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Smt. Sheelawati And Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation And Another
Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns two first appeals from awards (F.A.F.O. Nos. 578 of 1980 and 673 of 1980) arising out of a single award by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The deceased, Rajeshwar Prasad Tyagi, employed as a Sub-Station Attendant in the Hydel Department, Ghaziabad, U.P., was involved in a fatal road accident on 28.10.1977 when he was struck by a Delhi Transport Corporation bus (No. DHP 2470) driven by respondent No. 2. The deceased died on the spot. The claimants are the widow, Sheelawati, and four minor children (petitioners Nos. 2–5), who claimed damages totalling Rs. 2,35,000/-. The Tribunal found the accident resulted from rash and negligent driving by the bus driver. The Tribunal calculated compensation, awarded interest at 6% per annum from the date of judgment until payment, and passed an award dated 21.5.1980. Both the claimants and the Delhi Transport Corporation filed appeals against that award.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the widow (Sheelawati) is entitled to compensation for loss of consortium and, if so, the appropriate amount.
- Whether interest on the award is payable from the date of the petition (claim) or from the date of the judgment, in light of Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
- Whether amounts such as gratuity, provident fund, pension or insurance proceeds received by the claimants should be taken into account and deducted from the compensation awarded.
- What proportion of the deceased's income should be treated as personal expenses (i.e., what deduction should be made for the deceased's own maintenance) — specifically whether the Tribunal's deduction of 1/6th was proper.
- Whether and to what extent a deduction should be made to account for the fact that compensation is paid as a lump sum (i.e., the appropriate percentage deduction, if any, for lump-sum payment/uncertainty).
Arguments of the Parties
Claimants' (Appellants') Arguments
- The widow (Sheelawati) claimed Rs. 50,000 for loss of consortium; the Tribunal did not award any amount under this head.
- The claimants argued that interest should be awarded from the date of the petition (the date of making the claim) rather than from the date of the judgment.
Respondent's (Delhi Transport Corporation) Arguments
- The Corporation contended that amounts such as insurance, gratuity, provident fund, pension, etc., which become payable on the death of the employee, ought to be taken into account and the compensation reduced accordingly.
- The Corporation argued that the deceased would have spent half of his income on himself; accordingly, the Tribunal's deduction of only 1/6th for personal expenses was incorrect.
- The Corporation further contended that a larger deduction (commonly 25–30%) should be made on account of lump-sum payment/uncertainty rather than the 1/6th deduction made by the Tribunal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulsi Devi, 1988 ACJ 962 (Rajasthan) | Recognizing entitlement to compensation for loss of consortium on the death of a spouse. | Cited as authority that a living spouse is entitled to compensation for loss of consortium; used to justify awarding some compensation to Sheelawati. |
| Sohan Lal v. Bal Swaroop Bal Bhatnagar, 1987 ACJ 113 (Rajasthan) | Also cited for the proposition that compensation for loss of consortium is proper; additionally referenced in the context of lump-sum deduction jurisprudence. | Relied on to support award of consortium damages and discussed in relation to the approach courts take to lump-sum deductions (noting differing treatments and reasoning). |
| Damyanti Devi v. Sita Devi, 1972 ACJ 334 (P&H) | Authority indicating deduction for gratuity/pension/Provident Fund/insurance should not be made from compensation. | Used by the Tribunal and by this Court to reject the Corporation's contention that such benefits should reduce the compensation payable by the wrongdoer. |
| Bhagwanti Devi v. Ish Kumar, 1975 ACJ 56 (Delhi) | Similar principle: gratuity/pension/Provident Fund/insurance not deductible when fixing compensation for death. | Cited to support the view that these amounts are not to be treated as pecuniary benefits that reduce tort compensation. |
| Prem Devi Pandey v. Dayal Singh, 1976 ACJ 407 (Delhi) | Two points: (a) cited for treating family income division equally among family members (as Tribunal relied on it), and (b) cited among cases refusing deduction of provident fund/pension/gratuity. | The Tribunal relied on this case for its approach to dividing income; this Court contrasted it with other cases and used it as part of the survey of approaches to apportioning income among dependants. |
