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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Vishwanath.

Allahabad High Court
Apr 30, 1992
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.K. Gulati, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The reference arises under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee is a Hindu undivided family (HUF) which, in the previous years relevant to assessment years 1975–76 and 1977–78, sold agricultural lands that had been allotted to it on family partition pursuant to an arbitration award dated 14 September 1969. Before the Income-tax Officer (ITO) the assessee admitted liability to capital gains tax because, following the Finance Act, 1970, agricultural land of the kind in question fell within the definition of “capital asset” under section 2(14) w.e.f. 1 April 1970.

The assessee claimed, in computing capital gains, a deduction for “cost of acquisition” equal to the market value of the land as on 1 April 1970. The ITO rejected that claim and computed cost of acquisition as on 1 January 1954 relying on section 55(2). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the assessee’s claim; the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the acceptance and dismissed the Revenue’s second appeal. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Lucknow, sought a legal opinion from the High Court under section 256(1), referring two questions of law concerning (1) whether the land became a capital asset on 1 April 1970 by virtue of the Finance Act, 1970 amendment to section 2(14)(iii), and (2) if so, whether the cost of acquisition for computing capital gains should be taken as on 1 April 1970.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in holding that the agricultural land in question assumed the character of “capital asset” for the first time on 1 April 1970 by virtue of the amendment of section 2(14)(iii) of the Income‑tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 1970?
  2. If the answer to the first question is affirmative, whether the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the cost of the asset as on 1 April 1970 had to be adopted for the computation of capital gains?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The amendment by the Finance Act, 1970 brought agricultural lands within municipal or cantonment limits into the definition of “capital asset” w.e.f. 1 April 1970, and therefore capital gains on transfer of such lands became chargeable only from that date.
  • Consequently, in computing capital gains the cost of acquisition to be deducted from the full value of consideration should be the market value as on 1 April 1970 — the date the land first assumed the character of a capital asset — and not a prior date.
  • Adopting the market value as on 1 April 1970 is just and equitable; any other approach would be harsh to the assessee.
  • Section 49 was said to be inapplicable (as argued by the assessee) because, the contention ran, section 49 applies only where the asset was a capital asset at the time it was acquired by the previous owner — a condition alleged not to obtain here.

Revenue's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
CIT v. Smt. M. Subaida Beevi, [1986] 160 ITR 557 (Kerala High Court) Held that the cost of acquisition for the purposes of section 48 is not the cost on the date the asset became a capital asset; cost of acquisition may be the cost at acquisition even if the asset was not a capital asset then. The court expressed respectful agreement with this reasoning and used it to support the proposition that cost of acquisition is not to be taken as on the date the asset first became a capital asset (i.e., 1 April 1970).
Ranchhodbhai Bhaijibhai Patel v. CIT, [1971] 81 ITR 446 (Gujarat High Court) Observation that phrases like “cost of acquisition of the capital asset” and “cost for which the previous owner acquired it” all refer to the cost of acquisition of the property regardless of whether it was a capital asset at the date of acquisition. The court relied on this teaching to reject the assessee’s contention that the asset must have been a capital asset at the time of acquisition for section 49 to apply; the passage was quoted to support the statutory construction adopted.
CIT v. M. Ramaiah Reddy, [1986] 158 ITR 611 (Karnataka High Court) Disapproved the view that where agricultural land becomes a capital asset from 1 April 1970 the cost of acquisition must be taken as on that date; held that cost is to be determined under section 48 or on option under section 55(2). The court applied the rule in this decision, observing that the reasoning rejecting the ITAT's contrary approach “squarely applies” and supports the conclusion that cost of acquisition is not to be taken as on 1 April 1970.
Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, [1921] 12 TC 358; [1921] 1 KB 64 (English authority) Principle that taxing statutes must be read literally; there is “no equity about a tax” and one must look to what is clearly said in the statute; no implication or intendment to be read into taxing provisions. The court quoted this passage to emphasize that equitable considerations cannot override the clear statutory language governing computation of capital gains; this supported refusal to accept an equitable re‑characterisation of cost of acquisition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two stages corresponding to the two referred questions.

1. On the first question (whether the agricultural land assumed the character of “capital asset” only from 1 April 1970), the court found the answer plainly affirmative on the facts established by the Tribunal. It reviewed the statutory framework:

  • Section 45 charges profits or gains from the transfer of a “capital asset”.
  • Before 1 April 1970, section 2(14) expressly excluded agricultural land in India from the definition of “capital asset”.
  • The Finance Act, 1970 substituted a new clause (iii) in section 2(14) bringing within the definition certain agricultural lands (e.g., those within municipal/cantonment limits or within 8 km thereof) into the category of “capital asset” w.e.f. 1 April 1970. The parties agreed the lands in question fell within the new clause.
  • Section 47 (as amended by the same Finance Act) preserved an exclusion for transfers effected before 1 March 1970.
Given these legislative changes and the agreed facts, the Tribunal was correct that the lands became capital assets only on 1 April 1970. The first question was answered in the affirmative.

