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Ramua Alias Ram Lal v. State Of U.P .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (B.L. Yadav, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant identified in the opinion as "Ramua altas Ram Lal" preferred a criminal appeal against his conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. (murder) with sentence of life imprisonment and under Section 20-I, I.P.C. with sentence of four years' rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were imposed by the learned Sessions Judge by judgment dated 10th May, 1983 in Sessions Trial No. 146 of 1982.
The prosecution, as set out in the First Information Report (Ext. ka-1) lodged by the appellant's father Tiju, alleged that the appellant had been living separately with his wife Smt. Suhagrani (deceased) and two sons. The deceased was reported missing for seven days. The prosecution alleged that on 9-6-1982 the appellant took his wife and two sons into the jungle at Pali on the pretext of collecting dried wood and murdered his wife with an axe (kulhari), leaving her body in the jungle; only some bones were thereafter recovered.
On 16-6-1982, on the appellant's pointing out (as alleged), certain articles were recovered: a blouse, glass bangles, hair, torn clothes and a dhoti containing blood stains (Ext. Ka-2), and some bones (Ext. Ka-3). There was no eye-witness to the killing except one child, Bihari (P.W.1), the appellant's son (about 3–4 years). The Sessions Judge certified that the child did not understand the sanctity of the oath and that he understood questions only with difficulty; oath was therefore not administered. Other prosecution witnesses included the informant (P.W.2 Teju/Tiju), the scribe of the FIR (P.W.3), the father of the deceased (P.W.4), the person before whom an alleged extra-judicial confession and pointing out were made (P.W.5 Gajendra Singh), P.W.6 Kashi Ram (a witness to recovery on pointing out), and P.W.7 Ram Karan Singh (Investigating Officer). The Sessions Judge relied upon these prosecution witnesses and convicted the appellant.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the testimony of the child witness (P.W.1 Bihari) was admissible and reliable for the purposes of convicting the appellant.
- Whether the pointing out by the accused and the subsequent recovery of the alleged weapon (kulhari) and other articles were admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
- Whether the circumstantial and recovery evidence (bones, clothes, bangles, etc.) without a recovered body or reliable proof that the recovered items belonged to the deceased suffices to prove the corpus delicti and sustain a conviction for murder.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Sri Prakash Chandra Srivastava)
- The only eye-witness was the appellant's young son (P.W.1), who the Sessions Judge found did not understand the sanctity of truth and could not be administered oath; his testimony was unreliable and contradicted on cross-examination.
- P.W.2 (the informant/father) was declared hostile and was not an eyewitness; P.W.3 (scribe of FIR) merely recorded that the daughter-in-law was missing.
- The purported pointing out and recovery (including the kulhari) cannot be proved under Section 27 of the Evidence Act because the appellant was not in police custody when the pointing out was made; therefore Section 27 does not apply.
- The recovered articles and bones were not proved to belong to the deceased by reliable evidence; the prosecution had not come with clean hands and the dead body was not recovered — thus the appellant was entitled to acquittal.
State's Arguments (as presented by Mr. A.K. Dwivedi)
- The prosecution witnesses are reliable and the recovered bones and clothes belonged to the deceased.
- The appellant's statement/pointing out of the kulhari was admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the impugned conviction and sentence should be sustained.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| A.N. Sehgel v. R.R. Sheo Ram, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 304 : AIR 1991 SC 1406 : (1991 Lab IC 1227) | Cited for the proposition that a proviso is an exception and should not be interpreted so as to nullify the main enactment (principle of construction of provisos). | The court relied on this principle in construing Section 27 of the Evidence Act, observing that the proviso must be read as an exception compatible with the main sections (Sections 25 and 26) and cannot override them. |
| West Derby v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co., 1897 AC 647 | Authority cited in connection with interpretation of statutory provisos (illustrative authority referenced by the court). | Used as supporting authority for the court's approach that a proviso carves out an exception and should not be read to defeat the main enactment. |
| R.L.I. District Council v. T.V. Railway Co., 1909 AC 253 | Another authority cited on the interpretation of provisos and construction of legislation. | Referenced to support the court's construction of Section 27 as a proviso that must be read narrowly so as not to nullify Sections 25 and 26. |
| Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal, (1884) 6 All 509 | Held that the "information" contemplated by the relevant provision may be to a police officer or to a private individual (i.e., information need not be strictly to police). | The court noted that earlier authority had held the information could be to private individuals, but emphasized that in the present case no qualifying information to police while in custody was proved. |
| AIR 1958 AP 37 : 1958 Cri LJ 18 | Cited for the proposition that a person arrested by police during investigation is an "accused" for certain purposes. | The court used this authority to analyse whether the appellant was an "accused" at the time of the pointing out and recovery; it concluded he was not in custody when he pointed out the weapon. |
| Amin v. State of U.P., AIR 1958 All 293 : 1958 Cri LJ 462 | Holds that when suspicion attaches to a person and he is taken into custody or interrogated, he becomes an accused. | The court cited this case to explain that an accused becomes such when arrested or when suspicion crystallises, but in the present case the appellant was taken into custody only after the pointing out, making Section 27 inapplicable. |
| State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh, (1975) 4 SCC 472 : AIR 1975 SC 258 : 1975 Cri LJ 282 | Authority illustrating reluctance to convict for murder on confession alone where dead bodies were unrecognisable and post-mortem could not determine cause of death; stresses need for strong evidence when body is not recovered. | The court relied on this authority to support its conclusion that, absent recovery of the body or strong, reliable proof that recovered bones/clothing belonged to the victim, conviction is unsafe. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a stepwise analysis, applying statutory provisions and evidentiary principles to the facts adduced at trial:
- Admissibility and reliability of the child witness (P.W.1):
- The court observed Section 118 of the Evidence Act allows a child to be a witness, but competence must be ascertained: the child must understand questions put and give rational answers.
