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Benares Cotton And Silk Mills Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Sulbha Devi Gupta.
Factual and Procedural Background
The official liquidator of Benares Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. (in liquidation) received a claim from Smt. Sulbha Devi Gupta ("the claimant") for Rs. 1,17,948.49. The joint official liquidator investigated and, in a report dated August 21, 1960, concluded the claim was time-barred and noted that the liquidator himself had a claim against the directors (including the claimant) under section 235 of the Companies Act. The claimant objected to the liquidator's report before the District Judge, Varanasi. The official liquidator filed a written statement and a supplementary report; papers were filed by the claimant in support of her claim.
The District Judge framed two issues and held (1) the subject-matter was an advance made as a loan to the company, and (2) the claim was not barred by limitation. The District Judge relied on decisions including Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd. and a Madras High Court decision and treated the date of the winding-up as the date of presentation of the petition; consequently the District Judge allowed the claimant's claim subject to a restriction that the claimant would be entitled to payment only if she was not found guilty of misconduct in pending proceedings relating to the winding up.
Benares Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. (in liquidation), through the official liquidator, appealed under section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956. The respondent filed a cross-objection. Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Jagdish Swarup, senior advocate) argued the appeal; counsel for the respondent stated during hearing that he had no instructions in the appeal and the cross-objections.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the claimant's proof of debt was barred by limitation.
- Which date is the material date for computing limitation for proving a claim in compulsory winding up — the date of presentation of the winding-up petition or the date of the winding-up order?
- Whether the District Judge could lawfully impose the restriction that the claimant would be paid only if not found guilty of misconduct leading to the winding up (as raised in the respondent's cross-objection).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Benares Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. / Official Liquidator)
- The District Judge erred in his conclusion on limitation and misconstrued Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd.; the correct legal position is that limitation must be computed with reference to the date of the winding-up order (not the date of presentation of the petition).
- Authorities such as J.A. Dixit v. Official Liquidator, passages from Buckley on the Companies Acts, Palmer's Company Law, and Halsbury's Laws of England support the proposition that limitation ceases to run on the date of the winding-up order and that a claim must be within time on that date to be provable.
- Counsel pointed to other decisions (Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd.; Simplex Mfg. Co. Ltd.; Chandbali Steamer Service Co. Ltd.) and argued that the District Judge's reliance on contrary lines of authority was incorrect; the material date is the date of the winding-up order and not the date of presentation of the petition.
- Conceded that if the material date were the date of presentation of the petition (May 13, 1954), the claimant's advance dated July 9, 1951, would fall within three years; but the material date, properly construed, was the winding-up order date (May 4, 1955), on which the claim was already statute-barred.
Respondent / Claimant's Position (Smt. Sulbha Devi Gupta)
- A cross-objection disputed the District Judge's jurisdiction to impose the restriction that the claimant's entitlement would be withheld if she were found guilty of misconduct leading to the winding up. The impugned order was challenged to the extent such restrictions were imposed.
