, and potential prejudice), and therefore the amendment was properly refused. |
| AIR 1983 SC 319 | Cited among Supreme Court authorities that articulate the liberal approach to amendments; specific case name not given in the opinion text. | The court treated the authority as part of the body of Supreme Court jurisprudence favoring liberal amendments, but distinguished its application because of the factual findings that the amendment would introduce a new case and was belated. |
| (1991) 1 All Rent Cas 480 — Gauri Bala Dutta v. III Addl. Civil Judge, Varanasi | A single-judge decision of the High Court cited as an instance applying the liberal approach to allowing amendments at the appellate stage. | The High Court observed such local authority but did not consider it sufficient to overturn the learned Civil Judge's exercise of discretion where the latter had found the amendment to be belated and unrelated to the suit's pleaded case. |
| (1992) (i) All WC 154 | Cited by opposite parties for the proposition that amendments may be refused if there is mala fide delay or if the facts sought to be added were always within the applicant's knowledge. | The High Court regarded these single-judge authorities as supporting the refusal to allow amendment where delay and knowledge of facts were established and applied that reasoning to uphold the lower court's order. |
| (1992) (i) All WC 393 | Cited for the same proposition: refusal of amendment where mala fide conduct or unexplained delay is shown. | The court treated this decision as corroborative of the principle that an applicant who has not explained delay or whose conduct suggests intent to delay is not entitled to relief; the High Court applied that reasoning in the present case. |
| (1992) (iii) All WC 1578 | Cited as authority stating that liberal principles do not apply where the amendment will change the nature of the defence or will introduce a new cause of action. | The High Court relied on this premise to conclude that the 'liberal view' was not applicable once the learned Civil Judge found the amendment would change the defence's nature; accordingly, refusal was proper. |
| 1984 All WC 600 (also cited with 1986 All LJ 359) | High Court single-judge authority cited for the proposition that amendments may be refused when facts were always within knowledge of the applicant and no explanation for delay is furnished. | The court regarded these authorities as consistent with refusing belated amendments premised on facts already known to the applicant, and applied that approach to the case at hand. |
| 1984 All WC 798 : AIR 1984 All 293 | Cited by opposite parties as a further local authority holding that amendment can be refused when intended to delay proceedings or cause prejudice, and where the court below recorded that amendment would alter the case. | The High Court noted that these decisions had considered the Supreme Court authorities and concluded that, where the court below had recorded such findings, the principle of liberal amendment did not override those findings; the present order was not disturbed. |
| 1978 All WC 452 : 1978 All LJ 422 | Cited for the proposition that amendments should be refused when they amount to a change of case and would cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. | The High Court accepted that this line supports the denial of amendment in circumstances where the amendment would substantially alter the defence or require a new trial, and applied that rationale to uphold the impugned order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The High Court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner, applying the legal principles cited by both sides to the material facts:
- The court first recited the two grounds relied upon by the learned Civil Judge to refuse the amendment: (a) the amendment was belated (moved at the hearing of the appeal) and no satisfactory explanation for delay was offered in the application, and (b) the amendment sought to introduce averments that had no relation to the averments and relief claimed in Suit No. 29 of 1987 (i.e., it would introduce a new case and change the nature of the defence).
- The High Court examined the petitioner's explanations for delay. The application itself averred that omission to state the relevant facts was a mistake and unintentional; in the writ petition the petitioner alleged the omission resulted from the immaturity of the advocate who originally conducted the suit and that, on the advice of a subsequently engaged Senior Advocate, the amendment application was moved. The court found this explanation inconsistent and unpersuasive (noting it was "uncharitable" for a later advocate to describe the earlier one as immature) and that no satisfactory explanation for the delay was provided in the original amendment application.
- The court emphasized the lack of commonality between the two suits: the earlier Suit No. 139 of 1982 involved different parties (Ashok Kumar Yadav and Som Prakash Yadav) and related to premises described as 86/248 (old No. 110), whereas the second suit concerned premises No. 86/248 Ka and involved different parties (including opposite parties 2 and 3). Thus the High Court found no identity of parties and no necessary commonality of subject matter between the suits.