- The Sessions Judge had certified that the child did not understand the sanctity of truth and understood questions only with difficulty; oath was not administered. The court concluded this meant the child could not be regarded as a proper witness whose deposition could be relied upon.
- The court further examined P.W.1's evidence and noted material contradictions between examination-in-chief and cross-examination (denial of seeing a kulhari, saying he did not know what a kulhari was, inconsistent accounts of movements), reinforcing the conclusion of unreliability.
- Hostility and reliability of other prosecution witnesses:
- P.W.2 (informant/father) was declared hostile and contradicted the FIR's contents; the court found him unreliable.
- P.W.3 was merely the scribe of the FIR and did not add eyewitness detail about the occurrence.
- P.W.4 (father of the deceased) testified to recovery of certain articles but did not lodge reports about prior elopement; the court treated his testimony as limited to recovery witnessing.
- Admissibility of pointing out and recovery under Section 27:
- The court carefully analysed Section 27 and identified four conditions for its application: (1) the accused must be in police custody; (2) the accused must furnish information to the police; (3) there must be discovery of an instrument; and (4) the information must relate distinctly to the fact discovered.
- The opinion emphasised that Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26 and must be interpreted as an exception that does not nullify the main enactments (citing authorities on proviso interpretation).
- The court found no evidence that the appellant, while in police custody, furnished information to the police leading to the discovery; rather, the pointing out and recovery took place before arrest. Hence Section 27 did not make the pointing out/recovery admissible.
- The court also examined Section 273 Cr.P.C. and case law about when a person becomes an "accused," but concluded that the appellant was not in police custody at the time of pointing out; accordingly the recovery could not be admitted under Section 27.
- Corpus delicti and sufficiency of evidence:
- The court stressed that where a dead body is not recovered, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the crime (murder) occurred — invoking the maxim corpus delicti.
- Here the dead body was not recovered, no post-mortem was conducted, and there was no reliable proof that the recovered bones and other articles belonged to the deceased. Given those lacunae, and the unreliability of key witnesses, the court found the prosecution's case doubtful.
- The court relied on State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh to underscore reluctance to convict on confession/recovery alone where the body is not available or identity/cause-of-death cannot be established.
- Conclusion of analysis:
- Because the child witness was unreliable, other witnesses were hostile or not eyewitnesses, the pointing out/recovery did not satisfy Section 27, and the corpus delicti was not established by cogent evidence, the court concluded the conviction could not stand.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence are set aside. (The opinion states simply: "Appeal allowed.")
Direct consequences as recorded in the opinion:
- The conviction and sentences passed against the appellant were set aside.
- The appellant was not on bail and is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in some other case.
- The court directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lalitpur, to issue necessary release orders at an early date.
- The court directed that Mr. Prakash Chandra Srivastava, Advocate, who appeared as Amicus Curiae, be paid Rs. 1,100/- as fee by the State of U.P.
- A copy of the judgment was directed to be given to the learned counsel for the appellant on application, free of cost.
The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal precedent; it applies established principles (admissibility of testimony, construction of provisos, Section 27 requirements, corpus delicti) to the facts and reverses the conviction for insufficiency of reliable admissible evidence.