- During hearing the counsel who had filed the cross-objections stated he had no instructions in the appeal and the cross-objections; the text does not contain a detailed account of further arguments advanced on behalf of the claimant at the hearing.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd., [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All) | That a claim to be provable before the official liquidator should be within time on the date of the winding-up order; observed that "in order that the claim may be made before the official liquidator, it should be within time at the date of the order of winding-up." | The court analyzed Agarwala J.'s observations, held that the District Judge had misconstrued them (especially the sentence treating a date as the date of application), and concluded Jwala Prasad does not support treating the petition presentation date as the material date for limitation. |
| S. Abdul Muthalibu v. K.M. Mohammed Abdul Khader, [1962] 32 Comp Cas 1102 (Mad) | Relied on by the court below (District Judge) in support of holding the claim within time. | The present court noted the District Judge relied on this Madras decision but found the District Judge's overall reliance on earlier decisions to be a misunderstanding of the law as expounded in later, controlling authorities. |
| J.A. Dixit v. Official Liquidator, AIR 1963 All 284 | Considered the starting point of limitation; supported view that limitation should be computed from date of winding-up order (statute of limitation in abeyance from date of winding-up order). | The Division Bench's reasoning in J.A. Dixit was followed and endorsed; the present court agreed that limitation is suspended from the date of the winding-up order and that debts barred at that date cannot be proved. |
| In re General Rolling Stock Co. Ltd. (Joint Stock Discount Co.'s case), [1872] 7 Ch App 646 | Authority for the proposition that the statute of limitation would be in abeyance in regard to liabilities of a company from the date of the winding-up order. | Referred to as supporting authority (via J.A. Dixit and other citations) for the view that limitation stops running on the winding-up order date; relied on to buttress the legal position that debts not statute-barred on that date can be proved. |
| Chandbali Steamer Service Co. Ltd., In re, [1960] 30 Comp Cas 61 (Cal) | Support for the proposition that a claim not barred at the date of the winding-up order can be entertained and admitted; referenced on computation of limitation. | Cited by the court as consistent authority endorsing that claims barred at the date of the winding-up order cannot be entertained and to support the conclusion on material date for limitation. |
| Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd. v. A.K. Bhalla, [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216 (Punj) | A single-judge decision holding that the date of presentation of the winding-up petition might be the relevant date for computing limitation (i.e., favoring petition date). | The court noted this decision had been followed by a single judge in Simplex and that it had been criticized and later overruled in Ram Chand Puri; the present court treated the Lahore Enamelling approach as based on a misconstruction of Jwala Prasad and not preferable. |
| Simplex Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Hindustan Tools Mfg. Co. Ltd., [1960] 30 Comp Cas 251 (Punj) | Followed Lahore Enamelling's approach on material date for limitation. | Mentioned as an instance of reliance on the Lahore Enamelling view; the present court did not accept that approach as correctly reflecting the law. |
| Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1960] 30 Comp Cas 515 (Punj) | On appeal from Lahore Enamelling; the Division Bench considered the relationship between the date of petition and date of order for limitation purposes and referred to Jwala Prasad in its reasoning. | The present court discussed how the Division Bench in Ram Chand Puri quoted Jwala Prasad in a manner the present court considered to be a misconstruction; overall the present court rejects the interpretation that treats petition date as the material date for section 171 purposes. |
| Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol. 7, para 1273 | States that time under the Limitation Act ceases to run against a creditor on a winding-up order being made and that a proof in respect of claims statute-barred before the order is not allowed. | Quoted and relied upon by the court to support the proposition that limitation is suspended from the date of the winding-up order and that debts barred at that date are not provable. |
| Palmers' Company Law (quoted) | States that a statute-barred debt does not constitute a liability for winding-up purposes and that a winding-up order stops the period of limitation from running. | Used by the court to demonstrate accepted text-authority support for the rule that limitation stops running on the date of the winding-up order and that statute-barred debts cannot be proved. |
| Buckley on the Companies Acts (13th ed.), sec. 316, p. 630 | States that assets are to be applied in payment of liabilities subsisting at the time of the winding-up order; after the order is made, statutes of limitation do not run but debts barred at that date cannot be proved. | Relied upon by the court to confirm the principle that the relevant date for determining whether a debt is statute-barred is the date of the winding-up order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded methodically to identify the material date for computing limitation in a compulsory winding up and to test the admitted facts against that rule.
1. The court first observed the undisputed chronology in the present case: the advance was made on July 9, 1951; the winding-up petition was filed on May 13, 1954; and the winding-up order was made on May 4, 1955. It noted that, in ordinary civil proceedings, a suit to recover the loan would have to be instituted within three years from July 9, 1951 (i.e., up to July 9, 1954).
2. The pivotal legal question was whether limitation for proving claims in liquidation is assessed as at the date of presentation of the petition or the date of the winding-up order. The District Judge had treated the date of winding up as the date of presentation of the petition and concluded the claim was within three years; the court examined authorities to test that conclusion.
