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Ram Sewak Dubey And Others v. Smt. Ajirana And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The present Second Appeal was filed by the defendant-appellants challenging the judgment and decree dated 22-12-1980 of the Additional Civil Judge, Gorakhpur (Appeal No. 191 of 1978), which had allowed the appeal of the original plaintiff and set aside the trial Court's dismissal of the suit (Original Suit No. 693 of 1968). The original plaintiff, Smt. Rituraji, sued for cancellation of a sale deed dated 24-1-1969, alleging it was executed by fraud and undue influence. She claimed that after her husband's death she lived with her daughter and defendant No.1 (her son-in-law), who brought her to Gorakhpur for medical check-up and induced her to put thumb impressions on blank papers, which were later used to create the sale deed transferring her entire agricultural holdings. She alleged the deed was never read or explained to her and no consideration had been paid.
The defendants contested the suit, asserting that Smt. Rituraji was indebted and voluntarily agreed to sell her holdings to defendant No.1 for Rs. 6,000, of which Rs. 4,500 was allegedly paid at her residence and Rs. 1,500 before the Sub-Registrar. The trial Court (3rd Additional Munsif) framed two issues and dismissed the suit, finding the plaintiff had not proved her allegations. The plaintiff appealed; the lower appellate court (Additional Civil Judge, sitting as appellate court) reversed the trial Court, found the sale deed to be the outcome of fraud and undue influence, held that consideration did not pass, and cancelled the sale deed. The defendants then filed the present Second Appeal to the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sale deed dated 24-1-1969 was liable to cancellation in view of the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the plaint (i.e., allegations of fraud and undue influence)?
- To what relief was the plaintiff entitled?
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments (as set out in the plaint and appellate pleadings)
- The sale deed dated 24-1-1969 was obtained by fraud and undue influence; the plaintiff (Smt. Rituraji) is an illiterate woman who was induced, by defendant No.1 (her son-in-law), to put her thumb impressions on blank stamped papers which were later used to prepare the deed.
- The deed was never read over or explained to her; no consideration ever passed for the sale of her agricultural holdings.
- The marginal witnesses were personal relations of defendant No.1 and not independent witnesses; therefore the deed's genuineness is in doubt.
- The acknowledgment said to evidence payment of Rs. 4,500 was not produced in Court and thus payment was not proved.
Defendants' Arguments
- The plaintiff was in debt and voluntarily offered to sell her holdings; defendant No.1 purchased the property for Rs. 6,000.
- Payment of the purchase price was made: Rs. 4,500 at the plaintiff's residence and Rs. 1,500 before the Sub-Registrar; an acknowledgment for Rs. 4,500 was alleged to exist.
- The sale deed was duly executed, registered and carries prima facie probative value (including the Sub-Registrar's endorsement).
- The lower appellate court misread and wrongly reappreciated evidence, warranting interference in this Second Appeal (reliance placed upon cases holding High Court may interfere where there is misreading of evidence).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Govindraja Gounder v. Narayanaswami Pillai, 1969 SCD 624 | Where findings of fact recorded by the court below are based on misreading of evidence, the High Court is justified in interfering. | The Court acknowledged and agreed with the legal proposition but found that counsel for the appellants failed to identify any specific misreading by the lower appellate court; therefore the principle did not justify interference in this case. |
| Mehanga Singh v. Sunder Chand, 1969 SCD 781 | Same principle: High Court justified in interfering where the court below misread evidence in recording findings of fact. | The Court accepted the principle but held it inapplicable because the lower appellate court had properly and carefully reviewed the oral and documentary evidence; no misreading was demonstrated. |
| Radha Nath Seal v. Haripada Jana, AIR 1971 SC 1049 | Same principle regarding interference by appellate courts upon misreading of evidence. | The Court agreed with the legal proposition, but found the appellants had not shown the lower appellate court misread evidence; thus it did not lead to overturning the appellate findings. |
| Daya Shankar v. Smt. Bachi, AIR 1982 All 376 | In order to prove the genuineness of a document the burden lies on the person enjoying a dominating position (i.e., who is in a position to have abused influence), not on the person challenging the document. | The Court relied on this principle to affirm that, because the plaintiff was an illiterate woman living with the son-in-law, the burden was on defendants to prove due execution and payment of consideration; the defendants failed to discharge that burden. |
| V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 | The High Court cannot interfere with conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate court, however erroneous they may appear to the High Court; Section 100 CPC does not confer jurisdiction to correct such errors of fact. | The Court invoked this authority to emphasize the limited scope of interference in second appeal and to uphold the lower appellate court's conclusions of fact where no misreading or legal error warranting interference was demonstrated. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The High Court listened to counsel and examined the record. The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps (as reflected in the opinion):
- Accepted the factual premise relied upon by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff, Smt. Rituraji, was an illiterate woman, which has legal significance for burden of proof when a document is challenged on grounds of fraud or undue influence.