B.L Yadav, J.:— The appellant Ramua altas Ram Lal has preferred this criminal appeal against his conviction under S. 302, I.P.C and sentence for life imprisonment and under S. 20-I, I.P.C and sentence for four years rigorous imprisonment. The learned Sessions Judge has convicted the appellant by the judgment and order dated 10th May, 1983 in Sessions Trial No. 146 of 1982.
2. The prosecution story as contained in the F.I.R is that the appellant who was resident of village Pali, P.S Jakhlaun, district Lalitpur, was living separately from his father Tiju, who lodged the first information report (Ext. ka-1) that his daughter in law nanieiy. Smt. Suhagrani aged about 27 years was missing for the last seven days. She was wearing a Saari and some glass bangles etc. The appellant was living separately from his father with his wife Smt. Suhagrani the deceased and two children. It was alleged that somehow the appellant was not satisfied with his wife's conduct and on 9-6-1982 he sent to the jungle of Pali with his wife and two sons on the pretext to collect dried wood and murdered the wife there with an axe (Kulhari). Her dead body was left in the jungle after the murder. Only some bones were recovered. On the pointing out of the appellant on 16-6-82, when the first information report is alleged to have been lodged, the blouse, glass bangles, hairs and some torn clothes and dhoti containing blood stains were recovered (vide Ext. Ka-2). On the same date some bones were also recovered on the pointing out of the appellant (vide Ext. Ka-3). There is no eye-witness except one child named Bihari the son of the appellant aged aboutJ to 4 years (P.W 1). About whom the learned Sessions Judge has given a certificate to the effect that the child witness is not understanding the sanctity of the truth and understands the question with difficulty after repetition, and oath was not administered.
3. P.W 2 was informant Teju and P.W 3 is Suresh Kumar who was scribe of the firs information report. P.W 4 is Kamta, the father of deceased Smt. Suhagrani. P.W 5 Gajendra Singh before whom the alleged extra judicial confession was made by the deceased on 16-6-82. Kashi Ram is P.W 6, P.W 7 is Ram Karan Singh A.S.I the Investigating Officer. The statements of these prosecution witnesses have been relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge. The conviction and sentences, as aforesaid have been passed.
4. Sri Prakash Chandra Srivastava the lerned counsel for the appellant argued the appeal that except P.W.I Bihari, the son of the appellant aged about 3 to 4 years, about whom a certificate was given by the learned Sessions Judge that the child witness is not understanding the sanctity of the truth and that he understands the question in difficulty after the repetition, there was no other eyewitness and the case was based on circumstantial evidence. The statement of P.W 1 Bihari cannot be relied upon, as in the cross-examination he has denied the version which he has said in examination-in-chief. He has stated in the cross-examination that nobody was having Kulhari and he has again said that he does not know kulhari and again contradicted that his father and mother have not gone to pickup the small pieces of wood in the forest. He again said that they have come together on that date in the mid day at about 12 noon. In the last sentence of his statement (at page 30 of the paper book) he stated that when the kulhari was placed before him he does not know what is this? This indicates that he did not see either Kulhari or anything else in the occurrence and cannot be relied upon.
5. Similarly P.W 2 the father of the appellant was declared hostile and he was also not an eye-witness. P.W 3 was scribe of the first information report which does not disclose the occurrence, except that the daughter-in-law of the informant was missing for the last seven days.
6. P.W 4 is the father of the deceased and before him some pieces of blouse, some glass bangles chappal and the part of dhoti was recovered, and he did not lodge any report that his daughter used to elope with some body else. P.W 5 Gajendra Singh is the person before whom the appellant has made extrajudicial confession and the accused took him to the place of occurrence, from where some clothes of the deceased and some bones supposed to be of the deceased were recovered. The appellant told the Investigating Officer, who was accompanying the accused appellant that he would point out the Kulhari (axe) with which the murder was committed. Thereafter he was arrested. It means the appellant was not under custody, before he pointed out the axe with which the murder was committed which was recovered by the Investigating Officer, the provision of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for short the Act), permits proof of information furnished by the accused, whether information pertains to the confession or not. On the information furnished while the accused was not in custody of police, in case it relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved.
7. In the present case neither any information was given by the accused, nor he pointed out the articles recovered while he was in police custody.
8. P.W 6 Kashi Ram was a person before whom on the pointing out of the accused, bones, clothes and chappal etc. of the deceased were recovered. His statement also cannot be relied upon.
9. P.W 7 is the Investigating Officer before whom the first information report was lodged and the recovery of articles belonging to the deceased was made. He recovered the Kulhari by which the murder was caused, before he has arrested the accused. In other words before the appellant could be taken in custody, he has not pointed out the axe nor the recovery was made. It was also urged that the articles belonging to the deceased and even the bones were not proved to be of the deceased, by leading reliable evidence. It was urged that the prosecution has not come with clean hands nor the dead body was recovered and the appellant was entitled to acquittal.
