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S. Chand & Co. v. Ii Addl. District Judge

Allahabad High Court
Nov 6, 1984
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the dismissal of a revision filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.). The petitioner was tenant of premises No. 1779 (first floor), Gwynne Road, Lucknow, against opposite parties 3–5 (referred to in the opinion as the landlords).

Key chronological facts from the opinion:

  • 8-9-1980: Landlords sent a notice demanding arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy; the notice was served on the petitioner on 10-9-1980.
  • 25-9-1980: Petitioner sent a cheque for Rs. 2,808 (rent for 1-4-1980 to 30-9-1980); it was refused by the landlords.
  • 7-10-1980: Petitioner sent the rent for October 1980 by Money Order; it was also refused.
  • 4-10-1980: Petitioner applied in the Court of the Munsif North, Lucknow, for permission to deposit rent in Court under Section 30(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (registered as Misc. Case No. 258 of 1980).
  • 14-10-1980: Landlords filed a regular eviction suit in the District Judge's Court (SC Suit No. 58 of 1980), later transferred to the Vth Addl. District Judge.
  • 19-4-1982: The Munsif rejected the petitioner's S.30 application on the ground that a suit for eviction had already been filed and thus it was not possible to allow deposit under S.30.
  • Petitioner filed a revision under S.115 C.P.C. in the District Judge's Court; it was dismissed on 25-9-1982 as not maintainable, relying upon Ram Bharosey Lal v. The Munsif, Agra (1980 All Rent Cas 427).
  • Petitioner brought the present writ petition to the High Court challenging the dismissal of his revision as not maintainable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order passed by a Munsif under Section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (permission to deposit rent in Court) is amenable to revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (as amended in U.P.).
  2. Whether the earlier decision in Ram Bharosey Lal v. The Munsif (1980 All Rent Cas 427), relied upon by the lower revisional court, is binding or persuasive in relation to the maintainability of a revision under S.115 against an order under S.30.
  3. As argued by the landlords, whether the petitioner was precluded from depositing rent in Court because the application was made after the expiry of one month from receipt of the termination/demand notice and because a suit for eviction had already been filed (this issue concerns the merits and timeliness of the deposit application).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The Munsif, when acting under Section 30 of the Act, essentially functions as a civil Court subordinate to the District Judge.
  • Because the Munsif is a subordinate civil Court, an order passed by the Munsif under S.30 is revisable under S.115 C.P.C.; therefore the revision filed by the petitioner should have been entertained and not dismissed as not maintainable.

Landlords’ (Opposite Parties') Arguments

  • The learned Additional District Judge dismissed the revision relying on the decision in Ram Bharosey Lal v. The Munsif (1980 All Rent Cas 427), and therefore the dismissal should be upheld because the lower court followed binding precedent and no error was apparent on the face of the record.
  • Separately, the landlords contended that the deposit application was filed after the expiry of the one-month period from the date of receipt of the notice of demand/termination (dated 8-9-1980), and that a suit for eviction had already been filed in the District Judge's Court; therefore the petitioner was rightly not permitted to deposit rent in Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Bharosey Lal v. The Munsif, Agra, 1980 All Rent Cas 427 Was relied on by the lower revisional court for the proposition that a revision against an order passed under S.30 was not maintainable. The High Court observed that the decision rested on a concession made by counsel in that case, and therefore it was not persuasive or binding; the court rejected reliance on it for denying revisional jurisdiction under S.115 in the present circumstances.
Chatur Mohan v. Ram Behari Dixit, AIR 1964 All 562 (Full Bench) Considered whether the Munsif, while acting under provisions of the predecessor rent law (S.7-E of the Temporary Rent Act), functions as a Court or persona designata — i.e., whether revisional jurisdiction lies against his orders. The High Court treated this Full Bench decision as authority that supports the proposition that the Munsif performs court-like functions and thus is amenable to revisional jurisdiction; the opinion cites this as precedent supporting maintainability of revision under S.115.
J. Itay v. S.L. Thakral, 1968 All LJ 1020 Subsequent decision following the Full Bench reasoning in Chatur Mohan regarding the Munsif's functions under the predecessor rent legislation. The High Court noted that this decision followed the Full Bench in Chatur Mohan and treated it as reinforcing the conclusion that orders by the Munsif can be subject to revision.
Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Meerut, 1981 All Rent Cas 262 : 1981 All LJ 336 Held that the Prescribed Authority acting under S.21 of the Act is a persona designata and not a Court; accordingly, revision was held not maintainable in that context. The High Court distinguished this authority as inapplicable to S.30: the Prescribed Authority under S.21 (in that case) was held to be persona designata, but the present case concerns the Munsif under S.30, who the court found performs court-like functions; therefore Shakuntala Devi did not govern the present matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a textual and functional analysis of Section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act and the procedural Rule 21 prescribed for deposits under Section 30. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps, as reflected in the opinion:

