1. This appeal under S. 110-D, directed against an order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Fatehpur, dated 29th Sept. 1984, passed under S. 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, gives rise to an interesting though short question of importance. The question is whether an appeal lies under S. 110-D against such an order. Facts of the case are not very much relevant at this stage except that an accident occurred after Oct. 1, 1982 when the Central (Amendment) Act, 47 of 1982 came into force. The respondent No. 1 has lodged a claim alleging permanent disablement. On his application the Tribunal directed that a sum of Rs. 7,500/- be paid to him and also that initially it is to be borne by the owners of the vehicle though later there may be reimbursement made by insurer. Aggrieved, the owners of the vehicle have preferred this appeal.

2. Preliminary objection has been raised for the respondents to the effect that the order impugned does not constitute an award within the meaning of S. 110-D and hence an appeal does not lie. It is trite that the right to appeal is statutory; an appeal can be had only if the law provides for the same expressly or by necessary implication. S. 110-D(1) lays down that any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within the period specified, prefer an appeal to the High Court except, where the amount in dispute is less than Rs. 2,000/-. The argument put forth for the respondents in that the impugned order is not to be construed as an award of the Tribunal. A quick look at the scheme of the newly added provisions is necessary. Chapter VII-A comprising of Ss. 92-A to 92-E was introduced into the Motor Vehicles Act by the Central (Amendment) Act, 47 of 1982 with effect from 1st Oct, 1982. The caption given to the Chapter is “Liability without fault in certain cases”. S. 92-A enacts this principle of no fault liability where the accident results in death or permanent disablement. The amount of compensation payable in respect of permanent disablement of any person is fixed sum of Rs. 7,500/-, it being Rs. 15,000/- in case of death. For this compensation the claimant does not have to plead or establish wrongful act or omission on the part of the owner of the vehicle, and, there is no defence available on ground of contributory negligence or proportionate sharing of liability. Sub-secs. (3) and (4) of S. 92-A are material. They read as under:

“(3) In any claim for compensation under sub-sec. (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.

(4) A claim for compensation under sub-sec. (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement”

3. The compensation referred to in S. 92-A is in addition to other right to compensation claimed under the law; it is to be disposed of expeditiously in the first place before the claim, if any, on the principle of fault is taken up for consideration vide S. 92-B(1)/(2), sub-sec. (3) of S. 92-B provides for adjustment upon subsequent adjudication of the compensation claimed on the basis of fault. Permanent disablement is defined in S. 92-C as meaning injury suffered by reason of the accident involving:

“(a) permanent privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of either ear, or privation of any member or joint; or

(b) destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; or

(c) permanent disfiguration of the head or face,

Section 92-E gives overriding effect of Chapter VII-A providing that “the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.”

4. Certain changes were made at the same time in the provisions of Chapter VIII comprising of Ss. 93 to 111-A in order to effectuate the principle of liability without fault ‘Liability’ is now defined in S. 93(ba) as including liability in respect of death of, or bodily injury to any person under S. 92-A. The Explanation to S. 110-A inserted:

“For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression ‘claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons, arising out of the use of motor vehicles’ includes claims for compensation under Section 92-A”.

5. Section 110-A relates to application for compensation made on the principle of fault liability. A proviso was inserted to sub-sec. (2) of this section which in terms says:

“Provided that where any claim for compensation under S. 92-A is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant”

6. Section 110-B under the heading of “Award of the Claims Tribunal” along with the proviso which was introduced by the (Amendment) Act, 1984, reads as follows:—

“On receipt of an application for compensation made under S. 110-A, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and subject to the provisions of S. 109-B, may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid; and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be.

Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under S. 92-A in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim “Whether made in such application or otherwise” for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII-A”.

7. Provision for recovery of money due from any person under an award as arrear of land revenue is contained in S. 110-E which is to the effect:

“Where any money is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the money, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.”

8. This in brief is the scheme under the relevant provisions. The submission made for the respondents is that compensation provided for under S. 92-A is kept distinct from that which is awarded on determination of fault and that the determination made adjudging the fault liability alone constitutes the award. In support of this argument it is urged that there will have been no other purpose behind, inserting the proviso to S. 110-B quoted above After giving careful considerations, I find little force in this contention.

9. The amount provided for payment as a fixed sum under S. 92-A is in essence and also literally described as compensation. The object is to re-imburse the victim for the death or permanent disablement at the quickest possible moment. The controversy which the determination of fault or otherwise gives rise in time consuming; that entails a detailed probe into the evidence on both sides. Questions of contributory negligence etc. might also arise at that stage. In order that the sufferer does not have necessarily to await such protracted adjudication the ultimate end whereof remains unpredictable, the legislature has in its wisdom made an innovation by introducing Chapter VII-A which is benefit of requirement of fault determination. The procedure is distinct undoubtedly as appearing from Ss. 92-A and 92-B on the one side and Ss. 110-A and 110-B on the other. There is difference as to the scope of the enquiry in these two sets of the provisions. S. 92-E, no doubt, has the effect to make provisions of Chapter VII-A self-contained. For purposes of appeal and for execution however there is no conflicting provision in Chapter VII-A. The order made under S. 92-A is as well classed as an award. The proviso to S. 110-B (Award of the Claims Tribunal) is a pointer in this direction. The proviso contemplates, it would appear, that the direction to pay the compensation under S. 92-A constitutes an award nonetheless though the mode to arrive at the same is different. This in my view is implicit in the text of this proviso. If the intention were otherwise, the proviso would have made it explicit that the determination of compensation under S. 92-A is not to be construed as an award of the Claims Tribunal.