- Reviewed the evidentiary findings of the lower appellate court: a witness (D.W.3, Bajrang Sahai — the scribe) admitted that when the stamp papers were presented for scribing they already bore the plaintiff's thumb impressions; a marginal witness (D.W.2, Gauri Shankar) was a relation of defendant No.1; the alleged acknowledgment for Rs. 4,500 was not produced in Court though its existence was asserted; evidence of bank withdrawal (D.W.5) was not supported by relevant banking papers.
- Noted that the lower appellate court disbelieved defendants' explanations (for example, that the acknowledgment had been returned to the plaintiff upon request) and found those explanations unconvincing. The lower appellate court also held that the endorsement of the Sub-Registrar, while carrying presumptive value, did not override evaluation of surrounding circumstances and documentary gaps.
- Applied the legal principle (cited from Daya Shankar) that where a dominant person benefits from a challenged document, the burden to prove genuineness and payment of consideration rests on that person; here, the defendants (in the position of advantage) failed to discharge the burden of proving execution and payment.
- Addressed the appellants' contention—reliant on authorities permitting interference where there is misreading of evidence—by observing that the appellants' counsel did not point out any specific misreading by the lower appellate court. The High Court found that the lower appellate court had carefully and correctly weighed oral and documentary evidence.
- Invoked the settled principle from V. Ramachandra Ayyar that the High Court's power of interference in second appeal with findings of fact is constrained; absent a demonstrated misreading or relevant legal error, the High Court should not disturb concurrent appellate findings of fact.
On that basis, the High Court concluded the lower appellate court's findings that the deed was obtained by fraud and undue influence and that consideration was not paid were not amenable to interference in this second appeal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. By dismissing the second appeal, the High Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court which had allowed the plaintiff's appeal and cancelled the sale deed dated 24-1-1969.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The cancellation of the sale deed dated 24-1-1969 as ordered by the lower appellate court stands; the defendant-appellants' challenge fails and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
- Scope of precedent: The Court applied existing precedents to clarify the proper allocation of burden (especially where an illiterate or dominated person is involved) and the limited scope for disturbing findings of fact in a second appeal. The opinion does not purport to announce new law; it applies established principles to the record before it.
1. This Second Appeal has been preferred by the defendant-appellants against the judgment and decree dated 22-12-1980 passed by Sri G.S Pandey, Additional Civil Judge, Gorakhpur, in Appeal No. 191 of 1978 by which the appeal preferred by the plaintiff-respondents was allowed and the judgment and decree dated 15-3-1978 passed by the 3rd Additional Munsif, Gorakhpur, in Original Suit No. 693 of 1968 dismissing the suit was set aside.