  1. Textual reading of S.30: The court quoted sub-sections of S.30 and identified the statutory scheme allowing a tenant to deposit rent in Court when the landlord refuses to accept it (sub-s. (1)) or when a bona fide doubt exists as to who is entitled to receive rent (sub-s. (2)). Sub-s. (3) expressly provides that the deposit shall be made in "the Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction."
  2. Identification of jurisdictional facts: The court extracted the conditions that must exist before rent can be deposited under S.30(1): (i) existence of a building governed by the Act; (ii) rent relates to that building; (iii) rent was tendered to the landlord; (iv) the landlord refused to accept rent during the continuance of the tenancy.
  3. Examination of procedural Rule 21 and Form E: Rule 21 prescribes Form E as an application "for permission to deposit the rent of the building," requiring the applicant to file process-fee, notices in Form F, and copies for the opposite parties. Rule 21(3)-(5) contemplates notice, return of service and rejection if the applicant fails to take steps; Form E's language expressly contemplates that the Court grants permission for deposit.
  4. Functional conclusion regarding the Munsif's role: From the text of S.30 and R.21 the court concluded that the Munsif must first satisfy himself prima facie about the jurisdictional facts before issuing notice and deciding objections. The Munsif must be able to allow or reject the application; he must adjudicate questions of jurisdictional facts (subject, however, to the possibility that a separate eviction suit may examine the same circumstances more fully). These are court-like functions, not merely administrative acts by a persona designata.
  5. Precedent analysis: The court distinguished Ram Bharosey Lal because that decision rested on a concession by counsel; it relied on the Full Bench decision in Chatur Mohan v. Ram Behari Dixit and the subsequent decision in J. Itay v. S.L. Thakral to support the proposition that the Munsif performs judicial functions under the predecessor statute and thereby attracts revisional jurisdiction. The court distinguished Smt. Shakuntala Devi (where a Prescribed Authority under S.21 was held to be persona designata) as inapplicable to S.30.
  6. Conclusion on maintainability: Because the Munsif acts as a regular Court when exercising jurisdiction under S.30, and because the Munsif's Court is subordinate to the District Judge, a revision under S.115 C.P.C. lies against orders passed by the Munsif under S.30.
  7. On the merits: The court noted that the landlords' contentions about the timeliness of the application (after expiry of one month) and the pendency of a suit for eviction raise merits questions which were not considered by the Additional District Judge because he dismissed the revision as not maintainable. The High Court left those merits questions to be decided by the Additional District Judge on rehearing.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The High Court held that an order passed by the Munsif under Section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 is amenable to revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (as amended in U.P.).

Disposition in the present case: The writ petition was allowed; the High Court quashed the judgment and order dated 25-9-1982 passed by the II Additional District Judge, Lucknow (which dismissed the revision as not maintainable). The matter was remanded to the II Additional District Judge, Lucknow, with directions to dispose of the revision on merits in accordance with law and in light of the observations made in the opinion. There was no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The dismissal of the revision as not maintainable has been set aside; the Additional District Judge must now decide the revision on its merits (including questions about timeliness and the effect of the pending eviction suit) which he had not considered earlier.
  • Broader legal implication as expressed in the opinion: The court articulated that S.30 applications involve court-like adjudicatory acts by the Munsif (prima facie inquiry, ability to allow or reject the application, notice and opportunity to the landlord), and therefore such orders are subject to revisional scrutiny under S.115 C.P.C. The opinion distinguished prior decisions to the extent they were based on counsel's concession or concerned different statutory schemes/authorities.

Final line of the opinion (as recorded): "Petition allowed."

Show all summary ...

1. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

2. The petitioner is the tenant of opposite parties 3 to 5 (hereinafter referred to as landlords) in respect of premises No. 1779 (first floor) Gwynne Road, Lucknow. It appears that a notice dated 8-9-1980 was sent by the landlords to the petitioner demanding arrears of rent from him. The tenancy of the petitioner was also terminated by the said notice which was served upon the petitioner on 10-9-1980. It appears that in compliance of the demand made in the said notice, the petitioner sent a cheque for Rs. 2808/- being the rent for the period from 1-4-1980 to 30-9-1980 on 25-9-1980 which was refused. This was followed by rent for the month of October, 1980 which was sent by Money Order on 7-10-1980 but it was also refused. On the expiry of the period of notice, a suit for the eviction of the petitioner was filed by the landlords in the Court of the District Judge, Lucknow on 14-10-1980 which was registered as SC Suit No. 58 of 1980. It is still pending, having in the meantime been transferred to the Court of Vth Addl. District Judge, Lucknow. On 4-10-1980 petitioner filed an application in the Court of Munsif North, Lucknow, for permission to deposit the rent in Court under S. 30(1) of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short, Act) on the ground that the rent when tendered to the landlords through the cheque and the Money Order was refused by them. This application was registered as Misc. Case No. 258 of 1980 against which the landlords filed objections in which it was, inter alia, pleaded that a regular suit for eviction of the petitioner had already been filed on the ground of default and, therefore, there was no occasion to allow the petitioner to deposit the rent in Court particularly as his tenancy had been terminated by notice dated 8-9-1980 and he was no longer a tenant. The learned Munsif by his order dated 19-4-1982 rejected the application on the ground that a suit for eviction had already been filed against the petitioner and it was not possible to allow the petitioner to deposit the rent under S. 30 of the Act.

3. The petitioner challenged this order in a revision filed in the Court of the District Judge, Lucknow under S. 115 of the Civil P.C which was dismissed on 25-9-1982 as not maintainable on the basis of a decision of this Court in Ram Bharosey Lal v. The Munsif, Agra, 1980 All Rent Cas 427.

4. The petitioner has now come to this Court.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order passed by a Munsif under S. 30 of the Act is revisable under S. 115 of the Civil P.C as the Munsif essentially functions as a Civil Court subordinate to the District Judge and, therefore, the petitioner's revision could not have been dismissed as not maintainable. Learned counsel for the Landlords has, on the other hand contended, that in dismissing the revision, the learned Addl. District Judge had merely followed the decision of this Court in Ram Bharosey Lal's case (1980 All Rent Cas 427) (supra) and, therefore, the error not being apparent on the face of the record, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

6. I may at the very outset point out that the decision in Ram Bharosey Lal's case (supra) was based on a concession made by the counsel in that case that a revision against an order passed under S. 30 of the Act was not maintainable. The decision is, therefore, not of a persuasive or binding value and on a consideration of the whole gamut of the legal position. I have no hesitation in saying that the revision was maintainable and it could not have been rejected on the ground that the order of the Munsif was not revisable under S. 115 of the Civil P.C

7. S. 30 of the Act provides as under:

“30(1). If any person claiming to be a tenant of building tenders any amount as rent in respect of a building to its alleged landlord and the landlord refuses to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent until the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it.

(2) Where any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court or by settlement between the parties, continue to deposit the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such building.

(3) The deposit referred to in sub-sec. (1), or sub-sec. (2) shall be made in the Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction.

(4) On any deposit being made under sub-sec. (1), the Court shall cause a notice of the deposit to be served on the alleged landlord, and the amount of deposit may be withdrawn by that person on application made by him to the Court in that behalf.

(5) On a deposit being made under sub-sec. (2), the Court shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the person or persons concerned and hold the amount of the deposit for the benefit of the person who may be found entitled to it by a settlement between the parties and the same shall be payable to such person.

(6) In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid it shall be deemed that the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited in the case referred to in sub-sec. (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in sub-sec. (2).

8. Procedure for making the deposit of rent in Court has been prescribed in R. 21 which is quoted below:

“21 Deposit of rent (S. 30)

(1) Any person desirous of depositing rent under S. 30 shall apply in Form E. The application shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are opposite parties and also the process fee and notices in Form F.

(2) The deposit shall be made under the head “P-Deposits and Advances-II-Deposits not bearing interest-C-other deposit accounts (B) Departmental and Judicial Deposits-Civil-Deposits-Civil Court's Deposits.”

(3) On such deposit being made the Court shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the opposite-party along with a copy of the application.

(4) Where a notice of the deposit is returned unserved, the Court shall fix a date on or before which the applicant shall deposit fresh process fee and notices in Form F. If within the time so allowed or within such extended time as the Court may grant, the applicant fails to take steps as above, the application shall be rejected and the amount deposited shall be refunded to the applicant.

(5) In the case of continuance of deposit of rent for any subsequent period, fresh application shall not be necessary. But process fee and the notice in Form F shall accompany every deposit.”

9. According to sub-sec. (3) of S. 30 the deposit is to be made in the Court of Munsif having jurisdiction. The words “Court of the Munsif” and the further words “having jurisdiction” clearly indicate a regular Court contemplated by the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. A perusal of sub-sec. (1) of S. 30 further indicates that under sub-sec. (1) rent can be deposited in Court on its being refused by the landlord. The following conditions are contemplated to exist before the rent can be deposited in Court.