2. On the second question (whether cost of acquisition must be taken as on 1 April 1970 for computing capital gains), the court undertook a statutory construction of the code relating to capital gains:

  • Chapter IV‑E (sections 45 to 55A) forms an integrated code for determining capital gains tax; section 45 is the charging provision and sections 48 and 55 govern computation.
  • Section 48 requires deduction from the full value of consideration of the cost of acquisition of the capital asset; it does not condition that the asset must have been a capital asset at the date of acquisition.
  • Section 49 governs modes of acquisition (including partitions of HUFs) and provides that where assets are acquired on partition the cost to the recipient is the cost to the previous owner; section 49 contains no precondition that the asset must have been a capital asset at the time the previous owner acquired it.
  • Section 55(2)(ii) provides that where the capital asset became property of the previous owner before 1 January 1954, “cost of acquisition” for the recipient (where the previous owner’s cost cannot be ascertained) means the previous owner’s cost or the fair market value as on 1 January 1954, at the option of the assessee.
The court emphasised that the statutory language in section 55(2) is peremptory and exhaustive; once section 45 is attracted, computation must follow the manner provided in sections 48 and 55(2). There is no statutory warrant to treat the date on which an asset first becomes a capital asset (here, 1 April 1970) as the date for fixing cost of acquisition unless the statute so provides.

Applying these provisions to the facts, the court noted:

  • The assessee received the land on partition; under section 49(1)(i) the cost to the assessee is the cost to the previous owner (the HUF).
  • The previous owner had acquired the property before 1 January 1954 and the previous owner’s cost could not be ascertained (a stated finding of fact).
  • Accordingly section 55(2)(ii) applied and the cost of acquisition had to be reckoned as at 1 January 1954 (the previous owner’s cost or fair market value as on that date, at the option of the assessee).
The court rejected the Tribunal’s approach that the market value as on 1 April 1970 should be adopted simply because the land became a capital asset on that date. The court also rejected the assessee’s contention that section 49 did not apply on the ground advanced, relying on precedent (Ranchhodbhai Bhaijibhai Patel) to show the statutory phrases referring to “cost of acquisition” are intended to denote the cost of the property regardless of whether it was a capital or non-capital asset at acquisition.

The court further relied on the Karnataka High Court decision in CIT v. M. Ramaiah Reddy which disapproved the ITAT’s view in a similar factual situation and supported the proposition that cost of acquisition is to be determined under the existing statutory provisions rather than by reference to the date the asset became a capital asset.

Finally, the court declined to allow an equitable re‑writing of the statutory formula. It quoted the oft‑repeated principle from Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC: taxing statutes must be construed by their clear words; equity cannot be read into taxation provisions. Because the Finance Act, 1970 did not expressly alter the rules for determining cost of acquisition, the court held it was not open to the Tribunal to adopt an equitable approach contrary to the statutory code.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The first referred question was answered in the affirmative: the agricultural land in question assumed the character of a “capital asset” for the first time on 1 April 1970 by reason of the amendment to section 2(14)(iii) effected by the Finance Act, 1970.
  • The second referred question was answered in the negative: the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal was not correct in holding that the cost of the asset as on 1 April 1970 had to be adopted for the computation of capital gains. The cost of acquisition must be determined in accordance with the statutory code — section 48 read with section 55(2) (and, where applicable, section 49) — and, on the facts (previous owner acquired before 1 January 1954 and previous owner’s cost not ascertainable), the cost is to be taken as on 1 January 1954 in terms of section 55(2)(ii).
  • The court awarded costs to the Department in the sum of Rs. 300.

Implications:

The direct effect of the decision is that, although certain agricultural land became chargeable as a capital asset with effect from 1 April 1970, the computation of capital gains must follow the established statutory scheme (sections 48 and 55, and section 49 where applicable). Where the previous owner acquired the property before 1 January 1954 and the previous owner’s cost cannot be ascertained, section 55(2)(ii) prescribes the cost or fair market value as on 1 January 1954 — not the market value as on 1 April 1970. The opinion does not purport to introduce any alternate or broader rule outside the statutory provisions and does not identify any novel legislative change or broader principle beyond applying the existing statutory code and precedent.

Show all summary ...

