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Sarwan Lal And Another v. Kanti Prasad (Deceased By L.R'S) .

Allahabad High Court
Jan 1, 1985
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent filed a suit against the present appellant and the Municipal Board seeking an injunction. The relief sought was to remove fuel wood stalls from the roadside patri adjacent to the respondent's property and to restrain the defendants permanently from encroaching upon the same or obstructing free access to the road patri in front of the respondent's land.

Despite contest by the defendants, the suit was decreed on 25-3-1968. The Municipal Board appealed, but the appeal was dismissed on 30-10-1968. Execution proceedings were initiated on 23-3-1978 for recovery of costs and imprisonment of judgment debtors for non-compliance with the injunction.

The appellants objected under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) contending that the decree for mandatory injunction had become barred by limitation and could no longer be executed. The executing court dismissed the objection, but on appeal the order was modified holding that execution of the decree for mandatory injunction was barred as it was launched more than three years after the decree, pursuant to Article 135 of the Limitation Act. However, execution of the decree for prohibitory injunction was allowed to proceed. The appeal was partly allowed.

The judgment debtors have now filed a second appeal contending that even the decree for prohibitory injunction cannot be executed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree for prohibitory injunction can be executed when the decree for mandatory injunction has become barred by limitation.
  2. Whether a prohibitory injunction can be enforced by execution when it relates to an accomplished fact rather than a threatened act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The decree for permanent (prohibitory) injunction cannot be executed once it was held that execution of the decree for mandatory injunction (removal of fuel wood stalls) is barred by limitation.
  • Prohibitory injunctions can only be granted in respect of threatened acts and not in respect of acts already accomplished.

Court's Response to Arguments

  • The defendants' possession may be relevant in a suit for prohibitory injunction, but once a decree is granted, the executing court must execute it.
  • Objections regarding the maintainability of the suit on grounds such as possession should have been raised during trial, not at execution stage.
  • The plaintiff was not the owner of the road patri and could not claim possession, but the suit for mandatory injunction to remove encroachments was properly framed and decreed.
  • Execution of the decree for mandatory injunction is barred by limitation, but this does not affect the executability of the decree for prohibitory injunction.
  • The decree-holder’s right to execute the prohibitory injunction, including attachment of property or civil imprisonment, survives despite the bar on executing the mandatory injunction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shyam Sunder Pd. v. Ram Dass Singh, AIR 1946 Pat 392 Execution of a permanent injunction decree is only possible if an obstruction occurs; prohibitory injunction relates to threatened acts, not accomplished facts. The court distinguished the facts, holding that in the present case the prohibitory injunction decree was not barred by limitation and was executable independently of the mandatory injunction decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature of the two types of injunctions granted: mandatory and prohibitory. It recognized that the decree for mandatory injunction (removal of fuel wood stalls) could no longer be executed due to the limitation period under Article 135 of the Limitation Act. However, the court emphasized that this limitation does not extend to the prohibitory injunction, which imposes a continuing personal obligation on the defendants not to encroach or obstruct the road patri.

The court rejected the appellant’s submission that prohibitory injunctions apply only to threatened acts and cannot be enforced against accomplished facts. It held that once a decree is granted, the executing court must enforce it according to law. The court clarified that objections about possession or maintainability should have been raised during the trial, not at the execution stage.

Relying on the precedent of Shyam Sunder Pd. v. Ram Dass Singh, the court distinguished that case’s facts from the present one, noting that the execution of the permanent injunction decree here was not barred by limitation. The court concluded that the two reliefs—mandatory and prohibitory injunctions—are independent, and the executability of one does not depend on the other.

Therefore, although the removal of fuel wood stalls cannot be enforced by execution due to limitation, the prohibitory injunction remains enforceable through execution, including attachment of property or civil imprisonment for disobedience.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The court held that the decree for prohibitory injunction remains executable despite the bar on executing the decree for mandatory injunction due to limitation. The direct effect is that the decree-holder retains the right to enforce the prohibitory injunction through execution proceedings, including attachment or imprisonment, but cannot enforce the mandatory injunction for removal of encroachments after the limitation period.

