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Shakuntala Devi v. State Of Uttar Pradesh

Allahabad High Court
Oct 14, 1985
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.) filed by the applicant, Smt. Shakuntala Devi, aged about 72 years, who is implicated in Crime No. 280 of 1985 under Sections 302 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), registered at Police Station Galshaheed, District Moradabad. The prosecution alleges that the applicant, along with others, committed murder by burning the daughter of the informant, Sukhdayal. The daughter was married to Pramod Raj Katiyal, and the in-laws and husband were aggrieved over unsatisfactory dowry, leading to the alleged crime. The informant was informed by a police constable about the murder before lodging the first information report. The applicant was in custody pending trial at the time of this bail application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the word "may" in the first proviso to Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is to be interpreted as mandatory ("shall") or directory ("may") in the context of granting bail to a woman, sick, infirm, or a person under sixteen years of age.
  2. Whether the applicant, being a woman aged about 72 years, is entitled to bail under the provisions of Section 437(1) read with its first proviso.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • Section 437(1) of the Code provides that a person other than those tried by High Court or Sessions Court can be released on bail unless reasonable grounds exist to believe the person is guilty of an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment.
  • The first proviso to Section 437 states that the Court "may" grant bail to a woman, sick or infirm person, or a person under sixteen years of age.
  • The word "may" in this proviso should be interpreted as "shall," making it obligatory to grant bail to the applicant, who is a woman and infirm.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The word "may" in the first proviso to Section 437 is directory and not mandatory, allowing the Court discretion whether or not to grant bail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Duncan v. Dixon; Toronto Corporation v. Attorney General of Canada Effect of excepting or qualifying proviso in statutory construction. Used to explain that a proviso creates an exception to the general provision and cannot enlarge the scope of the enactment.
Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey Presumption that subject matter of proviso would otherwise be included in the enacting part of the section. Supported the interpretation that the proviso excepts or qualifies the main provision.
R. v. Bishop of Oxford Where statute authorizes an act for justice or public good, "may" means "shall". Applied to interpret "may" in the proviso as mandatory rather than discretionary.
Re Neath and Brecon Ry. Legislature's use of "may" in judicial matters is a courtesy but means "shall". Supported mandatory construction of "may" in the proviso.
State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh Discretion conferred with obligation converts "may" into "shall". Used to argue that "may" is to be construed as mandatory when coupled with a legal right or obligation.
Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka Determination of whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory depends on the purpose and context. Supported the view that the mandatory or directory nature of "may" depends on the statute’s purpose, particularly safeguarding liberty.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the language of Section 437(1) of the Code and its first proviso, focusing on the interpretation of the word "may." It observed that a proviso serves as an exception to the general rule and that the word "may," although generally permissive, can be construed as mandatory ("shall") when the power is conferred for the benefit of specifically defined persons, such as women, sick, infirm, or minors. The Court relied on authoritative texts and precedents, including Craies on Statute Law and various judicial decisions, to establish that the legislature’s use of "may" in the first proviso is a respectful expression but intended to be mandatory in the context of bail for vulnerable persons.

Further, the Court emphasized the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which adds weight to interpreting the provision in favor of granting bail to the applicant, who is a 72-year-old woman. The Court also noted the weak evidentiary basis of the prosecution, as the informant did not witness the occurrence and was informed of the murder by a police constable. Considering the applicant's age, infirmity, and the ongoing trial process, the Court found it appropriate to grant bail on compassionate grounds without prejudging the merits of the case.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that the word "may" in the first proviso to Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be interpreted as "shall," making the grant of bail to a woman, sick or infirm person, or a person under sixteen years of age mandatory rather than discretionary.

The application for bail by Smt. Shakuntala Devi is allowed. She is to be released on bail upon executing a personal bond and furnishing two sureties to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad.

The Court clarified that this decision is based on compassionate grounds and does not affect the merits of the trial. No broader precedent beyond the interpretation of the proviso and the grant of bail in this case is established.

Show all summary ...

B.L Yadav, J.:— This is an application under Section 439, Cr. P.C on behalf of the applicant Smt. Shakuntala Devi involved in Crime No. 280 of 1985 under Section 302/498-A, I.P.C, P.S Galshaheed, District Moradabad.

2. The applicant is aged about 72 years as is clear from the report of the Sub-Inspector of Police (Annexure-2 to the affidavit), who has conducted the search. The prosecution story is given in Annexure-2 to the affidavit in which it was alleged by Sukhdayal that he was informed by the Police constable that a murder has been committed by the applicant and Haraj Raj Katiyal and one Pramod Raj Katiyal by burning her daughter. It appears that the daughter of the informant Sukhdayal was married with Pramod Raj Katiyal. But the in-laws and the husband of the daughter were feeling aggrieved as they did not receive the satisfactory dowry. Hence it appears that the father-in-law, mother-in-law and the husband of the daughter have murdered her. The informant prayed that the matter may be investigated and justice be done. I have heard Sri. G.S Chaturvedi for the applicant, Sri. Keshav Sahai for the complainant and Sri Jagdish Tiwari for the State of U.P

3. It was urged by the learned counsel for the applicant that Section 437(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code), enacts that any person if brought before Court other than the High Court and Court of Sessions, can be released on bail but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

4. But the first Proviso to Section 437 of the Code enacts that the Court ‘may’ direct any person under sixteen years of age, woman, sick or infirm to be released on bail. The word “may” used in the proviso means “shell” and it is mandatory and not directory. Whenever the word “may” is used in any Statute in connection with court or Authority to grant some relief, it is a respectful expression that word “may” is used, but it really means “shall”. It was accordingly urged that it was obligatory to grant bail in case the applicant was a woman.