10. Mr. A.K Dwivedi the learned counsel appearing for the State urged that when the prosecution witnesses are reliable, the bones and the clothes etc. belonged to the deceased. The statement made by the appellant about pointing out of the kulhari was admissible in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and supported the impugned judgment and order.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that the appeal deserves to be allowed. No doubt the statement of a child witness can be admissible in view of provision of Section 118 of the Act. The statement of a child witness is admissible but before that it must be ascertained by the Court that the child understands the questions put to him and that he gives rational answers to the questions.
12. Competence of a child witness is tested on the basis of an old Latin Maxim “Varitatem Dicere A Corruption of Viordire” which means that examination of a witness is a series of questions by the Court usually in the nature of an examination as to his competence to give evidence in some other collateral matter prior to his cxamination-in-chief.
13. In the present case the learned Sessions Judge has put certain questions to the P.W 1 Bihari aged about 3-4 years and after those questions were put and answered by the child, he has given a certificate that the child witness does not understand the sanctity of truth, He understands the questions in difficulty after repetition. Oath not administered. This obviates that the child was not in a position to understand what is truth and what is falsehood and that he understands the questions in difficulty and after repetition. Consequently such witness cannot be said to be a proper witness who can depose correctly or on whose deposition reliance can be placed. For precaution's sake we have considered the statement of P.W 1 in detail. Whatever was stated in the examination in chief to the effect that his father has killed bis mother with kulhari was contradicted in the cross-examination. He even denied that there was any kulhari at all either in the hands of the appellant or in the hands of his mother. He says that he does not know what is kulhari, and he said that his father and mother came back in the noons and when the kulhari was placed before him, he said that he does not know, what is this. It means that he does not understand what was kulhari and he did not understand anything. No reliance can be placed upon such child witness.
14. P.W 2 is the father of the appellant, who was not an eye-witness. He has just lodged the first information report (Ext. ka-5). Ext. ka-1 that was only to the effect that his daughter-in-law was missing for the last seven days. The recovery was made. This witness was declared hostile. Whatever he stated in the examination-in-chief at one place, contradicted at the second place, in as much as when the first information lodged by him was read and explained to him, he told that he did not say all these things in the report nor it contains his thumb impressions. He was declared hostile. In certain circumstances even the statement of a witness declared hostile can be relied upon to some extent. But this witness does not appear to be reliable, as he even denied the contents of the first information report. P.W 3 is the scribe of the first information report.
15. P.W 4 was the father of the deceased and the witness of the recovery of the blouse, glass bangles, and chappals etc. He said, that when his daughter used to elope with some body else he did not lodge any first information report.
16. Similarly P.W 5 Gajendra Singh is the person before whom extra-judicial confession was made by the appellant and the recovery (Ext. 7) was also made in respect of certain articles and also the bones etc. were recovered in his presence when the Investigating Officer was also there. But the Investigating Officer has asked the appellant as to where the kulhari was placed. The appellant said that he can hand it over to him. Thereafter the appellant was arrested. The question of significance is as to whether the recovery of the instrument with which the murder was caused, was made. If the accused appellant has pointed out the instrument with which the murder was caused, thereafter he was arrested and made an accused. Whether the recovery of the instrument can be said to be admissible in view of the provisions of S. 27 of the Act.
17. A bare reading of the provisions of S. 27 of the Act indicates that it is unusually drafted by the Legislature. It opens with the word provided that it is accordingly a proviso to Sections 26 and 25. The main function of a proviso is to carve out an exception, to the main enactment. It cannot normally be interpreted so as to set at naught the main enactment. (See A.N Sehgel v. R.R Sheo Ram, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 304 : AIR 1991 SC 1406: (1991 Lab IC 1227), West Derby v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co., 1897 AC 647; R.L.I District Council v. T.V Railway Co., 1909 AC 253); Section 26 provides confession by accused while in police custody not to be proved against him. Section 25 enacts that confession to police officer not to be proved. This section as an exception to Ss. 25 and 26. Section 24 of the Act makes confession obtained by inducement, threat or promise to be irrelevant.
