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Basant Prasad Srivastava And Others v. State Of U.P And Others

Allahabad High Court

May 7, 1993

Judgment

Subsequent
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 11 March 1993 of a learned single Judge dismissing three writ petitions concerning the election and constitution of the Committee of Management of Sri Gandhi Smarak Uchchtar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Kauriya, Azamgarh.

Key factual and procedural events (as recorded in the opinion):

Elections for the Committee were held on 10 June 1986 for a three-year term. There was a dispute about who was properly elected Manager: Basant Prasad Srivastava (appellant No.1) claimed he was duly elected, but the District Inspector of Schools (D.I.O.S) attested the signature of Rajesh Singh as Manager, prompting Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23221 of 1987 by Basant Prasad Srivastava.
Writ Petition No. 23221 of 1987 was dismissed as infructuous on 31 July 1991 because the Committee's term had expired; the Court directed the D.I.O.S to hold fresh elections within three months.
In compliance, the D.I.O.S issued an election schedule on 10 January 1992 with a voters' list of 70 members prepared using 31 July 1991 as the cut-off date for enrolment. Several persons objected to the voters' list and filed a writ petition which was summarily dismissed on 23 January 1992, with the Court directing that objections be decided by the D.I.O.S.
The D.I.O.S. issued a further order on 24 January 1992 adding 45 names to the list; some objections led the Associate D.I.O.S (Election Officer) on 27 January 1992 to exclude those 45 names. On the scheduled election date (27 January 1992) disturbances led to postponement pending finalisation of the voters' list.
Two writ petitions (No. 4093 of 1992 and No. 3949 of 1992) then raised the central question of which cut-off date governed enrolment for the voters' list: 31 July 1991 (date of earlier order), 10 January 1992 (date of election schedule), or a third date mentioned in proceedings. A common judgment on 25 February 1992 directed the D.I.O.S to decide all claims after hearing and finalise the voters' list within specified time limits, leading to fresh election scheduling on 25 February 1992.
Three new writ petitions (Nos. 19469, 1977 and 21832 of 1992) challenged the validity of the voters' list produced pursuant to the 25 February 1992 schedule. An interim order dated 2 June 1992 did not stay the holding of the election but restrained giving effect to the result pending disposal of the writ petitions.
By a common judgment dated 11 March 1993 the learned single Judge dismissed these three writ petitions; this judgment is the subject of the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the High Court should entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the finalisation of the voters' list or other intermediate steps in an election process for constitution of a Committee of Management of an educational institution, or whether such disputes should be postponed until after the election is over.
What was the proper cut-off date for enrolment of members eligible to vote for the election — whether (a) the date the Committee's term expired (10 June 1989 implied by three-year term from 10 June 1986), (b) the date the Court directed the D.I.O.S to hold elections (31 July 1991 as the decision date of W.P. No. 23221 of 1987), or (c) the date the election schedule was published (10 January 1992)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellants submitted that the writ petitions did not involve the determination of disputed facts but raised a pure legal question as to the correct cut-off date for enrolment of members entitled to vote. They argued that the relevant date must be one of three identifiable dates and that membership as of those dates was a matter of record and not factual contention requiring trial.
On this basis, the appellants contended that the learned single Judge should have resolved the legal question rather than dismissing the writ petitions on the ground that they involved disputed factual issues inappropriate for writ adjudication at an intermediate stage of the electoral process.