5. Sri Keshav Sahai and Sri Jagdish Tewari for the complainant and the State respectively on the other hand urged very effectively that the word “may” in the first Proviso to section 437 of the Code is directory and not mandatory.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that the application deserves to be allowed. I am of the opinion that when after any provision of a section of a Proviso has been added, it simply means that the legislature wanted to create an exception in the form of Proviso to what was enacted in the general provisions of the Section.

7. Craies on Statute Law (Seventh Edition) at page 218 states as follows:

“The effect of an excepting or qualifying Proviso according to the ordinary rules of construction is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it, and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly and properly construed without attributing to it that effect. (See also Duncan v. Dixon(1), Toronto Corporation v. Attorney General of Canada(2).

8. In Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey,(3) it has been held as follows:

“The natural presumption is that but for the proviso, the enacting part of the Section would have included the subject matter of the proviso.”

9. So far as the controversy as to whether the word ‘may’ used in first Proviso to Section 437 of the Code is permissive or enabling expression or whether it was mandatory, in this connection I would again like to refer to Craies on Statutes (Seventh Edition) at page 285, which is as follows:—

“It is, however, a well recognised canon of construction, as Lord Cairns said in Julius V. Bishop of Oxford, that ‘where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically pointed out, and with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise, that power ought to be exercised and the court will require it to be exercised.’ And Lord Blackburn said: ‘The enabling words are construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right.”

10. In R. v. Bishop of Oxford(4), it was held as follows:—

“So long ago as the year 1693, it was decided in the case of R. v. Barlow, (1693) 2 Salk 609 that when a statute authorises the doing a thing for the sake of justice or the public good, the word ‘may’ means ‘shall’ and that rule has been acted upon to the present time……and of course the same rule will apply to the words ‘it shall be lawful’.

11. In Re Neath and Brecon Ry.(5), it has been held as follows:—

“it is the usual courtesy of the legislature in dealing with the judicature to use word ‘may’ but it really means ‘shall’.”

12. In State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh (6), the controversy about the construction of Rule 4(2) of the U.P Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947, was involved. Under Rule 4(2) of the Rules it was provided that the Government “may” direct the disciplinary proceedings against an officer specified under Rule 4 of the Rules to be tried before an Administrative Officer. The controversy arose as to whether the word ‘may’ used for the Governor means ‘shall’ or only it means ‘may’. In other words, whether the word ‘may’ has been used in a mandatory sense or in a directory sense. It was held by the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 as follows:

“The word ‘may’ generally does not mean ‘must’ or ‘shall’. But it is well-settled that the word ‘may’ is capable of meaning ‘must’ or ‘shall’ in light of the context. Where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word ‘may’ which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command. Sometimes, the Legislature uses the word ‘may’ out of deference to the high status of the authority on whom the power and the obligation are intended to be conferred or imposed.”

13. In Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka(7) in paragraph 12 thereof it has been held as follows:—

“……The question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory has to be decided not merely on the basis of any specific provision which for instances, sets out the consequences of the omission to observe the requirement, but on the purpose for which the requirement has been enacted, particularly in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the general scheme thereof. It would, inter alia depend on whether the requirement is insisted on as a protection for the safeguarding of the right of liberty of person or of property which the action might involve. The employment of the auxiliary verb ‘shall’ is inconclusive and similarly the mere absence of the imperative is not conclusive either.”

14. I am accordingly of the view that the word ‘may’ has been used in the first proviso to section 437 of the Code to mean ‘shall’ and ‘must’. The expression has been used as mandatory and not as directory. However, as the word ‘may’ has been used in connection with the right of liberty of the citizen which has been guaranteed as a fundamental right in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence it has assumed more dimension and can not be taken lightly. it is more important to mention here that even the informant has not seen the occurrence rather a police constable has informed him that his daughter has been murdered. Thereafter he reached the place of occurrence and thereafter lodged the first information report. The applicant having been lodged in the Jail and the matter is still to be tried and evidence to be collected and further as the applicant is a woman aged about 72 years, as is clear from the report of the police officer (Annexure ‘3’), I am of the opinion that just on compassionate grounds, without going into the merits of the case the applicant is entitled to be released on bail. It is, however, made clear that the observations made above shall not affect the merits of the trial in any manner.

15. Let the applicant Smt. Shakuntala Devi be released on bail in Crime No. 280 of 1985 under Sections 302/498-A, I.P.C.P.S Galshaheed, District Moradabad, on her executing a personal bond and furnishing two sureties to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad.