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Pushpendra Singh v. Supdt. Distt. Jail

Allahabad High Court
Jan 12, 1984
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.A. Misra, J., with H.N. Seth, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenged the detention of the petitioner Pushpendra Singh. The petitioner was implicated in offences punishable under Sections 396, 412 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. He was arrested on September 26, 1982 and remanded to jail custody under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate continued remanding him on several subsequent dates up to January 5, 1983. On January 11, 1983 the Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court and directed that the accused shall remain in custody until the conclusion of the trial (subject, as the Magistrate's order put it, to any order which the Sessions Court might pass) and that he be produced before the Sessions Court on January 24, 1983.

The accused was produced before the Sessions Court on January 24, 1983, and the Sessions Judge directed the record to be put up for fixing a date. The case was transferred on April 14, 1983 to the II Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital. A series of dates followed (May 20, June 20, July 7, August 8, September 17, October 22, November 17, November 25, November 26 and ultimately January 16, 1984) with various adjournments and remand/warrant entries. At some stages the petitioner was on parole and sometimes produced in custody; intermediate custody warrants dated June 20, 1983 and October 22, 1983 figure in the record.

The petitioner challenged the legality of detention and the validity of remand/warrant entries by way of this petition under Article 226. The petition was ultimately dismissed by the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate's committal order of January 11, 1983 — which remanded the accused to custody "subject to any order which may be passed by the Sessions Court" — complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 209(b) CrPC and whether any perceived defect in phrasing renders the detention illegal.
  2. Whether non-communication of the Magistrate's Section 209(b) order to the jail authorities renders the detention illegal.
  3. Whether subsequent warrants or remand orders (including those under Section 309(2) CrPC) passed by the Sessions Court validate or invalidate earlier detention, and how Section 209(b) interacts with Section 309(2).
  4. Whether the various intermediate custody warrants and subsequent entries (including entries made on custody warrants dated June 20, 1983 and October 22, 1983) satisfied the statutory requirements for a valid warrant of remand.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 209(b) CrPC is not a proper order and does not fulfil the statutory requirements of Section 209(b).
  • The Magistrate's order was not communicated to the jail authorities, and that non-communication renders the detention illegal.
  • The warrants of remand dated July 7, August 8, September 17, October 22, November 17 and November 26, 1983 were not proper warrants of remand as envisaged under Section 309 of the CrPC.

State's/Respondent's Position (as recorded)

  • The State was requested to produce documents showing communication of the Magistrate's order to jail authorities but failed to produce any such communication document.
  • The only document produced by the State was a "warrant Hawalati" indicating dates of remand up to January 11, 1983 and a note "January 24, 1983 Session Committed".

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surjeet Singh v. State of U.P. (Full Bench) The Full Bench held that "custody" under Section 309 of the Code includes illegal custody. The Court applied this principle to hold that even if the petitioner's custody up to June 20, 1983 had been irregular or illegal, the subsequent valid remand made on June 20, 1983 under Section 309 validated the custody from that date; therefore any earlier irregularity did not render continued detention unlawful after validation.
Uruj Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh Consideration of the Form for custody warrant (Appendix 'B' to General Rules Criminal), noting defects but holding that entries in the prescribed form may amount to substantial compliance with Section 344(1)(a) (old Code) so long as the intention of remand is clear. The Court relied on the Full Bench's analysis to conclude that the warrants and subsequent entries (including the entry dated October 22, 1983 and the entries made on that custody warrant) amounted to substantial compliance and a valid warrant of remand under Section 309(2). This supported the conclusion that the petitioner remained in legal custody.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis grounded in the statutory text and the facts before it:

  1. Interpretation of Section 209(b) CrPC:

    The Court noted that Section 209(b) commands the Magistrate to remand the accused to custody "during and until the conclusion of the trial" subject to provisions relating to bail. The provision is mandatory and leaves no option with the Magistrate.

    The Magistrate's order of January 11, 1983, though phrased to be "subject to any order which may be passed by the Sessions Court," was held not to be illegal for that reason. The Court emphasized that the Code itself makes remand subject to bail provisions; therefore omission or less felicitous phrasing by the Magistrate does not vitiate an otherwise unambiguous order that in substance remanded the accused under Section 209(b).