18. Broadly speaking, there are four conditions, before S. 27 is applied, 1st that the accused must be in the custody of a police officer, 2ndly the accused must give an information to the police (the exception contemplated by S. 27 is that even though this information may amount to a confession), 3rdly there must be discovery of an instrument and fourthly the information must relate distinctly to the fact discovered. This Section 27 is drafted on the same lines as Section 150 of Evidence Act XXV of 1861, or the relevant section of Indian Evidence Act VIII of 1869. A five Judge Full Bench of this Court in Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal*, (1884) 6 All 509, held that the information may be to the police officer or to any other private individual. In the present case there was no information (i.e the accused while in police custody must have said you will find a Kulhari at such a place and I killed my wife with it) the appellant was not in police custody when he pointed out the weapon. Experience reveals that S. 27 of the Act has been very often, misused by the police, hence Court must be vigilant about, its circumvention. In the absence of any information being furnished to the police just pointing out to the weapon and its recovery is not a relevant fact.
19. In other words there was no evidence to indicate that any information was conveyed by the appellant to the police officer or to P.W 5. The appellant has made a statement about pointing out of the weapon kulhari and thereafter he was arrested. To put it differently at the time when he pointed out the instrument, he was not an accused nor he was in the custody of the police officer. Consequently the recovery made at the time when he was not in the custody of the police officer could not be relevant under Section 27 of the Act.
20. There is another aspect of the case. The accused is not a defined term and Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the evidence must be taken in presence of the accused. The explanation of Section 273 indicates that the accused includes a person in relation to whom any proceeding under Chapter VIII has been commenced under this Code and Chapter VIII is about Security for keeping a peace and for good behaviour. Even if this explanation under Section 273 of the Code can be said to include a definition of word accused but that definition if it can be so properly called is an inclusive definition. This is not exhaustive. This term accused of an offence is not narrowly construed and interpreted. It is at the same time not necessary that his name must find place in the first information report. In AIR 1958 AP 37: (1958 Cri LJ 18) it was held that a person who is arrested by the police during investigation is an accused. In Amin v. State of U.P, AIR 1958 All 293 : (1958 Cri LJ 462), it has been held that the moment suspicion attached to a person or where a witness points to his guilt and he is taken in custody and interrogated, on that basis he becomes a person accused of an offence. In the present case he was taken into custody only after he has pointed out the ‘Kulhari’. It means that he was not in the police custody at the time when he pointed out the weapon used and consequently the recovery of the weapon does not become admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Even the statement of P.W 7 the Investigating officer does not show that the appellant was arrested first and thereafter the recovery was made on his pointing out. There is doubtful explanation to the effect that the accused was arrested and on his pointing out some bones and kulhari the instrument were recovered and memo Ext. Ka-4 was prepared. The statement of the accused appellant, in order to be admissible under S. 27 of the Act, it must have been stated by the Investigating officer P.W 7 that the appellant was in police custody and while he was under custody, on his pointing out the weapon and some bones were recovered. We have perused the statement of P.W 7 Ram Karan Singh and we find it not to be reliable.
21. In the absence of positively admissible and reliable evidence, which is lacking the recovery of the bones, chappal, glass bangles and pieces of the clothes including blouse alone could not be said to be sufficient to indicate that these articles belonged to the deceased. The dead body was not recovered nor any post-mortem has been conducted. What was the nature of the injuries, has also not been indicated. In such matters we are reminded of an old Maxim Corpus Delicti, This obviously connotes that before seeking to prove that the appellant is the author of the crime, it must be proved beyond all reason able, doubts that the crime charged has been committed. In the charge of murder it must be proved before convicting the accused that murder has been committed. The body of the victum must be recovered or must be proved by cogent evidence. The strongest possible evidence is required as to the fact of murder as the dead body was not forthcoming or the bones etc. have not been proved to be of the victim.
22. In State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh, (1975) 4 SCC 472 : AIR 1975 SC 258 : (1975 Cri LJ 282) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were reluctant to come to the conclusion of murder on the confession alone of the accused, as the dead bodies, alleged to be that of the deceased were unrecognisable due to decomposition and the post-mortem could not determine the cause of death, (vide para 13 page 260). Under these circumstances in the absence of the dead body or strong and reliable proof that the bones or glass bangles recovered were of the victim, the prosecution case appears to be doubtful, and it is not justified to record conviction.
23. In view of the premises aforesaid, the impugned judgment and order could not be sustained. In the result the appeal succeeds land is allowed. The conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside. The appellant was not on bail. He is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in some other case. We also direct that the necessary release orders may be issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lalitpur at an early date.
24. Before parting with the case we may point out that Mr. Prakash Chandra Sri vastava, Advocate has appeared as an Amicus Curiae and has assisted us effectively. We direct that he my be paid Rs. 1100/- as fee by the State of U.P at an early date. A copy of the judgment be given to the learned Counsel for the appellant on making usual application as free of cost.
25. Appeal allowed.
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