3. The court analyzed J.A. Dixit and the Court of Appeal authority in General Rolling Stock (1872) and relied on the passage in Halsbury, Buckley and Palmer to establish the settled proposition: limitation ceases to run on the date of the winding-up order and a claim which is statute-barred at the date of the winding-up order cannot be proved. The court expressly agreed with the Division Bench in J.A. Dixit that any debts barred at the date of the winding-up order are barred and not recoverable in liquidation.
4. Turning to Jwala Prasad, the court parsed Agarwala J.'s text. Agarwala J. stated that "in order that the claim may be made before the official liquidator, it should be within time at the date of the order of winding-up" and later referred to a particular date in that case. The present court concluded that Agarwala J.'s statements supported the proposition that limitation should be assessed at the date of the winding-up order; the District Judge had misread an isolated sentence in Jwala Prasad to mean that the winding-up order "relates back" to petition presentation date — a conclusion the court rejected.
5. The court explained there is no provision in the Companies Act that causes a winding-up order, when made, to relate back so as to suspend limitation from the date of presentation of the petition. The court noted section 162 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (deeming winding-up to commence at presentation) and section 168 were in the background of earlier reasoning, but emphasized that a statutory relation-back (equivalent to the Insolvency Act) was not enacted and a creditor retains the right to proceed while a petition is pending — therefore limitation is not suspended by mere presentation of the petition.
6. The court considered the Punjab decision in Lahore Enamelling (and its single-judge followings) but concluded those decisions were either a misconstruction of Jwala Prasad or were otherwise not consistent with the correct legal position. The court expressly endorsed Tek Chand J.'s view that relation-back cannot be extended so as to disturb the law of limitation.
7. On applying the settled rule that the material date is the date of the winding-up order, the court concluded the claimant's advance (July 9, 1951) was recoverable by suit only until July 9, 1954; because the winding-up order was passed on May 4, 1955 (after that date), the claim was already time-barred on the date of the winding-up order and therefore could not be proved in the liquidation.
8. As to the cross-objection challenging the District Judge's jurisdiction to impose restrictions withholding payment, the court held that once the claim was disallowed for being time-barred, the question of the imposed restriction fell away: disallowance of the claim automatically removed any need to consider the restriction. Thus the cross-objection had no merit once the claim was found barred.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the District Judge dated September 8, 1977, are set aside. The cross-objection filed by the claimant is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
Implications:
- The immediate consequence is that the claimant's proof for Rs. 1,17,948.49 is disallowed because it was statute-barred on the date of the winding-up order (May 4, 1955).
- The court's ruling confirms the application of the settled principle (as cited from authorities and texts in the opinion) that limitation for proving claims in compulsory winding up is to be computed as at the date of the winding-up order; claims already statute-barred on that date cannot be proved.
- The opinion does not purport to promulgate any novel rule beyond applying these principles to the facts; the decision affects the parties' rights in this liquidation by disallowing the claim and dismissing the cross-objection. The text of the opinion does not claim to establish wider precedent beyond the reasoning and authorities cited.
Banerji, J.:— The first appeal from order has been filed under section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956, against an order passed by the District Judge, Varanasi, dated September 8, 1977, allowing claim of the respondent, Smt. Sulbha Devi Gupta, for a sum of Rs. 1,17,948.49. Aggrieved by the above order, Benares Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. (in liquidation) has filed this appeal through the official liquidator.
2. Smt. Sulbha Devi Gupta, hereinafter referred to as “the claimant”, made a claim for a sum of Rs. 1,17,948.49 before the joint official liquidator. The latter investigated the claim and submitted a report dated August 21, 1960. In the above report, he held that the claim was barred by time and also pointed out that the liquidator had a claim against the directors including the claimant, under section 235 of the Companies Act, and, as such, the claimant was not entitled to any payment until the claim of the official liquidator had been fully satisfied. The claimant being dissatisfied with the report of the liquidator filed an objection before the Dist. Judge. The official liquidator submitted a reply in the form of a written statement. Papers were filed by the claimant in support of the claim. The official liquidator submitted his supplementary report.
3. Learned District Judge framed two issues. On the first issue he held that the subject-matter of the claim was advanced as loan to the company. This necessitated enquiring into the other issue, viz., whether the claim was barred by limitation. The District Judge held that the claim was not barred by limitation. The court below relied on a Division Bench decision of our court in the case of Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd., [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All) and a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of S. Abdul Muthalibu v. K.M Mohammed Abdul Khader, [1962] 32 Comp Cas 1102 (Mad). It was observed by the court below in its judgment that, according to the decision in the case of Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd., [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All), the date of the winding up would be treated as the date on which the application for winding up was made. On this basis, the court held that the advance was made on July 9, 1951, and the winding-up petition filed on May 13, 1954, was thus within three years and, as such, the claim was maintainable. The District Judge, while allowing the claim of. the respondent, also directed that the claim was allowed subject to the restriction “that she will be entitled to get this amount of the claim provided she is not found guilty of misconduct in the affairs of the company which misconduct led to the winding up of the company in the proceeding pending in that regard.”
4. Apart from the appeal, a cross-objection has been filed on behalf of the respondent. The appeal was argued by Mr. Jagdish Swarup, senior advocate, on behalf of the appellant, hereinafter referred to as “the bank”. Mr. Sidheshwari Prasad, who had filed the cross-objections on behalf of the respondent, appeared during the course of the hearing and stated that he has no instructions in the appeal and the cross-objections. We have heard the counsel.
5. Mr. Jagdish Swarup contended that the decision of the learned District Judge on issue No. 2 was patently erroneous. He urged that the court has misconstrued and misunderstood the decision in the case of Jwala Prasad, [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All). The above decision clearly lays down that the claim may be made before the official liquidator and it should be within time at the date of the order of winding up. This was the correct view in law and this had also been stated by a Division Bench of this court in the case of/. J.A Dixit… v. Official Liquidator…., AIR 1963 All 284. Mr. Jagdish Swarup also referred to a passage from Buckley on the Companies Acts and a passage from Palmer's Company Law as also paragraph 1273 of the fourth edition of Halsbury's Laws oj England. He also cited a decision in the case of Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd. v. A.K Bhalla, [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216 (Punj), which was followed by another single judge in the case of Simplex Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Hindustan Tools Mfg. Co. Ltd., [1960] 30 Comp Cas 251 (Punj). Learned counsel contended that the view taken by the District Judge that the law laid down in these two decisions was not applicable was erroneous. Learned counsel further contended that although the decision in the case of Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216 (Punj) had been overruled in Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1960] 30 Comp Cas 515 (Punj), the view taken therein was based on a misconstruction of the decision in Jwala Prasad's case, [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All). Learned counsel also cited a decision of a single judge of the Calcutta High Court in Chandbali Steamer Service Co. Ltd., In re, [1960] 30 Comp Cas 61 (Cal). To sum up, his argument was that the material date was the date of the winding-up order and not the date of the making of application for winding up. We are satisfied that the contention of the learned counsel is correct and the view taken by the learned District Judge is unsustainable in law and must be set aside. We proceed to give our reasons now.
6. In the present case, the winding-up petition was filed on May 13, 1954. The winding-up order was made on May 4, 1955. It is not disputed that the advance was given on July 9, 1951. In the normal course, a suit for recovery of the amount advanced as loan could be filed within three years from the date of the advancing of the loan. Thus, in the present case, the advance given on July 9, 1951, was recoverable by a suit up to July 9, 1954. It was clearly conceded by Mr. Jagdish Swarup that if the material date was the date of the making of the winding-up petition, i.e, May 13, 1954, the claim would be within time, but if the material date was May 4, 1955, the claim was clearly barred by time, as the period of three years from July 9, 1951, ended on July 9, 1954. We would not consider the legal position. Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 7, paragraph 1273, relates to statute-barred debts. It reads as follows:
“Time under the Limitation Act, 1939, ceases to run against a creditor on a winding-up order being made, and he is allowed to prove at any time before the company is dissolved, subject to the ordinary rule as to not interfering with dividends already paid. A proof in respect of claims statute-barred before the order is not allowed.”
7. Reference is made to a decision in In re General Rolling Stock Co. Ltd. Joint Stock Discount Co.'s case, [1872] 7 Ch App 646. This case has been referred to by a Division Bench of our court in/. A. Dixit's case, AIR 1963 All 284, and in the case of Chandbali Steamer Service Co. Ltd., In re, [1960] 30 Comp Cas 61 (Cal).
8. The precise question which came up for consideration in the case of J.A Dixit, AIR 1963 All 284, was as to which was the starting point of limitation; whether the date of the making of winding-up petition or the date when the winding up order was made. In that case, the learned company judge took the view that the date of making of the winding-up order was the point of time from which the limitation was to be computed. The learned company judge referred to the observations made by the Court of Appeal in Chancery in General Rolling Stock Co., In re, [1872] 7 Ch App 646 and the observations made by the Calcutta High Court in the matter of Chandbali Steamer Service Co. Ltd., [1960] 30 Comp Cas 61 (Cal). The Division Bench referred to a passage from the judgment of Lord Justice James who held that the statute of limitation would be in abeyance in regard to the liabilities of a company from the date of the winding-up order. Their Lordships also referred to the decision of Mukharji J. in the case of Chandbali Steamer Service Co. Ltd., In re, [1960] 30 Comp Cas 61 (Cal). It was observed therein (at page 290 of AIR 1963 All):
“…that a claim which was already barred by limitation at the date of the winding-up order could not be entertained by the liquidator or the court but the claim that was not so barred at the date of the winding-up order but became barred after the date of the winding-up order could be entertained and admitted.
An argument was raised on behalf of the appellants that since the winding up order related back to the date of the presentation of the petition for winding up, limitation must be held to be suspended from that date. This argument was founded on what was provided for in section 168 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913.”
9. Their Lordships rejected the argument by saying that “section 168 does not say that on the making of the order of winding up, it shall be deemed to relate back to the date of the presentation of the petition for winding up, as was the case under the Insolvency Act.”
10. Reference was also made to a decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216 (Punj) to urge that the date of making of the winding-up petition was the material date. The Division Bench rejected the argument and observed (at p. 290 of AIR 1963 All):
“We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that any debts due from the company which were barred at the date of the making of the winding up order would be barred and not recoverable in liquidation proceedings.”
11. We are in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench. The above view holds the field as far as this court is concerned.
12. It is surprising that the attention of the learned District Judge was not drawn to this decision although the District Judge was deciding the matter in the year 1977. He chose to rely on an earlier decision of this court, but in our view, the learned District Judge completely misunderstood as to what was laid down in that case. We will now refer to the case of Jwala Prasad, [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All).
13. Jwala Bank was originally a private bank. It was converted into a limited concern in the year 1938. At the time of conversion, an agreement was entered into between the Jwala Bank Ltd. and Sri Jwala Prasad. It was agreed that Jwala Prasad shall be the chairman of the board of directors of the Jwala Bank Ltd. for 20 years certain with a salary of Rs. 2,000 per month and a free furnished house. The bank functioned until April 12, 1948, when it was directed to stop its business by the Government. An application for winding-up of the bank was moved on August 1, 1949, and a winding-up order was made on February 17, 1950, and the official liquidator was appointed to take charge of the assets of the bank. Shri Jwala Prasad preferred a special appeal against the above order and on February 24, 1950, the operation of the winding-up order was stayed by the appellate Bench. The special appeal was dismissed on October 24, 1950. The official liquidator took charge of the assets of the bank on November 1, 1950. Shri Jwala Prasad filed his claim for a sum of Rs. 8 lakhs in respect of his monthly salary, compensation for free furnished house, travelling allowance and the price of goodwill of his private concern. The salary claimed was from July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1946, from June 1, 1950, to October 31, 1950, and from November 1, 1950, to June 30, 1958. The official liquidator allowed his claim for salary for the period between June 1, 1950, and October 31, 1950, and also allowed his salary for May, 1950, which he had by mistake not claimed but which was found due to him as also the travelling expenses between May 1, 1950, and October 31, 1950, at the rate of Rs. 300 per mensem. Rest of the claim was not allowed. Aggrieved, Jwala Prasad filed an appeal under section 183(5) of the Indian Companies Act before the learned company judge. The learned company judge allowed the claim for travelling expenses from June 1, 1950, to October 31, 1950. The rest of the claim was rejected. In the special appeal, the claim was made for past salary from July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1946, at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per mensem, further salary from November 1, 1950, to June 30, 1958, at the same rate and the price of the goodwill at Rs. 5 lakhs.
14. The special appeal was heard by a Bench consisting of Agrawal and Upadhya JJ. They gave separate opinions as there was difference of opinion. The matter was referred to a third judge, R.N Gurtu J. The question as to whether any part of the claim was barred or not was dealt with by Agarwala J. His observation is contained in paragraph 5 of the report and it will be relevant to quote the same to indicate whether the learned District Judge misunderstood and misconstrued the said observation.
15. Apart from this, the major portion of the claim is palpably barred by limitation. In order that the claim may be made before the official liquidator, it should be within time at the date of the order of winding-up. The date of winding-up would be treated as August 1, 1949, when the application for winding-up was made. The claim for the past salary from July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1943, would be barred by limitation even if the period of limitation be considered as six years under article 116 of the Limitation Act.
16. The learned District Judge in his order states:
“The other ruling is the Division Bench ruling of our Hon'ble High Court in Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd., [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All) which says that the date of winding-up would be treated as the date on which the application for winding-up was made. The aforesaid Division Bench ruling of our Hon'ble High Court and also the aforesaid Division Bench ruling of the Hon'ble Madras High Court clearly go to show that in the present case also, the limitation will be taken with reference to the date when the application for winding-up was moved which is May 13, 1954. The advance in question was given to the company on July 9, 1951. Thus, this advance given to the company is well within time and cannot be said to be barred by time.”
17. Let us now examine whether the observation made by the learned District Judge is correct. Agarwala J. very clearly observed: (at p. 313 of 27 Comp Cas): “In order that the claim may be made before the official liquidator, it should be within time at the date of the order of winding up.” This makes it clear that the claim has to be made before the official liquidator, and it should be within time on the date when the winding up order is made. This view finds support from the observations of Lord Justice James in In re General Rolling Stock Co., [1872] 7 Ch App 646, the view of the Calcutta High Court in Chandbali Steamer Service Co. Ltd., In re, [1960] 30 Comp Cas 61 (Cal), the view of the Punjab High Court in the case of Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216 (Punj), and the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in the case of J.A Dixit, AIR 1963 All 284. The next line of the judgement of Agarwala J. reads (at p: 313 of 27 Comp Cas):
“The date of the winding-up would be treated as August 1, 1949.”
18. It is to be noticed at once that his Lordship did not use the expression “winding-up order” in this sentence. Reference may be made to section 162 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. That section reads as follows:
“A winding-up of a company by the court shall be deemed to commence at the time of the presentation of petition for the winding-up.”
19. It appears to us that Agarwala J. had the provisions of section 168 of the Indian Companies Act in mind. August 1, 1949, was the date when the application for winding-up had been made. There is no provision in the Companies Act which states that the date of the winding-up order would relate back to the date of the making of the application for winding-up. Consequently, the court could not have taken the view that the winding-up order when passed would take effect from the date of the making of the winding-up petition. There is nothing in the Act which indicates that the right of a claimant against a company is suspended from the date of the presentation of the winding-up petition. A creditor has a right to proceed to recover his debt from the company even when his winding-up petition is pending and no final order has been passed thereon. Consequently, to suspend the operation of limitation even before the winding-up order was passed was not contemplated at all.
20. Reference may be made to Palmer's Company Law, volume I, page 1166. paragraph 85.53 reads:
“A statute-barred debt does not constitute a ‘liability’ of the company for the purposes of winding-up. The liquidator in a compulsory winding-up or an insolvent voluntary winding-up is under a duty to reject the proof of a statute-barred debt; in a solvent voluntary winding-up, he must do so likewise unless the contributories consent ……….
A winding-up order stops the period of limitation from running in the company's favour so that a debt which is not statute-barred at the date of the order can be proved for.”
21. Buckley on the Companies Acts, 13th edition, page 630, section 316 states:
“The assets are to be applied in payment of liabilities subsisting at the time of the winding-up order; after the order is made, statutes of limitations do not run.
But, of course, a debt barred at the date of the order cannot be proved, and cannot even in a solvent voluntary liquidation properly be paid unless the contributories consent;”
22. It is, therefore, obvious from the above that the correct position in law is that a debt which is within time at the date of the winding-up order can be proved, but one which has already become time-barred cannot be proved. In other words, a claim which is time-barred cannot be entertained or allowed. It is also clear from the enunciation of law, viz., Halsbury's Laws of England, Palmer's Company Law and Buckley on the Companies Acts, as well as decided cases referred to above that the limitation is suspended from the date of the winding-up order. Thus, any amount which is within time at the date of the making of the winding-up order can be entertained and, if proved, may be allowed.
23. In the present case, what has happened is that the learned District Judge has interpreted the sentence. “The date of the winding-up would be treated as August 1, 1949, when the application for winding-up was made”. This is clearly unwarranted and appears to us to be a misconstruction of that sentence.
24. Let us now examine as to what was the order passed by Agarwala J. in the case of Jwala Prasad, [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All). He was of the view that the claim for past salary from July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1943, would be barred by limitation even if the period of limitation be considered as six years under article 116 of the Limitation Act. It may be recalled that application for winding-up was filed on August 1, 1949. Six years from June 30, 1943, would take it to June 30, 1949. Thus, even this claim was barred on August 1, 1949. The other matter which was before the court was for future salary from November 1, 1950, to June 30, 1958. Agarwala J. held that this amount was payable because of the contract between Jwala Prasad and Jwala Bank and this contract subsisted.’ His Lordship held that the appellant's debt had to be evaluated as at the date of the winding-up order under section 228 of the Companies Act after making a deduction for the fact that he was now free to do any business or to seek employment of his choice. His Lordship deducted half the amount. It is, therefore, obvious from the above that the judgment of Agarwala J. was of no support to the appellant and the learned District Judge erred in taking the view that he has taken in his judgment.
25. The learned District Judge took the view that the single judge decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216 (Punj), could not be preferred to the Division Bench decision of this court in Jwala Prasad, [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All). In Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216 (Punj), Tek Chand J. was considering the question whether the principle enunciated under section 168 could be extended to the period of limitation prescribed for filing suits, appeals, etc. Tek Chand J. observed (at p. 221 of 28 Comp Cas):
“The Legislature in its wisdom did not choose to extend the operation of section 171 to all suits and other legal proceedings filed or pending after the date of the winding-up petition ……The terminus a quo for purposes of a statutory bar under section 171 against commencing and continuing legal proceedings dates from the winding-up order. A creditor can take legal proceedings against a company after the petition is presented, and if the petition is dismissed and no winding-up order is made, then the suit or other legal proceedings will go on unhindered by the provisions of the Indian Companies Act.”
26. Tek Chand J. observed that “I cannot read in the words ‘when a winding-up order has been made’ the words ‘when a petition for winding-up is made” He further observed (at p. 222 of 28 Comp Cas):
“The principle governing limitation as embodied in section 9 of the Indian Limitation Act is that when once limitation has commenced to run it will continue to do so unless it is stopped by virtue of any express statutory provisions.”