- The court addressed the petitioner's contention that documents from the earlier suit (plaint, written statement, judgment, Commissioner's report) were already on the record of Suit No. 29 of 1987 and that therefore permitting the amendment would not require oral evidence. The High Court held that mere filing of the earlier judgment or documents did not obviate the need for proper pleadings; oral or documentary evidence not connected to the pleadings deserved to be ignored for purposes of framing the issues. The earlier suit's pleadings and judgment could not bind the present opposite parties who were not parties to that earlier suit.
- Weighing the authorities: the High Court acknowledged the Supreme Court authorities advocating a liberal view in allowing amendments (i.e., amendments should not be refused on technical grounds and must be allowed unless mala fide or causing uncompensable injury). However, it also considered High Court single-judge authorities cited by opposite parties emphasizing refusal where amendments are mala fide, belated, based on facts long within the applicant's knowledge, or would change the nature of the defence. Given the specific factual findings below (belatedness, lack of explanation, absence of commonality, and that the amendment would change the nature of the defence), the High Court concluded the exceptions to the liberal rule applied.
- The court therefore concluded that the learned Civil Judge had exercised judicial discretion properly, applying settled principles concerning amendments. The High Court found the amendment was clearly belated, the facts sought to be introduced had been within the applicant's knowledge, and the amendment appeared moved with a design to delay the proceedings. On these bases the High Court found no error in the impugned order and declined to interfere.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition under Article 226 is dismissed. The High Court upheld the order dated 3-10-1992 refusing the amendment application.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The learned Civil Judge's refusal to permit the petitioner to amend his written statement (Application No. 27-A) in the appeal arising from Suit No. 29 of 1987 is affirmed. The amendment will not be allowed; the writ petition is dismissed with costs, and the interim order earlier granted is discharged.
- Precedential effect: The opinion applies established principles about allowing amendments (the general "liberal view") but emphasizes recognized exceptions (mala fide conduct, belatedness without satisfactory explanation, amendment changing nature of defence, lack of commonality). The opinion does not purport to announce a new legal principle; it applies settled law to the facts and therefore does not set out any novel precedent beyond its factual application.
Disposition: Petition dismissed (with costs); interim order discharged.
1. This petition is directed against an order dated 3-10-1992, passed in Civil Appeal No. 107 of 1990 Sant Ram Agarwal v. Smt. Ram Dei and others. The petitioner had filed an application numbered as 27-A and sought amendment in the written statement, filed by him in suit No, 229 of 1987. The said application for amendment was rejected by the aforesaid order dated 3-10-1992.
2. It may also be relevant to indicate that suit No. 29 of 1987 was decided by the learned Munsiff, South, Lucknow on the 26th of July, 1990. The application for amendment was moved at the time of the hearing of the appeal arising from the judgment in the said suit. By the said application for amendment 18 paragraphs were sought to be added to the written statement.
3. Present opposite parties 2 to 4 had filed suit No. 29 of 1987 on the allegation that in the night intervening 24-25 December, 1986 the petitioner had blocked main door of premises No. 86/248 Ka Mohalla Kurmi Tola Lal Kunwan Lucknow and had covered the area measuring 13' x 12' situated in front of the aforesaid door into a room and has fixed exit door in it. The allegation further was that the petitioner took forcible possession over the land situate in front of the aforesaid door in illegal manner. On these facts opposite parties 2 to 4 prayed relief of mandatory injunction, directing the petitioner to demolish and to removed illegal construction made by him in front of the exit door of premises No. 86/248 Ka and further for a decree for permanent injunction, restraining the petitioner from making any encroachment for construction over the land situate in front of this exit door.
4. Earlier the petritioner had filed suit No. 139 of 1982 in the Court of Munsif South Lucknow against Ashok Kumar Yadav S/o late Ram Prasad Yadav and Som Prakash Yadav s/o Badloo Ram Yadav praying relief for permanent injunction, restraining them from taking forcible possession over the premises No. 86/248 having old No. 110.
5. Present opposite parties 2 and 3 are the widow and son of late Badloo Ram Yadav. By the amendments the petitioner sought to incorporate facts leading to the possession in suit No. 139 of 1982. The said suit was decreed in favour of the petitioner who was plaintiff in the said suit by a judgment dated 28th January, 1985.
