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Bansidhar () v. Smt. Seema ().
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal under section 19 of the Family Courts Act challenges the Family Court, Bareilly's judgment dated 17-8-1991, which allowed a petition filed by the respondent Smt. Seema under section 125 CrPC and directed the appellant Bansidhar to pay Rs. 400 per month as maintenance from 25-4-1990.
The respondent filed the section 125 CrPC petition on 25-4-1990 (initially before the lower criminal court) claiming Rs. 500 per month. Her pleaded facts were that she married the appellant on 20-5-1989, lived with him at Agra, and was soon thereafter ill-treated and subjected to dowry demands. She alleged an attempt to set her on fire on 26-9-1989 by the appellant's mother and brother; her uncle Kaushal Kumar lodged an FIR (Case Crime No. 339 of 1984 under section 498-A IPC) and the police rescued her. She claimed the appellant ran a shoe business earning Rs. 5,000 per month and asked for maintenance because she could not maintain herself.
The appellant denied the allegations, pleaded that a false FIR was lodged by the respondent's uncle, stated he worked as a packer earning Rs. 400 per month, and asserted the respondent refused to live with him and perform marital obligations. At trial before the Family Court, the respondent and Kaushal Kumar testified for the respondent; the appellant and his father Om Prakash Goel testified for the defence. The Family Court accepted the respondent's case and awarded Rs. 400 per month from the date of presentation of the petition. The appellant appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Family Court was right in accepting the respondent's evidence and awarding Rs. 400 per month as maintenance under section 125 CrPC.
- How section 13 of the Family Courts Act (prohibiting a party's entitlement as of right to be represented by a legal practitioner before a Family Court) should be interpreted and whether it is repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act or Article 22(1) of the Constitution when representation is denied.
- Whether the appellant was prejudiced by an alleged refusal to permit legal representation before the Family Court and, consequently, whether the impugned order should be set aside on grounds of denial of right to be represented by counsel.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's (Smt. Seema) Case and Arguments
- Marriage took place on 20-5-1989; after marriage she resided with the appellant and performed marital obligations.
- Immediately after marriage, the appellant's parents and relations demanded dowry (stated figure Rs. 40,000), ill-treated her, and on 26-9-1989 an attempt was made to set her on fire; she was rescued after her uncle lodged an FIR and police intervention.
- She feared for her life and had justifiable grounds to live separately; the appellant earned substantial income (claimed Rs. 5,000 per month), making her entitled to maintenance (claimed Rs. 500 per month, Family Court awarded Rs. 400).
Appellant's (Bansidhar) Case and Arguments
- Denied dowry demand, ill-treatment, or any attempt to set the respondent on fire; alleged the FIR was false and lodged by an inimical uncle.
- Claimed to be a packer in a shoe shop earning Rs. 400 per month (denying business income); submitted a letter and a certificate (challenged by the Court as unreliable).
- Argued that the Family Court did not permit him to be represented by counsel because of section 13 of the Family Courts Act; contended that section 13 is repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act and that denial of counsel in proceedings which may lead to fine/imprisonment under section 125(3) CrPC violates Article 22(1) of the Constitution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re Lily Isable Thomas, AIR 1964 SC 855 | Cited for the interpretive presumption that repeated words in later statutes are intended to have the same judicially understood meaning; used in connection with the phrase "as of right". | The court relied on this line of authority to support reading "as of right" in section 13 of the Family Courts Act according to established judicial construction (i.e., no inherent right to representation but such phrase to be read consistently with prior interpretations). |
| Vajarvelu v. Special Deputy Collector, AIR 1965 SC 1017 | Used alongside the Lily Thomas authority to illustrate how courts treat repeated statutory language and the meaning given to "as of right" in earlier statutes. | Applied to reinforce the presumption about the legislative intent behind repeating the phrase "as of right", supporting the conclusion that section 13 does not create an absolute prohibition on representation. |
| A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271 : AIR 1982 SC 710 | Held that a detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board under preventive detention scheme but emphasized parity if the detaining authority is permitted counsel; illustrates limits on Article 22(1) where constitution permits exceptions. | The court quoted and relied on the reasoning in A.K. Roy to distinguish contexts where representation may be denied by statute and to explain that Family Courts' scheme—allowing assistance of amici and other persons—calls for permitting representation when others are heard; used the case to illuminate how denial of counsel has been treated in preventive detention jurisprudence and the equality considerations involved. |
| State of M.P v. Shobha Ram, AIR 1966 SC 1910 | Addresses a statute barring legal practitioners from Nyaya Panchayat proceedings and holds that where an accused never claimed a right to counsel at trial the existence of the statutory bar did not cause prejudice; supports limiting remedial relief when no request for counsel was made in the court below. | The court applied this precedent to hold that because the appellant had not requested permission to be represented before the Family Court, he could not now contend the provision was ultra vires; the decision supports dismissal of the appeal for want of a contemporaneous request and resulting prejudice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two principal strands of analysis: (A) credibility and maintenance quantum; and (B) the legal question of right to legal representation under section 13 of the Family Courts Act and related constitutional and statutory provisions.