| Saminder Kaur v. Union of India, 1987 ACJ 7 (Gauhati) | Held that family pension, provident fund/pension/gratuity and life insurance should not be treated as benefits to be deducted from compensation; articulated reasons why such amounts are not pecuniary benefits for the tortfeasor. | Relied on strongly by the Court to reject the Corporation's submission; the Court quoted the principles from this decision on family pension, deferred payments, and life insurance to support non-deduction. |
| Devki Devi Tiwari v. Raghunath Sahai Chatrath, 1978 ACJ 169 (Allahabad) | Held that half of the deceased's earnings may reasonably be taken as spent on himself. | Quoted to show there is no uniform rule; the Court considered it in determining the proper proportion to allow as the deceased's personal maintenance in the present facts. |
| Sundari Devi v. Dilip Kumar Sabat, 1979 ACJ 84 (Orissa) | Authority relied on by the Tribunal for making a deduction of 1/6th on account of lump-sum payment. | The Tribunal relied on this case to make a 1/6th deduction for lump-sum payment; this Court reviewed that approach and ultimately did not interfere with the Tribunal's deduction in the present facts. |
| Mohinder Kaur v. Manphool Singh, 1973 ACJ 515 (Delhi) | Illustrates a case where a 30% deduction was allowed for lump-sum payment. | Cited by the Corporation to argue for larger deductions; the Court discussed it as part of the range of authorities and trends but did not adopt a larger deduction in this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a step-by-step review of the Tribunal's award and the issues raised in the appeals, applying relevant legal principles and cited authorities strictly as found in the record:
- Loss of consortium: The Tribunal had not considered the claim for loss of consortium (Rs. 50,000 claimed). The Court observed established authority that a surviving spouse is entitled to compensation for loss of consortium and cited National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulsi Devi and Sohan Lal v. Bal Swaroop Bal Bhatnagar. On the facts (including the age of the deceased), the Court concluded that some compensation should be awarded and fixed the amount at Rs. 10,000 to Sheelawati.
- Interest: The Court considered Section 110-CC of the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, noting that interest is admissible from a date not earlier than the date of making the claim. Given that the accident occurred in October 1977 and the claim was made thereafter, the Court found no reason to award interest only from the date of judgment. It held that interest should be awarded from the date of the petition (the date of the claim), not from the judgment date.
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Deduction of gratuity, provident fund, pension, insurance: The Corporation's contention that these amounts should be offset against the compensation was rejected. The Court relied on authorities cited by the Tribunal (including Damyanti Devi, Bhagwanti Devi, and Prem Devi Pandey) and particularly the Gauhati High Court decision in Saminder Kaur. The Court summarized the reasoning from Saminder Kaur:
- Family pension should not be used to reduce tortfeasor liability because it would allow the wrongdoer to benefit.
- Provident fund, pension or gratuity are deferred payments arising from the deceased's service and would have been payable irrespective of the manner of death; they are not pecuniary benefits to be deducted.
- Life insurance proceeds result from a contractual arrangement premised on premiums paid by the deceased and therefore should not be deducted from compensation.
- Deduction for deceased's personal expenses (proportion of income spent on self): The Tribunal had divided the deceased's income by six (family of six) effectively resulting in a 1/6th deduction for the deceased's personal expenses. The Court reviewed conflicting precedent: Prem Devi Pandey (equal division) and Devki Devi Tiwari (half of earnings treated as spent on self), and observed there is no hard and fast rule. Considering the specific facts — a family consisting of the deceased, his wife and four minor children and a modest income (noted as Rs. 417 per month in the opinion, and an annual income earlier recorded as Rs. 5,009.10) — the Court found that it was reasonable to conclude the deceased would have spent about one-third of his income on himself and contributed two-thirds to family expenses. Consequently, the Court adjusted the per-claimant contribution calculation so that each claimant's annual share of the deceased's contribution was assessed at Rs. 668 per annum.