The opinion does not set out detailed affirmative arguments presented by the respondents; only counsel for respondent No. 3 was noted as having been heard.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Desi Chettiar v. Chinnasami Chettiar, AIR 1928 Mad 1271	The inconvenience to public administration of allowing individual petitions to stall elections; courts should avoid holding up elections while individuals pursue personal grievances.	Cited to illustrate and support the proposition that individual grievances should not delay the election process and that courts should be cautious about intervening at intermediate stages.
N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64	Controversial matters and disputes arising out of elections should ordinarily be postponed until after the elections so that election proceedings are not unduly retarded or protracted; elections must be concluded according to schedule.	Relied on to reinforce the principle that courts should refrain from intervening during intermediate stages of elections and that disputes should be resolved post-election.
Nanhoo Mal v. Hira Mal, (1976) 3 SCC 211 : AIR 1975 SC 2140	The right to vote or stand for election is a creature of statute and is subject to statutory procedures; challenges to election offices are to be made by the procedure prescribed (e.g., by election petition) and general principles against intermediate interference apply equally to local bodies.	Applied to conclude that principles against intermediate-stage interference apply to elections of Committees of Management for educational institutions; supports that writ petitions were not the appropriate remedy at the intermediate stage.
S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1988 SC 616	Non-compliance with statutory provisions or rules by an election authority does not automatically vitiate an election; only if an election court finds that such non-compliance materially affected the election result can the election be declared void.	Invoked to show that alleged irregularities in the electoral process do not automatically render an election void and that such contentions are properly examined in an election petition or trial where material effect on the result can be assessed.
Committee of Management, Shri Radha Krishna Sanskrit Mahavidyaalaya, Deoria v. Deputy Director of Education, Gorakhpur (Special Appeal No. 406 of 1992, decided 7 Sep 1992)	Writ petitions under Article 226 should not be entertained at an intermediate stage of the election process for Committees of Management; disputed factual questions of membership cannot be resolved in writ jurisdiction at that stage.	Relied on by the Court as a directly comparable High Court authority applying the non-interference principle to elections for Committees of Management of educational institutions; used to justify dismissal of the appellants' writ petitions.
Hridaya Narain Rai v. Deputy Director of Education Vth Region, Varanasi, 1993 All WC 184	The principle that matters likely to vitiate an election should not be raised at intermediate stages is of general applicability (not confined to Representation of the People Act) and applies to Committee of Management elections; disputes about electoral rolls can be raised after the election, and challenges may be brought before civil courts or under statutory provisions (e.g., Section 16-A(7) of the Intermediate Education Act).	One of the Judges (R.A. Sharma, J.) applied these principles to similar facts; the present Court treated this authority as fully applicable and used it to support refusal to interfere at the intermediate stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate bench agreed with the learned single Judge's legal approach and reasoning. The Court's analysis proceeded along the following lines (as set out in the opinion):

Principle of non-interference at intermediate stages: The Court reiterated the well-established principle that courts should, as a rule, refrain from intervening during the conduct of elections and finalisation of voters' lists by means of writ jurisdiction (Art. 226). This principle aims to prevent undue delay or obstruction of public administration and the election process.
Nature of the dispute: Although appellants argued the dispute was purely legal — confined to identifying a single cut-off date for enrolment — the Court observed that interference at intermediate stages tends to cause practical problems (vacancy or wrongful occupation) and that disputes as to electoral rolls are typically contentious and involve factual determinations most suitably resolved in fora designated by statute or in civil/election proceedings after the election.
Availability of appropriate remedies: The Court emphasized that aggrieved persons have appropriate statutory or civil remedies to challenge an election after its conclusion (for example, by filing an election petition or a civil suit). It referred to precedents holding that the right to vote or hold office is statutory and subject to the remedies and procedures prescribed by law.
Materiality standard: Relying on S.T. Muthusami the Court noted that mere non-compliance with statutory provisions or rules does not automatically vitiate an election; only when non-compliance materially affects the result may an election be set aside. This supports deciding substantive electoral disputes in proceedings capable of full fact-finding rather than by interim writ intervention.
Precedential support: The Court explicitly cited several precedents (Desi Chettiar; N.P. Ponnuswami; Nanhoo Mal; S.T. Muthusami; and High Court decisions) to demonstrate that the foregoing principles are well established and applicable to elections to Committees of Management of educational institutions.
Conclusion on appellants' position: Given the above principles and the availability of post-election remedies, the Court held that the learned single Judge did not err in refusing to entertain the writ petitions at an intermediate stage and in directing that the election result be declared and appropriate steps taken in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Implications and direct consequences (as established by the opinion):

The judgments of the learned single Judge dismissing the three writ petitions challenging the voters' list and related intermediate election matters are affirmed.
The election process should be allowed to reach its logical conclusion — the result was to be declared and further steps taken in accordance with law (as directed by the single Judge and affirmed by this Court).
Aggrieved persons retain available post-election remedies (for instance, election petition or civil suit) to challenge alleged irregularities; only where non-compliance is shown to have materially affected the result may an election be set aside (as reflected in the cited authorities).
The Court noted no change in existing law; it applied established precedent and principles rather than laying down new law. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.

This summary is strictly confined to the facts, arguments, authorities, and reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts, inferences, or outside information have been introduced.

Show all summary ...

S.C Mathur, A.C.J:— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 11th March, 1993 passed by the learned single Judge whereby he dismissed three writ petitions relating to election dispute.

2. The dispute relates to constitution of Committee of Management of Sri Gandhi Smarak Uchchtar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Kauriya, district Azamgarh. Election for constituting the Committee was held on 10th June, 1986. The Committee elected on this date was to continue for a period of three years. According to one claim Shiv Prasad Singh was elected President and Basant Prasad Srivastava, appellant No. 1 was elected Manager. The District Inspector of Schools, for short D.I.O.S, instead of attesting the signatures of Basant Prasad Srivastava attested the signatures of Rajesh Singh as Manager. This led to the filing of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23221 of 1987 by Basant Prasad Srivastava. He asserted that he was the duly elected Manager and, therefore, his signature should have been attested by the D.I.O.S and not of Rajesh Singh. This writ petition remained pending for more than three years. It came up for hearing on 31st July, 1991 when it was dismissed as infructuous by D.P.S Chauhan, J. on the ground that the period for which the Committee had been elected had already expired. He, however, directed the D.I.O.S to get the elections held within three months. In view of the direction contained in this Court's order dated 31st July, 1991 the D.I.O.S took steps for holding elections. He issued election schedule on 10th January, 1992 enclosing there, with a list of 70 members of the Society who were entitled to vote at the election. This list appears to have been prepared taking 31st July, 1991 as the cut-off date for enrolment of members. 31st July, 1991 is the date on which Writ Petition No. 23221 of 1987 was decided. Jang Bahadur Singh, Rajesh Singh respondent No. 3 and others were dissatisfied with the voters' list enclosed with the election schedule dated 10th January, 1992. They accordingly filed a writ petition which was dismissed summarily by R.B Mehrotra, J. by his judgment and order dated 23rd January, 1992. The learned Judge observed that the election shall not be postponed but if any one raised grievance that his name had been wrongly excluded from the voters' list the same shall be decided by the D.I.O.S The D.I.O.S postponed the election and thereafter by order dated 24th January, 1992 he added the names of 45 persons to the voters' list and fixed 27th January, 1992 as the date for election. Against the inclusion of 45 names in the voters' list objections were filed by some members. The Associate District Inspector of Schools who was also the Election Officer by his order dated 27th January, 1992 excluded the names of the said 45 persons from the voters' list. On the date of election viz., 27th January, 1992 was disturbance at the site of elections and accordingly the polling was postponed till the list of eligible voters was finalised by the D.I.O.S or by the Court. This led to the filing of Writ Petition No. 4093 of 1992 by the Committee of Management and Basant Prasad Srivastava and Writ Petition No. 3949 of 1992 by Rajesh Singh and others. The claim in Writ Petition No. 4093 of 1992 was that the elections should be held on the basis of the voters' list dated 10th January, 1992 while the claim in Writ Petition No. 3949 of 1992 was that elections should be held on the basis of list dated 10th January, 1992 as amended by order dated 24th January, 1992. In these two petitions the question raised was as to what was the cut-off date for enrolment of members — (1) 31st July, 1991 when Writ Petition No. 23221 of 1987 was decided, or (2) 10th January, 1992 when election schedule was notified. Both the writ petitions were decided by a common judgment dated 25th February, 1992 by P.P Gupta, J. It appears from the judgment of P.P Gupta, J. that the D.I.O.S was not entertaining objections to the voters' list preferred by those who were not petitioners in the writ petitions filed before this Court. P.P Gupta, J. was of the opinion that those who were not petitioners before this Court were also entitled to prefer their objections before the D.I.O.S He accordingly directed the D.I.O.S to comply with this Court's order dated 23rd January, 1992 and decide the claims preferred not only by the petitioners of the writ petition in which the order dated 23rd January, 1992 was passed but also by others. The claims were directed to be decided by a reasoned order after giving opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties. The voters' list was directed to be finalised within one month from the date of production of a certified copy of the judgment before the D.I.O.S and the election was directed to be held within one week thereafter. In pursuance of this judgment claims were decided and fresh election schedule was announced on 25th February, 1992. This led to the filing of three writ petitions which have given rise to the present appeal. These three writ petitions are— 19469, 1977 and 21832 of 1992. In these three petitions again the validity of the voters' list has been challenged.