  2. Non-communication to jail authorities:

    The Court acknowledged non-communication as a "grave irregularity" and as culpable negligence on the part of jail authorities in not requiring the Court to send the order. However, the Court distinguished the authority to detain (which vests in the courts) from the administrative act of carrying out detention (which is performed by jail authorities). Because the Magistrate had validly passed an order under Section 209(b), non-communication did not render the detention illegal; it remained a procedural irregularity that should be remedied administratively and disciplinarily against responsible officers.

  3. Interaction of Section 209(b) and Section 309(2):

    The Court analyzed the relationship between Section 209(b) (special, mandatory provision requiring remand at committal) and Section 309(2) (a general provision empowering trial courts to remand by means of a warrant). The Court held that Section 209(b) does not mandate that remand be effected by a warrant, while Section 309(2) permits trial courts to remand by warrant if the accused is in custody.

    Therefore, the Sessions Court's exercise of power under Section 309(2) (including issuance of warrants and intermediate custody entries) did not invalidate the earlier committal remand under Section 209(b), nor did the prior Section 209(b) order prevent the Sessions Court from issuing warrants under Section 309(2). Both could co-exist, and a valid warrant under Section 309(2) would validate custody even if earlier custody had been irregular.

  4. Validity of the particular warrants and entries:

    The Court examined the intermediate custody warrants dated June 20, 1983 and October 22, 1983 and subsequent entries on those warrants (including the remand entries of November 17, 25 and 26, 1983). It held the June 20 warrant and the October 22 warrant fulfilled the requirements of a valid warrant of remand under Section 309(2). The Court dismissed objections based on non-use of a printed form (Rule 157 of General Rules Criminal) observing that Rule 157 prohibits use of unauthorized printed forms but does not prohibit a typed or handwritten warrant when printed forms are not available; hence no breach of Rule 157 occurred.

    Drawing on Uruj Abbas, the Court held that the practice of making entries on custody warrants on subsequent dates amounts to substantial compliance with the statutory/formal requirements and that the intended remand was clear from the record. Thus the remand entries validated continued custody.

  5. Remedies and administrative observations:

    While the Court refused to hold detention illegal on account of non-communication, it described the non-communication as a grave irregularity and culpable negligence by jail officers, stating that responsible officers should be "severely dealt with" and steps taken to avoid recurrence. The Court also cautioned subordinate courts to use careful language when recording orders.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was dismissed. The Court held that the petitioner's detention in pursuance of the Magistrate's order under Section 209(b) CrPC remained legally valid until the conclusion of the trial, subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail. The subsequent remand/warrant entries under Section 309(2) CrPC (including the order of June 20, 1983 and the custody warrant of October 22, 1983 with subsequent entries) amounted to valid remands that either validated or continued the legal custody.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioner's detention was held to be lawful and the writ petition under Article 226 was dismissed.
  • Non-communication of the Magistrate's order to jail authorities was characterized as a grave irregularity and culpable negligence; the Court indicated that officials responsible should be dealt with administratively, but such non-communication did not itself render the detention illegal where the detaining order was otherwise valid.
  • The opinion confirms that a Magistrate's remand under Section 209(b) need not be by a specific form of warrant to be valid; the Sessions Court may, and did, exercise its power under Section 309(2) to issue warrants, which did not invalidate the earlier committal remand.
  • The Court cautioned subordinate courts to use careful wording in judicial orders; the Court also accepted that substantial compliance with prescribed warrant forms is sufficient where the intention to remand is clear (following Uruj Abbas).
  • The Bench refused the petitioner's oral request for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court: the request for a certificate under the relevant constitutional provision was not granted (the Court recorded that the oral prayer under Article 134-A was rejected by the Bench).

No broader novel legal principle was established beyond the application of the cited precedents and statutory interpretation: the Court applied established principles (as in Surjeet Singh and Uruj Abbas) to the facts and dismissed the petition.

Disposition: The petition is dismissed. (Dated January 12 and 19, 1984; judgments signed by H.N. Seth, J. and R.A. Misra, J.)

Show all summary ...

R.A Misra, J.:— In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner complains against his detention.