(A) Credibility and Award of Maintenance
- The Court found the respondent's testimony and that of her uncle Kaushal Kumar to be natural and corroborated by contemporaneous documentary evidence (the FIR lodged on 26-9-1989 and the fact of police rescue).
- The temporal proximity between the alleged incident (26-9-1989) and the FIR made it implausible that the FIR was fabricated months earlier to create evidence; the Court treated the FIR as corroborative of the respondent's account.
- The appellant's and his father's denial did not inspire confidence in the Court; the Court noted that no Indian lady would readily break her matrimonial home by making false accusations without reason, lending further credibility to the respondent's narrative.
- On quantum, the Court evaluated competing claims about the appellant's income. The respondent alleged the appellant carried on a shoe business earning Rs. 5,000/month; the appellant claimed to be a packer earning Rs. 400/month and produced a certificate the Court found unreliable. Considering the overall facts and circumstances, the Court accepted that the appellant had substantial income from business and that Rs. 400/month as awarded was just and proper.
- On these factual findings and the application of section 125 CrPC, the Court found no infirmity in the Family Court's order awarding maintenance from the date of petition.
(B) Legal Representation — Interpretation and Application of Section 13
- The Court undertook a textual and contextual interpretation of section 13 of the Family Courts Act, including examination of dictionary meanings of "right" and "as of right".
- The Court concluded that the first part of section 13 means that no party has a legal entitlement "as of right" to be represented by a legal practitioner; representation is therefore subject to the Family Court's discretion. The proviso (permitting assistance of a legal expert as amicus curiae in the interest of justice) supports a discretionary reading rather than a total bar.
- The Court noted statutory contrasts with other provisions (e.g., sections in the Industrial Disputes Act, COFEPOSA, NSA) that impose a complete bar on representation and observed that section 13 uses different language and must be read differently.
- Addressing the contention of repugnancy with section 30 of the Advocates Act, the Court pointed out that section 30 had not been brought into force by the Central Government; therefore the alleged repugnancy did not require adjudication in this appeal.
- Critically, the Court examined the record to determine whether the appellant had made any request before the Family Court for permission to be represented by a legal practitioner. The record showed no such request or contemporaneous complaint; the affidavits filed in support of stay applications alleged only that the appellant was not informed he could take a lawyer and felt handicapped, but did not show that he had formally sought permission below. On this basis, the Court held the appellant could not now raise a constitutional challenge to the provision.
- The Court relied on State of M.P v. Shobha Ram to support the proposition that where the party did not assert a right to counsel at trial or request counsel, the existence of a statutory bar, standing alone, did not afford relief if no prejudice was shown.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Family Court's order dated 17-8-1991 stands. The respondent Smt. Seema's petition under section 125 CrPC is upheld and the appellant Bansidhar remains bound to pay Rs. 400 per month as maintenance from the date of presentation of the petition (25-4-1990).