3. In the three writ petitions which have given rise to the present appeal an application was made for interim relief. By order dated 2 June, 1992 the holding of election was not stayed and it was provided that the result of the election shall not be given effect to and the election shall be subject to the result of the writ petition. The three writ petitions have been dismissed by a common judgment dated 11th March, 1993. This is the judgment which is the subject matter of the present appeal.

4. The learned single Judge has observed that it was well settled proposition of law that in proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution Courts should not interfere with election process and finalisation of list is not amenable to challenge in writ jurisdiction. It has also been observed that dispute regarding correctness of voters' list is a highly disputed question of fact which can be decided only by Civil Court. With these observations the learned single Judge directed that the result of the election be declared forthwith and further steps be taken in accordance with law.

5. In the present appeal we have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for respondent No. 3.

6. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the writ petition did not involve determination of any disputed fact. According to him the question for determination was as to what was the cut-off date for enrolment of members. It is submitted that there could be only one of the three alternative dates— (1) the date on which the term of the Committee elected on 10th June, 1986 expired; (2) the date on which the Court directed the D.I.O.S to hold election i.e 21st July, 1992 and (3) the date on which election schedule was published in compliance of Court's order dated 31st July, 1991 i.e 10th January, 1992. It is stated that membership on these three dates was known and on this there was no dispute. On this basis it is submitted that only a legal question was involved in the three writ petitions and, therefore, instead of dismissing the writ petitions on the ground that they involved determination of factual dispute the learned single Judge should have proceeded to decide the legal question.

7. In our opinion the judgment of the learned single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity. The election process having started it must come to its logical conclusion. Once it has to its logical conclusion by declaration of result of the election the aggrieved person may challenge the election by filing election petition or civil suit in accordance with law. In such a proceeding the election may not be set aside if the alleged illegality or irregularity has not materially affected the result of the election. Approach to Court at intermediate stages in the election is bound to result in an office either remaining vacant or being occupied by a person whose entitlement to hold the office has ceased. Neither is a happy situation. It is, therefore, desirable that the election process should end as early as possible and the declaration of result should not be deferred through repeated interim orders passed from time to time. In taking this view we have the support of authorities which may be immediately noticed.

8. In Desi Chettiar v. Chinnasami Chettiar, AIR 1928 Mad 1271 the Madras High Court observed:

“It is clear that there is another side of the question to be considered, namely, the inconvenience to the public administration of having elections and the business of Local Boards held up while individuals prosecute their individual grievances. We understand the election for the elective seats in this Union has been held up since 31st May because of this petition, the result being that the electors have been unable since then to have any representation on the Board, and the Board is, functioning, if indeed it is functioning, with a mere nominated fraction of its total strength; and this state of affairs the petitioner proposes to have continued until his own personal grievance is satisfied.

9. The above view of the Madras High Court was referred to with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in N.P Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64. In this case their Lordships have observed thus (at p. 70 of AIR):

“Having regard to the important functions which the legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognised to be a matter of first importance that elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time schedule and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted.”

10. In Nanhoo Mal v. Hira Mal, (1976) 3 SCC 211 : AIR 1975 SC 2140 their Lordships after referring to the judgment of the Madras High Court in Desi Chettiar (AIR 1928 Mad 1271) and their own judgment in Punnuwami's case (AIR 1952 SC 64) (supra) concluded as follows:

“In absence of any express provisions in the Act to the contrary these principles are applicable equally to cases of elections to local bodies also.”

11. It has also been laid down that the right to vote or stand as a candidate to the election is not a civil right but is a creature of the statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it.

12. In paragraph 5 of the report it has been observed:

“It follows that the right to vote or stand for election to the office of the President of the Municipal Board is a creature of the statute, that is, U.P Municipalities Act and it must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. Therefore, the election to the office of the President could be challenged only according to the procedure prescribed by that Act and that is by means of an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of the Act and in no other way.”