2. The relevant facts are these:

3. The petitioner Pushpendra Singh is involved in a crime punishable under Section 396/412/120-B of Indian Penal Code. He appears to have been arrested on September 26, 1982 and remanded to jail custody under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate continued to remand him to jail custody on subsequent dates to wit, October 10, and October 23, 1982, November 5 and 18, 1982, December 1 and 14, 1982 and lastly on January 5, 1983. The learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court on January 11, 1983. The accused was present in custody before the court when the aforesaid committal order was passed. The learned Magistrate directed that subject to any order which may be passed by the Sessions Court, the accused shall remain in custody until the conclusion of the trial and further directed that the petitioner shall be produced before the sessions court on January 24, 1983. The petitioner was produced before the sessions Judge on January 24, 1983 in compliance to the aforesaid order dated January 11, 1983. The learned sessions Judge directed the record to be put up for fixing a date in near future.

4. It was produced before him on April 14, 1983 on which date he transferred the case to the court of II Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital. May 20, 1983 was fixed for appearance of the accused in the court of the II Additional Sessions Judge. It so appears that the petitioner was released on parole and did not personally appear in the court of II Additional Sessions Judge on May 20, 1983. An application for the exemption of personal attendance was allowed and the case was adjourned to June 20, 1983 for framing of charges. The petitioner Pushpendra Singh was produced in custody before the court on June 20, 1983 but as Nirankar a co-accused was on parole, so the case was again adjourned to July 7, 1983 for framing of charges and the accused Pushpendra Singh was remanded by a warrant to jail custody till the aforesaid date. Again on July 7, 1983 the case was adjourned to August 8, 1983 on the same ground and the accused who was present in custody was directed to be produced on the next date. The case was again adjourned to September 17, 1983 due to the absence of co-accused Nirankar on August 8, 1983. The accused was present in custody and was directed to be produced on the next date. The orders dated July 7 and August 8 directing the petitioner to be produced on the next date fixed, have been passed on the warrant for intermediate custody dated June 20, 1983. It so appears that on September 17, 1983 the case was again adjourned to October 22, 1983 and the accused who was present in custody was directed to be produced before the court on the next date. This order has also been passed on the aforesaid custody warrant. The accused was produced before the court of 11 Additional Sessions Judge on October 22, 1983 but the case was adjourned to November 17, 1983. The learned Sessions Judge on this date prepared a fresh warrant for intermediate custody directing the Jailor of District Jail Nainital to receive and keep the petitioner in custody till the aforesaid date to art. November 17, 1983 and produce him before the court on that date. On November 17, 1983 the case was adjourned to November 25 and the accused who was present in custody was directed to be produced on November 25, 1983. Again on November 25, 1983 the case was adjourned to November 26, 1983 and the accused who was in custody, before the court and was directed to be produced on the next date. Similarly on November 26, 1983 the accused who was in custody before the court was directed to be produced on January 16, 1984 because the case was adjourned for that date. All these three orders dated November 17, 25 and 26, 1983 have been passed on the custody warrant dated October 22, 1983.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the validity of the petitioner's detention in pursuance of the order passed under Section 209(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Magistrate on two grounds—firstly that the order passed by the learned Magistrate is not a proper order and does not fulfil the requirements of the provisions contained in Section 209(b) and secondly, on the ground that the order passed by the learned Magistrate has not been communicated to the jail authorities. The warrants of remand dated July 7, August 8, September 17, October 22, November 17 and November 26 have been attacked on the ground that they do not constitute proper warrants of remand as envisaged under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