- On the question of legal representation before Family Courts, the opinion interprets section 13 of the Family Courts Act to mean that a party does not have an absolute entitlement "as of right" to be represented by a legal practitioner; representation is discretionary and may be permitted by the Family Court in the interest of justice (the proviso and scheme of the Act permit assistance of amici and other persons).
- Because section 30 of the Advocates Act had not been brought into force, the Court did not decide any direct conflict between section 13 and section 30. The Court also declined to annul the impugned order on constitutional grounds because the appellant had not sought permission to engage counsel before the Family Court and therefore had not shown prejudice arising from the statutory provision.
- No novel legal principle was laid down beyond the Court's interpretive application of existing authorities and the conclusion that, in the absence of a contemporaneous request for counsel, a collateral attack on section 13 will not succeed. The decision affirms the Family Court's factual findings and sustains the maintenance order.
G.P Mathur, J.:— This appeal has been filed under section 19 of the Family Courts Act against the judgment and order dated 17-8-1991 of the judge, Family Court, Bareilly, whereby the petition moved by respondent Smt. Seema under section 125 CrPC was allowed and the appellant Bansidhar was directed to pay Rs. 400/- per month as maintenance to the respondent from 25-4-1990.
2. The respondent Smt. Seema filed a petition under section 125 CrPC on 25-4-1990 against the appellant Bansidhar claiming Rs. 500/- per month as maintenance. The petition was filed before the Lower Criminal Court 1st. Bareilly. The case of the respondent, in brief, was that she was married to the appellant on 20-5-1989 and thereafter she went to the house of her husband and resided with him at Agra and also performed marital obligations. The parents and other relations of the appellant started ill-treating her immediately after marriage and put pressure upon her to bring more dowry from her parents. On 26-9-1989 the appellant's mother and brother tried to pour kerosene on her and set her on fire but she was any how saved and a first information report of the incident was lodged at P.S Lohamandi, Agra, by her uncle Kaushal Kumar on the basis of which case was registered as Case Crime No. 339 of 1984 under section 498-A IPC. The respondent was turned out of the house on 26-9-1989 after giving her beating and the articles given to her as presentation in the marriage, which was her stridhan, was retained by the appellant's parents and brother. They further told the respondent that in case she wanted to live with her husband, she should bring Rs. 50,000/- from her parents. The case of the respondent further was that her life was not safe in case she lived with the appellant and she might even be murdered. The appellant was carrying on shoe business at Agra and had an income of Rs. 5000/- per month. The respondent was unable to maintain herself and accordingly she prayed that Rs. 500/- per month may be awarded to her as maintenance. The appellant Bansidhar filed a written statement denying the allegations made in the petition filed by the respondent. His case, in brief, was that no dowry was ever demanded from the respondent nor she was ill-treated or assaulted. A false FIR had been lodged against him by the respondent's uncle as he was inimical to him. The allegation in the FIR that an attempt was made to set the respondent on fire after pouring kerosene on her was absolutely false. His case further was that he was merely working was a packer in a shoe shop and was getting only Rs. 400 per month. The res-pondent was an educated lady and she was earning Rs. 800/- per month from tuitions before her marriage. The respondent had refused to live with the appellant and had refused to perform her marital obligations and, therefore, she was not entitled to any maintenance. It was also pleaded that after the receipt of the notice from the respondent the appellant had sent her a reply to come and live with him but she has refused to do so and, therefore, she was not legally entitled to get any maintenance from the appellant.
3. Before the Family Court the respondent examined herself and Kaushal Kumar in support of her case. The appellant Bansidhar examined himself and his father Om Prakash Goel in support of bis case. The copy of the FIR lodged by Kaushal Kumar was also filed which is Ex. Ka. 1 on the record and the appellant filed two documents, namely, copy of the letter dated 24-8-1989 written by his father and a certificate from Prakash Boot House. After considering the evidence on record the learned judge, Family Court, Bareilly, awarded Rs. 400 per month as maintenance to the respondent from the date of presentation of the petition under section 125 CrPC.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have also perus-ed the record.