13. The dispute in Nanhoo Mal's case ((1976) 3 SCC 211 : AIR 1975 SC 2140) (supra) related to the office of the President of the Municipal Board, Soron in the district of Etah in the State of Uttar Pradesh. However, the observations made in the judgment are of general application and are not confined to elections to the legislature and local bodies. The principles laid d own in this case are fully applicable to the case on hand.

14. In S.T Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1988 SC 616 it has been observed in paragraph 4 of the report at page 620:

“……… Even if there is any mistake committed by either the election authority or the Returning Officer in the allotment of symbol to the appellant the said mistake can only amount to a non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. It is clear from Cl. (c) of R. 11 of the Rules made for the purpose of providing a machinery for the decision of election disputes relating to panchayat union councils that every action amounting to such non-compliance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder would not automatically vitiate an election. It is only when the election Court on a consideration of the entire material placed before it at the trial of an election petition comes to the conclusion that the result of the election has been materially affected by such non-compliance with any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder the election of the returned candidate can be declared void……”

15. The appellant's writ petitions were not maintainable in view of the proposition laid down in this case also.

16. Special Appeal No. 406 of 1992, Committee of Management, Shri Radha Krishna Sanskrit Mahavidyaalaya, Deoria v. Deputy Director of Education, Gorakhpur, decided on 7th September, 1992 arose from a writ petition in which the validity of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education in respect of entitlement of a person to participate and vote in election for constituting Committee of Management of an educational institution was challenged. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground that a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained at an intermediate stage of an election process. Upholding the judgment of the learned single Judge the Division Bench observed as follows:

“In this State there are large number of educational institutions and the functioning of such institutions are controlled and managed by a Committee of Management. Such Committee is constituted under the rules, regulations or certain Administrative Schemes. The term of such Committee of Management is limited by time. The election process inter alia involves the determination of the members who can vote and participate in the election, nomination, preparation and publication of programme, scrutiny and declaration of result. In case, at the intermediate stage of the election process, the High Court entertained petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution it will further delay the election process. Secondly, the disputed question of fact as to who are the members and other related matters cannot be decided in the writ jurisdiction………….”

17. In Hridaya Narain Rai v. Deputy Director of Education Vth Region, Varanasi, 1993 All WC 184 it has been held by one of us (R.A Sharma, J.) as follows:

“The principles that any matter which has the effect of vitiating election should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before the Court and the person who is interested in challenging the election should wait till the election is over are the principles of general applicability not confined to the election under Representation of the People Act. As mentioned above, these principles have been applied by the Supreme Court to the elections to the local bodies. There is nothing in the Intermediate Education Act or the Scheme of Administration, framed thereunder which excludes the applicability of the aforesaid principles to the election of a Committee of Management of an educational institution. In view of the ratio laid down by Supreme Court in the case of Nanhoo Mal ((1976) 3 SCC 211 : AIR 1975 SC 2140) (supra) the above principles are fully applicable to the instant case also. Hence there cannot be any interference with the electoral process at the intermediate stage, by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

18. It has been settled by this Court more than once that election of the Committee of Management of an educational institution can be challenged before Civil Court. A dispute with respect to the management of such institution can also be agitated before Deputy Director of Education under Section 16-A(7) of the Intermediate Education Act and the decision of the Deputy Director given under the above provision is subject to the decision of a competent Court. Neither Intermediate Education Act nor the Scheme of Administration limits/restricts the ground on which the election of the Committee of Management can be challenged. Election of such a committee, as such, can be challenged, both on merits as well as on the ground that the persons who were not entitled to vote were permitted to vote or the persons who were entitled to vote were excluded. The order of any person or authority limiting the right to vote in the election to certain persons only is liable to be challenged, while challenging the election and competent authority or the Court can set aside the election of the Committee of Management on that ground. Under these circumstances it is not open to challenge any order at the intermediate stage. The position would have been different had the law excluded the challenge to the election on the ground of defective electoral roll. But, as mentioned above, this is not the position in the instant case.

19. This was also a case relating to the election for constituting a Committee of Management of an educational institution like the present one. The observations made in this judgment are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The learned single Judge has, therefore, rightly applied the law in dismissing the appellants' writ petitions. The special appeal, therefore, lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

20. The special appeal is accordingly dismissed but without any orders as to costs.

21. Appeal dismissed.