6. Section 209(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, hereinafter called ‘the Code’ commands that Magistrate to remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail and leaves no option with the Magistrate. In the instant case the learned Magistrate has on January 11, 1983 committed the case to the Court of Sessions and has directed in the second para of the order that the accused shall remain in custody until the conclusion of the trial subject to any order which may be passed by the Sessions Court. The proper order should have been to remand the accused including the petitioner to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail. But the fact that the learned Magistrate has in his order mentioned that the order of remand is subject to any order which may be passed by the Sessions Court does not render the order illegal. It is significant to bear in mind that the Code itself commands that the remand of the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial shall be subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail. So any order passed under Section 209(b) of the Code remanding the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial, will be subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, irrespective of the fact that the order passed by the Magistrate does not clarify this fact. We would like to repeat that the Code itself says that the remand will be subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail. So it is not necessary for the Magistrate to clarify this position and the order will remain subject to the provisions of the Code even if this fact is not mentioned in the order. We do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of remand passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 209(b) is illegal because the learned Magistrate has mentioned that the order is subject to any order which may be passed by the Sessions Court. The order of remand passed by learned Magistrate is not at all open to two interpretations in this case. A plain reading of the order makes it abundantly clear that the accused has been remanded to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial as provided under Section 209(b) of the Code, subject to the provision of the Code relating to bail. The petitioner was in custody before the court when the aforesaid order was passed. The learned Magistrate committed the case to the court of Sessions and thereafter complied with the mandatory provisions of Section 209(b) by remanding the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial. It is a perfectly legal order passed under Section 209(b) of the Code, though the language of the order is not very happy. Weakness of language does not render an order illegal, provided the substance fulfils the requirements of law and is not open to more than one interpretation. But we would hasten to caution the subordinate courts to be careful in the use of language while performing judicial functions.

7. We have given sufficient opportunity to the learned counsel for the State to produce the documents whereby the aforesaid order of remand under Section 209(b) of the Code might have been communicated to the Tail authorities but the learned counsel for the State has failed to produce any such document before us. The only document produced is a document described as warrant Hawalati which contains the dates on which the petitioner was remanded to jail custody upto January 11, 1983. There is a note in the aforesaid document which reads as “January 24, 1983 Session Committed”. It is significant to note that in his order dated January 11, 1983, the learned Magistrate did direct that the accused shall be produced before the Sessions Court on January 24, 1983 and the aforesaid date is also mentioned in the warrant Hawalati. It is the date on which the accused was required to be produced before the court of Sessions. This document undoubtedly gave two informations to the jail authorities—(1) that the case of the accused was committed to the court of Sessions and (2) that he was required to be produced before the Sessions Court on January 24, 1983. The order-Court on January 24, 1983. The order-sheet of Sessions Court shows that the accused was actually produced before the Sessions Court on January 24, 1983 and the learned Sessions Judge directed the case to be put up in near future for fixing a date, without passing any order of remand under Section 309 of the Code. The Sessions Judge simply observed in his order that the accused was produced before him in compliance of the Magistrate's order dated January 11, 1983. The Sessions Judge appears to have passed the order on January 24, 1983 after perusing the Magistrate's order dated January 11, 1983 wherein the accused were remanded to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial. That appears to be the reason why he did not exercise his power under Section 309 of the Code to remand the petitioner to custody by a warrant. The crucial question which now arises for determination is whether non-communication of the order passed under Section 209(b) of the Code to the Jail authorities renders the petitioner's detention in pursuance of that order illegal.

8. The power to detain an accused vests in the criminal courts and the jail authorities simply carry out the orders by keeping an accused in physical custody. So the power of detention vests in the courts and not in the jail authorities. In the instant case the detaining authority is the Magistrate who has directed the petitioner's detention by virtue of the mandate under Section 209(b) of the Code. As discussed above the order of detention passed by the learned Magistrate is perfectly valid and the detention of the petitioner on the basis of the aforesaid order would continue to remain valid till the conclusion of the trial. The order so passed by the Magistrate is only subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail. Communication of the order is no doubt necessary to inform the jail authorities about the order passed and authorise them to keep the accused in detention but its non-communication does not render the order of detention illegal. Non-communication of the order of detention to the authorities is a grave irregularity and the jail authorities are also guilty of culpable negligence in not requiring the Court concerned to send the order of detention, but the detention cannot be said to be illegal if it is actually in pursuance of a perfectly legal order passed under Section 209(b) of the Code. The officers responsible for the irregularity and negligence should be severely dealt with and suitable steps should be taken to avoid repetition of such irregularities but on that score the detention which is based on a perfectly valid order cannot be held to be illegal. It is to be borne in mind that the detention under the provisions of Section 209(b) and Section 309 of the Code is neither punitive nor preventive. The main object on the other hand is to secure the attendance of the accused during the trial and at the time of the pronouncement of the judgment. The cause of justice should not be made to suffer on account of some negligence on the part of the officers. In the instant case there is a valid order of detention passed under Section 209(b) of the Code which cannot be rendered illegal due to its non-communication to the jail authorities, though as observed above the non-communication amounts to grave irregularity and culpable negligence. In the result the detention of the petitioner during and until the conclusion of the trial by virtue of the order passed under Section 209(b) of the Code would continue to be legal, till the conclusion of the trial subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail.