R.K Gulati, J.:— It is a reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”).

2. The assessee is a Hindu undivided family. In the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1975–76 and 1977–78, the assessee had sold certain agricultural lands allotted to its share on the family partition of a bigger Hindu undivided family that was effected by an arbitration award dated September 14, 1969. Before the Income-tax Officer, the assessee admitted that it was liable to “capital gains tax” as the agricultural lands transferred by it fell within the purview of “capital asset” as defined in section 2(14) of the Act after its amendment by the Finance Act, 1970. However, in the computation of “capital gains”, the assessee put forward a claim that it was entitled to deduct from the full value of the consideration received, the market value as on April 1, 1970, of the assets transferred, as cost* of acquisition of the assets. The Income-tax Officer did not agree with the assessee. He computed the capital gains taking the cost of acquisition of assets transferred as on January 1, 1954. For the view the Income-tax Officer took, he relied upon the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 55 of the Act. On appeal, the claim made by the assessee was accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax which also was upheld by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal while dismissing the second appeal filed by the Revenue. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was of the opinion that, as the agricultural land became a capital asset for the first time on April 1, 1970, because of the amendment brought about in section 2(14) of the Act, by the Finance Act, 1970, the assessee was entitled to adopt the value of the land as on April 1, 1970, as the cost of acquisition of the asset, inasmuch as the agricultural land held by the assessee prior to April 1, 1970, was not a capital asset. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal accordingly directed that the cost of acquisition of the capital asset should be the cost as on April 1, 1970, for purposes of computing the capital gains. At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Lucknow, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred the following two questions of law for the opinion of this court:

“1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in holding that the agricultural land in question had assumed the character of ‘capital assets’ for the first time on April 1, 1970, by virtue of the amendment of section 2(14)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 1970, with effect from April 1, 1970?”

3. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, then

“2. Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that it was the cost of the asset as on April 1, 1970, which had to be adopted for the computation of capital gains?”

4. In so far as question No. 1 is concerned, it does not pose much of a problem. On the facts found by the Tribunal, the answer is self-evident which could be in the affirmative only. Indeed, from the statement of the case submitted by the Tribunal and from the various orders attached thereto, it is apparent that the parties were never at issue in so far as the controversy involved in the first question is concerned. In our opinion, the question did not merit a reference to this court. Whatever contest existed between the parties, that was in relation to the computation of capital gains which is the subject-matter of the second question. Be that as it may, in order to answer the first question, we may refer to a couple of statutory provisions and the legislative amendments effected thereto as those provisions stood at the relevant time.

5. We may first notice section 45 of the Act. Under this section, the charge to income-tax under the head “Capital gains” is attracted only in respect of profits or gains arising from the transfer of a “capital asset”. The expression “Capital asset” is defined in section 2(14) of the Act. Before April 1, 1970, the definition of the expression “Capital asset” as contained in section 2(14) excluded from its scope, inter alia, agricultural land in India. Section 2(14), prior to April 1, 1970, as it stood, in so far as it is relevant for our purposes, read as under:

“‘capital asset’ means property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession, but does not include—…

(iii) agricultural land in India.”

6. By the Finance Act, 1970, which came into effect from April 1, 1970, the definition of “capital asset” contained in section 2(14) of the Act was amended and in place of clause (iii) extracted above, a new clause (iii) was substituted as a result of which, agricultural land in India, which fell within the mischief of sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (iii) came within the ambit of “capital asset”. The result of this amendment was that any profits or gains arising from the transfer of such land became exigible to capital gains tax, which hitherto were not amenable to capital gains tax. There is no dispute before us and none was raised before the tax authorities that the agricultural lands held by the assessee which were the subject of transfer in the previous years relevant to the assessment years in question, were covered either by sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of clause (iii) of sub-section (14) of section 2 of the Act.

7. By the same Finance Act, an amendment was also effected in section 47 of the Act and clause (viii) was inserted in that section. In so far as it is relevant for our purpose, the amended provisions of section 47 of the Act read thus:

“47. Transactions not regarded as transfer.— Nothing contained in section 45 shall apply to the following transfers —…

(viii) any transfer of agricultural land in India effected before March 1, 1970.”