(i) There should be a building contemplated and governed by the provisions of the Act.

(ii) The rent should be in respect of the said building.

(iii) It should have been tendered to the landlord; and

(iv) The landlord should have refused to accept the rent during the continuance or subsistence of the tenancy.

10. Similarly, under sub-sec. (2) a tenant can deposit the rent in Court if a bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who was entitled to receive the rent Under sub-sec. (1), the tenant can continue to deposit the rent in Court until the landlord signifies in writing his willingness to accept it Under sub-sec. (2) subsequent deposits can be made till the doubt has been removed or dispute has been settled by the decision of a competent Court or by settlement between the parties.

11. Form E which is the form prescribed under R. 21 for making a deposit in the Court contains the following sentence in the beginning.

“Applicant prays for permission to deposit the rent of the building as per particulars furnished below”.

12. This contemplates a permission of the Court for making the deposits. Notice of the application is issued to the landlord under sub-sec. (4) of S. 30 read with sub-rules (3) and (4) of R. 21. The necessary process fee and copies of the application as also notice in Form F are also to be filed along with an application in Form E. Sub-r. (4) of R. 21 further provides that if the notice issued to the landlord is returned unserved, the tenant shall deposit fresh process fee and notice in Form F. It further provides that on tenant's failure to take steps, the application shall be rejected. These Statutory provisions, therefore, definitely provide for the allowing of the application as also its rejection. These provisions further contemplate that on an application being moved, the Munsif, before issuing notice to the landlord, shall first satisfy himself, prima facie, of the ground on which the rent was sought to be deposited in court i.e about the existence of jurisdictional facts. If after issue of the notice to the landlord, the latter files objection, then the Munsif shall have to decide the question relating to the jurisdictional facts, although the order passed by the Munsif will not operate as res judicata and it will be open to the Court trying a regular suit for the eviction of the tenant to examine the circumstances in which the deposits were made under S. 30 and whether such deposits were at all validly made. These are essentially the functions of a Court. The Munsif, therefore, while acting under S. 30, acts as a regular Court and not as a persona designata.

13. Since the Court of Munsif is a Court subordinate to the Court of the District Judge, a revision under S. 115 of the Civil P.C (as amended in U.P) would lie against an order passed by the Munsif under S. 30 of the Act.

14. I may in this connection point out that under various provisions of U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Act III of 1947) which has since been replaced by the present Act, the Munsif had to perform various functions, as for example, the rent could be deposited in Court under S. 7-C in the circumstances identical to those mentioned in S. 30 of the present Act; the Munsif could direct eviction of a tenant under certain circumstances under S. 7-B, the Munsif could also pass an order for necessary repairs etc. and adjustment of rent under S. 7-E. The question whether the Munsif while acting under S. 7-E functions as a Court or persona designata or that a revision under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure would lie against an order passed by him under that section was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Chatur Mohan v. Ram Behari Dixit, AIR 1964 All 562. This Full Bench decision was followed in a subsequent decision of this Court in J. Itay v. S.L Thakral 1968 All LJ 1020.

15. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has cited a decision of this Court in Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Meerut, 1981 All Rent Cas 262 : (1981 All LJ 336) and has contended that the revision was not maintainable. The revision in that case was filed against an interlocutory order passed by the Prescribed Authority under S. 21 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority was held to act as persona designata and not as a Court. The decision is, therefore, not applicable to the facts of this case.

16. In view of the above discussion, I am clearly of the opinion that an order passed by the Munsif under S. 30 of the Act is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the District Judge under S. 115 of the Civil P.C and the learned Addl. District Judge was, therefore, not justified in rejecting the revision in the instant case as not maintainable.

17. Learned counsel for the Landlords (opposite parties 3 to 5) has, however, contended that since the deposit was sought to be made by the petitioner after the expiry of the period of one month from the date of receipt of notice of demand/termination of tenancy dated 8-9-80 and since a suit for eviction of the petitioner had already been filed in the Court of the District Judge the petitioner was rightly not allowed to deposit the rent in Court.

18. This is a question which relates to the merits of the case which were not considered or examined by the learned Addl. District Judge, who dismissed the revision on the ground that it was not maintainable under S. 115 of the Civil P.C I have left these questions to be decided by him.

19. I accordingly allow the writ petition and quash the judgment and order dated 25-9-1982 passed by II Addl. District Judge, Lucknow, contained in annexure No. 4. The case is remanded to the II Addl. District Judge, Lucknow to dispose of the revision on merits in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. There will be no order as to costs.

20. Petititon allowed.