27. Tek Chand J. held (at p. 226 of 28 Comp Cas);
“The doctrine of relation back is restricted in scope and cannot be extended for all purposes. In particular, it will not be correct to extend it, so as to interfere with the law of limitation and especially with the rule embodied in section 9 of the Indian Limitation Act. Moreover, if the scope of the doctrine of relation back is widened, that will introduce considerable uncertainty regarding the termination of the period of limitation.”
28. With respect, we entirely agree with the view expressed by Tek Chand J.
29. This decision came up before a Division Bench on appeal and is reported as Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1960] Comp Cas 515 (Pun). Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Jwala Prasad, [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All). This is what the learned judges have said in their judgment (at p. 519 of 30 Comp Cas);
“In Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd., [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All), which came before the Allahabad High Court, the point for consideration was similar to the one before us. The learned judges observed that the date of the filing of the application for winding up was the relevant date for computing limitation. The question in that case related to the claim for the recovery of the salary of the managing director. That part of the claim in respect of the salary, which was within limitation on the date the application for winding up was filed, was held to be provable.”
30. Paragraph 5 of the judgment in Jwala Prasad's case, [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All) was quoted. The Division Bench of the Punjab High Court held that the facts and law were in all fours and were similar to the case before them. The Division Bench observed (at p. 520 of 30 Comp Cas):
“… the Allahabad High Court held that for the purposes of limitation, the date when the application for winding up is made is to be considered the date when the order for winding up is made. This is, in effect, what section 168 of the Companies Act provides.”
31. It appears to us and we say so with great respect that the judgment of Agarwala J. was misconstrued. The observation of the Division Bench was as follows:
“The learned judges observed that the date of the filing of the application for winding up was the relevant date for computing limitation.”
32. No such observation had been made by Agarwala J. in the case of Jwala Prasad, [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All). Further, the observation that “part of the claim in respect of the salary, which was within limitation on the date the application for winding up was filed, was held to be provable”, was also incorrect. The learned judge had not held that any part of the claim in respect of the salary was within limitation except what had been allowed by the official liquidator on the date when the application for winding up was filed. In our opinion, there is nothing in the judgment of Agarwala J. to warrant the conclusion that the material date was the date of the making of application for winding up.
33. On a consideration of the law and the various decisions cited above, we are of the opinion that the material date for the purposes of computing the limitation is the date of the passing of the order on the winding-up petition, which is commonly known as winding up order. We are further of the view that the date of making of the application for winding up is not the material date for the purposes of section 171 of the Indian Companies Act. We are also of the view that there is no question of relating back the winding-up order to the date of the making of application for winding up.
34. Applying these tests to the admitted facts of the present case, it is clear that the advance which was given on July 9, 1951, could be recovered up to July 9, 1954. The winding-up order having been passed on May 4, 1955, the loan advanced to the company was barred by time. Having held that the date of making of the application for winding up being irrelevant, the filing of the said application on May 13, 1954, would not enure to the benefit of the claimant. The material date being the date of the passing of the winding-up order, i.e, May 4, 1955, the claim was clearly barred by time. The view taken by the learned District Judge is patently erroneous and cannot be sustained. For the reasons indicated above, the appeal must be allowed. A cross-objection has been filed by the claimant. A perusal of the grounds of the cross-objection shows that the claimant disputed the jurisdiction of the learned District Judge to impose restrictions having the effect of withholding its implementation. The impugned order was being challenged to the extent the restrictions had been imposed. The learned District Judge had in the order indicated that the claimant would be entitled to get the amount of the claim provided she was not found guilty of misconduct in the affairs of the company which misconduct led to the winding up of the company. We are of the view that the cross-objection has no legs to stand once the court comes to the conclusion that the claim is barred by time and not maintainable. Restrictions imposed would automatically fall on disallowing the claim. In this view of the matter, the cross-objection has no merits and must fail.
35. In the result, therefore, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned District Judge dated September 8, 1977, are set aside. The cross-objection is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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