8. From a discussion of the provisions noticed above, the position that obtains is that prior to April 1, 1970, agricultural land in India, wherever located whether in urban asset (sic). The position, however, changed because of the amendment that was brought about by the Finance Act, 1970. After the amendment, agricultural land situated within municipal or cantonment limits or within 8 kilometres of the limits of any municipality or cantonment board was made a “capital asset” w.e.f April 1, 1970. To put it differently, agricultural land not falling within items (a) and (b) of clause (iii) of sub-section (14) of section 2 of the Act continued to be a non-capital asset for the purposes of the Act. As, undisputably, the agricultural land with which we are concerned fell within the exception to the exceptions introduced by the Finance Act, 1970, the Tribunal was right in holding that the agricultural land in question had come within the purview of the definition of “capital asset” with effect from April 1, 1970, by virtue of the amendment in section 2(14)(iii) of the Act effected by the Finance Act, 1970. The first question is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative.

9. This brings us to the second question which raises a controversy as to how the capital gains are to be computed where a capital asset which was the subject-matter of transfer was not a capital asset at the date when. it was acquired but subsequently became a capital asset. In the opinion of the Tribunal, in such a situation, the deduction for “cost of acquisition” is to be made at the market value of the asset on the date it came within the purview of the definition of capital asset under section 2(14) of the Act. It is the correctness of this view that is the subject-matter of the second question.

10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

11. For the assessee, it was contended that the view taken by the Tribunal was just and equitable. It was contended that agricultural lands within the municipal or cantonment limits were brought under the definition of “capital assets” by the Finance Act, 1970, as a result of which capital gains arising or accruing on the transfer of such lands became amenable to income-tax with effect from April 1, 1970, and consequently, in reckoning capital gains, the cost of acquisition to be deducted, ought to be the market value as on the date the land assumed the character of “capital asset” and not with reference to any anterior date. According to learned counsel, any other view would be harsh to the assessee and cannot be sustained. It was also urged that section 49 of the Act had no application, for it applied to a case where the asset was a “capital asset” not only at the time of its transfer but also at the time of its acquisition by the previous owner, a position not obtaining in the instant case.

12. We have considered the matter carefully, but regret our inability to sustain the view taken by the Tribunal. We can neither accept any of the contentions put forward on behalf of the assessee.

13. Chapter IV-E of the Act deals with capital gains. It provides an integrated code concerning the determination and computation of the charge under the head “Capital gains”. It has within its fold sections 45 to 55A of the Act. If certain fundamental concepts underlying some of these provisions are kept clear in mind, it would help a great deal to resolve the controversy set up for consideration.

14. We have noticed earlier and, at the cost of repetition, it may be observed that section 45 brings to charge “any profits or gains from the transfer of an asset effected in the previous year”. Two conditions are predominantly required to attract this section, viz., there must be a transfer of property and the asset transferred must be a “capital asset” at the date of transfer. If these conditions are attracted, any profit or gain arising from. such transfer is exigible to “capital gains tax”.

15. The next step in the process is the computation of capital gains that is to be charged to tax. The manner for computation is provided in section 48 read with section 55 of the Act. Under section 48, the starting point is the full value of the consideration received or accruing. According to this section, capital gains are to be computed after making deduction from the “full value of the consideration”, inter alia, of the cost of acquisition of the capital asset. This section does not envisage that the capital asset transferred must also be a capital asset on the date of acquisition besides its being capital asset on the date of its transfer. As pointed out by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in CIT v. Smt. M. Subaida Beevi, [1986] 160 ITR 557, with which we are in respectful agreement, the cost of acquisition of a capital asset within the meaning of section 48 is not the cost on the date on which the asset transferred became a capital asset. The deduction permissible under section 48 is the cost of acquisition of the capital asset transferred for consideration, whether or not it was a capital asset on the date of its acquisition. The exigibility of capital gains to tax under section 45 read with section 48 of the Act is not on the basis that what was transferred was a capital asset on the date of its acquisition, but on the basis that the subject-matter of transfer is a capital asset within the meaning of the Act.

16. The next relevant provision is section 49 of the Act which speaks of cost with reference to certain modes of acquisition. It, inter alia, provides that when a Hindu undivided family is partitioned and, thereafter, the erstwhile members come to hold the assets obtained on such partition, the cost of acquisition to the members shall be the cost of acquisition to the family, i.e, the previous owner. It is relevant to observe that section 49 does not contemplate any pre-condition for its application that the asset which was sold had to be a capital asset within the meaning of section 2(14) at the time it was acquired by the previous owner, as was sought to be argued before us. The contention in that behalf, in our opinion, is without any substance and cannot be sustained. It would be profitable to refer to the observations of the Gujarat High Court in this connection in Ranchhodbhai Bhaijibhai Patel v. CIT, [1971] 81 ITR 446, which came to be made repelling a similar contention as canvassed before us, though in a different context. The court observed (at page 459):

“The words ‘cost of acquisition of the capital asset’, ‘the cost for which the asset was acquired’ and ‘the cost for which the previous owner of the property acquired it’ are variously used by the Legislature to denote the same idea and the reference is intended to be made only to the cost of acquisition of the property regardless of the question whether it was a capital asset or non-capital asset at the date of acquisition.”