No new precedent was established; the decision clarifies the independent executability of prohibitory injunctions vis-à-vis mandatory injunctions in the context of limitation.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an execution second appeal. The respondent had filed a suit against the present J.D, appellant, and the Municipal Board for the relief of injunction that after removal of the fuel wood stalls from the roadside parti adjacent to the plaintiff's property the defendants may be permanently restrained from encroaching the same and to refrain from obstructing free access to the road patri from any point in front of his land.

2. In spite of contest by the defendants the suit was decreed on 25-3-68. The Municipal Board, Aligarh, filed an appeal but the same was dismissed on 30-10-1968. On 23-3-1978 an execution was taken out for the recovery of costs and for committing the judgment debtors to civil prison for their failure to comply with the injunction. The appellants filed an objection under S. 47, C.P.C, contending that decree for mandatory injunction had become barred by time and could no longer be executed. The objection was dismissed by the executing court but on appeal the order was modified and it was held that only decree for mandatory injunction could not be executed because execution was launched more than three years after the decree in view of Art. 135, Limitation Act. However, execution of the decree for prohibitory injunction could proceed and the appeal was partly allowed.

3. The judgment debtors have now come up in appeal and contend that even the decree for prohibitory injunction cannot be executed.

4. Learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously urged that even the decree for permanent injunction cannot be executed once it was held that execution of decree for mandatory function for removal of the existing fuel-wood stalls could not proceed. According to the learned counsel prohibitory injunction can be granted only in respect of a threatened act and not in respect of an accomplished fact. I cannot possibly agree. The learned counsel appears to be under some misapprehension as to the legal position. The defendants' possession may be a relevant consideration in a suit for prohibitory injunction but once a decree has been granted, the executing court have only to execute the same. An objection as to maintainability of the suit on such a ground could well be taken during the trial but not before the executing court. It has been candidly conceded that the plaintiff being not the owner of the road patri no relief of possession could have been claimed by him. The plaintiff could only pray for a mandatory injunction for directing the defendants to remove their materials from the road patri. The suit as framed was, therefore, proper and was rightly decreed. In view of the decree, the plaintiff had both the modes of executing the decree open to him. On the expiry of the time allowed to remove the material voluntarily from the road patri, the decree-holder could put the decree for mandatory injunction under execution for the purpose as also to execute the decree for prohibitory injunction. Since the execution of the decree for mandatory injunction had become barred by time, therefore, the remedy to execute the same was no longer available to him. This, however, cannot mean that other part of the decree also must become unexecutable on that ground. The only effect of non-executability of the decree for mandatory injunction would be that actual removal of goods from the road patri cannot be sought through execution. The right of the decree holder to execute the decree for prohibitory injunction by attachment of the property or for committing the judgment debtors to civil prison continues to survive.

5. The learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on Shyam Sunder Pd. v. Ram Dass Singh, AIR 1946 Pat 392. In that case the relief of mandatory injunction for removal of an encroachment from the village path-way had been dismissed but a decree for permanent injunction had been passed restraining the defendants from encroaching upon the said path way. The Court held that such a decree was not capable of execution until an obstruction was caused to it. As soon as obstruction is caused in breach of the decree a cause of action for enforcement of the decree would arise. Thus decree holders' right to apply for execution accrues only when an obstruction is caused.

6. The facts and circumstances of the Patna case are obviously very different from those of the present case. It is not disputed that the execution of the decree for permanent injunction was not barred by limitation. The only objection raised was that the decree was not executable since the decree for mandatory injunction could no longer be executed. The two reliefs granted by the decree are in no way interdependant. Even if actual removal of the material from the road side patri may not be possible through execution yet the personal obligation imposed on the defendants by prohibitory injunction would still be binding. They may choose to disobey the injunction only at their own peril. The decree holders can certainly bring the matter before the Court by way of execution in the manner prescribed by law.

7. In view of what I have said above, I do not find any force in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.

8. Appeal dismissed.