5. There is no dispute that the marriage of respondent with the appel-lant took place on 20-5-1989. The statement of the respondent shows that she went to her husband's house after her marriage and soon thereafter a demand of Rs. 40,000 was made from her by her husband and his relations. When she expressed inability to satisfy the demand of her husband, he assaulted her and further threatened her that in case the demand of money was not met she would be murdered. She has also narrated the incident which took place on 26-9-1989, when her husband's younger brother and mother attempted to pour kerosene on her and set her on fire She was saved only on account of the timely arrival of her uncle Kaushal Kumar who informed the police. Thereafter the police came and rescued her. She has further stated that her husband was carrying on shoe business and was earning Rs. 5000/- per month. In cross-examination a suggestion was made to her that her husband was working in a foot wear shop but she denied the said suggestion. She also denied the suggestion that she was carrying on some tuition work. No other question was put to her. The respondent's other witness Kaushal Kumar is her uncle. He stated that he bad gone to the Sasural' of the respondent on 10-9-1989 and had tried to persuade her husband and in-laws not to ill-treat her. These persons demanded Rs. 40,000/- but he told them that it was not within his means to pay the aforesaid amount, however, the family members of Bansidhar said that it was necessary to pay the aforesaid amount. He returned after leaving the respondent Smt. Seema in her Sasural. On 17-9-1989 he sent respondent's younger brother Rajiv Kumar to know about her well-being. After returning from there Rajiv Kumar informed that the respondent was not safe in her ‘Sasural. He has also deposed about the incident which took place on 26-9-1989 regarding the attempt made to set the respondent on fire. He has proved the FIR lodged by him, copy of which was filed as Ex. Ka, 1. In cross-examination a suggestion was made to him that he had lodged a false FIR and that he was giving false statement. He, however, denied both the suggestions made to him.
6. The statement of Smt. Seema and Kaushal Kumar appear to be very natural and is also corroborated by the FIR which was lodged on 26-9-1989. The petition under section 125 CrPC has been filed on 25-4-1990. As such, it is difficult to believe that a false FIR was lodged seven months before, in order to create evidence for the case. The evidence on record also shows that almost immediately after marriage the appellant and his family members were ill-treating the respondent and were putting pressure opon her to bring dowry from her parents. They further made an attempt to murder her. In these circumstances we are inclined to accept the statement of Smt. Seema that her life was not safe in the house of her husband and she had no option but to leave her husband's house and live separately otherwise she might have been murdered. Therefore, the respondent Smt. Seema has justifiable grounds to live separately from her husband.
7. We have also examined the evidence adduced by the appellant. No doubt both the appellant and Om Prakash Goel have stated that the marriage was performed without taking any dowry and that they never demanded any dowry from Smt. Seema or her family members. They have farther denied to have ill-treated or made any attempt to set Smt. Seema on fire However, their statement does not inspire confidence. The statement of Smt. Seema and Kaushal Kumar is most natural and appears to be reliable. No Indian lady would like to break her matrimonial home and make absolutely false accusations against her husband without any reason. The version of the respondent finds corroboration by the FIR lodged by Kaushal Kumar on 26-9-1989 and also from the fact that the police rescued her from the house of her-in-laws and handed her over to the safe custody of her uncle, There-fore, we are not inclined to accept the version of the arpellant that no un-toward incident took place or there was no demand of dowry or that the respondent was living separately without just cause.
8. Regarding the quantum of maintenance the learned judge, Family Court, has given good reasons for awarding Rs. 400 per month to the respon-dent. It is admitted fact that the respondent is a post-graduate. Her case is that the appellant is carrying on shoe business and his income is Rs. 5000/- per month. On the contrary the statement of the appellant Bansidhar is that he is working as a packer in a foot wear shop and is getting a salary of Rs. 400 per month. We are not prepared to accept the version of the appel-lant. No-one would marry his post-graduate daughter to a person who is merely working as a packer on a monthly salary of Rs. 400 in a foot wear shop. The certificate of income filed by the appellant is not at all reliable. Such a certificate can be procured easily by any one. The appellant is a young and healthy person. Looking to overall facts and circumstances of the case we are inclined to accept the version of the respondent that the appel-lant is carrying on foot wear business and has substantial income of his own. In these circumstances the amount of Rs. 400 per month awarded to the respondent as maintenance appears to be just and proper. Thus we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the court below awarding Rs. 400 per month as maintenance to the respondent from the date of presentation of the petition.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that though order 3 Rule 1 CPC and section 303 CrPC give a right to a party to appear through a counsel in a proceeding before the civil court or before a criminal court, as the case may be, but the Family Court did not permit the appellant to be represented by a counsel in view of section 13 of the Fimily Courts Act and thus the appellant could not properly defend himself. According to learned counsel the provisions of section 13 of the Family Courts Act are repugnant to section 30 of the Advocate Act which lays down that every Advocate whose name is entered in the State roll shall be entitled, as of right, to practise in all courts including the Supreme Court. Learned counsel further contended that the maintenance amount awarded by the Family Court in proceedings under chapter IX CrPC is recoverable as fine under sub-section (3) of section 125 of the code and the person ordered to pay mainten-ance can also be sentenced to imprisonment and as he is not allowed to be defended by a counsel his fundamental right as enshrined in Article 22(1) of the Constitution is violated.
10. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by the learned counsel it will be useful to quote section 13 of the Act which reads as follows:—
13. Right to legal representation.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, no party to a suit or proceeding before a Family Court shall be entitled, as of right, to be repres-ented by a legal practitioner:
Provided that if the Family Court considers it necessary in the interest of justice, it may seek the assistance of a legal expert as amicus curiae.”
11. The dictionary meaning of the word “right” in the context in which it is used in section 13, is as under:
Chambers : just or legal claims; what one has a just claim to.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary : Something to which one has just claim; a power or privilege vested in a person by the law to demand action or forbearance at the hands of another; a legally enforceable claim against another that the other will do or will not do a given act; a capacity or privilege the enjoyment of which is secured to a person by law.
Wharton's Law Lexicon : It is a liberty of doing or possessing something consistently with law.
The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar : A lawful title or claim to anything, property prerogative, privilege.
12. The expression “as of right” also finds place in section 15 of Easements Act and section 25 of Limitation Act. It is well known principle of interpretation of statutes that use of same words in similar connection in a later statute gives rise to a presumption that they are intended to convey the same meaning as in the earlier statute. When once certain words in an Act of Parliament have received a judicial construction and the Legislature has repeated them, the Legisiature must be taken to have used them according to the meaning which a court of competent jurisdiction has given to them (See in re Lily Isable Thomas, AIR 1964 SC 855 and Vajarvelu v. Special Deputy Collector, AIR 1965 SC 1017, while interpreting section 15 of Easement Act it has been held that ‘enjoyment as of right’ must mean an enjoyment had, not secretly or by stealth, or by tacit sufference or by permission asked from time to time, on each occasion or even on many occasions of using it; but an enjoyment had openly, notoriously without particular leave at the time by a person claiming to use it as a matter of right.
13. The correct meaning of first part of section 13, therefore, is that no party to a suit or proceeding before a Family Court can make a legal claim to be represented by a legal practitioner. But the Family Court can grant leave or permission to a party to be represented by a legal practitioner. The representation by a legal practitioner will, therefore, depend upon the discretion of the Family Court. The section does not impose a complete bar on representation by a legal practitioner. The proviso to section 13 also lends credence to the above view that the Family Court may, in the interest of justice, permit a party to be represented by a counsel.