- Deduction for lump-sum payment/uncertainty: The Tribunal had allowed a deduction of 1/6th relying on Sundari Devi v. Dilip Kumar Sabat. The Corporation argued for a higher deduction (25–30%) citing cases such as Mohinder Kaur and instances where courts made 25% or 30% deductions. The Court examined the line of authority and the evolving approach (including concerns about inflation and the time gap between claim and payment) and emphasized that there is no rigid rule: the appropriate deduction must be judged on facts and circumstances. Given the modest amounts involved, the minor status of several claimants, and the Tribunal's award of 6% interest, the Court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's deduction and therefore rejected the Corporation's contention for a larger deduction.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeals were allowed in part. The Court modified aspects of the Tribunal's award while upholding other elements:
- Loss of consortium: The Court awarded Rs. 10,000 to the widow, Sheelawati, for loss of consortium (the Tribunal had not awarded any amount under this head).
- Interest: Interest on the award is to run from the date of the petition (date of claim) rather than from the date of judgment, under the interpretation of Section 110-CC (old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939).
- Benefits such as gratuity, provident fund, pension and life insurance: The Court rejected the Corporation's contention that these amounts should be deducted from the compensation. The Court followed the line of authority (including Saminder Kaur) that treats these amounts as not reducing tortfeasor liability.
- Deduction for deceased's personal expenses: On the facts the Court adjusted the approach and concluded that the deceased would have spent about one-third of his income on himself, yielding an assessed per-claimant contribution of Rs. 668 per annum.
- Lump-sum deduction: The Court declined to increase the Tribunal's deduction (which was 1/6th) and found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's decision on this ground.
Implications: The direct effects are adjustments in the compensation calculation for the claimants (award of Rs. 10,000 for consortium to the widow; interest payable from date of petition; recalibration of the deceased's personal expense deduction to one-third; rejection of deductions for gratuity/pension/provident fund/insurance; and validation of the Tribunal's lump-sum deduction). The opinion applies and follows existing precedents; it does not purport to lay down a new universal rule — rather it reiterates that many of these matters depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Additional Notes
The opinion states that the Tribunal's specific per-claimant award calculations were set out "below" in the reported judgment text; those detailed numerical distributions are not included in the excerpt provided here. Consequently, the exact resulting monetary award per claimant as finally computed by the Court (after applying the adjustments described) is not available in the provided text.
1. Both these F.A.F.Os. arise out of the same award given by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and are being disposed of by a common order.
2. Rajeshwar Prasad Tyagi was employed as Sub-Station Attendant in the Hydel Department, Ghaziabad, U.P. At about 4.00 p.m. on 28.10.1977, while he was going to attend to his duties, he met with an accident by bus No. DHP 2470 driven by Sri Prakash, respondent No. 2, owned by Delhi Transport Corporation and died on the spot. Sheelawati is the widow and petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 are the minor daughters and son of the deceased. They have preferred the claim.
3. According to the claimants' case Rajeshwar Prasad Tyagi was coming on the bicycle on the patri of the road from the Meerut side while the bus was going towards Meerut side and the driver tried to overtake a motor cycle by driving at high speed. In the process it hit the cycle and dragged the deceased and the cycle to some distance resulting in the death of Rajeshwar Prasad Tyagi on the spot. The claimants filed a claim for Rs. 2,35,000/-. The Tribunal found the accident on account of rash and negligent driving by the driver. This finding has not been challenged before us. After considering the evidence and the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal found that the amounts payable to each of the claimants would be as given below:
It accordingly passed an award dated 21.5.1980 granting these amounts along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the judgment till the date of payment. Being aggrieved by this award the claimants have preferred F.A.F.O. No. 578 of 1980 and Delhi Transport Corporation F.A.F.O. No. 673 of 1980.
4. After taking into consideration what amount he would have got at the time of the retirement, the learned Tribunal held annual income to be Rs. 5,009.10. The family consisted of himself, his wife, unmarried minor daughters and unmarried minor son. He divided the amount by six. Thereby, according to the Tribunal, 5/6th income was to be spent equally on each of the claimants, i.e., Rs. 834.00 per annum. He was further of the opinion that Manju, Baby, Anju and Titu were to get the benefit for 9, 13, 18 and 13 years respectively. He further awarded Rs. 4,000/- as marriage expenses for each child. According to him, Sheelawati might have got the benefit for 24 years during the service of the deceased and for 12 1/2 years thereafter. He also awarded Rs. 600/- per claimant on another ground. The period for which each of the claimants were to be benefited in case the deceased remained alive has not been challenged nor the award of Rs. 4,600/- per claimant on two counts as mentioned above has been challenged before us. According to the Corporation the amount of insurance, gratuity, pension etc. should have also been taken into consideration and the compensation should have been reduced. This contention was not accepted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal reduced the 1/6th of the compensation amount on account of lump sum payment. After calculating the compensation in the light of the above, the Tribunal found each of the claimants to be entitled to the amount as mentioned above.
5. In F.A.F.O. No. 578 of 1980 preferred by the claimants, it has been contended that Sheelawati, widow, was deprived of the company of her husband and as such the amount by way of loss of consortium should have been granted and Rs. 50,000/- has been claimed in the petition towards the same. The other contention was that the interest should have been awarded from the date of the petition and not from the date of judgment. The Delhi Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') has challenged the award mainly on three grounds, namely: firstly, that the amount of insurance, gratuity, provident fund etc. should have been considered and the compensation amount should have been accordingly reduced, secondly, that the deceased would have spent half of the income on himself and as such the deduction of 1/6th income only on that account is wrong and thirdly, that atleast l/3rd deduction should have been made on account of lump sum payment.
6. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records.
7. In the petition Rs. 50,000/- has been claimed for loss of consortium. No amount has been awarded by the Tribunal. This matter has not been at all considered by it. In our opinion, it is quite established that in case of the death of one spouse, living spouse is entitled to compensation for the loss of consortium. Such compensation has been awarded in the cases of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulsi Devi 1988 ACJ 962 (Rajasthan) and Sohan Lal v. Bal Swaroop Bal Bhatnagar 1987 ACJ 113 (Rajasthan). Therefore, some compensation should have been awarded under this head. The amount will vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case. Considering the facts of the case and the age of the deceased, we are of the opinion that Rs. 10,000/- should be awarded as compensation under this head to Sheelawati.
8. As regards the question of interest under Section 110-CC of the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the interest admissible was from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim. In the instant case the accident look place in October, 1977. There appears no reason why the interest should have not been awarded from the date of the petition. We, therefore, find that interest should have been awarded from the date of the petition and not from the date of the judgment.
9. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Corporation is that on account of the death of the victim the claimants have become entitled to the gratuity, provident fund and insurance money and as such this amount will amount to the benefit derived by the claimants on account of death of Rajeshwar Prasad. In our opinion the contention of the learned Counsel for the Corporation cannot be accepted. The learned Tribunal has itself cited some cases that is: Damyanti Devi v. Sita Devi 1972 ACJ 334 (P&H), Bhagwanti Devi v. Ish Kumar 1975 ACJ 56 (Delhi) and Prem Devi Pandey v. Dayal Singh 1976 ACJ 407 (Delhi), in which deduction on account of gratuity, pension, provident fund and insurance was not allowed. Therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent is without any force. Moreover, the matter also stands concluded by the Gauhati High Court decision in the case of Saminder Kaur v. Union of India 1987 ACJ 7 (Gauhati). In this case it has been held that:
Family Pension: The widow of a Government employee would be entitled to family pension under the service conditions. We do not think that it is a benefit received by the widow and the wrongdoer should be allowed to take advantage of the family pension and gain by it.
Provident Fund, Pension or Gratuity. Provident fund, or pension, or gratuity are deferred payments of satisfactory service, savings and contributions of the deceased employee. These amounts his family would have in any case been entitled to get whether the employee died a natural death or died in an accident. They ought not to be taken into consideration for determining the amount of just compensation as they cannot be termed as pecuniary benefits.
Life Insurance: Payment received for life insurance cannot also be considered as a benefit received by the widow or dependants of the deceased. Insurance money was payable because premiums were paid by the deceased and a contract was entered into for such payment on death. The tortfeasor cannot be permitted to gain by the deduction of the insurance policy amount.
We, therefore, find that the deduction as claimed by the Corporation on this ground was rightly rejected by the learned Tribunal.
10. The next point for consideration is whether the deduction of l/6th of the income towards the expenses incurred by the deceased on himself is proper or not. The Tribunal has relied on the case of Prem Devi Pandey v. Dayal Singh 1976 ACJ 407 (Delhi), wherein whole income of the family was divided equally amongst the members of the family of the deceased. However, in the case of Devki Devi Tiwari v. Raghunath Sahai Chatrath 1978 ACJ 169 (Allahabad), half of the amount of the earnings was taken to have been spent by the deceased in maintaining himself. There can be no hard and fast rule in this regard. It is common knowledge that earning member, if in service in some office, has to go to and come from the office. He has to spend several hours per day in the office. His personal expenses, what may be called as pocket expenses, will not only be more than the minor dependant but also more than the adult dependant.
Therefore, normally to divide the whole income equally amongst the members of the family of the deceased may not be a proper criterion. In the instant ease the family of the deceased consisted of himself, his wife and four minor children. The income was merely Rs. 417/- per month. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, in our opinion he must be spending about 1/3rd of the income upon himself and he must be contributing 2/3rd of his income for expenses towards other family members. Therefore, his contribution towards each of the claimants would come to Rs. 668/- per annum.
11. Lastly, the Tribunal has given a reduction of l/6th on account of lump sum payment relying on the case of Sundari Devi v. Dilip Kumar Sabat 1979 ACJ 84 (Orissa). On the other hand, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Corporation is that these deductions on this ground are generally allowed by the courts from 25 per cent to 30 per cent. In the case of Mohinder Kaur v. Manphool Singh 1973 ACJ 515 (Delhi), 30 per cent deduction was allowed on account of lump sum payment. In the case of Sohan Lal v. Bal Swaroop Bal Bhatnagar 1987 ACJ 113 (Rajasthan), 25 per cent deduction was made on account of lump sum payment. But the Division Bench did not allow this deduction on account of the fact that there had been a steep fall in the value of rupee and also there had been inflation and rise of prices. It has been held that:
Thus it can be said that at one time the deduction of some amount from the compensation on account of uncertainties of life and lump sum payment was considered proper but fall in the value of rupee and the rising inflation have led the courts to take a view that deductions should not be made from compensation payable to the claimants. It may be stated that the effect of rising prices and inflation is felt when the compensation payable is paid after a long time. In several cases the period between the date of the submission of the claim and the date on which the compensation is actually paid to the claimants is more than a decade, during which the economic situation in the country undergoes a vast change. If the compensation awarded is paid to the claimants soon after the decision of the Claims Tribunal, then the effect of the fall in the purchasing power of the money will not be as deep rooted as it would be if the money is paid after ten years when the appeal is decided. Hence, some significance is to be attached to the time when the compensation is actually paid to the claimants after the submission of the claim.
Thus again there cannot be any hard and fast rule. The matter should be judged from the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, the amount coming to the share of the claimants is not much. Four of the claimants were minor. The rate of interest awarded was 6 per cent per annum only. In the circumstances we are of the opinion that no interference is called for in the deduction made on this account and the contention raised on behalf of the learned Counsel for the Corporation is accordingly rejected.
12. The total compensation of each of the claimants calculated in the light of the above discussions will be as below:
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