6. That on behalf of the present opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 objections were filed to the application for amendment. It was pleaded in the said objection that the appellant/ defendants wanted to take a fresh defence which he could not take earlier before the lower Court and was not legally entitled to do same at a very belated stage. It was also pleaded that the appellant-defendants wanted to harass the respondent-Landlord by dragging them in an unnecessary litigation by the amendment sought which requires fresh trial and thus would not be permitted under law.
7. The learned Civil Judge Mohanlal Ganj by an order dated 3-10-1992 rejected the said application for amendment on the ground that the averments sought to be incorporated by way of amendment in the written statement has no relation with the averments and relief claimed in suit No. 29 of 1987. The application was also rejected on the ground of being highly belated. It held that no explanation has been offered for the delay and the averments sought to be incorporated by way of amendment are not such as were not within the knowledge of the appellant, the present petitioner. It also held that there was no commonalty between the two suits.
8. A counter-affidavit on behalf of opposite parties 2 and 3 was filed in reply to the averments in the writ petition and the petitioner had filed the rejoinder-affidavit.
9. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for opposite parties 2 and 3.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that in view of several Supreme Court decisions as also of this Court that a liberal view with regard to permitting amendment should be adopted. He urged that merits of the proposed amendment are not to be seen at the time of granting or refusing leave since they could only be adjudicated upon at the time of final trial.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that documents pertaining to filing of suit No. 139 of 1982 by the petitioner and a Commissioner's report dated 24th of March, 1982 were already on record of suit No. 29 of 1987 but the learned Munsif while deciding suit No. 29 of 1987 did not take the said documents into consideration in view of the fact that necessary averments had not been pleaded in the written statement.
12. In paragraph 20 of the writ petition it has been alleged that the necessary averments in the written statement could not be pleaded because of immaturity of the Advocate initially conducting the suit on behalf of the petitioner. It has been alleged that the petitioner engaged Senior Advocate to argue the appeal on his behalf and on his advice the application for amendment was moved.
13. The learned counsel for opposite parties 2 and 3 on this aspect of the matter has drawn attention to paragraph 19 of the amendment application, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure 13 to the writ petition.
In paragraph 19 aforesaid it has been averred
That the defendant/appellant could not state the above facts in the pleadings by mistake. The omission to state the above facts was unintentional.
14. The learned counsel for opposite parties 2 and 3 therefore submitted that the reason for seeking amendment now stated in the written statement is altogether different from that indicated in the application for amendment. The learned counsel for opposite parties 2 and 3 also submitted that there was no identity of the parties nor there was any commonalty between the two suits. He further urged that since the facts sought to be introduced had all along been in the knowledge of the petitioner and no attempt to explain the conduct as to why the amendment could not be sought earlier having been made, this conduct of the petitioner disentitles him to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.
15. Both the counsel have cited a few decisions to support their submissions which have been noted.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited the following decisions in support of his submission that a liberal view should be taken and an amendment even at the appellate stage should have been allowed. The decisions are :
(i) AIR 1971 SC 361, Mohd. Mustapha v. Sri Abu Baker and other; (ii) AIR 1969 SC 1267, Jaijai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply Gurgaon; (iii) AIR 1978 SC 484, M/S Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram .; (iv) AIR 1983 SC 319; (v) (1991) 1 All Rent Cas 480, Gauri Bala Dutta v. III Addl., Civil Judge, Varanasi.
17. The first-four decisions are by the Apex Court while 5th decision is by a learned single Judge of this Court. It is not necessary to analyse in detail of the aforesaid decisions.
18. The principle that emerges as laid down from the said decisions is that amendment should not be refused on technical ground. It is the discretion of the Court before whom the application for amendment comes up. Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of the justice, parties should not be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always give leave to amend the pleading of the party unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide or that by his blunder he has caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated by an order of costs. The proposed amendment even if belated may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to other side. It has also been laid down that party should not be allowed by means of an amendment to set up a new cause of action particularly when a suit on the new case or cause of action is barred by time.