2. The original plaintiff Smt. Rituraji brought a suit for the cancellation of the sale deed dated 24-1-1969 alleged to have been executed by her in favour of the defendants on the allegations that after the death of her husband she was left with one daughter alone; that one of the daughters of the plaintiff was married to defendant No. 1 while defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were the collaterals of defendant No. 1; that after the death of the plaintiffs husband defendant No. 1 was looking after her and he started living with the plaintiff; that defendant No. 1 proposed to the plaintiff for a medical check up of her eyes and ears on account of the old age and brought her to Gorakhpur; that defendant No. 1 impressed upon the plaintiff that some document be executed by her so that her property may be divided equally amongst her daughters; that on the said pretext the plaintiffs thumb impressions on several blank papers were obtained by defendant No. 1; that sometime in June, 1969 the plaintiff could over-hear about the execution of the sale deed and on inspection it was revealed that the alleged sale deed which was said to have been executed by the plaintiff was the outcome of fraud and undue influence; that the alleged sale deed was never executed by her nor it was ever read over or explained to her; that no consideration had ever passed; that the marginal witnesses of the sale deed were none else but the nephew of defendant No. 1 and the other one a resident of the village of defendant No. 1; and that the alleged sale deed covered the entire agricultural holdings of the plaintiff. The defendants contested the suit alleging that the plaintiff was burdened with loans and he required money to pay them off; that she herself offered and agreed to sell her holdings in favour of defendant No. 1; that defendant No. 1 purchased it for Rs. 6000/- out of which Rs. 4500/- were paid to the plaintiff at her residence while the remaining amount of Rs. 1500/- was paid to her before the Sub-Registrar, and that the allegations of fraud and undue influence made by the plaintiff were wrong.
3. On a perusal of the pleadings of the parties the learned Munsif framed two issues which are to the following effect:
1. Whether the sale deed dated 24-1-1969 was liable to cancellation in view of the allegations as contained in para 11 of the plaint?
2. To what relief was the plaintiff entitled?
4. The learned Munsiff on the basis of the evidence on record held that the plaintiff had failed to establish the plaint allegations and had also failed to prove her contentions. The suit was accordingly dismissed as already indicated above.
5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 15-3-1978 passed by the trial Court the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the court of the District Judge, Gorakhpur, which was transferred to the court of the Additional Civil Judge for disposal.
6. The lower appellate court found that admittedly the plaintiff was an illiterate lady and as such the burden of proving due execution of the sale deed and the passing of actual consideration was on the defendants (vendees) which they failed to discharge. It has also been held by the lower appellate court that the consideration of Rs. 6000/- being the price of the agricultural holdings never passed on to the plaintiff. The evidence of D.W 2 Gauri Shankar, who was a marginal witness to the deed, is admittedly a relation of defendant No. 1. This witness admitted in his cross-examination that on being paid Rs. 4500/- the plaintiff Smt. Riturajihad issued an acknowledgment and given it D.W 4 Ram Bilas. The lower appellate court has found that the amount of Rs. 4500/- and Rs. 1500/- were never paid as consideration to the plaintiff. The lower appellate court has observed that the document evidencing the acknowledgment was not produced in court and the non-production of such an important document which would have been the best piece of evidence for the passing of the consideration casts a doubt about the payment as well as the genuineness of the deed in question. Further it has been found by the lower appellate court that D.W 3 Bajrang Sahai, the scribe of the deed, had stated that at the time when the stamped papers were brought before him for scribing the matter on the document it bore the thumb impressions of Smt. Rituraji, the plaintiff, thereby indicating that some fraud had been perpetrated. This statement of D.W 3 Bajrang Sahai has been contradicted by D.W 4 Ram Bilas who is one of the vendees. As regards the acknowledgment D.W 4 Ram Bilas stated that on being demanded by the plaintiff Smt. Rituraji the acknowledgment was returned to her. The statement of D.W 5 Ram Sewak that he withdrew the money from the Bank was disbelieved by the lower appellate court as the relevant papers showing such withdrawal from the Bank had not been produced. The submission on behalf of the defendants that the endorsement of the Sub-Registrar carried higher degree of presumptive value as regards the character of a document was repelled by the lower appellate with the observation that the veracity of documents has also to be judged taking into consideration the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. The genuineness of the deed dated 24-1-1969 was found to be doubtful and the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that it had been got executed by fraud and undue influence. Agreeing with the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff that the judgment of the trial Court was based on surmises and conjectures and lacked proper appreciation of the evidence on record the lower appellate court allowed the appeal filed on behalf of the plaintiff as already indicated above and granted the relief of cancellation of the sale deed dated 24-1-1969. Hence this Second Appeal before this Court. The respondents in this appeal are Smt. Ajirana and Smt. Alena who were substituted before the lower appellate court as the heirs of the original plaintiff Smt. Rituraji.