17. Another section which has an important bearing on calculating the capital gain is section 55 of the Act. Under clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of that section, it is provided that, where the capital asset becomes property of the assessee by any of the modes specified in section 49 and the capital asset becomes property of the previous owner before January 1, 1954, the “cost of acquisition” means the cost of the capital asset to the previous owner or the fair market value of the asset on January 1, 1954, at the option of the assessee.

18. From the analysis of the provisions referred to above, it is evident that the incidence of tax on the capital gains contemplated under section 45 is to be computed in the manner provided for in section 48 of the Act or upon the option being exercised by the assessee in accordance with section 55 of the Act. The meaning assigned to the phrase “cost of acquisition” under section 55(2) of the Act is exhaustive and the language used is peremptory. It does not give any latitude to introduce any other facts of the meaning to the expression “cost of acquisition”. Once it is found that section 45 which is the charging section is attracted, the profits or gains ought to be computed as stated earlier in the manner prescribed by the Act and in no other fashion. There is nothing in the provisions to which we have referred to suggest that the cost of acquisition of an asset could be reckoned in a manner differently except as provided by section 48 read with section 55(2) of the Act. The argument that the cost of acquisition would vary or would depend on the fact whether the asset at the time of acquisition was a capital asset or not within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Act is without any merit and cannot be accepted.

19. As noticed earlier, the assessee had received the agricultural lands in question on partition of a bigger Hindu undivided family and, in terms of section 49(1)(i), the cost of acquisition of the asset to the assessee was the cost for which the previous owner, namely, the Hindu undivided family had acquired it. It is not in dispute that the family in its turn had acquired the property in question before January 1, 1954. It has been found as a fact that the cost of the agricultural land to the family (previous owner) could hot be ascertained. In the circumstances, the case squarely fell within the purview of section 55(2)(ii) of the Act and the cost of the capital asset, therefore, had to be reckoned as the cost as on January 1, 1954. The charge under the head “Capital gains” takes into account the capital appreciation from the date of acquisition to the date of sale, subject of course to certain provisions. The only laxity permitted is to substitute the market value of the asset as on January 1, 1954, if the asset sold was in existence at the time, in the place of the cost of acquisition. The amendment brought about by the Finance Act of 1970, does not alter this legal position, nor furnish a different basis to determine the cost of the asset transferred otherwise than in accordance with section 55(2) of the Act as on January 1, 1954. The effect of the amendment is to bring certain types of agricultural land within the meaning of “capital asset” under the Act, but it does not influence the computation or determination of the taxable gains in terms of the provisions discussed earlier so as to add or detract anything from them. This is what the Income-tax Officer had held. The appellate authorities including the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal were not justified in interfering with the manner in which the capital gains were computed by the Income-tax Officer. The problem with which we are concerned also came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in CIT v. M. Ramaiah Reddy, [1986] 158 ITR 611, where the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had expressed a similar view as in the case in hand. The Bench disapproved the view taken by the Tribunal in that case. It was observed (at page 613):

“There is hardly any basis for the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal. The agricultural land became a capital asset from April 1, 1970, but that does not mean that the cost of acquisition of the land has to be taken as on April 1, 1970, itself. The cost of acquisition of every capital asset has to be determined in accordance with section 48 or upon the option being exercised by the assessee under section 55(2) of the Act…. The finding of the Tribunal that the cost of acquisition has to be determined as on April 1, 1970, is untenable. The assessee was in possession of the asset long prior to April 1, 1970. It is, therefore, not correct to state that the cost of acquisition has to be taken only on that date.”

20. The rule laid down in the above decision squarely applies to the case before us. From the discussion made above, we cannot sustain the view taken by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

21. The argument of the assessee that the Tribunal has taken an equitable view is of no consequence. In this connection, the classic statement of Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, [1921] 12 TC 358; [1921] 1 KB 64 may be recalled where it was observed:

“In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.”

22. As seen earlier, having regard to the relevant provisions, the view taken by the Tribunal is totally unwarranted in law. It cannot be sustained only on the ground that it would be equitable to do so. By effecting the amendment in the definition of “capital asset”, if the Legislature intended that the computation of the “capital gains”, viz., the cost of acquisition be treated differently, as contended by the assessee, it was for the Legislature to specifically provide for that situation. In the absence of any such provision, the assessee cannot be helped by this court. For what has been stated above, we answer the second question in the negative against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

23. The Department shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 300.