19. The learned counsel for opposite parties 2 and 3 on the other hand, cited the following decisions :
(i) (1992) (i) All WC 154; (ii) (1992) (i) All WC 393; (iii) (1992) (iii) All WC 1578; (iv) 1984 All WC 600 : (1986 All LJ 359); (v) 1984 All WC 798 : (AIR 1984 All 293); (vi) 1978 All WC 452 : (1978 All LJ 422).
All the aforesaid decisions are by a learned single Judge of this Court. The decisions of the Supreme Court, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, have also been referred to and considered in these decisions. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are specifically on the ground whether amendment of pleadings should be refused if there is mala fide design to delay the proceedings and if the facts sought to be introduced had all along been in the knowledge of the appellant and no attempt to explain the conduct as to why the amendment could not be sought earlier is a conduct which disentitles the petitioner to the discretionary relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It was also held that principle of 'liberal view' would not be applicable if the Court below had recorded a finding that amendment will change the nature of the defence.
20. Now the said proposition of law may be considered in the light of the facts of the instant case. As noted hereinabove the learned Civil Judge Mohanlal Ganj in his order which has been impugned in the writ petition has given two reasons for rejecting the amendment application. First that the amendment application is belated one as it has been filed at a stage at the time of the hearing of the appeal for which no reason has been mentioned in the application. Secondly, held that the amendment seeks to introduce a new case. He held that the facts now sought to be averred by the amendment were well within the knowledge of the petitioner-applicant. The only reason indicated in the application for delay was that due to mistake that the facts could not be averred in the written statement. In the present writ petition it has been averred that the said facts could not be pleaded in the written statement because of the immaturity of his advocate. Evidently no such ground had been taken in the application for amendment. It is uncharitable for an Advocate engaged later to say that the previous advocate was immature. Be that as it may. The fact remains that the amendment was sought at a belated stage viz. at the time of the hearing of the appeal. The facts now sought to be introduced pertain to an earlier litigation in suit No. 139 of 1982 between the petitioner and Ashok Kumar Yadav and Som Prakash Yadav sons of Ram Prasad Yadav. Ram Prasad Yadav is shown to be the brother of Badloo Ram Yadav, husband of opposite party No. 2 and uncle of opposite party No. 3. The said suit evidently was not between the same parties as in the present petition and suit No. 29 of 1987. The other suit No. 139 of 1982 also was not in respect of the premises which was subject matter of the second suit. The premises which were the subject matter of the first suit were 86/ 248 while in second suit they are in respect of premises No. 86/248 Ka. Thus there is no commonalty between the two suits.
21. It has been averred in para 20 of the writ petition that the documents pertaining to suit No. 139 of 1982 and the judgment dated 28th of January 1985 in the said suit were filed in suit No. 29 of 87. It is settled principle of law that oral or documentary evidence not connected with the pleadings of the parties deserves to be ignored. The petitioner is trying to fill up the lacuna in the pleadings in his written statement in the later stage.
22. Sri R. C. Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that in the event the amendment is allowed the petitioner will not lead any oral evidence. The copy of the plaint of the first suti as also the written statement and the judgment rendered in the said suit as also the report of the Commissioner were already on record. This plea has also been taken in ground 'B' in the writ petition. I am not impressed with the same, since earlier suit was not between the parties and did not pertain to the same premises. The judgment in the earlier suit was also on the basis of the evidence, adduced in the said suit. Mere filing of the judgment will not prove anything in relation to the issues involved in the second suit. The pleadings in the written statement of the first suti cannot bind the present opposite parties 2 and 3. They were not parties to the said suit. Considering all these aspects of the matter I do not find any good reason to interfere with the order, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Mohanlal Ganj, Lucknow in his order dated 3-10-92 Annexure-1.
23. Even if the principle of liberal view is adopted in view of the finding that the amendment will change nature of the defence it must be held that the principle of adopting liberal view will not be applicable and the petitioner has not succeeded in making out of a case under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Civil Judge has exercised his discretion judicially and has applied the settled principle governing disposal of an application for amendment. The facts sought to be introduced had alt along been in the knowledge of the applicant. The amendment is clearly belated and has been moved with a design to delay the proceedings. Refusal to allow the amendment by the learned Civil Judge cannot be said to be in any manner erroneous in law.
24. In the light of the discussion herein-above the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. The interim order passed earlier is discharged.
25. Petition dismissed.
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