14. It may be noticed that the language used in the section is different from section 36(3). Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or section 8(e) of Conser-vation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act or section 11(4) of National Security Act which impose a complete bar on representation by a legal practitioner. Clause (1) of Article 22 of the Cons-titution provides that any person arrested and detained in custody shall not be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Clause (3)(b) makes an exception and says that the provisions of clause (1) shall not apply to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. It is under this clause that the provision in the detention laws, which debar representation through legal practitioner, is constitutionally protected. However, when the vires of the aforesaid provisions was challenged a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.K Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271 : AIR 1982 SC 710, observed as follows in para 94 of the report:—
“We must, therefore, hold regretfully though, that the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. It. is, however, necessary to add an important caveat. The reason behind the provisions contained in Art. 22(3)(b) of the Cons-titution clearly is that a legal practitioner should not be permitted to appear before the Advisory Board for any party. The Constitution does not con-template that the detaining authority or the Government should have the facility of appearing before the Advisory Board with the aid of a legal practitioner but that the said facility should be denied to the detenu In any case, that is not what the Constitution says and it would be wholly inappropriate to read any such meaning into the provisions of Art. 22. Permitting the detaining authority or the Govt, to appear before the Advisory Board with the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal advisor would be in breach of Art. 14, if a similar facility is denied to the detenu. We must therefore make it clear that if the detaining authority or the Govt, takes the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser before the Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner”
15. The Court further held that whosoever assists or advises on behalf of the Government Advisory Boards on facts of law must be deemed to be in a position of legal advisor. The scheme of the Family Courts Act shows that while hearing a case it can hear persons other that parties to the dispute. Section 13 permits the Family Courts to take assistance of amicus curiae. Section 5 permits the association of institutions or organisations engaged in social welfare and persons working in the field of social welfare, or professionally engaged in promoting the welfare of the family. In our opinion if the Family Court hears anyone other than a party, as amicus curiae or as legal expert, it must permit a party to be represented by a legal practitio-ner if the said party makes a request to that effect. The scheme of the Act does not show that there is any complete prohibition or representation by a legal practitioner before the Family Courts.
16. So far as the submission made with regard to section 30 of the Advocates Act is concerned may be pointed out that sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act provides that it shall came into force on the date as the Central Government may in the official gazette appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of the Act. Section 30 finds place in chapter IV of the Act while as sections 29, 31, 33 and 34 of Chapter IV have been enforced with effect from 1-6-1969, but section 30 has not yet been enforced by the Central Government. Since section 30 has not yet been enforced the question as repugnancy, as contended by the learned counsel, need not be examined.
17. Now we have to examine whether the appellant moved any appli-cation or made any request before the Family Court for permission to be represented by a legal practitioner. From the record of the case we do not find that any such request was made by the appellant before the Family Court. In the affidavit filed in support of the stay application, which has been sworn on 1-9-1991, the only allegation made in para 25 and para 26 is that the appellant was never informed by the Family judge that he can take assistance of a lawyer and that he was very much handicapped in effectively putting his case on account of lack of legal assistance. The affidavit shows that the appellant never made any attempt to seek permission of the Court for allowing him to engage a lawyer. In fact it appears that he never complained to the court that he was feeling handicapped in effec-tively putting forward his case on account of lack of legal assistance. The appellant filed a supplementary affidavit, which has been sworn on 18-9-1991 and in this affidavit also there is no whisper to the effect that the appellant was denied the assistance of a lawyer though he had made a request to that effect. In these circumstances we are satisfied that the appellant never made a request before the Family Court to permission to engage a lawyer.
18. The next qu:stion which falls for consideration is whether the impugned order should be set aside on the legal contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. Since the appellant made no request before the Family Court for permission to appear through counsel and such a request was not refused, it is not open to him to contend that the provisions of the Act are ultra vires. We are supported in our view by the decision of a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M.P v. Shobha Ram, AIR 1966 SC 1910. In this case accused Sobha Ram was convicted by the Nyay Panchayat but the conviction was set aside by the High Court of M.P on the ground that section 63 of the M.P Panchayat Act, which provided that no legal practitioner shall appear on behalf of any party in any dispute or case before the Nyay Panchayat, was violative of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Hon'ble Sarkar, C.J and Hon'ble Mudholkar, J. held that section 63 was not ultra vires. Hon'ble Bachawat, J. and Hon'ble Shelat, J., though held that section 63 was void as it denied a person a right to be defeaded by a legal practitioner of his choice but reversed the judgment of the High Court on the ground that during the trial the accused never claimed that he should be defended by a counsel and the existence of section 63 on the statute book did not cause him any prejudice. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed in limine.
19. Appeal dismissed.
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