Mathura Refinery Mazdoor Sangh And Others v. Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner And Others

1. By means of this petition, three petitioners have approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for seeking a direction in the nature of certiorari quashing Cl. 20.8, of the certified standing orders of respondent 2 and also for quashing the order of respondent 1, dated 20 October, 1989, which is annexed with the petition as annexure I.

2. For certification of the standing orders pertaining to the employees of Mathura Refinery under the provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (for brevity hereinafter referred to as standing orders). Steps were taken by the Indian Oil Corporation before certifying officer, who after hearing the Oil Corporation and the representatives of the registered trade union, certified the standing orders on 31 January, 1985. Thereafter an appeal was preferred by the Indian Oil Corporation before the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner, New Delhi, under provision of S. 6 of the standing orders. The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner after hearing both the parties confirmed the standing orders certified by the certifying officer with modification and the modification as inserted was to the following effect:

“Where a workman has been convicted for a criminal offence of grave nature in a Court of Law or where the General Manager is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is neither expedient nor in the interest of security to continue the workman, the workman will be removed or dismissed from service without following the procedure laid down under Cls. 17.3 to 17.7 of these standing orders.”

3. I have beard the learned counsel for the parties.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised two-fold submissions:

Firstly, the notice under rule 7-A of Sub-cl. 3(a) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1948 (for brevity hereinafter referred to as the rules), was not given to all the trade unions and while making submission he laid emphasis on the word “trade unions” used therein and submitted that it is purposely used in plural.

Secondly, the appellate authority had not adjudicated upon the fairness and reasonableness of the provision of standing orders as required under S. 4 of the aforesaid Act.

5. So far as question of giving an opportunity under rule 7-A of Sub-cl. 3(a) of the rules, is concerned, the notice was given to the registered trade union, which was in existence at the relevant time. In the petition, it is no where stated that before the certifying officer no trade union was heard and further it has not been stated that the petitioners approached the certifying officer before certification of the standing orders. The case of the respondent, as set up in Para. 3 of the counter-affidavit, is that petitioner 1 was the union of contractors workmen and it has no locus standi to challenge the standing orders, which have been made final in the appeal. Petitioner 2 is a union which came into existence subsequently and, therefore, there was no question of giving of any notice of opportunity to such a union, which was not in existence at the relevant time. Petitioner 3 is a member of a recognised union, which was heard by the certifying officer as well as by the appellate authority and, therefore, this petitioner has also no locus standi to maintain the petition. Thus the argument has got substance. In the rejoinder affidavit it has not been stated as to what interest of petitioner 1, union of contractors workmen, was involved. Further it has not been stated that petitioner 2 was in existence before the proceedings for certification of the standing orders were taken. Thus, I am of the view that these petitioners have no locus standi in the matter to be heard and to maintain the petition.

6. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is regarding fairness and reasonableness of the provisions, which has been added by the appellate authority in the certified standing orders. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appellate authority had not adjudicated upon the fairness and reasonableness of the provision, which has been inserted, though with the consent of the parties. The provision, as quoted above, clearly states that the authorities may pass the order on being satisfied for the reasons to be recorded in writing. I do not find any unfairness in the provision.

7. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that under S. 10 of the aforesaid Act, the standing orders finally certified are not liable to be modified until the expiry of six months from the date on which the standing orders came into force. It is admitted that six months have already lapsed to the certification of the standing orders and if the parties are aggrieved then it is always open for them to move for modification before the certifying officer. I am not inclined to interfere as there is no inconsistency, unfairness or unreasonableness and it is always open to the concerned persons to approach for modification as stated supra.

8. I do not find any force in the petition. The petition is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.