9. The provisions contained in Section 209(b) of the Code is mandatory and shall be followed by a Magistrate while committing the case to the court of Sessions. It is a special provision not only empowering the Magistrate to remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial but commanding him to do so. Section 209(b) of the Code does not say that the Magistrate is required to remand the accused to custody by means of a warrant. The provisions contained in Section 309 of the Code empowering a Magistrate to remand the accused if in custody is a general provision and says that the trial court may remand the accused by means of a warrant if he be in custody. The trial court has thus been empowered under Section 309(2) of the Code to remand the accused by means of a warrant if he is in custody. The trial court has not been precluded from exercising his powers under Section 309(2) in case the accused has been remanded to custody during and until conclusion of the trial under Section 209(b) of the Code. This power has been given to trial courts after the Code directed the Committing Magistrate to remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial so the trial court can exercise its power under Section 309(2) of the Code irrespective of the fact that the learned Magistrate while committing the accused remanded him to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial as provided under Section 209(b) of the Code. So an order remanding the accused to custody by means of a warrant under Section 309(2) would net render the previous order under Section 209(b) of the Code illegal. Similarly the order passed under Section 309(2) of the Code would not be rendered illegal simply because of a previous order under Section 209(b) of the Code. The Sessions Judge has in this case passed orders of remand under Section 309 of the Code in spite of the fact that there was an order under Section 209(b) of the Code. But as discussed shove that does not invalidate the order passed under Section 209(b) of the Code. The Sessions Court was competent to pass an order of remand under Section 309 of the Code though it was not necessary as there was already an order of detention under Section 209(b) of the Code. The order of remand passed on June 20, 1983 fulfils all the requirements of a valid warrant of remand under Section 309 of the Code and has not been attacked by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Surjeet Singh v. State of U.P(1) decided by a Full Bench of this Court, it has been decided that ‘custody’ under Section 309 of the Code includes illegal custody. So even if the custody of the petitioner was illegal upto June 20, 1983 it was validated by virtue of the order of remand passed on June 20, 1983 under Section 309 of the Code. Subsequent orders of remand passed on June 7, August 8, and September 17, 1983 have been written on the warrant of intermediate custody dated June 20, 1983 wherein it has been mentioned that the accused is present in, custody before the Court and as the case has been adjourned so he shall be produced on the next date. On October 22, 1983 a fresh warrant of intermediate custody was prepared and that also fulfils the requirements of a valid warrant of remand under Section 309 of the Code though a few words “till the conclusion of the trial” have been inserted in the last line without carrying any meaning. They appear to be redundant and meaningless. The subsequent orders of remand, including the last order dated November 26, 1983 have been passed on this very custody warrant. In these orders it has been mentioned that the accused is present in custody and that he shall be produced on the next date as the case was adjourned to that date. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in these orders there is no direction that the accused shall be taken in custody again. The orders simply say that the accused is in custody and shall be produced on the next date. The last order is dated November 26, 1983 and has been passed on warrant for intermediate custody dated October 22, 1983. As discussed above the order dated October 22, 1983 is a perfectly valid warrant for intermediate custody. The learned Additional Sessions Judge on that date directed the Jailor, District Jail, Nainital to receive the petitioner in his custody and produce him before the Court on the next date to wit, November 17, 1983. No form of warrant has been prescribed by the Code. It so appears that the High Court has in exercise of its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India prescribed a Form for intermediate custody of remand under Section 344 of the Old Code but it has not been reproduced in the Appendices to General Rules Criminal for subordinate Courts. It has been referred in the list of printed Forms authorised for use in subordinate criminal courts, given in Appendix ‘B’ of General Rules Criminal. Rule 157 of General Rules Criminal says “A list of printed Forms authorised for use in criminal Courts is given in Append ice ‘B’ No printed Form other than an authorised Form shall be used in any court. So Rule 157 prohibits only the use of printed Forms other than these which have been authorised far use and given in Appendice ‘8’ of the Rules, the use of a printed Form not given in Appendices that is prohibited. The rule does not prohibit the preparation of a warrant by getting the matter typed or hand written, obviously because at times printed forms may not be readily available. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, has not committed breach of Rule 157 of General Rules Criminal by preparing the custody warrant on October 22, 1983 in his own language, which is not in a printed Form but fulfils all the requirements of a valid custody warrant. The petitioner was produced before the Sessions Judge on subsequent dates in custody and the learned Sessions Judge has on the same custody warrant (dated October 22, 1983) remanded him to custody saying that the accused is present in custody, the case has been adjourned so let him be produced on the next date. The subsequent orders as mentioned above are on the custody warrant dated October 22, 1983 and are in continuation of the same. The only possible interpretation of the orders dated November 17, November 25, and November 26, 1983 is that the petitioner has been remanded to custody by means of the aforesaid warrants. The accused was in custody. The authority who was physically detaining him was being directed to produce him on the next date and that followed that the Sessions Judge did direct the accused to continue in the same physical custody to wit, Jail custody. No other interpretation of the aforesaid orders is possible.