10. An important clue in this behalf is furnished by S. 110-E which contains the exclusive provision for recovery of money from any person under an award as arrear of land revenue. There is no other mode of recovery provided in the Act including in respect of the sum provided for under S. 92-A. The Legislature cannot be assumed to have left unspecified a provision for recovery of the amount directed to be paid under S. 92-A. As the appellant's learned counsel rightly urged, it is not difficult to conceive a case where despite the order of the Tribunal the owner of the vehicle or the insurer declines to pay the amount under S. 92-A. Shall the claimant in such a case be left to be satisfied with mere paper transaction? In S. 110-E, the expression used is ‘award’, in the context, there being nothing to the contrary, there is no basis for not construing this expression ‘award’ appearing likewise in S. 110-D. The award within S. 110-E covers also an order under S. 92-A and upon the same footing such an order is to be considered included within the purview of S. 110-D. The rule of harmonious construction warrants this and no other construction. The order under S. 92-A rests upon objective consideration; it is not a matter of subjective satisfaction; there could be no intention to leave a claimant who has lost in proceeding under S. 92-A without the right to appeal or without remedy to recover the amount in the event of compensation under S. 92-A being allowed. Chapter VII-A enacts social welfare legislation; it must receive beneficial construction.

11. Assuming that there is ambiguity or that the meaning of the enactment is obscure, the question arises, “What is to be done? We must try and get at the meaning of what was intended by considering the consequences of either construction”. Answering this question the learned author in Craise on Statute Law (7th Edn.) (1971) at page 94 observes:

“And if it appears that one of these constructions will do injustice, and the other will avoid that injustice it is the bounden duty of the court to adopt the second, and not to adopt the first, of those constructions. However “difficult, not to say impossible” it may be to put a perfectly logical constructions upon a Statute, a court of justice is bound to construe it, and, as far as it can, to make it available for carrying out the objects of the legislature, and for doing justice between parties.”

12. In regard to social welfare enactment particularly the rule of beneficial construction ordains that if a statute is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to the interest of the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed, Jeewan Lal Ltd., (1984) 4 SCC 356 : (AIR 1984 SC 1842).

13. Consideration being had to the above, I find that appeal lies under S. 110-D against the impugned order passed under S. 92-A of the Act.

14. Upon merit, counsel for the appellant contended not without force that liability to pay compensation under S. 92-A arises where an accident has resulted in death or permanent disablement and not otherwise. This being not a case of death, the question is whether the respondent suffered permanent disablement as defined in S. 92-C. Finding on this would constitute the foundational rest upon which payment of compensation under S. 92-A rests. The tribunal in the instant case has not gone into this aspect. There is no finding recorded in regard to permanent disablement on the basis either of the evidence on record or admission of parties.

15. The other infirmity in the order rightly pointed out is the direction that the amount shall in the first place be borne by the owner of the vehicle though subsequently he might be reimbursed by the insurer. There is no warrant for such reservation. As I mentioned above, ‘liability’ as now defined in S. 93(ba) includes liability arising under S. 92-A. Neither S. 95(5) nor S. 96 makes any distinction in regard to the liability of the insurer in one case to indemnify the insured and in the other case to pay to the claimants the amount mentioned in the order or award as compensation without further inquiring as to whether the insured who was found liable to pay the said compensation amount to the claimants was so found on the principle of no fault liability or fault liability. I am supported in this view by the decision of a Division Bench in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Beasa Devi, AIR 1985 Punj & Har 96. In para 10 it is observed:

“In view of the above, we hold that the insurer is liable to satisfy the compensation claim arising from the accident with the insured vehicle to the extent of the amount that the policy of the insurance in terms of S. 95 happens to cover and, therefore, to the extent of the policy cover the insurer without inquiring as to whether the amount awarded is under S. 92-A or otherwise shall be liable to pay the amount awarded to the person named in the award or awards.”

16. The governing factor for application of the appropriate law, it has been held, moreover, is not the date on which the policy of insurance came into force but the date on which the cause of action accrued i.e the accident occurred for enforcing liability arising under the terms of the policy vide Padma Srinivasan v. Premier Insurance Company Limited, (1982) 1 SCC 613 : (AIR 1982 SC 836). The liability of the insurer and the owner of the vehicle being joint and several including in respect of compensation under S. 92-A there is no question of apportionment between them. Mehta Madan Lal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (1983) 2 SCC 262 : (AIR 1983 SC 1136).

17. For the reasons stated above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order impugned is set aside. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Judge, Fatehpur) shall decide afresh the claim raised by the respondent under S. 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein. Costs on parties. The interim order dated 5-12-1984 is vacated.

18. Appeal allowed.