Panna Lal Agyan And Others v. Hon'Ble Speaker, Sri Balram Jakgad, And Others

Ravi S. Dhavan, J.:— A Hon'ble Member of Parliament was about to or had submitted resignation to resign his seat in Parliament from the constituency he represented to the Speaker. Upon this had followed this writ petition before this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The resignation submitted by the Member of Parliament is under clause (3) of Article 101 of the Constitution of India. The reliefs sought in the writ petition are in effect (a) a writ of mandamus to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha directing him not to accept the resignation should he receive it, (b) a writ of mandamus to the Prime Minister restraining him from recommending the resignation of the Member of Parliament, if made and (c) a writ of mandamus to the Member of Parliament to withdraw his resignation, if made. There is a fourth relief sought also under what is ‘deemed fit and proper’ clause which seeks a relief from the Court to secure the ends of justice to save democracy. The petitioners upon their narration in the petition were not sure whether the resignation has been tendered. The petitioners refer to the resignation, as alleged resignation.

2. The Hon'ble Member of Parliament is Mr. Amitabh Bachchan. The constitutency — Allahabad. Before asking the petitioners their locus standi to present this petition, this Court required them to be sure or to satisfy this Court that it may have jurisdiction to interfere in a matter such as in issue in the writ petition. This Court put the proposition to the petitioners that the resignation, of which an issue was being made, is a resignation contemplated under clause (3)(b) of Art. 101 of the Constitution and that this is a matter between Member of Parliament and the Speaker. This action is personal to the Member of Parliament, and the satisfaction in accepting the resignation is exclusive to the discretion of the Speaker. Would it be proper for this Court to issue a writ as to either of these persons? To accept or not to accept a resignation of a Member of parliament is the conduct of business with which the Speaker is vested with discretion to accept it or to reject it. Can this Court interfere with this discretion? The propriety apart, generally, this Court put the proposition to the petitioners that if clause (2) of Article 122 inhibits the discretion vested in this Court to restrain it from exercising it, may tantamount to interfere with the conduct of business or procedure to be followed by an officer and Member of Parliament, in reference to a right conferred.

3. This Court did not receive any satisfactory argument from the learned counsel for the petitioners except a submission which has no relevance in law or constitutional propriety. The submission was that a Member of Parliament cannot resign without taking leave of the electorate, a situation that is well nigh impossible. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted his argument to support the petition on the strength of a case reported in AIR 1952 Madh Bha 31; Anand Bihari v. Ram Sahay. Beyond this he had nothing further to say. This case, reflecting on the scope of quo warranto sought against the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat, out of context and not applicable.

4. In reference to the context, this is a matter where this Court did not consider it appropriate to entertain the present petition and interfere with a discretion which is personal to the Member of Parliament to resign and further the discretion vested with the Speaker to accept or not to accept the resignation. The submission of resignation by a Member of Parliament in reference to Article 101 of the Constitution of India is a unilateral act upon which no restraint can be put by a Court. The ethics or morality of resignation is also outside the purview of the Court and is a matter personal to the Member of Parliament. The acceptance of the resignation is a matter of consideration for the Speaker and he alone will be the judge whether the resignation ought to be accepted or not. It is the domain of the Speaker if from information received or otherwise and after making such enquiry as he thinks fit, and therefore being satisfied whether the resignation is voluntary or genuine and if it ought to be accepted or not. This Court then cannot read anything in between the lines of Art. 101 so as to sugest that a Member of Parliament cannot resign or that in reference to a resignation, if submitted, Speaker cannot consider its acceptance.

5. It is not for this Court, thus, to interfere with what otherwise is a subject matter of enquiry and satisfaction of the Speaker. Upon a resignation being submitted and forwarded to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, it is not the business of this Court to intrude into a discretion which the Constitution requires of the Speaker. Should the petitioners desire to express anything on the resignation of the Member of Parliament then this Court is not the forum for it. If what they have to say partakes of the nature of information received by the Speaker, then the satisfaction of the Speaker to accept or not to accept the resignation is exclusively at his discretion.

6. There may be an occasion when this Court has and will protect the liberty of a citizen, so guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, if there is unwarranted interference with it otherwise than in accordance with law. Such is not the case here. In matters which are exclusive to the business of the Parliament or the State legislature, and relate to the discharge of discretion or power vested in a Member of Parliament or an officer of it, the jurisdiction of this Court to interefere has been curtailed under the Constitution.

7. While reserving scrutiny of a grievance on the petition of a citizen seeking redress under deprivation of liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, in matters relating to the internal procedure and conduct of proceedings, in reference to the context, the High Court cannot interfere.

8. In this regard there are cases of the English courts which reflects on the affairs which are exclusive to Parliament. Bradlaugh v. Gosset, (1884) 12 QBD 271 is one such case. In this case it was laid down, upon examination of the history of the privileges of the legislature and the scope of interference by courts, that in a matter relating to the internal management of the procedure of the House of Commons, the Court of Queen's Bench had no power to interfere. In Bradlaugh v. Gosset (supra) for certain reason the Speaker of the House of Commons declined to administer the oath, by law prescribed, when the plaintiff Charles Bradlaugh wasduly elected a burgess to serve in the House of Commons for Northampton. An action was brought before the Queen's Bench Division; the High Court declined to interfere. Between the three Judges, the judgments were delivered by Lord Coleridge, C.J and Stephen, J. with Mathew, J. concurring. This case is noticed on the issue which it settled, in re: under Art. 143 of the Constitution of India; in the matter of Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, AIR 1965 SC 745. The latter case was on another matter. A controversy settled on the powers, privileges and immunities of the legislature, and how far they are subject to fundamental rights.

9. This Court would resent interference in its proceedings or its discretion, a restraint already settled by the Constitution under Art. 121. Likewise, in a matter relating to the conduct of a Member of Parliament in reference to a resignation submitted by him or the acceptance of it or the rejection of it, is the business of the Parliament alone upon which this Court ought not to comment, nor should this court comment on a matter under the discretion of the Speaker, to arrive at satisfaction to accept the resignation or not to accept it.

10. The filing of this writ petition particularly by members of the Bar was indiscreet when the discipline of the Constitution, in reference to the context, was clearly explicit that upon the resignation of a Member of Parliament there is no duality of jurisdiction to monitor or control the Resignation. It is the business of the Parliament, to be acted upon by the Speaker.

11. We are further constrained to make observations on the manner in which the writ petition has been presented. We were not about to exercise our discretion upon it on merits. But, a circumstance like this must not be without comment for posterity. We have already commented above that the petitioners were not even sure whether the resignation had been submitted, or not submitted, or forwarded to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.

12. The pleadings in the writ petition are less law and more inanity on why a Member of Parliament ought not to resign, a circumstance with which the Court is not concerned. The entire information which the petitioners have gathered is from newspapers and for the averments of the facts presented they are not prepared to accept personal responsibility and yet have sought to seek writs, orders and directions from this Court in the face of the edict of the Constitution that subject matters of such a nature cannot be enquired into by this Court.

13. The writ petition was ill advised and was an indiscreet act in an attempt which could have embarrassed the jurisdiction of this High Court should it have remained pending for any reason whatsoever.

14. The writ petition is dismissed.

15. Petition dismissed.