10. In Uruj Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh(2) the Form of custody warrant given in Appendice ‘8’ of General Rules Criminal was considered; some defects were pointed out and some amendments were suggested. The front side of the form contains on one half of it divided vertically the matter reproduced below in English and the remaining half contains a translation of the same material in Hindi:

“WARRANT FOR INTERMEDIATE CUSTODY OF REMAND

(Section 344, Criminal P.C, 1898)

The Jailor of

Whereas of

charged with

and has been remanded to take his trial before the Court of……..

You are hereby required to receive the said ………… into your custody and produce him before the said Court as required on the reverse.

MAGISTRATE

11. Date day of 19”

12. The back side of the Form is divided into four columns with heading both in English and Hindi in general column and a note at the end. With only the English part of the heading the back side is reproduced below:

N.B:—The reasons for remanding the accused must be given in the record. No accused may be remanded to custody for a term exceeding 15 days at a time (Section 344, Code of Crimnial Procedure, 1898)”.

13. The Form reproduced above does not require the trial court to say on subsequent dates that the Jailor is again requried to receive the accused in his custody. On subsequent dates the trial court has simply to fill up the columns given on the reverse. In column No. 1 “number of the accused” is to be given. In Column No. 2 “date of order” is to be given. In Column No. 3 “date on which accused is to be produced” is to be given. Inspite of the defects pointed out in the aforesaid Form, the Full Bench in the case of Uruj Abbas (supra) held that the use of the aforesaid Form and entries in the columns on the reverse would amount to substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 344(1)(a) since the intention of the remand would be fairly clear. In the instant case as mentioned above the learned Sessions Judge required the Jailor to receive the accused in his custody on October 22, 1983 and on subsequent dates when the accused was produced in custody directed the Jailor to produce him on the next date. The intention of warrants of remand date November 17, November 25 and No. 1 November 26 is very clear that the accused is remanded back and shall continue in the same custody and produced on next date to which the case was adjourned. The last order of remand is dated November 26, 1983 and it expires on January 16, 1984. It amounts to a substantial compliance with requirements of Section 309(2) of the Code and amounts to a valid warrant of remand as contemplated under Section 309(2) of the Code. The petitioner thus continues in legal custody.

14. In the result there is no substance in this petition. It shall be dismissed.

15. The petition is dismissed.

Sd. H.N.S, J.

Sd. R.A.M, J.

Dated: January 12, 1984.

H.N Seth, J.:— While the judgment on behalf of the Bench was being delivered by me, learned counsel for the petitioner made an oral request for a certificate under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution to enable him to go up in appeal to the Supreme Court. This oral request made by the learned counsel shall be considered by the Bench when assembles next. List the case for considering the request made by learned counsel for the petitioner on Tuesday, the 17th of January, 1984.

Sd. H.N Seth, J.

16. January 12, 1984.

H.N Seth and R.A Misra, JJ.:— Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner we are not satisfied that this case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. We accordingly reject the oral prayer under Article 134-A of the Constitution made by the petitioner on 12th January, 1984.

Sd. H.N Seth, J.

Sd. R.A Misra, J.

Dated: 19th January, 1984.