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the lower appellate court has wrongly misread the evidence on behalf of the parties and thus has committed an error of law warranting interference by this Court in second appeal. In support of his submission the learned counsel has placed reliance upon Govindraja Gounder v. Narayanaswami Pillai, 1969 SCD 624, Mehanga Singh v. Sunder Chand, 1969 SCD 781 and Radha Nath Seal v. Haripada Jana, AIR 1971 SC 1049 where it has been held that in a case where findings of fact have been recorded by the court below by misreading the evidence the High Court would be justified in interfering with such findings of fact. I respectfully agree with the proposition of law laid down in the above decisions by the Supreme Court, but in the instant case before me the learned counsel for the appellants failed to point out as to where the lower appellate court has misread the evidence. On the other hand I find that the lower appellate Court has very graphically scanned the evidence both oral and documentary and has recorded its findings strictly in accordance with the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties. The lower appellate court has found on the basis of the evidence that the plaintiff Smt. Rituraji was an illiterate lady and fraud was perpetrated on her. The case of the plaintiff from the very beginning was that she was an illiterate lady, and that defendant Ram Sewak on a false pretext obtained her thumb impressions on some blank stamped papers. Bajrang Sahai, D.W 3, a defendant's own witness has admitted that when the stamp paper was given to him for scribing the deed it already bore the thumb impressions of Smt. Rituraji, the plaintiff. In such circumstances the burden was on the appellants (defendants) to prove the execution of the sale deed and the passing of the actual consideration. The lower appellate court has found that the appellants failed to discharge this burden. As regards consideration, the lower appellate court found on the basis of the oral evidence that the amount of Rs. 4500/- was not paid to the plaintiff Smt. Rituraji, since deceased. The acknowledgment in token of having received Rs. 4500/- was not produced in court though the appellants came forward with the case that such an acknowledgment was there as admitted by Ram Bilas, D.W 4. His explanation that on being demanded by Smt. Rituraji the acknowledgment was returned to her was found very unconvincing and was rightly not believed by the lower appellate court. This acknowledgment was a material document to show the payment of Rs. 4500/- to Smt. Rituraji and in its absence the lower appellate court rightly came to the conclusion that the amounts of Rs. 4500/- as well as Rs. 1500/- were never paid as consideration to the plaintiff. In view of the above it cannot be said that the lower appellate court has committed misreading of evidence either oral or documentary.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants then submitted that the sale deed was duly executed and registered. Once it was found that Smt. Rituraji was an illiterate lady, as was the case of the plaintiff, the burden shifted on the defendants-appellants to prove the execution and passing of the consideration. In such a situation Courts always insist on placing the burden of proof on the person who was in such advantageous position to establish that he did not abuse his position. The principle was originally confined to cases of Pardahnashin ladies but there is no reason why the said principle should not also embrace within its sweep the cases of persons who by reason of their apparent physical or mental incapacity or infirmity or being placed in circumstances where they are greatly amenable to the overpowering influence of another person are induced to enter into conveyances and transactions relating to their property. Appellant Ram Sewak who is the son-in-law of Smt. Rituraji was residing with her and it has come in evidence that signatures of Smt. Rituraji were obtaind on plain stamped papers for other purposes as has been found by the lower appellate court. In Daya Shankar v. Smt. Bachi, AIR 1982 All 376 it has been held that in order to prove the genuineness of a document the burden is on the person enjoying the dominating position and not on the person challenging it. As shown above it is manifest that such a burden has not been discharged. On the other hand it is apparently emerging that fraud and undue influence was perpetrated on Smt. Rituraji. Further a finding of fact has been recorded that no consideration was paid to the plaintiff. These findings of fact are not liable to interference by this Court in Second Appeal.
9. Another submission on behalf of the appellants has been made that a necessity arose for Smt. Rituraji to dispose of her agricultural holding. There is not an iota of evidence as to what compelled Smt. Rituraji to dispose of her holdings. The story of debt which Smt. Rituraji had to clear necessitating the sale of the entire holdings was rightly found wholly unconvincing. I do not find any good reason to differ from the findings recorded by the lower appellate court.
10. In V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 the Supreme Court has held that the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact, recorded by the lower appellate court however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court.
11. The Supreme Court further observed that however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, there is no jurisdiction under S. 100, C.P.C to correct that error.
12. In view of the above discussions this appeal has no merit and deserves to be dismissed.
13. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.
14. Appeal dismissed.
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